The Market Response to Beating After‐tax Earnings Targets Revisited using Analysts’ Pre‐tax Earnings Forecasts and Concurrent Tax Note Disclosures

We investigate whether the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets is informed by the availability of pre‐tax and after‐tax earnings forecasts. We find evidence the premium is discounted for firms achieving only after‐tax earnings forecasts compared with firms achieving both forecast targets. This is likely due to the uncertainty about future profitability and earnings quality created by failing to attain pre‐tax earnings targets. For firms achieving only pre‐tax earnings forecasts, no premium is documented. Taken together, our results indicate that while pre‐tax earnings forecasts may not move the market, they have an informational role in providing a context for assessing the achievement of after‐tax earnings targets. We also consider the usefulness of the tax note disclosures of deferred tax assets from carry‐forward losses for assessing the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets. Reflecting the duality of this tax deferral, we find evidence that recognition of these tax assets conveys information about lower earnings quality when recognition is likely to be opportunistic (in the case of firms achieving only after‐tax forecasts), and provides a signal of future profitability (in the case of firms achieving only pre‐tax forecasts).     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.     

Earnings characteristics and analysts’ differential interpretation of earnings announcements: An empirical analysis

This study provides empirical evidence on factors that drive differential interpretation of earnings announcements. We document that Kandel and Pearson's forecast measures of differential interpretation are decreasing in proxies for earnings quality and pre‐announcement information quality. This evidence yields new and useful insights regarding which earnings announcements are less likely to generate newfound disagreement among analysts and investors. Recent research suggests that investor disagreement can increase investment risk, increase the cost of capital, and cause stock prices to deviate from fundamental value. Therefore, our results support prior intuition that increasing the quality of earnings and pre‐announcement information can improve the efficiency of capital markets.     

Management by the Numbers: A Formal Approach to Deriving Informational and Distributional Properties of “Unmanaged” Earnings

We explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of earnings frequency distributions under the assumption that managers use unbiased accounting information to sequentially decide on real options their firms have and report generated earnings truthfully, with the market pricing the firm based on those reported earnings. We generate benchmarks against which empirically observed earnings‐returns relations and aggregate earnings distributions can be evaluated. This parsimonious model shows a coherent set of results: reported losses are less persistent than reported gains, decision making diminishes the S‐shaped market response to earnings and earnings relate to returns asymmetrically in the way documented by Basu [1997]. Furthermore, the implied frequency distribution of aggregate earnings is neither symmetric nor necessarily single‐peaked. Instead, it may exhibit a kink at zero and look similar to the plots reported by Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]. However, within our model, none of these phenomena are due to reporting noise, bias, or some undesirable strategic managerial behavior. They are the natural consequences of using past earnings as the basis for value increasing managerial decision making that in turn generates the future earnings on which future decisions will be based.     

Investors' Use of Historical Forecast Bias to Adjust Current Expectations

We explore the extent to which investor response to earnings information differs in the presence of historical bias in earnings forecasts. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that investors take historical forecast bias into account when interpreting information in earnings announcements and that the market's reaction to forecast errors is larger (less negative) when forecasts are historically more optimistic and suggests that the functional form commonly used in the earnings response literature does not appropriately capture the effect of real unexpected earnings information (i.e., investors' expectation errors as opposed to analysts' forecast errors) on stock returns.     

An Investigation of Auditors’ Judgments When Companies Release Earnings Before Audit Completion

The majority of U.S. public companies release annual earnings prior to the completion of audit fieldwork. We investigate this phenomenon in a controlled experiment with audit partners and senior managers. We find that releasing earnings before completion of the audit pressures auditors to adopt the goals of management, thereby reducing the likelihood of post‐announcement audit‐adjustment recommendations. We also examine the effect of audit committee (AC) strength in improving auditors’ judgments after annual earnings are released. When ACs are actively involved in accounting issues and proactively communicating with auditors—characteristics currently lacking in most ACs—the negative effects on auditors’ judgments are completely mitigated. Our study provides evidence on potential unintended consequences of early release of earnings and the importance of investing in high‐quality ACs to mitigate adverse effects of client pressures on audit judgment and financial reporting quality.     

Anticipated Earnings Announcements and the Customer–Supplier Anomaly

I test whether the anticipation of earnings news stimulates acquisition of customer information and mitigates returns to the customer–supplier anomaly documented by Cohen and Frazzini (“Economic Links and Predictable Returns.” The Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 1977–2011). I find that attention to a firm's publicly disclosed customers increases shortly before the firm announces earnings, and that customer stock returns predict supplier stock returns shortly before, but not after, the supplier's earnings announcement. I further find some evidence that these predictable returns are increasing in the level of customer information acquisition. These results are unique to anticipated disclosure events and suggest that anticipation of supplier earnings announcements resolves investor limited attention to customer information and accelerates price discovery of customer news.     

Unsophisticated Arbitrageurs and Market Efficiency: Overreacting to a History of Underreaction?

Prior research has documented that arbitrage activity significantly reduces or eliminates stock market anomalies. However, if anomalies arise due to unsophisticated investors’ behavioral biases, then these same biases can also apply to unsophisticated arbitrageurs and thereby disrupt the arbitrage process. Consistent with a disruption in the arbitrage process for the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly, I document that the historically positive autocorrelation in firms’ earnings announcement news has become significantly negative for firms with active exchange‐traded options. For these easy‐to‐arbitrage firms, the firms in the highest decile of prior earnings announcement abnormal return (prior earnings surprise), on average, underperform the firms in the lowest decile by 1.59% (1.43%) at their next earnings announcement. Additional analyses are consistent with investors learning about the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly and overcompensating. This study suggests that unsophisticated attempts to profit from a well‐known anomaly can significantly reverse a previously documented stock return pattern.     

Asymmetric Trading Costs Prior to Earnings Announcements: Implications for Price Discovery and Returns

We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.     

Earnings expectations and the quality of financial services

Using complaint data filed by consumers with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau against financial institutions, we show that banks receive, on average, 13.3% more customer complaints in the quarter immediately after they narrowly beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The effect is mainly driven by banks’ attempts to reduce their non-interest expenses to beat earnings benchmarks. The relationship is stronger when bank CEOs receive a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation. Overall, our paper demonstrates how capital market incentives exacerbate shareholder–customer conflicts.     

Earnings Metrics,Information Processing,and Price Efficiency in Laboratory Markets

An enduring issue in financial reporting is whether and how salient summary measures of firm performance (“earnings metrics”) affect market price efficiency. In laboratory markets, we test the effects of salient earnings metrics, which vary in how they combine persistent and transitory elements, on investor information search, beliefs about value, offers to trade, and market price efficiency. We find that including transitory elements in salient earnings metrics causes traders to search unnecessarily for further information about these elements and to overestimate their effect on fundamental value relative to a rational benchmark. In contrast, separately displaying persistent elements in earnings increases the accuracy of traders’ value estimates. Prices generally reflect traders’ beliefs about value, and prices are most efficient when transitory elements are excluded from earnings metrics entirely. Our study contributes to research on salience effects in financial reporting by showing that including transitory elements in salient earnings metrics causes inefficient information search and biased beliefs about value that can aggregate to affect market prices. We also contribute to research in experimental markets by showing that redundant disclosure is not always beneficial; redundant disclosure of transitory earnings elements, in particular, appears to have negative consequences for investor behavior and market efficiency.     

The Relation Between Investor Uncertainty and Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements: Evidence from the Property‐Casualty Insurance Industry in the USA

Abstract:   This paper investigates the relationship between investor uncertainty, gauged by properties of analysts' forecasts, and the stock market response to earnings. We find that uncertainty is best characterized by a comprehensive measure recently proposed by Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) , BKLS. The BKLS measure is related to uncertainty‐inducing events, as well as factors that affect the difficulty faced by analysts in forecasting earnings. We conclude that, first, pre‐disclosure uncertainty is a significant determinant of the price reaction to the earnings release, and second, BKLS is a more comprehensive measure of uncertainty than simple dispersion.     

Intangible assets,IFRS and analysts’ earnings forecasts

We investigate whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 by Australian firms has been associated with a loss of potentially useful information about intangible assets. We find that the negative association between the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and aggregate reported intangibles previously documented by Matolcsy and Wyatt (2006 ) becomes stronger subsequent to IFRS adoption, primarily for firms with high levels of underlying intangible assets. Our result is largely attributable to reported goodwill, rather than other intangible assets, suggesting that the impairment approach to goodwill valuation required by IFRS conveys more useful information than does the former straight‐line amortization approach. When we investigate a sub‐sample of firms that report lower intangibles under IFRS than under the prior Australian GAAP, we do find some evidence consistent with a loss of useful information relating to intangibles.     

The Informational Role of Short Sellers: The Evidence from Short Sellers’ Reports on US‐Listed Chinese Firms

Using US‐listed Chinese firms as the setting, this paper studies a novel channel through which investors can acquire information about firms’ financial reporting quality, that is, the reports published voluntarily by short sellers. I find that short sellers tend to target firms that have financial reporting red flags and that exhibit ‘good’ operating performance and stock valuations. Targeted firms experience an average three‐day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of ?6.4%, and ?13.6% for initial coverage of the firm, and the CARs are more negative when the reports allege more severe misconduct of the firms. Non‐targeted firms also experience losses in value following short seller reports, especially when they hire the same non‐Big 4 auditors as targeted firms and when their earnings quality is poor. In comparison, analysts fail to perform proper due diligence and are much less effective than short sellers in exposing misreporting risk in Chinese firms.     

Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms

This study examines the incremental information in loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand‐collection, we posit and find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Additional tests suggest that loss firms disclosing non‐GAAP profits have significantly better future performance than GAAP‐only loss firms and are not overvalued by investors. Comparing non‐GAAP earnings of profitable firms to those of loss firms, we find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP metrics are significantly more predictive and less strategic. We conclude that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures are particularly informative about loss firms and help investors disaggregate losses into components that have differential implications for forecasting and valuation.     

Terrorism activities and long-term annual management forecasts

We study the effects of terrorist attacks on firms’ long-term annual management earnings forecasts bias. We find that the managers of firms located closer to the epicenters of attacks are more likely to issue optimistic long-term annual earnings forecasts relative to the managers of a control group of unaffected firms. The exposure effect is stronger for more severe terrorist events, and firms with more uncertain fundamentals and less geographic diversification. In addition, we document that managers’ forecast optimism intensifies for firms with stronger negative stock market reaction to the terrorist event, for CEOs with higher ability and for companies that are more likely to issue equity or engage in acquisitions following the terrorist event. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that long-term annual earnings forecasts are used by managers to counterbalance the short-term pessimistic response to terrorist attacks.     

Asymmetric trading by insiders – comparing abnormal returns and earnings prediction in Spain and Australia

This paper examines whether the ‘external governance’ imposed by comparative financial accounting standards reduces the trading advantage of insiders. We do this by directly comparing insider trading returns and insider’s ability to predict future earnings from accruals in Spain and Australia. Results show higher excess returns and greater prediction of future earnings from conditioned insider trading in Australia that is then utilized by financial analysts to lower forecast errors – particularly in contrarian‐based accruals trading. Possible explanations include: (i) a high asymmetric quality for market‐based accruals, (ii) information transfer from informed insiders to uninformed insiders and financial analysts and (iii) a more timely dissemination of financial information in Spain through different ownership and governance structures.     

The Sophisticated and the Simple: the Profitability of Contrarian Strategies

A variety of variables have been used to form contrarian portfolios, ranging from relatively simple measures, like book‐to‐market, cash flow‐to‐price, earnings‐to‐price and past returns, to more sophisticated measures based on the Ohlson model and residual income model (RIM). This paper investigates whether: (i) contrarian strategies based on RIM perform better or worse than those based on the Ohlson model; (ii) contrarian strategies based on more sophisticated valuation models (e.g. Ohlson and RIM) perform much better than the relatively simpler ranking variables that have been used so extensively in the finance literature. Given that the RIM and Ohlson models require greater information inputs and technical know‐how, and make different implicit assumptions on future abnormal earnings, it is important to ascertain if they offer significantly greater contrarian profits to outweigh the increased costs that they entail. Indeed, our surprising finding is that simple cash flow‐to‐price measures appear to do almost as well as the more sophisticated alternatives. One would have expected the sophisticated models to significantly outperform the simple cash flow to price model for the reasons given by Penman (2007) .