Developing Country Second‐Mover Advantage in Competition Over Environmental Standards and Taxes

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a “second‐mover advantage.” In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental standard levels. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of fiscal competition. Four distinct outcomes can be characterized by varying the marginal cost to firms of an environmental externality: (1) the outcome may be efficient; (2) the developing country may be a “pollution haven”—a place to escape excessively high environmental standards in the developed country; (3) the developing country may “undercut” the developed country and attract all firms; (4) the developed country may be a pollution haven.     

TAX COMPETITION IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: HOW LARGER MARKETS REDUCE PROFIT TAXES*

We set up a simple two‐country model of tax competition where firms with different productivity decide in which location to produce and sell output. In this model, a unique, asymmetric Nash equilibrium is shown to exist, provided that countries are sufficiently different with respect to their exogenous market size. Sorting of firms occurs in equilibrium, as the smaller country levies the lower tax rate and attracts the low‐cost firms. A simultaneous expansion of both markets that raises the profitability of firms intensifies tax competition and causes both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite higher corporate tax bases.     

跨国公司行业选择与地点选择战略的相关性

行业选择和地点选择分别是跨国公司进入战略的主要论题,但现有研究缺少对两者之间是否存在相关性的分析。本文以中国FDI的“引进来”部分（IFDI）和“走出去”部分（OFDI）为倒,分析中国作为东道国引进外资时和其作为母国对外投资时在行业选择上的差异;并考虑地点选择因素,研究“走出去”的中国企业在发达国家和发展中国家的行业选择上是否存在差异,以及在中国投资的发达国家和发展中国家在行业选择上是否存在区别。通过跟踪200家外商来华投资企业和40家中国对外投资企业（118个项目）的投资产业、母国和东道国信息,运用描述统计和卡方检验得出实证结论：外商来华投资和中国对外投资在行业选择和地点选择上都存在差别;发达国家和发展中国家在华投资行业的技术含量有显著不同,即跨国公司的行业选择与地点选择存在相关性;但中国企业在对外投资中受资源寻求动机的强烈影响,其到发达国家和发展中国家进行投资时在行业选择上没有体现出差异性。     

外商投资动机对区位选择的影响——基于昆山台资企业问卷调查的研究

本文在考察外商投资动机与区位选择关系的基础上,根据对昆山台资企业问卷调查的第一手资料,实证分析了昆山台资企业投资的基本动机和选择在昆山投资主要看重的区位因素。结果表明,市场导向型、成本导向性、垄断优势导向型与竞争合作导向型的台资企业分别偏重市场、成本、政策服务与投入供应配套的区位因子。不同规模、不同产品类型的企业也有着截然不同的区位偏好。在上述发现的基础上,本文对利用和管理外资提出了相应的启示。     

International Outsourcing,Tax, and Patent Protection

We show the implications of strengthening patent protection in a developing country in the presence of a vertical technology transfer, which, despite its empirical relevance, did not get due attention in the literature. We show that if there is imperfect knowledge spillover under a weak patent protection, a strong patent protection in the developing country increases the profit of the developed‐country firm if there is a uniform tax rate in the developing country. However, if there is either perfect knowledge spillover under weak patent protection or discriminatory tax policy in the developing country, the profits of the developed‐country firms are the same under weak and strong patent protections in the developing countries.     

Footloose Capital and Comparative Advantage

We investigate the effect of country size differentials and Ricardian technology differences on firms’ location decisions using a two‐country, two‐good (homogeneous agricultural good and differentiated manufacturing products), two‐factor (labour and footloose capital) simple new economic geography model. We found that manufacturing firms may agglomerate in a country where the manufacturing sector has a comparative disadvantage. In addition, when country size differentials and Ricardian technology differences exist between two countries, the key factor influencing firms’ location decisions changes according to the level of trade liberalization, from being market size‐dependent to becoming technology‐dependent.     

THE ALLOCATION OF OECD DIRECT INVESTMENT BETWEEN CEECS: A DISCRETE CHOICE APPROACH

The choice of the location of foreign direct investment is a complex phenomenon, depending not only on host‐country characteristics, but also on host‐industry and specific source‐firm characteristics. To capture these different influences for foreign investment location decisions into 13 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) over a twelve‐year period, this paper uses a Generalized Nested Logit (GNL) model with firm, industry, and country data. The novel empirical results show that the responsiveness of firms’ decisions regarding where to locate capital in CEECs to country‐level variables differs both across sectors and across firms of different sizes and profitability.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Vertical technology transfer and the welfare implications of patent protection

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing-country firms, and many trading companies from developing countries create competition in the developed countries, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay considerable attention to these aspects. In a Cournot oligopoly with vertical technology transfer, we show that patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if the following three conditions hold together: (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods sellers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country producers is sufficiently high. We also show that patent protection in the developing country always creates higher developing-country welfare if no developing-country firm enters the final goods market. We also discuss the implications of Bertrand competition on our results.     

Industrial Location and Spatial Inequality: Theory and Evidence from India

The authors argue that spatial inequality of industry location is a primary cause of spatial income inequality in developing nations. Their study focuses on understanding the process of spatial industrial variation: identifying the spatial factors that have cost implications for firms, and the factors that influence the location decisions of new industrial units. The analysis has two parts. First the authors examine the contribution of economic geography factors to the cost structure of firms in eight industry sectors and show that local industrial diversity is the one factor with significant and substantial cost‐reducing effects. They then show that new private sector industrial investments in India are biased toward existing industrial and coastal districts, whereas state industrial investments (in deep decline after structural reforms) are far less biased toward such districts. The authors conclude that structural reforms lead to increased spatial inequality in industrialization, and therefore, income.     

Open technology innovation activity and firm value: evidence from Korean firms

Despite the importance of Open Technology Innovation Activity (OTIA) for firm value, the literature investigating effects of OTIA announcements of developing country firms is not known in international academic circles. Our study using an event study approach examines the effects of OTIA (technology import and joint R&D) announcements of firms in Korea, one of the leading developing and highly innovative countries. We find that the announcements of OTIA produce positive average abnormal returns. Interestingly, unlike the prior studies on developed country firms, OTIA with firms in the homogenous industry leads to greater firm value than that involving firms in heterogenic industries. This implies an importance of a technological fusion with external firms in different industries for value of developing country firms. In addition, this article finds no home bias that a nationality of partner firms is not essential for the relation between OTIA and value of firms.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.     

Foreign direct investment,international trade,and firm heterogeneity

We present an asymmetric model with firm heterogeneity and foreign direct investment (FDI) from a developed country to a developing country. We found that the successful entry firms could be sorted from highest to lowest according to productivity as reimport firms, FDI firms, export firms, and domestic firms. We also found that FDI decreases (increases) the gross national income of the developed (developing) country, but it can either increase or decrease the world income according to the level of the relative propensity to spend. In addition, we demonstrated that FDI influences welfare through variations in average price, national income, and the number of types of goods.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

Explaining Export Performance through Inputs: Evidence from Aggregated Cross‐country Firm‐level Data

Which trade barrier related to intermediate inputs forms a greater burden on the export performance of firms in developing countries? Using aggregated cross‐country firm‐level data covering 43 mostly developing economies, this paper estimates the marginal importance of the impact of various intermediate input trade cost barriers, namely tariffs, non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) and services barriers, on firms' export behavior. In a cross‐sectoral setting, this paper takes the firm's export performance in goods as a central focus to study the effects of these different trade barriers through the exporting firm's choice of use of intermediate inputs. The results show that the most significant trade barriers on inputs that impede export performance in developing countries are mainly NTBs and restrictions of services.     

Cost‐reducing R&D Investment,Labor Market and Trade

This paper constructs a two‐country model in which oligopolistic firms export goods and undertake cost‐reducing R&D investment. Each country imposes tariffs. A decrease in the tariff rates in both countries decreases cost‐reducing R&D investment.     

What drives the localization of Spanish multinationals in developing and transition countries?

In this paper, we investigate the location determinants of Spanish multinational firms in developing and transition economies. We pay particular attention to the role played by market potential and agglomeration economies as decisive factors in location. We also analyze whether, beyond the observed attributes, there are any significant differences across regions in terms of attracting foreign affiliates. With this aim, we estimate a mixed logit model, which allows us to endogenously consider the existence of complex substitution patterns among different destinations. Our results confirm that Spanish investment in developing and transition countries depends on market potential and agglomeration externalities. The intensity of these externalities, however, depends on the nationality of competitors, greater rivalry being observed among Spanish‐owned affiliates. Furthermore, our findings show that the location of multinational firms responds both to factors related to the local business environment, including the cost and quality of labor and infrastructures, and to the existence of specific regional effects.     

Export Competition between Landlocked and Coastal Countries: An Analysis of Strategic Export Policies

This paper analyzes economic rivalry between two firms using an international Cournot duopoly model, where a firm from a landlocked country (LC) and a firm from a coastal country (CC) compete in a third‐country market. It is assumed that the landlocked country firm adopts a transport‐cost reducing R&D subsidized by its government, while the CC government imposes a toll fee on the LC firm. The findings show since a change in the LC's transport‐cost reducing R&D subsidy has a positive effect on its export and a negative effect on the CC's export, both measures have effective strategic export policies.     

Migration,Foreign Aid and the Welfare State

Aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign aid and the welfare state are highlighted in this paper. Migration is modeled as a costly movement from an aid‐recipient developing country with low income and no welfare state, towards a rich donor, developed country with a well‐developed welfare state. Within this model, it is found, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the co‐financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost decreases, e.g. as a result of greater economic integration between the two countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid and the recipient country to increase the co‐financing rate.