政府公共投资的经济效应分析

关于政府公共投资的经济效应,学术界有颇多争论,虽然一系列研究成果发现公共资本与经济增长正相关,但也有一些学者通过研究得出了截然相反的结论。文章运用经济增长理论分析政府公共投资的经济效应,并以中国相关数据为样本进行实证检验,实证检验得出结果:公共投资与产出正相关。在此基础上,文章根据我国目前所处的经济发展阶段,运用计量经济模型,估计出我国当前政府公共投资的最优规模,即公共投资占GDP的合理比重为4.5%,公共投资占财政总支出的合理比重为22%左右。     

Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?

We give an account of an overlapping–generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra–family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra–generational (inter–family) redistribution through a compulsory pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter–family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but support is not significantly affected. The efficiency of voluntary transfers increases, however. Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high.
JEL classification : C 91; H 55     

公共消费支出及其最优规模分析

公共消费支出作为政府支出的一个重要组成部分,其与经济增长之间的关系始终是经济学界关注和探讨的热点问题之一,可谓众说纷纭、观点不一.文章首先对公共消费支出的内涵与外延作了新的界定,在此基础上通过理论与模型相结合的方法分析了公共消费支出的效应,包括经济效应和社会效应,并对我国最优公共消费支出规模作了估计.     

我国GDP长期增长中公共支出效应的实证分析

文章利用VAR模型系统分析了政府消费支出、政府公共投资(包括转移支付)及预算外支出与GDP之间的长期动态关系.通过分析,我们认为政府收入支出、政府消费支出对经济增长的短期效应为正,政府公共投资对经济增长短期无显著影响.从长期看,政府消费支出、预算外支出对经济增长有一定的解释力,而政府公共投资对经济的长期增长解释力则较弱.     

Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods

In this paper, we examine the viability ofcooperative policies oriented to the resolution oftransboundary pollution problems using the theory ofprivate provision of public goods in a two-countrymodel. We analyze the effects on economic welfare ofvoluntary technological transfers oriented to reducingthe emission of pollutants.Our analysis shows that when the atmosphere istaken as a pure public goods, ``a strong paradox' emerges:the advanced country, in spite of the transfer, seesits economic welfare improved while the developingcountry sees it worsen. Moreover, if both a technicaland an income transfer occur, this paradox mightnot be solved. Furthermore, ``a paradoxicalimprovement' occurs when the advanced country does nottake any policy towards the environment but thedeveloping country does: an improvement in the levelof technology in the developing country allows for anexpansion of the level of utility in both countries.On the other hand, in the case where the atmosphere istaken as an impure public goods, when both countriespursue an abatement policy, the transfer of technologyleads to an improvement in welfare in bothcountries.     

我国农村转移劳动力对经济增长贡献的实证分析

从我国农村转移劳动力对经济增长贡献的研究现状入手,从农村劳动力转移数量与人力资本提升角度分别阐述对经济增长的影响并利用有关数据进行实证分析,验证农村劳动力转移与其素质提升有利于社会经济增长。关于农村转移劳动力素质提升对经济增长贡献的效度测量的各种方法还需要进一步深入研究。     

Intergenerational Transfers: An Integrative Approach

The empirical literature was unable to conclude whether intergenerational transfers are motivated mainly by altruistic or strategic motivations. I suggest that both may be plausible, namely that people are neither pure altruists who derive utility simply from being good to others, nor pure egoists who consider only strategic selfish considerations, but are actually driven by a combination of incentives. I show that assuming a combination of motives changes, sometimes dramatically, the results obtained in the traditional models and resolves the puzzle concerning the empirical results.     

我国政府供给偏好决定的一个经济学解释--政治均衡与经济效率

政府供给偏好包括政府供给的规模偏好与结构偏好,它们是社会各方政治影响力相互冲突和竞争的结果。我们通过构建“执政能力函数”,从最简单的消费者集团与纳税人集团政治影响力制衡模型,到多集团、多政府供给项目下的政府供给结构决定模型,再到官僚控制下的政府供给偏好决定模型,逐步阐释了政治均衡决定资源配置的低效率属性,进而说明,相对于市场,政府供给规模和范围边界的收敛趋势会促进社会资源配置效率的改进。在我国当前社会经济转型过程中,政府供给偏好的形成具有更多的动态特征,从提高整个社会资源配置效率和建设和谐社会的目标来看,公共决策的民主化虽然能够在一定程度上缓解政治均衡的低效率,但无法从根本上消除政治均衡决定资源配置的低效率属性,因此我国当前政府职能转型的核心重点不在于公共决策的完全民主化,而在于协调政府供给范围调整与市场经济深化的进程和路径。公平竞争、自发扩展的市场经济秩序是市场“内生型”政府供给偏好形成的基础。     

Public Transfers and Participation Decisions in Botswana's Subsistence Economy

Botswana has an extensive set of publicly provided cash and in‐kind food transfers geared at providing a safety net to poor and vulnerable groups. While such programs have improved household welfare, from a theoretical perspective they could have also created work disincentives or welfare dependency among recipient families. This article tackles this issue by modeling the impact of publicly provided cash and in‐kind food transfers on farmer participation decisions in the subsistence crop economy in Botswana, using a probit regression and agricultural census data for 2004. Results show that social pensions have had no impact on farmer participation decisions, most likely because they are too small to influence household behavior. However, government food rations (GFRs) have reduced the probability of farmer participation in subsistence crop production, and, hence, have created work disincentive among recipient subsistence families. Specifically, recipient families of GFRs are 8.1 percentage points less likely to participate in crop production than non‐recipient households.     

Religious and Economic Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of State Tax Rates and Public Spending

In an attempt to examine the role of religion and religious institutions in the formation of economic and political preferences, we empirically test the relationship between religious and economic variables in the context of the 50 US states. Specifically, we test whether changes in the religious composition of states over time influences state tax rates (public revenue), and state spending patterns (public expenditure). We use church membership rates and religious contributions as alternative measures of a state's religiosity level. The results report a weak relationship between state tax rates and the religiosity of the state population over time. However, a negative relationship was observed between religiosity and public welfare spending, and a positive relationship between religiosity and public education spending. Variations arise when Catholics are included in the analysis of public spending.     

诚信的经济学分析

本文以信息经济、交易费用、产权和博弈论为依据分析诚信和诚信缺失问题,探讨诚信与市场经济运行的内在关系.用社会生产方式对立统一运动的辩证观点,阐述诚信是经济范畴又不是经济范畴;从社会物质文明和精神文明协调发展的角度,说明构建与市场经济相适应的社会诚信体系的重要现实意义和历史意义.     

经济腐败的经济学分析

经济官员拥有着特权。这种特权在市场经济条件下,可能形成"政治市场",成为特殊商品,进而进行权钱交易。本文对经济腐败的成本收益进行了详细分析,并对经济腐败的风险成本与反经济腐败的对策进行了博弈分析。在对经济腐败决策模型和影响其风险决策的主要因素分析的基础上,提出经济腐败行为总是遵循"以最小腐败成本获取最大腐败收益"的经济学原则。因而,加大腐败者的经济腐败成本,可以减少经济腐败,从而降低经济腐败风险,并提出了加强经济腐败风险管理的对策。     

垄断的经济学再思考

如果交易费用为零,那么垄断厂商就会实施完全价格歧视。不考虑收入分配效应,完全价格歧视实现了资源的最优配置。如果交易费用不为零,那么消费者剩余和利润是不可以简单相加的,更不可以二者之和是否达到了最大来判定真实经济是否是效率的。交易费用不为零,也不能得出垄断存在资源配置扭曲的结论。传统分析忽视了垄断的成因,忽略了那所谓的福利三角形,其实是避免价值消散和获得规模经济的必要的代价。传统分析还不恰当地以为政府既有能力又有动力管好垄断这样的问题。因而,其一般化的反垄断政策主张也错了。     

Economic Analysis of Public Policies for Controlling Heroin Use

Policies for controlling heroin use are surveyed. Motivations for harm minimisation and abstinence policies are derived. Pursuing abstinence alone using supply-oriented policies increases heroin prices possibly creating social harm. Pursuing harm minimisation alone reduces user costs that compromise drug abstinence objectives. These tradeoffs between policy objectives are examined for a number of proposed policies including (i) the public provision of heroin to addicts, (ii) the use of safe injecting rooms, (iii) methadone programs and (iv) drug use prevention policies. Coupling legal sanctions that impact specifically on new users with harm minimisation policies, enables relaxation of some policy tradeoffs but penalises a class of users who impose low social costs.     

诚信的经济学分析

本文从经济学的角度来分析诚信的问题。笔者分别从交易费用、道德风险问题和博弈三个不同的视角,分析了诚信是如何来影响经济绩效的,以及诚信对信息不对称的市场经济运行的作用。同时得出了一个重要结论:即使交易双方守信不违约的情况下,诚信的交易费用也是存在的,诚信度的大小决定了这种交易成本的大小。正是各种交易成本对经济绩效产生了重要的影响。最后提出了建设无形制度的观点。     

绿色管理的经济学分析

绿色管理是在21世纪新经济的时代背景下成长起来的管理理论,是对既有管理理论的彻底变革。绿色管理理论体系的发展成熟,与生态经济学、可持续发展经济学、循环经济理论等新经济学理论密切相关,它们既为绿色管理理论提供了思想基础,又为绿色管理实践提供了理论指导。     

关于掠夺的经济学分析

本文从规范经济学的角度,以生产效率、经济效率为标准,对掠夺进行分析和评判。掠夺活动可分为纯粹财富转移型和生产资源转移型两大类。本文指出,财富转移型掠夺不会增加社会财富,反而带来掠夺成本和抵抗成本等社会损失,若这类掠夺蔓延开来,还会打击生产积极性,降低社会总产出。本文从资源配置方式的高度,分析生产资源转移型掠夺,发现其内在激励约束机制的缺陷,指出掠夺式的资源配置容易导致有害于社会生产的资源转移。本文比较了交易和掠夺这两种资源配置方式,并发现在激励约束机制、过滤机制、信息成本等方面,交易都优于掠夺,最后指出,掠夺与节约交易成本没有必然联系,节约交易成本不能当作为掠夺辩护的理由。     

Cash Transfers to the Poor and the Labor Market: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output.