Cost‐Based Anti‐dumping as a Repeated Game

In this paper, we consider anti‐dumping (AD) duties as a tool to facilitate collusion between a domestic and a foreign firm in an infinitely repeated differentiated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observable and each firm receives a privately observed i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We consider second‐best scenarios, where market‐share or production arrangement with sidepayments is not allowed. We show that there exist equilibrium‐path reciprocal ADs. The collusive (trigger) price is distorted downward compared with complete information benchmark as a trade‐off between diminishing the incentive to deviate and ensuring off‐schedule deviation gains when private cost shocks are highly favourable. The model differs from Green and Porter ( 1984 ) and Rotemberg and Saloner ( 1986 ) in that it is the private cost shocks as opposed to public demand shocks that necessitate modifications of collusion. In conclusion, AD policy may encourage collusion, and therefore, unless the source of market imperfection is carefully examined, laissez faire might be a better choice.     

STRATEGIC CANDIDACY AND SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS*

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.     

Border tax adjustments and tariff‐tax reforms with consumption pollution

We develop a model of a small open economy, where pollution per unit of consumption between domestically produced and imported quantities of the same good differs. We show that the first‐best policy combination calls for consumption taxes on all polluting goods, and border tax adjustment (BTA) measures, that is, tariffs or import subsidies. We identify conditions under which well‐known tariff‐tax reform policies for developing economies, such as a consumer‐price‐neutral piecemeal reform of trade and a consumption tax, and a consumer‐price‐neutral reform of all trade and consumption taxes improve welfare. We also evaluate whether reforms of trade taxes alone are superior to consumer‐price‐neutral reforms of trade and consumption taxes.     

Are Native and Non‐Native English Speaking Tutors Equally Effective?

Many studies find a negative effect of non‐native English speaking instructors on students' performance in universities where the language of instruction is English. However, the negative effect observed in the existing literature is not found in the study by Fleisher, Hashimoto and Weinberg (2002) , which uses the sample of instructors who received training in the Ohio State University's PhD programme. In many economics departments in Australia, mainly because their PhD programmes are not large enough, it is unrealistic to have all the tutors trained in the methods recommended in Fleisher, Hashimoto and Weinberg (2002) . This gives rise to a potential negative impact of non‐native English speaking tutors on students' performance. Nevertheless, by analysing the panel data drawn from first‐year quantitative methods, microeconomics and macroeconomics courses in an Australian university, we find no statistically significant difference in the effectiveness of small class teaching between native and non‐native English speaking tutors.     

MEASURING POVERTY USING BOTH INCOME AND WEALTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN

We study the correspondence between a household's income and its vulnerability to income shocks in two developed countries: the U.S. and Spain. Vulnerability is measured by the availability of wealth to smooth consumption in a multidimensional approach to poverty, which allows us to identify three groups of households: the twice‐poor group, which includes income‐poor households who lack an adequate stock of wealth; the group of protected‐poor households, which are all those income‐poor families with a buffer stock of wealth they can rely on; and the vulnerable‐non‐poor group, including households above the income‐poverty line that do not hold any stock of wealth. Interestingly, the risk of belonging to these groups changes over the life‐cycle in both countries while the size of the groups differs significantly between Spain and the U.S., although this result is quite sensitive to whether the housing wealth component is included in the wealth measure or not.     

WATER QUALITY TRADING IN THE PRESENCE OF ABATEMENT‐COST SHARING

This paper examines how water quality trading interacts with nonpoint‐source abatement‐cost sharing (e.g., as currently practiced by the National Resource Conservation Service through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]) to promote the participation of nonpoint sources in a water quality market, participation that has thus far been noticeably lacking nationwide. As such, an idealized version of water quality trading is envisioned, where water quality trading and nonpoint cost sharing are treated as complementary policy instruments rather than substitutes. Toward this end, the subgame‐perfect equilibrium concept is used to model a “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and nonpoint sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources' production costs. We characterize ex ante (or second‐best) nonpoint abatement levels when the regulator chooses cost‐share rates in concert with a water quality market. Numerical analysis indicates that current EQIP cost‐share rates would likely be lower and more flexibly determined in the presence of water quality trading. (JEL Q53)     

MEASURING NON‐ECONOMIC WELL‐BEING ACHIEVEMENT

Income per capita and most widely reported, non‐ or non‐exclusively income based human well‐being indicators are highly correlated among countries. Yet many countries exhibit higher achievement in the latter than predicted by the former. The reverse is true for many other countries. This paper commences by extracting the inter‐country variation in a composite of various widely‐reported, non‐income‐based well‐being indices not accounted for by variations in income pre capita. This extraction is interpreted inter alia as a measure of non‐economic well‐being. The paper then looks at correlations between this extraction and a number of new or less widely‐used well‐being measures, in an attempt to find the measure that best captures these achievements. A number of indicators are examined, including measures of poverty, inequality, health status, education status, gender bias, empowerment, governance and subjective well‐being.     

Interlinkage and Generous Tit‐for‐Tat Strategy

We investigate an infinitely‐repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect monitoring and consider the possibility that the interlinkage of the players' distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a generous tit‐for‐tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed.     

TURNPIKE PROPERTIES OF A MONEY‐IN‐THE‐UTILITY‐FUNCTION MODEL*

This study establishes the global stability of a long‐run stationary state in a money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model. The major finding is that the constant money supply rule results in a stable allocation and price system if consumers discount their future utilities sufficiently weakly. Nominal and real interest rates will be in the neighbourhood of the inverse of the consumers’ discount factor β^‐1.     

Global Investment Environment of the Post‐Quantitative Easing World: The ‘new‐old’ and ‘new‐new’ Normal

Global markets since late 2007 are not ‘normal’, where normal means market conditions we would expect to observe going forward in the absence of any new economic shocks. Financial markets have been dominated by extraordinary central bank policies that were created to deal with challenging market conditions reflecting heightened risk aversion and illiquidity. Markets in the future will have some characteristics that look more like the market conditions observed in the pre‐crisis period, which I call the ‘new‐old normal’ and other conditions that differ from the past, which I call the ‘new‐new normal’. I first review what happened during the financial crisis in terms of developments in three asset classes, equities, fixed income and currencies, to place the forward‐looking view in proper context. Then the transition period from the quantitative easing (QE) era of exceptional monetary policy to post‐QE markets is discussed. Post‐transition, we will see some features of the post‐QE world that will resemble pre‐crisis market conditions, the ‘new‐old normal’ with higher policy interest rates, wider cross‐country interest differentials, lower cross‐asset return correlations and a resurgence of the importance of cross‐country differences in fundamentals in international investing. However, some features of the post‐QE investment environment will be unlike anything observed in the past: the ‘new‐new normal’ with reduced liquidity and more days of exceptionally large volatility and asset price moves due to regulatory effects resulting in a reduced ability of market‐makers to provide inventory buffers for counterparties and electronic trading venues that shut down trading in high volatility periods; low inflation; flatter yield curves; and emerging markets providing less opportunity for diversification gains as they converge to developed financial market characteristics.     

Long‐Term Contracts,Irreversibility, and Uncertainty

Long‐term contracting implies contracting based on expected future demand. In this paper, I develop a multiperiod procurement model where, once the actual level of demand is realized, the irreversible initial provision level may be supplemented by additional provisions. This paper shows that, with the possibility of additional upward adjustments, the first‐period provision level will be lower than when no additional adjustments are possible. This reduction in first‐period provision level is higher under complete contracting than under incomplete contracting, and because of the reduction in information rents it yields a higher expected utility to the principal but lower total welfare.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: WHAT LEGAL RECOGNITION DOES FOR SAME‐SEX COUPLES

Using Current Population Survey data, I examine how same‐sex couples' labor force participation and health insurance coverage change as a result of their unions being legally recognized. The results indicate female same‐sex couples switch from arrangements where both members work to arrangements where only one member of the couple works. Being able to gain health insurance through a spouse's employer seems to play a major role in this change. Male same‐sex couples experience no change in their labor force participation or health insurance. (JEL J08, I13, J18)     

Mecro‐Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro‐Perceptions of the Macro‐Economy

We develop an incomplete information theory of economic voting, where voters' information about macro‐economic performance is determined by the economic conditions of people similar to themselves. We test our theory using both cross‐sectional and time‐series survey data. A novel survey instrument that asks respondents their numerical assessment of the unemployment rate confirms that individuals' economic information responds to the economic conditions of people similar to themselves. Furthermore, these assessments are correlated with individuals' vote choices. We also show in time‐series data that state unemployment robustly correlates with evaluations of national economic conditions, and presidential support.     

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Goals are an important motivator. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address this issue in a model based on two stylized facts. First, goals serve as reference points for performance. Second, present‐biased preferences create self‐control problems. We show the power and limits of self‐regulation through goals. Goals increase an individual's motivation—but only up to a certain point. Furthermore, they are painful self‐disciplining devices. Thus, greater self‐control problems may result in tougher goals; but for a severe present bias goals either lack a motivating force, or are too painful to be accepted.     

THE BROTHER‐IN‐LAW EFFECT*

When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother‐in‐law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother‐in‐law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.     

TWENTY‐FIRST‐CENTURY TRADE GOVERNANCE: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

This paper focuses on twenty‐first‐century‐trade governance patterns within the Commonwealth (CW) countries. It uses an augmented gravity model to examine the role of governance in influencing trade and investment flows, and whether enhanced trade governance within the CW countries could potentially foster trade gains, on a both intra‐ and extra‐CW basis. Results show a 10% reduction in the costs incurred for a good to exit a country can increase intra‐CW exports by 5%. Second, contract enforcement is more efficient among CW members, and requires 20% less time compared to the world average. Third, every 1 percentage point improvement in government effectiveness triggers an increase in exports from CW, at 3.4%, compared to the rest of the world, at 2.4%. Finally, trade between CW members is three times higher when they belong to an existing regional trade agreement. (JEL F10, 011, F13)     

International risk‐sharing in the short run and in the long run

Abstract International risk‐sharing has far‐reaching implications both for economic policy and for basic research in economics. When countries do not share consumption risk, individuals experience consumption fluctuations that are undesirable and possibly unnecessary. We investigate bilateral risk‐sharing at short vs. long horizons. We find substantial cross‐country consumption correlations at trend and business‐cycle frequencies. Correlations are particularly high within Europe. Prior research focused on first‐difference correlations, which are typically quite low. We argue that this reflects measurement error. At all horizons, we find that consumption correlations are not significantly different from output correlations, implying a lack of deliberate consumption risk‐sharing.     

Pecking order and core‐periphery in international trade

This paper analyzes the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows. A multi‐country trade model with firm‐level heterogeneity in productivities and countries’ market potential provides a simple micro foundation for the link between these variables. In the model, market size and trade costs jointly determine a country‐specific pecking order of exporters serving their destination countries. In a counterfactual setting where bilateral trade costs are homogeneous across country pairs, market size predicts a common ranking of exporters among destination countries. This leads to a unique core‐periphery structure of the world trade network. With heterogeneous trade costs, we illustrate the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows and its margins in a simple gravity‐like setting. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that both market size and trade costs (measured through the network position of countries) have a significant impact on bilateral exports: countries in the core bilaterally trade more with other countries in the core than with peripheral countries, conditional on typical observables.     

Uncertainty and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good in a Two‐Moment Decision Model

In this paper, we explore the potential benefits of uncertainty that may arise in a two‐moment model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good. We find that an increase in a given contributor i’s risk associated with the aggregate contribution level of the other contributors (i.e., an increase in social uncertainty) induces that contributor to increase his own contribution level if and only if the uncertainty's incremental effect on the expected value of his net marginal utility is negative. Contributor i’s welfare likewise increases when a closely related condition is met, namely that the uncertainty's marginal effect on his expected marginal utility value of the public good exceeds its countervailing effect on the numeraire. Further, the corresponding aggregate contribution to the public good increases in the presence of free‐riding if and only if the incremental effect of contributor i’s contribution on the aggregate expected value of all other contributors’ net marginal utilities is small‐enough positive. We derive similar conditions for the case of private uncertainty, where the increase in contributor i’s risk is associated with his own marginal valuation of the public good. A simple example illustrates these conceptual results. Numerical analysis demonstrates that an increase in private uncertainty can have a nonmonotonic impact on contributor i’s welfare.