Justifying social discounting: The rank-discounted utilitarian approach

The discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized for treating generations unequally. We propose an extended rank-discounted utilitarian (ERDU) criterion instead. The criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on non-decreasing streams, but it treats all generations impartially: discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion. We show that more inequality averse ERDU societies have higher social discount rates when future generations are better off. We apply the ERDU approach in two benchmark economic growth models and prove that it promotes sustainable policies that maximize discounted utilitarian welfare.     

The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies

This paper studies the relationship between social conflict and skilled–unskilled wage inequality through the three-sector general equilibrium approach. In the basic model without the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that when the government enhances the degree of controlling social conflict, the skilled–unskilled wage inequality will be narrowed down (resp. widened) if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive (resp. labor intensive) than the urban unskilled sector. The extended models address the issue under different economic structures or different types of social conflict. In the extended model with the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that the skilled–unskilled inequality will be widened when the degree of controlling social conflict is increased. In other extended models, we find that the above obtained results are still robust.     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects

We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness (i) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), (ii) reduces competition, (iii) reduces the conflict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and (iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility.     

Social conflict and growth

Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory of economic growth, we observe that poor countries have invested at lower rates and have not grown faster than rich countries. To explain these empirical regularities we provide a game-theoretic model of conflict between social groups over the distribution of income. Among all possible equilibria, we concentrate on those that are on the constrained Pareto frontier. We study how the level of wealth and the degree of inequality affects growth. We show how lower wealth can lead to lower growth and even to stagnation when the incentives to domestic accumulation are weakened by redistributive considerations.     

United States income inequality: The concept of countervailing power revisited

This article uses some of the conceptual infrastructure associated with J.K. Galbraith’s “countervailing power” argument to explore the deep history of U.S. income inequality. Two explanatory variables—institutional power and distributive conflict—have played an integral role in the shifting patterns of U.S. income inequality since the late nineteenth century. The “commodified” power of large firms, manifested in aggregate concentration and the markup, exacerbates inequality while the “countervailing” power of organized labor, manifested in union density and strike activity, mitigates inequality. One implication of this research is that U.S. income inequality is unlikely to diminish unless the labor movement (or a comparable social movement) is strengthened.     

Unfair inequality and growth*

Fighting against economic inequality is one fundamental social goal in the agendas of most governments. However, recent studies highlight that people actually prefer unequal societies, as they accept inequality generated by an individual's effort and wish to reduce only unfair inequality (generated by factors beyond an individual's control). This distinction might help to explain the fundamental unsolved question about whether inequality is good or bad for growth: unfair inequality (UI) could be growth-deterring, while fair inequality (FI) might be growth-enhancing. We derive a reduced-form growth equation from a stylized overlapping-generations model with human capital that includes FI, UI, and poverty. Then, using an instrumental variable approach, we show for alternative samples and inequality measures at the worldwide level that the estimated coefficient associated with UI is always negative, while the coefficient of total inequality increases when UI is included in the regression. Moreover, we find that poverty mediates this relationship because the higher the poverty rate, the smaller the impact of either type of inequality on growth.     

MARKET ECONOMIES WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

I consider a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labor. I represent economic decision makers as “consumer–producers,” who consume as well as produce commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a nontrivial social division of labor is guided by Increasing Returns to Specialization (IRSpec) in production. Under IRSpec, I show existence of competitive equilibria, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterize these equilibria. Markets equilibrate through the adjustment of the social division of labor; the production technologies completely determine the equilibrium prices.     

Income inequality in China: causes and policy responses

The phenomenal economic growth in China has been accompanied by a rapid increase in income inequality. This paper reviews the historical trends and patterns of income inequality in China, discusses the potential causes underlying rising income inequality, and applies the functional distribution of income approach in understanding China’s income inequality. This analytical approach highlights how rising return to capital relative to wage incomes can be an important source for increasing income inequality in China. The paper provides the evidence which shows that the rapid economic growth in China has been relying on a model that pays high returns to various kinds of capital including financial capital and real estate, while the ownership of capital is very unequal. This finding prompts us to rethink about the causes of China’s income inequality and to formulate appropriate policies based on the new way of understanding this pressing issue of income distribution in China.     

Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses

This article argues that domestic social conflicts are a key to understanding why growth rates lack persistence and why so many countries have experienced a growth collapse since the mid-1970s. It emphasizes, in particular, the manner in which social conflicts interact with external shock on the one hand, and the domestic institutions of conflict-management on the other. Econometric evidence provides support for this hypothesis. Countries that experienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 were those with divided societies (as measured by indicators of inequality, ethnic fragmentation, and the like) and with weak institutions of conflict management (proxied by indicators of the quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic rights, and social safety nets).     

The Making of Pro‐Poor Growth

A system of three endogenous equations is used to estimate the determinants of poverty dynamics. The system incorporates: (i) the direct effect of growth and income inequality on poverty, (ii) the feedback effect of poverty on inequality and growth, and (iii) different channels through which economic policies can contribute to poverty reduction. Results suggest that countries tend to move towards one of two possible equilibria. The positive (virtuous) equilibrium is characterized by fast growth, decreasing inequality, and rapid poverty reduction. The negative (vicious) equilibrium involves slow (or even negative) growth, sharpening inequalities, and resilient poverty. The policy mix is critical in determining to which of the two equilibria a country converges.     

Corporate social responsibility,vertical product differentiation and international competition

Would a foreign firm’s consumer‐oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country’s voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import‐competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit‐driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer‐oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm’s profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm’s profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U‐shaped. When firms’ decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm.     

Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games

We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria—the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk–dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria. This is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the players are sufficiently impatient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Public debt and welfare in a quantitative Schumpeterian growth model with incomplete markets

This paper quantifies the welfare effects of counterfactual public debt policies using an endogenous growth model with incomplete markets. The economy features public debt, Schumpeterian growth, infinitely-lived agents, uninsurable income risk, and discount factor heterogeneity. Two versions of the model are specified, one with households holding equity in the group of innovating firms. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy to match the degree of wealth inequality, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP, the firms’ exit rate, the average growth rate, and other standard long-run targets. When comparing balanced growth paths, I find large welfare gains in equilibria characterized by governments accumulating public wealth. The result is robust to the mechanism used to generate a highly concentrated wealth (i.e., preference heterogeneity or “superstar” income shocks). Welfare effects decompositions show that level effects and growth effects reinforce each other. The responses of both the intermediate goods and their market conditions are key in explaining the large level effects. The version of the model without equity is computationally easier to solve, allowing to consider transitional dynamics. Taking into account the dynamic adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium, I show that the transitional welfare costs are not large enough to change the sign of the welfare effects stemming from a change in public debt. I find that eliminating public debt would lead to a 0.8% increase in welfare, while moving to a debt/GDP ratio of 100% would entail a welfare loss of 0.5%. A decomposition analysis shows that growth accounts for approximately 50% of the overall welfare effects.     

The impact of heterogeneity of discount factors and asset returns on inequality

We investigate the effect of differential access to financial markets, discount factor and wealth endowment on poverty and inequality. We construct a model of educational and savings choice with heterogeneous agents. Motivated by empirical evidence, in this economy the return on savings is a non-decreasing function of the amount saved. As expected, more patient households tend to become wealthier and more educated. The heterogeneity on portfolio returns is shown to be key to our main result: the model closely fits the data on income and wealth inequalities, being able to explain the existing Brazil’s inequality patterns. The model was also calibrated to the US, with similar fit. We then evaluate two types of public policies based on cash transfer schemes (CTSs), that aim to reduce poverty and inequality. We find that the CTS version in which receiving the benefit is conditional on educating the household’s youngster outperforms its unconditional version in almost all dimensions analysed.     

Identification of Dynamic Models of Rewards Programme

“Frequent‐buyer” rewards programmes are commonly used by companies as a marketing tool to compete for market share. They provide a unique environment for studying consumers’ forward‐looking behaviour. The consumer's problem on accumulating reward points can be formulated as a stationary infinite horizon discrete choice dynamic programming model. We show that the parameters of this model, including the discount factor, are well‐identified. In particular, it is possible to identify state‐dependent discount factors (i.e. discount factors can vary with the number of reward points). We discuss how this identification result is related to the goal‐gradient hypothesis studied in the consumer psychology literature.     

中国经济的包容性增长:测量与评价

本文首先对包容性增长的基本内涵进行了综述,在此基础上,构建了一套由4个维度、7个领域、13个指标组成的包容性增长指数;然后对评价指标赋权重,形成了一套包容性增长的综合评价指标体系;最后,运用该指标体系对1990-2009年中国的包容性增长进行了测量,并根据测量结果提出了建议。评价结果发现,中国经济增长总体上呈现包容性趋势,经济增长迅速并且带来了就业增长,提高了人的基本能力和基础社会保障水平,但是中国包容性增长整体水平比较低,并且发展缓慢,收入不平等越来越显著,成为中国实现经济包容性增长的巨大障碍。因此,应该从实现机会平等角度设计政策,追求经济增长的包容性。     

税收、收入不平等和内生经济增长

企业家(通过金融中介)从家庭借贷来支撑创新。二者在企业家的努力不为外人所见的情形下双方签订信用合同分享创新带来的垄断利润(即蛋糕)。两个有代表性经济人(企业家和家庭)的存在允许人们在内生经济增长模型里研究收入不平等。本文研究发现,企业家分配份额的增加一开始会提升增长速度,但是过了一定值后会拉低增长速度;而该份额的增加一直拉大企业家和工人间的收入差距。所以降低企业家获得的蛋糕的份额的分配改革可缩小收入差距。提高企业家来自创新的收入的税率将降低他们的努力程度,从而降低增长速度,但是该税率的提高有助于降低收入不平等程度。存款收入的税率提高尽管不会改变企业家的努力程度,但是也会降低经济增长速度,而且不会降低收入不平等(如果工人有一定比例的存款)。对于劳动收入(工人工资)的税率增加会加剧工人和企业家间的收入不平等,但对经济增长速度没有影响。     

Human capital and economic growth in an overlapping generations model

The paper describes an aggregative optimal growth model, the essential features of which are that individuals are mortal and obtain their labor skill through educational training. The process of human capital formation is described by an education function which relates the pass rate to the educational expenditure per student. Two alternative scenarios, private and public education regimes, are separately investigated. Under the decentralized education regime, risk-neutral individuals borrow to finance their education when young. Under the centralized education regime, the cost of education is financed by taxes imposed on the workers in the economy, and the central government maximizes a long-term social target function. The equilibria of both regimes are analyzed and various comparative static results derived. It is shown that educational investment in a decentralized equilibrium is higher than that in the centralized steady state. We also establish that there exists a time discount rate at which or above which the decentralized per capita consumption exceeds that of the centralized steady state whereas for time rates of discount sufficiently near the population growth rate, the above result will be reversed.     

Social mobility and inequality in urban China: understanding the role of intergenerational transmission of education

China’s rapid economic growth since the late 1980s has been accompanied by great economic and social transformations, which have resulted in a sharp increase in income inequality. This article contributes to the literature of social mobility in China by examining the impact of parental education on the education of their children. Using the 1990 and 2000 Chinese Population Censuses, we employ nonparametric estimation strategies to provide a systematic investigation of intergenerational transmission of education in urban China. We find evidence of increasing parents–children educational correlations. Our results raise concerns regarding economic inequality in urban China as high intergenerational persistence of education is expected to be a barrier to equal opportunities in children’s education attainments and their future labour market outcomes.