Visibility estimates of budgetary burden and benefit in European countries

Intermediate territorial levels of government in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain are different regarding their basic institutions, devolved powers, revenue and public expenditure systems, public revenue equalization mechanisms, accountability, public performance management, and financial control bodies. In spite of the complexity derived from these different characteristics, this paper presents some indicators which permit the creation of time and space fiscal visibility measurements and comparisons. It also advances systematic estimates on visibility for intermediate subsystems of public revenue and expenditure now in force in these European countries. Policy implications seem straightforward. That is, current values are low in general, and allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms that aim to raise both public revenue and expenditure visibility.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Seventh International Atlantic Economic Conference, Vienna, Austria, March 16–23, 1999. The author is indebted to the participants of this conference and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The author is responsible for any errors or shortcomings.     

Budget burden and benefit visibility of European central level governments

Central levels of government in European Union member countries are different regarding their basic institutions, powers, fiscal systems, accountability, public performance management, financial control bodies, and the like. In spite of this, the economic operation of such levels of government should be analyzed, evaluated, and compared from an efficiency viewpoint. This paper presents general indicators to systematically assess the burden and benefit visibility of public budgets of the International Monetary Fund member countries and specific estimates for the central subsystems of public revenue and expenditure now in force in such European countries. An important policy implication of these estimates seems straightforwardly perceived: significant allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms, aiming to raise their current visibility values. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Ninth International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 14–21, 2000, Munich, Germany. The author is indebted to conference participants for helpful comments. The author is responsible for any errors or shortcomings.     

The employment effect of changes in the composition of fiscal consolidations

This paper assesses the magnitude and nature of fiscal consolidation policies and their impact on employment. In particular, in an attempt to address fiscal imbalances in the near term, countries have been faced with the delicate challenge of doing so without damaging recovery prospects and thus, counter to their original aim, worsening further public finances. In this regard, the paper reviews recent austerity measures adopted by governments and discusses how prolonging fiscal consolidation measures in their current form could be counterproductive for guaranteeing debt sustainability. Moreover, the article shows how poorly designed fiscal cuts – directly or indirectly affecting labour – seem to have been dampening job prospects. The paper sheds light on how fiscal and employment goals can be achieved together. More specifically, it finds that a fiscally-neutral change in the expenditure and revenue composition of fiscal consolidation can boost job creation. In this sense, the paper shows that it is imperative to find the right policy mix and recommends countries to be mindful of the nature and pace of consolidation.     

Fiscal harmonization in the European Union with public inputs

Fiscal harmonization among the European Union member states is a goal involving major difficulties for its implementation. Each country faces a particular trade-off between fiscal revenues generated by taxation and the productive efficiency loss induced by their respective tax code. This paper provides a quantitative analysis of these trade-offs for a number of the European Union (EU-15) member states using a dynamic general equilibrium model with public inputs. Calibration of the model for the EU-15 member states provides the following results: i) the maximum tax revenue level is relatively far from the current tax levels for most countries; ii) the cases of Sweden, Denmark and Finland are anomalous, as productive efficiency can be gained by lowering tax rates without affecting fiscal revenues; iii) in general, countries would obtain efficiency gains without changing fiscal revenues by reducing the capital tax and increasing the labor tax; and iv) capital tax harmonization to the average capital tax rate can be done with quite small changes in both fiscal revenues and output for most countries.     

Arithmetic visibility estimates for OECD countries with three government levels

The importance of fiscal visibility has been well known for a long time but attempts to quantify it by taking the internal structure of every type of revenue and expenditure in a fiscal system into consideration are recent. Indicators used until now rest on structural parameters combined in a multiplicative way with a 0 estimate always resulting in at least one of such factors being null. An alternative way to measure fiscal visibility consists of combining parametric values in an additive instead of a multiplicative form. Calculations can then show estimates which are much more sensitive to the initial values. The aim of this contribution is to present new additive indicators that are applied to several territorial government levels in Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the U. S. Comparisons, conclusions, and comments are offered for general development. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 55th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Vienna, Austria, March 12–16, 2003. The author is indebted to participants of this conference for helpful comments. The responsibility for any errors or shortcomings are the author's.     

我国省际间财政差异趋势与影响因素的实证研究

本文通过1980-2005年间的样本数据,揭示1980年以来我国省际间财政差异的变化趋势,以及这种变化趋势的影响因素.我们的研究表明,在财政收入方面,受地区经济差异加大的影响,1994年以后财政收入差异有扩大态势,而分税制改革有助于缩小省际间财政收入差异.在财政支出方面,1995年以后财政支出差异呈上升趋势,这是地区间经济发展水平差异与分税制共同作用的结果,但是前者的作用远远大于后者.因此,缩小省际间财政差异的途径除转移支付外,还应当主要致力于缩小省际间经济发展水平差异.     

Fiscal adjustment in a panel of countries 1870–2016

The financial crisis from 2007 and, even more so, the Covid-19 pandemic caused large increases in public sector deficits and debts in many countries and prompted concern about fiscal adjustment. This paper examines fiscal adjustment to debt and deficits for a panel of 17 countries over 1870–2016 using the Jordà–Schularick–Taylor Macrohistory Database. This long span panel is informative since it contains many examples of large fiscal shocks similar to those recently experienced. The results from reduced-form models suggest that large deficits or surpluses tend to prompt stabilising feedbacks, mainly through changes in revenue, and there is greater pressure to adjust on countries running a deficit versus those running a surplus. However, the debt–GDP ratio prompts much less stabilising feedback by expenditure or revenue.¹     

Investing Volatile Resource Revenues in Capital‐Scarce Economies

Natural resource revenues are an important financing source for public investment in many developing economies. Investing volatile resource revenues, however, may subject an economy to macroeconomic instability. This paper studies fiscal approaches to investing resource revenues, using Angola as an example. With spend‐as‐you‐go, resource revenues are spent as received, resulting in little external saving; public investment can be interrupted, driving up the capital depreciation rate and undermining stability. Gradual scaling‐up, instead, allows countries to build up external saving to shield investment from revenue volatility. The framework adopted here can be used as a planning tool to define a medium‐term fiscal strategy.     

失衡的增长结构与财政制度安排

本文基于中国式治理模式,从财政视角利用实证数据分析了中国失衡增长的内生机制。本文认为,中国失衡的增长结构与财政收支制度安排有关。在中国式治理模式下,1994年税改中确立的财政收入制度不仅挤压了居民消费能力,而且通过引致财政支出结构扭曲恶化了居民消费倾向。实现经济平衡增长,中国需要在现行体制框架内重构财政收支体系,通过建立以人为本的财政支出体系构筑居民有钱消费、敢于消费的制度环境,通过建立以人为主的财政收入制度构筑政府有效行政的激励结构和经济社会的内生平衡机制。     

What determines public education expenditures in Russia?1

Recent studies suggest that the allocation of expenditures in education is important for growth. The state of public education spending in many transition economies highlights the need for an assessment of the nature of education expenditures in these countries. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by estimating the determinants of education expenditures in the Russian Federation. Results from panel data analysis show that revenue and the student‐population ratio have a positive impact on education expenditures while the effect of population density is negative. Three regional variables also show significant impact. The income and price elasticity of public education expenditures are estimated to be 0.57 and ?0.18, respectively, a result comparable to studies from other countries. The results presented here provide insight into how fiscal institutions and the structure of the political process in Russia may affect the degree of resource allocation in the educational sector during the transition process.     

Welfare Analysis of a Fiscal Reconstruction Policy in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Public Investment

Constructing an endogenously growing overlapping generations model with public investment, we examine the welfare effects of a fiscal reconstruction policy. In this paper we define a fiscal reconstruction policy as a policy where the government reduces its spending level without changing the tax revenue and allocates the surplus of the revenue to redeem public debt. We show that if government spending is not productive it is possible that a fiscal reconstruction policy improves the utilities of both the current and future generations, while if government spending is productive it can harm the utilities of both generations. Received February 26, 2002; revised version received July 8, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003     

地方政府财政支出的结构偏异——基于跨界公共事务的视角*

本文通过理论分析发现,我国地方政府不仅存在生产性支出偏好,还会在外部性和信息不对称等因素影响下,改变其对跨界公共事务的资金投入。在“量入为出”预算编制原则下,本文利用2010—2019年我国31个省级政府面板数据,实证分析了地方政府一般公共预算收入对跨地区民生性支出、跨地区生产性支出、地区民生性支出和地区生产性支出四类财政支出的影响。结果表明：在全国层面上,跨地区生产性支出受财政收入的影响最大,地区民生性支出次之。比较三类地区的结果发现,区域内政府竞争强度越高,地方政府对外部性的重视程度越强,因而当地用于跨界公共事务的资金会越少。从不同类型财政收入对财政支出的影响结果来看,只有间接税收入可以同时对三类地区财政支出产生显著影响。最后根据研究结论,本文提出了相应的政策建议。     

The fiscal implications of hurricane strikes in the Caribbean

This paper empirically traces the fiscal impacts of hurricane strikes. To this end, a hurricane damage index is derived from a physical wind field model for a panel of Caribbean countries over 36 years. Results, based on panel VAR and impulse response functions analysis, show that, overall, hurricane strikes exert a short-term impact. Indeed, the study finds that the response of government spending is positive and significant while public investment, debt and tax revenue do not appear to respond (significantly) to hurricane strikes. Moreover, the study finds that Governments respond to hurricane strikes by engaging in short term deficit financing.     

Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.     

Fiscal Policy in New EU Member States: Go East,Prudent Man!

The European Union accepted 10 new member states (NMS) in 2004, eight of which were former socialist countries. New members have had to adjust their economic policies to EU standards. Perhaps most difficult has been fiscal policy, where NMS must comply with the Stability and Growth Pact rules. Indeed, four of the eight post-communist NMS breached the SGP limits and were put in the Excessive Deficit Procedure. While the SGP is being modified, fiscal policy is set to remain on the agenda for all NMS.

This article analyses fiscal policy in the eight NMS, focusing primarily on the period immediately preceding their EU accession. The structure and scale of these countries' fiscal policy are analysed and the main trends in the revenue and expenditure of their public budgets identified. Then the dynamics of fiscal policies in the NMS are explored and the main factors in them isolated. The authors show how much of the consolidation was due to the fiscal authorities' effort and how much was caused by external factors. They also show that most NMS governments have run rather inconsistent fiscal policies and have not consolidated their budgets appropriately, postponing politically difficult consolidation measures. However, they also identify a group of countries characterised by strong reform efforts and responsible fiscal policy making, supported usually by strong economic growth. In this context, room is given to economic as well as political economy factors.     

Fiscal crises,decentralization, and indiscipline

How does fiscal decentralization influence fiscal discipline and the probability of a fiscal crisis? Discrete choice analysis used with panel data reveals that crisis probability is associated positively with spending decentralization and negatively with vertical fiscal imbalance. These effects are prevalent in countries with a higher degree of tax revenue decentralization, while a stronger rule of law mitigates such adverse decentralization effects. The findings imply that reduced risk sharing against local shocks under tax revenue decentralization destabilizes the sustainability of a nation's fiscal system. Therefore, policymakers should be cognizant of the undesirable impacts of decentralization on fiscal crisis and indiscipline.     

Export Product Diversification and Public Revenue’s Dependence on Resource Revenue

ABSTRACT

This article tries to reconcile two major priorities for countries, notably resource-rich countries on the international development agenda: export product diversification with a view to helping them better integrate into the multilateral trading system and tax reforms with a view to reducing the dependence of total public revenue on resource revenue, and therefore developing a more sustainable stream of public revenue. The analysis therefore involves examining empirically the impact of export product diversification on countries’ overall public revenue dependence on resource revenue, this dependence being measured by the share of resource revenue in total public revenue. The empirical analysis shows that export product diversification exerts a negative and significant impact on resource revenue share of total public revenue, and therefore could help facilitate tax reforms towards lower resource revenue dependence. Hence, while tax policy is the main policy tool to conduct tax reforms, export product diversification would likely contribute to facilitating the implementation of these reforms.     

Fiscal limits in developing countries: A DSGE Approach

This paper studies fiscal limits in developing countries using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach. Distributions of fiscal limits, which measure a government’s capacity to service its debt, are simulated based on macroeconomic uncertainty and fiscal policy. The analysis shows that expected future revenue plays an important role in explaining the low fiscal limits of developing countries, relative to those of developed countries. Large devaluation of real exchange rates can significantly reduce a government’s capacity to service its debt and lower the fiscal limits. Temporary disturbances, therefore, can shift the distribution of fiscal limits and suddenly change perceptions about fiscal sustainability.     

Resource‐driven victory

The vast popularity of distributive policies in many resource‐rich countries coincided with the oil and gas price hike of 2004. However, following the sharp decline of price in the late 2014, this popularity started waning and the tendency toward more productive policies gained traction. Using a theoretical model, this paper studies the optimal composition of public spending and demonstrates that, for a sufficiently low amount of any exogenous revenue, for example, resource revenue, investing revenue in productive public good is preferable. The representative agent prefers more distributive policies as resource revenue increases. A key determinant of the optimal composition of public spending is the inherited level of productivity. Countries with too low or too high productivity both find distributive policies more appealing even for a small amount of resource revenue. Yet, they have an essential difference. Resource revenue eradicates individuals' incentive to work in countries with low initial productivity while individuals always prefer to work in highly productive countries.     

Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective

Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis ( Brennan and Buchanan 1980 ). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.