Realitic and Analytic Syntheses of Macro- and Microeconomics

We study the impact of employer's opportunism on wage rigidity in capitalist companies by arguing that the need to fix wages is crucially influenced by the asymmetric distribution of decision-making power and information in favor of the stronger contractual party — the employer, and against the weaker contractual party — employees. The capitalist entrepreneur can make decisions, whose negative consequences are borne by workers in terms of lower wages and more intense work pace. Excessive wage reductions in the face of negative exogenous shocks or too risky investment decisions represent the main instances of such opportunistic behavior. Fixed wages can represent workers' best response to the emerging risk of the employer moral hazard, but this implies a heightened risk of layoffs since wages and employment levels cannot be fixed at the same time. Besides discussing piece rate contracts, profit-sharing and codetermination as counterexamples, we observe worker cooperatives which depart from the presence of contrasting interests and private information in the principal-agent framework. Indeed, several empirical studies have shown greater employment stability and wage flexibility in worker cooperatives vis-à-vis the capitalist firm.     

THE RESPONSE OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES TO IMPORT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS

We examine the wage and employment impact on Chinese firms of an increase in import competition associated with China's WTO accession in December 2001, with an emphasis on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that both wage and employment are negatively impacted by an increase in import competition, but firms with high state ownership cut employment less and reduce wages more than their private counterparts, suggesting that they prioritize the protection of employment over that of wages. This finding supports the notion that SOEs may have ‘multitask’ responsibilities in terms of protecting employment as well as achieving efficiency. We also find that firms with higher capital intensity reduce their wages less but cut employment more in response to intensified import competition. This provides empirical support for the efficiency wage theory.     

Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labour market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. To investigate the impact of these changes, we use unique longitudinal matched employer‐employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and enables links of the workers to the firms in which they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign‐owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and are also able to improve the match quality of their workers. JEL Classifications: J23, J31, J41, J61, P23, P31.     

EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION INSIDE FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF WORKER COOPERATIVES

There is evidence that worker cooperatives provide a greater stabilization of employment compared to capital‐managed firms. While the reasons of this behaviour can be ascribed to their property and governance structure, less is known of the tools to put it into practice. I discuss two possible ways to guarantee employment insurance: by letting wages fluctuate, or by accumulating reinvested profits into an income stabilizing fund that copes with downturns without firing and without reducing wages. In this second case, I find out that asset locks play a wage smoothing role. This may explain the large share of profits that are reinvested in this indivisible and not appropriable fund. I provide evidence for this mechanism by means of original data at the firm level and of first‐hand collected survey data at the individual level on risk perception in a sample of Italian cooperatives.     

On the stability of the cooperative type of organization

The stability of producer cooperatives in market economies is analyzed in a dynamic context. It is shown that, when permitted to hire wage laborers, a producer cooperative, even if its labor productivity is higher than in an otherwise equivalent capitalist firm, is likely to lose its cooperative character because members' personal income will be maximized when “expensive” members are replaced by “inexpensive” wage-laborers. Producer cooperatives will maintain their organizational character best when they operate in a marginal industry where cooperation enhances members' productivity so that their earnings exceed their opportunity wages. In general, competitive markets for membership are not a sufficient condition to prevent the transformation of cooperatives into capitalist firms.     

Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game

This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions.     

Wage Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages: A Synthesis

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro–Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non–shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.     

COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND CONVENTIONAL FIRMS IN A SAMPLE OF QUASI‐TWIN COMPANIES

The resilience of cooperatives and their positive contribution to employment in times of crisis is well established. However, their overall economic performance relative to conventional firms is still controversial, casting doubt on the ability of this alternative organizational form to govern the fundamental drivers of productivity. To shed new light on the issue, we study the comparative technical efficiency of agricultural cooperatives (ACs) and conventional firms (CFs), drawing on a unique data set comprising all wine‐producing companies in Sardinia (Italy) from 2004 to 2009. Due to the similarity of the habitats in which the firms operate and the careful measurement of several key inputs, the observed units are ‘twins’ in all non‐organizational respects, providing an ideal setting for comparison. Having generated efficiency scores through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we regressed the scores on external covariates and ownership type using a pooled truncated maximum likelihood formulation. Our findings, which survive correction for spatial correlations, indicate that cooperatives are less technically efficient than their capitalist counterparts and struggle more to adapt to extreme weather fluctuations. Both results are particularly worrying in light of the main challenges facing the wine industry in the near future: liberalization of EU planting rights and climate change.     

The importance of worker, firm and match effects in the formation of wages

This paper estimates a Mincerian wage equation with worker, firm, and match specific effects and thereby complements the growing empirical literature started by the seminal paper of Abowd (Econometrica 67:251–333, 1999b). The analysis takes advantage of the extensive Danish IDA data which provides wage information on the entire working population in a 27-year period. We find that the major part of wage dispersion in the Danish labor market can be explained by differences in worker characteristics. However, the relative contributions of the three components vary across subgroups of workers. The match effect constitutes a non-negligible part of the overall wage dispersion. An analysis of inter-industry wage differentials shows that firm characteristics are more important at the industry level than at the worker level. Similarly, we find evidence that high-wage workers tend to sort into high-wage industries to a larger extent than they sort into high-wage firms within industries. The mobility pattern of workers is related to the quality of the firm and the match. Finally, we find that firms’ wage policies differ across subgroups.     

RAISING CAPITAL BY ISSUING TRANSFERABLE MEMBERSHIP IN A WORKER COOPERATIVE

It is generally recognized that worker cooperatives have a disadvantage in raising capital compared with conventional capitalist firms. In this paper, we explore a method for a worker cooperative to raise non‐redeemable equity by issuing transferable membership shares as financial securities.     

A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications

This paper helps close the gap between theory and empirical evidence in the literature on asymmetric employer learning. If an employer's private learning is reflected in a worker's wage and one employer's private information is transmitted to the next when the worker makes a job-to-job transition, then asymmetric employer learning will appear in wage regressions as learning over an employment spell. Extending previous work that assumes all learning takes place publicly, this paper develops wage regressions that test for both asymmetric employer learning and public learning. The empirical results, including tests of alternative explanations, are consistent with asymmetric employer learning's having at least as much of an effect on wages during an employment spell as does public learning. The model developed in this paper illustrates how the story suggested by the empirical work might unfold. It shows that outside firms can profitably compete with a better-informed employer through bidding wars, even when the worker is equally productive in all firms. Furthermore, this competition results in different wages for workers with the same publicly observable characteristics, a result that previous models of asymmetric learning have not produced.     

The Productivity Effects of Worker Mobility Between Heterogeneous Firms

We analyze the effect of worker inflows on establishments’ productivity, using German data. Previous studies for other countries have found positive effects of hiring workers from superior (more productive or higher paying) firms. Ranking establishments by their median wage, we find that inflows from inferior establishments seem to increase hiring establishments’ productivity. Further empirical analyses suggest our findings are due to a positive selection of such inflows from their sending establishments. These workers might have to find a better job match in order to advance their careers, an interpretation supported by the finding that the effect is driven by workers with short tenure at their previous employer. Our findings reflect the increasingly assortative pattern of worker mobility in Germany found in a related strand of literature.     

Determinants of wage stickiness in a developing economy

We explore wage flexibility in a developing country and compare our results to what has been found in similar studies using European data. In particular, we conduct a survey of 1189 firms in Pakistan to analyze the determinants of wage rigidity. We find that the existence of competitive wages and an interaction with the informal economy are statistically significant determinants of wage stickiness. While the role of competitive wages is similar to what has been found in studies of European firms, the latter find a much larger role for turnover, collective bargaining and employment protection. In contrast, in Pakistan we find that firms hiring from the informal sector are significantly more flexible in changing their wages. This suggests that the informal sector adds to the wage flexibility of the formal sector.     

Wage settlements and wage setting: results from a multi-level model

Which dimensions of wage setting differ across establishments applying collective contracts and uncovered establishments? The empirical analysis reported here utilizes German linked employer–employee data for the years 1990, 1995 and 2001 and is restricted to workers without supervisory functions in larger manufacturing firms. Results show that the expected wage of an average worker is higher in firms applying collective contracts, while returns to human capital and the gender wage gap are reduced. Moreover, during the 1990s these effects became stronger.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Its Bark is Worse Than its Bite: The Wage and Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage in the US

This study examines the effect of changes in the US minimum wage on wages and employment in 32 industries selected for their presumed sensitivity to the minimum wage. Applying time series techniques commonly used in macroeconomics and finance to changes in the minimum wage occurring from 1967 and 1991, we initially test for a wage response; only where one is found do we test for an employment response. Twenty-five per cent of the industry/minimum-wage-increase pairs show evidence of an appropriate wage response. Eight of these 54 show a statistically significant negative employment response, while six show significant, positive employment responses. Positive effects may be due to either a high variance distribution centred on zero or markets with 'lemons' problems concerning worker quality. Limiting analysis to industries in which the minimum wage binds provides no evidence of a consistent negative relationship between the historical minimum wage and employment.     

Wage,productivity and unemployment: microeconomics theory and macroeconomics data

We confront microeconomics theory with macroeconomics data. Unemployment results from two main micro-level decisions of workers and firms. Most of the efficiency wage and bargaining theories predict that over the business cycle, unemployment falls below its natural rate when the worker’s real wage exceeds the reservation wage. However, these theories have weak empirical support. Firm’s decision predicts that when the worker’s real wage exceeds the marginal product of labour (MPL), unemployment increases above its natural rate. Accounting for this microeconomic decision helps explain almost all the fluctuations of US unemployment.     

Conflict in the labor market: Seniority rules and unemployment

This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of two labor-market institutions that play an important role in worker-management interactions: seniority-based layoffs and majority voting on wage proposals. Together, these make the median worker, rather than the marginal worker, the important decision maker for wage and employment outcomes. Since he is risk-averse, he will trade off higher wages for greater security of employment; therefore, the equilibrium level of unemployment will be much less than 50%, but higher than the conventional natural rate of unemployment. Median-worker behavior helps to explain both the greater frequency of excess supply than excess demand (59.4% versus 40.6% of the time since 1890) and the wage concessions of 1981–1983. A new Phillips curve is derived which incorporates systematic influences of the size of the labor force (to correct for the inappropriate measure of excess supply) and Tobin's “q” variable (to measure the risk of unemployment for the median worker). With U.S. data for 1957–1983, this new Phillips curve has a higher explanatory power than the traditional one. Additional forces that influence wages and employment in this setting are identified: firms have an incentive to bargain actively over wages rather than accept union demands passively and senior workers have a “social contract” with junior workers that reduces the extent to which the former exploit the latter.     

The responsiveness of industry wages to low‐frequency shocks in Canada

Abstract The first objective of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between low‐frequency shocks to labour demand and average wages on an industrial basis using a Canadian longitudinal data set. We estimate a fixed‐effects model that controls for workers’ unobservable attributes. The second major objective is to extend the existing industry‐based literature by estimating a specification allowing for a comparison between the degree of wage responsiveness of within‐firm stayers and between‐firm movers. The findings indicate that average wages by industry tend to respond positively to low frequency changes in employment, and that there is some degree of wage flexibility within firm‐worker matches.