An empirical study of the value-relevance of using proportionate consolidation accounting for investments in joint ventures

This research examines bond risk premiums to determine whether creditors of companies with investments in joint ventures reflect legal or implicit measures of the debts of joint ventures. The legal view suggests that the amount of potential loss from an investment in a joint venture is limited to the investment. The implicit view suggests that the operations of the joint venture and the venturer are interdependent. Equity method accounting reflects the legal view and proportionate consolidation reflects the implicit view.The study examines whether bond risk premiums are more highly associated with accounting numbers from proportionate consolidation than equity method accounting. The study uses data from 10Ks, the Wall Street Journal, and Moody's Bond Record from May 1, 1995 through April 30, 1998. These 4 years are used because US interest rates were fairly stable during this period, which is an important factor when examining bond risk premiums. Additionally, the companies in the study needed to remain stable across the window of study – no mergers, acquisitions, buy-outs, or liquidations – in order to maintain a comparative sample over the entire time period. The risk premium model uses measures of default that change between equity method accounting and proportionate consolidation. Differences in the explanatory power of the model determine how creditors view the joint venture debts.The study shows that approximately half of equity investments represent investments in joint ventures. Furthermore, the average joint venture uses debt to finance about two-thirds of the assets. The results show that proportionate consolidation fails to improve the explanatory power of the model when examining the entire set of companies that invest in joint ventures. However, the data reject the null hypothesis of no improvement with proportionate consolidation when examining companies who guarantee the debt of their joint venture. The policy implication of this study indicates that a change to proportionate consolidation would provide more value-relevant information to creditors when companies guarantee the debt of the joint venture.     

Takeover risk and the correlation between stocks and bonds

Existing research suggests that, for a given firm, stock returns and bond prices are positively related, and this implies a negative relation between stock returns and bond spreads. In this paper, we show how takeover risk influences this relation. Bondholders of high-rated firms can suffer losses in a takeover, particularly if the takeover is largely funded with debt, resulting in a more positive (or less negative) correlation between stock returns and bond spread changes. Consistent with this notion and based on a large sample of data covering the period from 1980 to 2000, we find that high-rated firms which are likely to be taken over have a more positive correlation between stock returns and bond spread changes, while target firms with a poison put or an indebtedness covenant have a more negative correlation. Overall, our findings have implications for the pricing and hedging of bonds and default risk based financial products such as credit default swaps.     

The impact of junior debt issuance on senior unsecured debt’s risk premiums

Numerous studies have examined the impact of security issuance upon the value of pre-existing debt and equity but the focus has largely been on changes in equity value. We examine changes in senior unsecured debt risk premiums that accompany new junior debt issues. Additionally, we test several hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of junior debt issues. Extant theory suggests senior debt value may be threatened under certain conditions by the issuance of junior debt. Our results indicate that when junior debt replaces bank debt, senior default risk premiums experience abnormal declines. The result is broadly consistent with the elevation of the senior unsecured debt by way of the elimination of a separate and more senior class of debt claimants. In contrast, we also find that larger junior bond issues are associated with abnormal increases in senior risk premiums, broadly consistent with issue size being correlated with negative information about firm cash flows. We find strong evidence of interaction effects. For example, replacement of bank debt results in greater changes in default risk premiums the larger the issue size. We also find lower credit ratings magnify other effects. For example, if the junior debt issued matures before the outstanding senior unsecured bond, senior risk premiums experience abnormal increases for lower rated debt.     

Asymmetric valuation of sustained growth by bond- and equity-holders

Viewing equity as a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike price equal to contractual debt obligations yields an asymmetric prediction on how debt and equity markets view sustained growth. Debt holders are expected to benefit from sustained growth when the default risk is high, while equity holders value such growth when risk is low. Using Altman’s z-score and debt ratings as alternative proxies for the default risk, we document a negative association between bond yield spreads and sustained growth in earnings for firms with high risk only. In sharp contrast, using earnings multiples from returns-earnings regressions as a proxy for equity market rewards, we find that earnings multiples are larger when earnings growth is sustained for the low risk sample only. Decomposing earnings growth into revenue and nonrevenue growth, we find that the debt market rewards for firms with revenue growth are confined to the high risk sample only, while nonrevenue growth firms are not rewarded for either sample. Equity investors value revenue-led earnings growth for low and high risk samples while nonrevenue growth is rewarded for the low risk sample only. Our study adds to our understanding of how changes in firm value from sustained earnings and revenue growth are divided between key providers of capital and how default risk plays an instrumental role in this valuation process.     

Endogenizing exogenous default barrier models: The MM algorithm

In this paper, we propose a Maximization–Maximization (MM) algorithm for the assessment of hidden parameters in structural credit risk models. Step M1 updates the value, volatility, and expected return on the firm’s assets by maximizing the log-likelihood function for the time series of equity prices; Step M2 updates the default barrier by maximizing the equity holders’ participation in the firm’s asset value. The main contribution of the method lies in the M2 step, which allows for ‘endogenizing’ the default barrier in light of actual data on equity prices. Using a large international sample of companies, we demonstrate that theoretical credit spreads based on the MM algorithm offer the lowest CDS pricing errors when compared to other, traditional default barrier specifications: smooth-pasting condition value, maximum likelihood estimate, KMV’s default point, and nominal debt.     

Distress risk premia in expected stock and bond returns

Prior studies find that shareholders’ strategic actions over debtholders are significant for stock prices but not for bond prices. I find that for firms with private and public debt, strategic default has no significant effect on distress risk premia in expected stock or bond returns, suggesting that the dispersion of bondholders greatly weakens the shareholder advantage effect. The shareholder advantage effect on stock prices is only significant for firms with only private debt and to some degree affected by the dispersion of stockholders and complexity in capital structure. Overall, renegotiation friction helps explain the cross-sectional implications of strategic default for stock and bond prices.     

A Reexamination of the Tradeoff between the Future Benefit and Riskiness of R&D Increases

Many previous studies document a positive relation between research and development (R&D) and equity value. Though R&D can increase equity value by increasing firm value, it can also increase equity value at the expense of bondholder wealth through an increase in firm risk because equity is analogous to a call option on the underlying firm value. Shi [2003] tests this hypothesis by examining the relation between a firm's R&D intensity and its bond ratings and risk premiums at issuance. His results show that the net effect of R&D is negative for bondholders. We reexamine Shi's [2003] findings and in so doing make three contributions to the literature. First, we find that Shi's [2003] results are sensitive to the method of measuring R&D intensity. When we use what we argue is a better measure of R&D intensity, we find that the net effect of R&D is positive for bondholders. Second, when we use tests that Shi [2003] recognizes are even better than the ones that he uses, we find even stronger evidence of the positive effect of R&D on bondholders. Third, we examine cross‐sectional differences in the effect of R&D on debtholders. Consistent with our main finding, we document a negative relation between R&D increases and default risk. The default risk reduction is also more pronounced for firms with higher initial default scores (where the debtholders have more to gain from an R&D increase) and for firms with more bank debt (where the debtholders have greater covenant protection from the possible detriments associated with R&D increases).     

The changing relevance of accounting information to debt holders over time

A number of studies have examined the change over time in the information content of accounting numbers to stockholders. However, the stockholders’ perspective is not necessarily identical to that of debt holders. The two groups face different risks and rewards, and thus their informational needs are not the same. We examine the change in the information content of accounting numbers over time from the debt holders’ perspective and hypothesize about the economic and reporting factors likely to affect this change. Using the association between accounting numbers and bond valuation and returns, we find that the information content to debt holders has increased over time. In contrast, but consistent with prior studies, we find that the information content to equity holders has declined. The results suggest that the increased information content to debt holders is related to changes in credit risk and to reporting factors such as the increase in reporting conservatism, the shift towards fair value accounting, and the increase in the frequency of losses. The findings contribute to the scant literature on the use of accounting information by debt holders and the extent to which financial reporting meets their unique needs.     

Investigating corporate management lobbying in the U.K. accounting standard-setting process: a multi-issue/multi-period approach

A large body of literature examines the motives of corporate managers to lobby accounting standard-setters. In general, studies confine their examination to single episodes of the standard-setting process (e.g., exposure draft). This article extends the literature by adopting a multi-issue/multi-period approach to investigate corporate lobbying of the U.K.'s ASB. The findings suggest that the extent of corporate lobbying, defined on the basis of the frequency with which companies made submissions to all of the publications issued by the ASB over a six-year period, depends on the size of companies, the debt covenant costs they face and whether they are listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Separate analyses, however, involving (a) the frequency of lobbying on income-related issues and (b) the frequency of lobbying on disclosure issues revealed that, while all these three variables explain lobbying on income-related issues, only size is significant in explaining lobbying on disclosure issues. The results also suggest that the debt to equity ratio is an imperfect proxy for debt covenant costs.     

A simple continuous measure of credit risk

This paper introduces a simple parameterization for the risk-neutral default probability distributions for risky firms that are easily computed from quoted bond prices. The corresponding expected times to default have a particularly simple form and are proposed as a measure for credit risk. Being continuous in nature, times to default provide a much finer measure of risk than those provided by ratings agencies. Comparison with the ratings provided by Moody's and the distance to default measures calculated using the Merton [Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance, 2(2), 449-470] model shows that the highest rank correlation is found between the proposed time to default measure and Moody's ratings.     

Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management

We examine the impact of differential incentives arising from proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management. We reason that firms with loans close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants have a stronger incentive to engage in earnings management than firms that are far from violating their debt covenants. We find results consistent with this expectation. Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants engage in higher levels of accounting earnings management, real earnings management, and total earnings management than far-from-violation firms. In additional analysis, we find that firms with a stronger incentive to avoid covenant violation switched from using more accounting earnings management before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to using more real earnings management and more total earnings management afterwards. We also document that the earnings management implications of debt covenant violation are observed primarily for firms with poor credit ratings and for firms that do not meet analyst forecasts.     

On the suboptimality of single-factor exercise strategies for Bermudan swaptions

This paper examines the interaction between momentum in the returns of equities and corporate bonds. We find that investment grade corporate bonds do not exhibit momentum at the three- to 12-month horizons. Instead, the evidence suggests that they exhibit reversals. However, significant evidence exists of a momentum spillover from equities to investment grade corporate bonds of the same firm. Firms earning high (low) equity returns over the previous year earn high (low) bond returns the following year. The spillover results are stronger among firms with lower-grade debt and higher equity trading volume, seem robust to various risk and liquidity controls, and hold even after controlling for past earnings surprises. In examining the source of the spillover, we find that the bond ratings of firms with positive (negative) equity momentum continue to improve (deteriorate) in the future, suggesting underreaction to the information in past equity prices about changing default risk is a likely source of the spillover effect. Overall, our results suggest that both equity and debt underreact to firm fundamentals, but past equity returns is a better proxy of firm fundamentals than past bond returns.     

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.     

Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress.     

Accounting Conservatism and the Cost of Capital: An International Analysis

This paper examines the role of conditional accounting conservatism in mitigating the cost of equity and debt capital in an international setting. The findings are that firms domiciled in countries with more conservative financial reporting systems have lower cost of equity and debt capital. The paper further explores the cross‐sectional variation of the above relationships, finding that the negative association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity and debt capital is more pronounced in countries with stronger legal enforcement, suggesting a complementary role between conservatism and legal institutions in capital markets. In addition, the paper finds that conservatism only reduces the cost of debt in countries where accounting‐based covenants are widely used, consistent with the argument that conditional conservatism improves the efficiency of debt contracts via accelerating covenant violations.     

The Ex‐Ante Monitoring Role of Accounting Covenants in Public Debt

In contrast to what is known about accounting covenants in private debt, little empirical evidence on the role of accounting covenants in public debt exists. Diffuse ownership, arm's length monitoring, and collective action problems are unique to the public debt setting and raise the question of whether these covenants serve their intended role. As such, this study investigates whether including covenants reliant upon accounting inputs influences borrowers’ actions to prevent adverse credit events. Accounting covenants in the public debt setting provide firms with a disciplining mechanism to renegotiate ahead of costly technical default – a stark contrast to the ex‐post renegotiation ‘trip wire’ role covenants play in private debt. In particular, the results show that including accounting covenants in public debt is associated with an increased probability of ex‐ante renegotiation, that is, negotiation through consent solicitations ahead of covenant violation. This ex‐ante renegotiation, in turn, is associated with decreased adverse credit events. Cross‐sectional results support these findings as the ex‐ante renegotiation role of accounting covenants varies with bondholders’ and trustees’ monitoring ability.     

Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism

We hypothesize debt markets—not equity markets—are the primary influence on “association” metrics studied since Ball and Brown (1968 J Account Res 6:159–178). Debt markets demand high scores on timeliness, conservatism and Lev’s (1989 J Account Res 27(supplement):153–192) R ², because debt covenants utilize reported numbers. Equity markets do not rate financial reporting consistently with these metrics, because (among other things) they control for the total information incorporated in prices. Single-country studies shed little light on debt versus equity influences, in part because within-country firms operate under a homogeneous reporting regime. International data are consistent with our hypothesis. This is a fundamental issue in accounting.     

Bondholder and stockholder reactions to discretionary accounting changes

This study examines bondholder and stockholder reactions to discretionary accounting changes that increase reported income to determine whether the changes are associated with a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders or with a loss in the wealth of both groups of investors. The evidence supports the wealth loss hypothesis. Negative relative returns to bondholders and stockholders appear to be related to the accounting changes after controlling the effects of earnings. The study examines earnings, management compensation, and debt covenant variables as possible motives for the accounting changes. It finds systematic differences between the change companies and matched nonchange companies on all three variables. The profile data are consistent with a setting in which managers use accounting changes to boost reported income and their own compensation during poor years.     

The determinants of secondary market prices for developing country loans: the impact of country risk

With better-defined variables based on Euromoney country risk data as explanatory variables, the determinants of the prices of the debts of less-developed countries (LDCs) in the secondary market are estimated. With the use of cross-sectional data on 27 countries for the years 1992, 1993, and 1994, the regression results indicate that sovereign credit ratings constitute the most important variable influencing prices; other significant variables include the level of external indebtedness and the amount of debt in default. Separate results have been obtained for each of the two categories of countries grouped according to the level of economic development. These results are more meaningful than those of previous studies because the model includes, in addition to debt-servicing capacity, other variables that best explain the prices of LDCs' debt within the context of a risky debt instrument.     

Original-Issue Systematic and Default Risk Pricing Efficiency of Speculative-Grade Bonds

We investigate whether primary market, original‐issue risk premiums on speculative‐grade debt are justified solely by expected defaults or whether these risk premiums also include other orthogonal risk components. Studies of secondary‐market holding period risk and return have hypothesized that risk premiums on speculative‐grade debt may be explained by bond‐ and equity‐related systematic risk and possibly other types of risk. Using an actuarial approach that considers contemporaneous correlation between default frequency and severity and first‐order serial correlation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the entire original‐issue risk premium can be explained by expected default losses. This suggests that speculative‐grade bond primary markets efficiently price default risk and that other types of risk are priced as coincident as opposed to orthogonal risks.