我国问题银行危机处置和市场退出机制研究

问题银行的市场退出是市场经济的必然要求,在欧美国家已形成较为成熟的模式。我国问题银行危机处置和市场退出尚未形成规范化的机制,不仅加大了银行机构的道德风险,也严重浪费了有限的公共资金的配置效率。市场退出机制的设计不仅需要考虑银行内部的成本和收益,也要考虑外部的成本和收益,重点解决风险识别、处置方式选择、注资救助成功预测、注资救助成本——收益分析、数据库建设和系统设计等关键性问题。我国问题银行危机处置和市场退出机制的建设仍需经历漫长的优化和发展之路。     

欧洲稳定机制框架设计及启示

欧洲稳定机制是永久性救助机制,其目的在于稳定欧洲金融状况、加强监察欧盟地区的经济状况以及防止债务危机的发生,为有金融困难或重组银行需要贷款的欧盟成员国提供经济援助。欧洲稳定机制在治理结构、救助程序、规模与职能以及救助方保障等方面对原有欧洲金融稳定机制进行了扬弃和取代,有效维护了欧洲地区的经济金融稳定,值得我国以及亚洲国家学习借鉴。     

对如何救助“问题银行”的思考

在现代市场经济条件下 ,由于经济运行的不确定性、信贷信息的非对称性和经济主体的道德风险等原因 ,使得商业银行的运行总是处于风险之中 ,而风险作为损失的一种可能性 ,其本身存在着一个“度”的概念 ,当银行风险越过其“度”时 ,该银行便有可能成为“问题银行”。由于问题银行的存在和发展 ,对经济运行均会产生威胁 ,甚至带来灾难性的后果 ,所以 ,政府和中央银行不得不对问题银行实施救助 ,以降低问题银行所可能引致的社会和经济成本。     

银行企业债务损失的经济学分析—兼论对银行不良贷款的治理

银行的企业债务损失,是我国银行不良贷款长期居高不下的一个重要原因。在自由经济中,由于信息不对称、不完全契约和信用的次优博弈等市场缺陷的存在,银行的企业债务损失不可避免。校正市场缺陷,需要依靠必要的制度安排和非制度约束。监管的加强和提高发放贷款的谨慎度,属于宏观层面的适应性反应,在导致企业债务损失的微观机制没有得到根本治理的情况下,对于防止银行的企业债务损失意义不大。目前,运用制度创新的手段,改善微观经济运行环境,是解决企业债务损失和银行不良贷款问题的一条有效途径。     

中国银行业系统性风险的“社会性消化”机制研究

银行业系统性风险是个连续累积过程,主要经由信用和信息渠道完成,本质上是通过流动性波动的形式进行的。我国银行业系统2003年前不良资产率一直很高,2003年后的流动性波动剧烈,尤其受近期经济下行等影响,系统性风险积聚一直较高。宏观压力测试表明,在轻度、中度和重度的情境下,我国银行业系统性风险都较高程度地累积存在且渐趋严重,而"社会性消化"机制——基于合作均衡的市场内在的风险"自我消化"机制和银行软预算约束对风险的外部"救助"机制,使我国短期内"规避"了金融危机,但其引致的道德风险、信贷扩张以及资产泡沫却在长期内使银行体系脆弱性增强,系统性风险积聚增加,须强化金融基础制度建设进行防范和化解。     

债转股的利弊浅析

在经济下行压力下,债转股再次成为关注焦点.债转股一方面能够减轻企业和银行负担,另一方面也能给企业和银行带来不利影响,必须在债转股的主体、承接主体、损失承担和退出机制等方面采取措施.     

构建国有股份制商业银行基层机构操作风险的内部管控体系

根据巴塞尔委员会的定义,操作风险是指由不完善或有问题的内部程序、人员及系统或外部事件所造成损失的风险。一般意义而言,一家银行不断地出现这样或那样由于操作原因而导致的损失,必然会对该银行的声誉产生负面影响。操作风险损失往往是出现了这样或者那样风险的结果反映,如何构建好内部管控体系已经成为国有股份制商业银行控制操作风险的关键。     

系统性风险传染机制中的级联故障研究——兼论"多而不能倒"与"大而不能倒"

本文将违约损失风险参数内生于网络,兼顾偿还风险传导和流动性风险传染渠道,构建了复杂银行系统网络的级联故障模型,并且结合可得的我国263家商业银行财务数据进行仿真模拟,量化了共同冲击、特定银行倒闭等几个情境下的级联故障程度.研究发现:第一,我国银行系统"多而不能倒"不仅与"大而不能倒"并存,且独立于"大而不能倒"而存在.第二,中小银行相对于大银行能承受的破产故障边界更低、波动更小,更容易发生联合倒闭情形.因而,研究中小银行联合倒闭极具现实意义.第三,大型银行是众多中小银行倒闭的第一道防线,而中小银行的救助成本远低于大型银行.因此,防范化解重大风险时要重视多家中小银行风险集聚现象而规避传染源,兼顾"多而不能倒"和"大而不能倒",低成本救助,从而实现风险在银行间的缓冲疏散和对抗吸收.     

构建我国农村流域水污染受害者社会救助机制

我国农村流域水污染受害者数量多,分布范围广,受害程度深,应对能力差,如何使这一弱势群体走出困境,关系到我国社会主义和谐社会的构建.从我国国情以及国外救助经验分析表明,当前必须尽快构建农村流域水污染受害者的社会救助机制,包括救助对象确认和监测机制,救助需求揭示机制、救助主体分工协作机制、救助资源筹集机制、救助保障机制、救助效果评价机制等.解决农村流域水污染受害者困境是一个长期、多方利益协调的过程,因此文章呼吁尽快建立这种社会救助机制.     

建立新的信贷机制提高信贷效益

建立新的信贷机制提高信贷效益●石福林国有专业银行转变成国有商业银行,使其成为自主经营、自负盈亏、自我约束、自我发展的金融企业,要求银行必须建立新型的信贷管理机制,让信贷工作围绕这个机制有规律、有节奏地安全运行,最终达到对企业和银行提高经济效益的作用。...     

Banking distress in MENA countries and the role of mergers as a strategic policy to resolve distress

This paper studies banking distress in MENA countries and considers the extent to which mergers are used as a solution for resolving individual banking distress. We use a two-level nested logit model to model the interdependence between merger decisions and the distressed state of banks. Both bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables are deployed to predict banking distress. In line with other recent papers, we challenge the view that specific bank indicators such as CAMEL category and bank size are more significant determinants of banking distress than macroeconomic variables. A comparison of model fits and out-of-sample forecasts indicates that the unordered NL model statistically outperforms a standard logit model by substantial margins. Our empirical study shows that 67% of the distressed banks in our sample are involved in merger transactions and that weak financial status systematically increases the likelihood of a bank being involved in a merger. Distressed state-owned banks are less likely to be a target of a merger transaction. However, global economic conditions do not significantly affect the decision of distressed banks to initiate a merger policy.     

Government bailouts and default risks of a duopoly: strong bank versus weak bank

A duopolistic loan market includes a strong bank without the problem of early closure that opts out of government bailouts and a weak bank with this problem that participates in the bailout programmes of distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections. A direct implication of our framework is that the strong bank’s equity will be priced as a standard call option, while the weak bank’s equity will be priced as a down-and-out call option. We find that an increase in either bailout (i.e. distressed loan purchases and direct equity injections) directly decreases the weak bank’s default risk but indirectly increases the strong bank’s default risk. Accordingly, either bailout contributes to banking stability since the indirect positive effect insufficiently offsets the direct negative effect, giving an overall negative response of default risks to an increase in either bailout. Higher competition by shifting to quasi-competition from collusion increases banking stability under either bailout. Our analysis suggests that competition is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability.     

A barrier option framework for rescue package designs and bank default risks

Rescue packages adopted to stabilize the banking system are generally divided into three categories: government purchases of distressed assets, government guaranteed debt issuance programs, and direct equity capital injections. Countries afflicted by the recent financial crisis launched general programs in one or two, and even in three different categories. In this paper, we examine that the design of a government rescue package for a distressed bank depends on the expected reduction of the default risk in the bank's equity returns. We find that the bank's default risk is negatively related to distressed loan purchases, and to capital injections, but positively related to guaranteed debt issuance. We also find that the rescue package including all three categories is not guaranteed to increase stability for the rescued bank. Specifically, the combination of distressed loan purchases and capital injections is superior to the package of the three categories in addition to the solo instrument. This suggests that an effective design of a government rescue package for the financial services industry largely depends on its targets.     

Assessing bank equity risk under Legacy Loan Program

We study the effects of purchasing distressed loan on bank equity risk under the Legacy Loan Program (LLP), in which the government is in partnership with private investors. The bank may refuse LLP when its knock-out value is too low. When the bank decides to participate in the LLP, the participation of a private investor generates a decrease in bank interest margin and an increase in equity risk, but the knock-out value with the LLP assistance generates an increase in bank interest margin and a decrease in equity risk. Our results suggest that the success of LLP depends critically on the willingness of a weak bank to participate in it. However, the participation of a private investor in LLP does not decrease the weak bank’s equity risk but poses instability to the banking system.     

Market Size and Investment Performance of Defaulted Bonds and Bank Loans: 1987–2001

The defaulted and distressed, public and private debt markets in the United States swelled to a record $680 billion (face value) at the end of 2001. The market value of this 'niche' segment was approximately $400 billion.
Defaulted security investors enjoyed an excellent year on average, as returns in 2001 were 17.5 per cent on bonds, 13.9 per cent on bank loans, and 15.6 per cent combined defaulted public bonds and private bank loans.
The Altman–New York University Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Bonds grew to over 200 individual issues and a face value of $56.2 billion; the market value was only $11.8 billion. The market–to–face value ratio of the Bond Index grew somewhat to 0.21 from 0.15 one year ago, but remained at a relatively low figure. The face value of our Defaulted Bank Loan Index also grew to $44.7 billion and the market–to–face value ratio remained quite low at 0.53.
The recovery rate on defaulted bonds (price just after default) was very low at 25 cents on the dollar; likewise, the bank loan recovery rate in 2001 was also relatively low at 55 cents on the dollar. With new defaulted bonds rising in 2001 to a record $63.6 billion (default rate of 9.80 per cent) and the default outlook for 2002 high investment opportunities should abound in the distressed debt market.
Indications are that distressed investors (both old and new) are successfully raising funds because investor expectations are buoyant.
(J.E.L.: G21, G33).     

The Korean financial crisis and the soft budget constraint

A panel of Korean firms is used to test for the soft budget constraint (SBC) in bank lending before and after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. SBC is present if a firm can borrow from its bank despite being in financial distress, which we define by a low Altman's z-score. We find that prior to 1997 financially distressed firms were able to borrow while after the crisis their ability to borrow declined substantially. We also demonstrate that SBC was a significant factor in the firms’ propensity to default during the crisis.     

Financial distress,bank debt restructurings,and layoffs

We develop a model of a financially distressed firm to analyze the implications of a bank debt restructuring when the operational characteristics of the firm's project for the post-distress period are endogenously determined as part of the workout. We establish a formal link between the debt restructuring and operational actions such as employee layoffs, and show how these actions are affected by the firm's capital structure, the ordering of absolute priorities, and the allocation of control rights and residual claims after reorganization. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of reorganization law.     

Bankruptcy regime and the banking system

Banks’ behavior as creditors relies heavily on the content of legal rights granted by the national bankruptcy laws. Using a sample of 87 countries over the period 2005–2016, this paper investigates whether the degree of such legal rights influences the following banking indicators: (1) private credit, (2) bank lending-deposit spread, and (3) foreign banks’ presence. Robust dynamic panel estimates indicate a significant and positive impact only on foreign banks’ presence in countries with a high level of creditors’ protection and bankruptcy systems that encourage the survival of financially distressed firms.     

Asymmetric effects of uncertainty shocks: Normal times and financial disruptions are different

We examine whether the response of the euro area economy to uncertainty shocks depends on financial conditions. We find strong evidence that uncertainty shocks have much more powerful effects on key macroeconomic variables in episodes marked by financial distress than in normal times. We also document that the recovery of economic activity following an adverse uncertainty shock is state dependent: it is gradual in normal times, but displays a more accelerated rebound when the shock hits during financial distress, reflecting monetary accommodation provided by the central bank. These findings are based on a non-linear data-driven model that accounts for regime switching and time-varying volatility. Our findings imply that whether financial markets are calm or distressed matters when it comes to the appropriate policy responses to uncertainty shocks.