通货膨胀目标制真的有效吗——基于国际实践经验考察

通货膨胀目标制是货币政策规则理论的重要发展成果,并作为稳定物价体系和金融市场的工具被众多国家所采用.但是,国内外学术界对于通货膨胀目标制的实施效果莫衰一是,争论剧烈.文章以32个国家作为研究样本,通过基于面板数据的DID模型,实证考察了通货膨胀目标制是否真的有效这一命题.研究得出,采用通货膨胀目标制后,政策实施国家和非政策实施国家的差异缩小了,而且政策实施国家通胀水平的下降幅度远远高于非政策实施国家的下降幅度,通货膨胀目标制对新兴市场国家的影响要高于对工业化国家.     

通货膨胀目标制的研究成果综述

本文分别从理论和实证两方面详细综述了通货膨胀目标制的研究成果。理论方面主要是以时间为脉络介绍了通货膨胀目标制理论的发展过程;实证方面则从一国采取通货膨胀目标制的影响因素、支持通货膨胀目标制的实证研究和反对通货膨胀目标制的实证研究三方面进行了综述。     

通货膨胀目标制的研究成果综述

本文分别从理论和实证两方面详细综述了通货膨胀目标制的研究成果.理论方面主要是以时间为脉络介绍了通货膨胀目标制理论的发展过程;实证方面则从一国采取通货膨胀目标制的影响因素、支持通货膨胀目标制的实证研究和反对通货膨胀目标制的实证研究三方面进行了综述.     

中国宏观经济波动的隐性通货膨胀目标分析

本文利用新凯恩斯宏观经济模型对我国隐性通货膨胀目标、潜在产出和自然利率进行联合估计,并根据估计结果对我国宏观经济波动进行分析。研究结果表明,我国通货膨胀缺口可以度量我国的实际通货膨胀压力,我国的实际通货膨胀率整体上与隐性通货膨胀目标较为一致,经济政策对通货膨胀的调控具有有效性;隐性通货膨胀目标与宏观经济波动之间密切相关,通货膨胀缺口与产出缺口、实际利率缺口具有显著的动态影响关系。因此,应该充分发挥隐性通货膨胀目标在通货膨胀风险识别和预警方面的作用,提高其政策应用价值。     

浅谈通货膨胀目标制的有效性

自1990年以来,通货膨胀目标制作为缓解恶性通货膨胀、降低通货膨胀率波动性的工具,逐渐为越来越多的国家采用。然而,围绕这一类货币政策有效性的争论一直没有停止。使用68个国家的数据重新检验这一命题,基本方法是应用动态面板数据固定效应模型。由于结果随数据、方法的改变而有所不同,因此认为没有决定性的证据表明通货膨胀目标制对于降低通货膨胀率有效。     

通货膨胀目标制效应的数理分析与启示

在比较、分析通货膨胀目标制类型和特征的基础上,运用数理经济学工具对通货膨胀目标制的宏观经济效应进行实证分析,结果表明:通货膨胀目标制对宏观经济的有效性影响要优于其它货币政策框架.因此,我们应该为尽快引进这种政策框架进行积极准备.     

通货膨胀目标制的国际实践及启示

本文对通货膨胀目标制的实施情况及实施条件进行分析,得出我国实行通货膨胀目标制的条件还不成熟。但是在制定货币政策时,我国可以借鉴通货膨胀目标制的单一货币政策目标,减少货币政策对经济周期的扰动,进而实现经济的稳定增长。     

论通货膨胀目标制在我国的可行性

最近一段时间，国内学术界建议我国采纳通货膨胀目标制的呼声越来越高，通货膨胀目标制也确有许多优越性。但从该制度实施的必要条件和我国当前的具体国情来分析，我国目前并不适合实行通货膨胀目标制。     

加拿大的通货膨胀目标制及借鉴

通货膨胀目标制是20世纪90年代开始实施的一种新型的货币政策,通货膨胀目标成为货币政策领域最受人关注的焦点。本文分析了加拿大中央银行实施通货膨胀目标制的背景、目标设定以及实施情况,而且还研究了通货膨胀目标制对中央银行的结构影响。实证检验了该政策的效果,最后得出相关结论。     

加拿大的通货膨胀目标制及其启示

通货膨胀目标制是20世纪90年代开始实施的一种新型的货币政策，通货膨胀目标制成为货币政策领域最受人关注的焦点。本文以加拿大作为样本，分析了加拿大中央银行实施通货膨胀目标制的背景、目标设定以及实施情况，研究了通货膨胀目标制对中央银行的结构影响，实证检验了该政策的效果，最后得出相关结论。     

从通货膨胀目标制看货币政策透明度建设

近年来，通货膨胀目标制已成为一种新的货币政策框架，而通货膨胀目标制的显著优点在于能通过增强货币政策的透明度，提高政策的可信度，进而提高货币政策的有效性。提高货币政策的透明度正在成为一种国际趋势。因此．本文通过借鉴实施通货膨胀目标制的西方发达国家的成功经验，探讨我国应如何加强货币政策透明度的建设，提高货币政策有效性。     

Inflation Targeting Around the World

This paper examines the inflation record of twenty-nine inflation- and noninflation-targeting economies. Both industrial and emerging market economies are considered. Empirical evidence is based on a comparison of actual and forecasted inflation, an econometric analysis that estimates changes in inflation persistence, and an estimate of the probability of a breach in the inflation target as a proxy for the fragility of the targeting regime. I find that inflation persistence has fallen in only a handful of emerging market economies. However, the inflationtargeting regime is not especially fragile in emerging market economies. As these economies gain experience with inflation targets and respond appropriately to forecast errors generated by the private sector, the likelihood of breaches in the target ranges tends to fall.     

Inflation Targeting as Constrained Discretion

This paper suggests a simple framework for modeling inflation targeting as constrained discretion. Although it is widely claimed that inflation targeting has been successful in maintaining low and stable inflation, an announcement of an inflation target does not by itself mean that central bankers are precommiting to how they conduct monetary policy. In comparison to the assumption of many theoretical studies, central banks conduct monetary policy in a discretionary fashion and rarely precommit to a rule in reality. Therefore, the central bank in this paper is modeled as discretionary, yet faced with a constraint, that an average of future inflation over a certain horizon should be kept on or near the preannounced target level. It is natural to add this constraint to the central banker’s optimization problem, since inflation targeting involves one way or another an evaluation of the performance over a certain horizon. So it is argued that the better outcome of inflation targeting does not come from a commitment but from “constrained discretion.” This paper also sheds some light on optimal targeting horizon.     

Inflation Targeting,Fiscal Policy,and the Exchange Rate Regime

Until recently, Turkey’s economy was characterized by high inflation, undisciplined public finance management, and a fragile banking system and experienced multiple economic crises. After the economy was hit by another crisis in 2001, the central bank became independent, adopted inflation targeting as the monetary policy framework, and implemented reforms to adopt a more stringent fiscal policy. Inflation rates decreased to single-digit levels within 3 years after the independence of the central bank. This article analyzes the end of the high inflation period in the context of monetary and fiscal policy interactions within a Markov-Switching Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model in which monetary and fiscal policies are allowed to switch between different regimes.     

Fiscal Dominance and Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Turkey

In the aftermath of the 2000-2001 crisis in Turkey, the banking sector was in turbulence, requiring immediate action. The rescue operation significantly increased the public debt ratio with respect to gross domestic product. At the beginning of 2002, the central bank of Turkey announced that it was going to implement an implicit inflation-targeting regime. The fiscal dominance caused by the high debt ratio severely constrained the conduct of monetary policy. Other obstacles to the conduct of monetary policy included a high level of exchange rate pass-through, inflation inertia, and a weak banking sector. This paper offers an account of the monetary policy experience of Turkey in the postcrisis period and provides lessons for policymakers in other emerging markets.     

Endogenous Price Stickiness,Trend Inflation,and Macroeconomic Stability

Previous studies show that higher trend inflation is more likely to induce indeterminacy of equilibrium in sticky‐price models based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged. This paper demonstrates that when the degree of price stickiness is endogenously determined in a Calvo model, indeterminacy caused by higher trend inflation is less likely. A key factor for determinacy is the long‐run inflation elasticity of output implied by the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This elasticity declines substantially with higher trend inflation in the case of exogenously given price stickiness, whereas in the case of endogenous price stickiness the decline in the elasticity is mitigated because higher trend inflation leads to a higher probability of price adjustment.     

Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Pass-Through: The Turkish Experience

Using a vector autoregression model, we show that the pass-through from imported inflation to domestic inflation has weakened substantially and slowed after the adoption of inflation targeting in Turkey. We argue that this finding is due mainly to several features—such as enhanced credibility of the central bank, changing behavior of the exchange rate, and a shift in expectation formation—possibly acquired by the implementation of a successful inflation-targeting regime. These observations suggest that adopting an inflation-targeting regime in itself may help to reduce exchange rate pass-through.     

Fiscal Adjustment and Inflation Targeting in Less Developed Countries

Inflation targeting may not be viable in less developed countries (LDCs) where policymakers rely too heavily on cuts in infrastructure investment to balance the budget. Using a mix of analytical and numerical methods, we demonstrate that the equilibrium ceases to be saddle point stable under active policy when infrastructure cuts account for 30–70% of fiscal adjustment and the return on infrastructure exceeds a comparatively low threshold value. The result is robust to the form of the Taylor rule, the degree of real wage flexibility, the initial level of debt, the choice of a balanced‐budget or debt‐targeting rule, and the q‐elasticity of private investment spending.     

Inflation Targeting Does Not Matter: Another Look at OECD Sacrifice Ratios

Recently in this journal, Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) concluded that inflation targeters were able to bring inflation down at less cost than nontargeters (p. 242). This comment shows that their conclusion is not robust but instead is the result of comparing a particular subset of inflation targeting (IT) disinflations with nonsimultaneous disinflations that occurred under very different macroeconomic conditions. In their sample, simple extensions such as justifiably varying the treatment group of IT disinflations, to control for common time‐varying effects or to control for the Maastricht Treaty effects, suggest that IT does not matter.