Austrian economics and value judgments: a critical comparison with Neoclassical Economics

This article points out the limits of Austrian economics as far as the passage from positive to normative economics is concerned. We propose a comparison with neoclassical economics and discuss the different theoretical solutions adopted by these two schools of thought in their legitimization of the normative discourse. The bridge from positive to normative economics is analyzed as resting upon two interdependent pillars, one of a technical nature, the other of an ethical one. In neoclassical theory, these two pillars are, respectively, the Pareto principle and the so-called minimal benevolence principle. In the case of Austrian economics, they are the coordination principle and a set of value judgments considered to be ‘quasi-universal’. One problem for Austrian economics is that the coordination principle turns out to be incompatible with process analysis, the latter being a central tenet of the Austrian theory. A second problem, which creates serious difficulties for both schools, has to do with distribution. Our thesis is that whereas the neoclassical solution of the distributive problem is formally consistent (although deeply unrealistic), the Austrian solution is theoretically untenable and based on strong, although implicit, value judgments.     

Comparing alleged incommensurables: Institutional and Austrian economics as rivals and possible complements? ∗

The purpose of this article is to explore the changing relationship between Austrian and Institutional economics and the common ground that they appear increasingly to share. It is maintained that both parties have something to learn from each other - there are gains to be made from intellectual trade and inter-research tradition discourse. Neither Austrian economics nor institutional economics presently provides a sufficiently robust or sophisticated approach to individual and group problem-solving activity within institutional-knowledge constraints and historical time dynamics, yet they are both beginning to seriously grapple with such issues. The gulf between the Austrian and Institutional research traditions is narrowing given that there is some convergence toward a middle ground where it is recognized that individuals do not exist in a vacuum and that institutions both constrain and enable purposeful behaviour. Through increased interaction Austrians may learn to take ‘institutional’ frameworks even more seriously whilst Institutionalists may learn to be even more earnest in their treatment of ‘individual’ action within a historical time continuum.     

The changing face of mainstream economics

This article argues that economics is currently undergoing a fundamental shift in its method, away from neoclassical economics and into something new. Although that something new has not been fully developed, it is beginning to take form and is centered on dynamics, recursive methods and complexity theory. The foundation of this change is coming from economists who are doing cutting edge work and influencing mainstream economics. These economists are defining and laying the theoretical groundwork for the fundamental shift that is occurring in the economics profession.     

Can neoclassical economics become social economics?

This essay has both a general and a specific purpose. Its general purpose is to pose the question: Can neoclassical economics be social economics? Its answer to this general question is: Yes, but only if it abandons its methodological soul; that is, by abandoning methodological individualism, positivism, and ahistoricism, and expressly and systematically adopting a methodological perspective which is holistic, normative, and historical. Its specific purpose is to identify and examine the major elements in the economics of one leading figure in the historical development of neoclassical economics who self-consciously attempted to combine, to paraphrase Schumpeter, a neoclassical head with a social economics heart: Alfred Marshall.     

The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics

Behavioral and experimental economics present challenges to the neoclassical theory of individual behavior, which is based on individuals making choices within the framework of utility functions that are assumed to have certain well-defined characteristics. Results in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that it is common for individual behavior to systematically deviate from the neoclassical axioms of utility maximization. Austrian economics is also based on axiomatic theories of utility maximization, but the assumptions underlying utility-maximizing behavior are much weaker in the Austrian approach. As a result, they have more solid behavioral foundations and are less subject to challenge by the empirical findings of behavioral and experimental economics. Neoclassical policy conclusions are often overly strong because of its behavioral foundations which are challenged by behavioral and experimental economics and are often misleading because of the comparative static nature of neoclassical welfare economics. For purposes of policy analysis, the Austrian approach provides better insights because of its more realistic behavioral foundations.     

Austrian economics at the cutting edge

Austrian economists today have a valuable opportunity to rejoin the mainstream of the economics profession. As Colander, Holt, and Rosser have argued, neoclassical orthodoxy is no long mainstream. What I call the “heterodox mainstream” is an emerging new orthodoxy. The five leading characteristics of the emerging new orthodoxy are bounded rationality, rule following, institutions, cognition, and evolution. When listed in this order, they suggest the acronym BRICE. The Austrian school is also an example of BRICE economics. The shared themes of BRICE economics create an opportunity for intellectual exchange between Austrians and other elements of the heterodox mainstream. Although Austrians should engage the heterodox mainstream energetically, they should also defend the essential elements of an early version of neoclassical economics, elements at risk of becoming half-forgotten themes of an earlier era. These elements are supply and demand, marginalist logic, opportunity-cost reasoning, and the elementary theory of markets. JEL Codes A14, B50, B53 This text is an edited version of a talk given in Washington, D.C. on 19 November 2005 at the SDAE annual dinner. I thank persons present at that time for a helpful discussion. I also thank William Butos, Roger Garrison, Steven Horwitz, and Peter Lewin for useful comments on an earlier draft.     

Emergence versus neoclassical reductions in economics

ABSTRACT

Many epistemic anomalies of the neoclassical research programme originate from its ontologically reductionist meta-axioms, which predicate how economic macro-systems are constituted from their micro-entities and how the latter behave – namely atomistic aggregativity, normative equilibration and global instrumental rationality. This paper explores the metaphysical foundations of the premise of emergence and argues that it can be a remedy to the ills of neoclassical reductions, and a foundational epistemic principle in a progressive systemic research programme in economics, which would bridge existing streams of ‘heterodox’ economic theory.     

Bioeconomics as economics from a Darwinian perspective

Bioeconomics—the merging of views from biology and economics—on the one hand invites the 'export' of situational logic and sophisticated optimization developed in economics into biology. On the other hand, human economic activity and its evolution, not least over the past few centuries, may be considered an instance for fruitfully applying ideas from evolutionary biology and Darwinian theory. The latter perspective is taken in the present paper. Three different aspects are discussed in detail. First, the Darwinian revolution provides an example of a paradigm shift which contrasts most significantly with the 'subjectivist revolution' that took place at about the same time in economics. Since many of the features of the paradigmatic change that were introduced into the sciences by Darwinism may be desirable for economics as well, the question is explored whether the Darwinian revolution can be a model for introducing a new paradigm in economic theory. Second, the success of Darwinism and its view of evolution have induced economists who are interested in an evolutionary approach in economics to borrow, more or less extensively, concepts and tools from Darwinian theory. Particularly prominent are constructions based on analogies to the theory of natural selection. Because several objections to such analogy constructions can be raised, generalization rather than analogy is advocated here as a research strategy. This means to search for abstract features which all evolutionary theories have in common. Third, the question of what a Darwinian world view might mean for assessing long term economic evolution is discussed. Such a view, it is argued, can provide a point of departure for reinterpreting the hedonistic approach to economic change and development. On the basis of such an interpretation bioeconomics may not only go beyond the optimization-cum-equilibrium paradigm currently prevailing in economics. It may also mean adding substantial qualifications to the subjectivism the neoclassical economists, at the turn of the century, were proud to establish in the course of their scientific revolution.     

Can neoclassical economics handle complexity? The fallacy of the oil spot dynamic

This paper is essentially a rebuttal of the view that neoclassical economics can handle complexity. I have coined the locution ‘oil spot dynamic’ to denote the neoclassical ability to subsume each and every new perspective. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing why the oil spot dynamic cannot work with the complexity approach, which is seen as a coherent stand-alone research program that stems from the SFI Economics Program and manifests itself with different nuances.The fallacy of the oil spot dynamic is relevant in this period, in which economists are beginning to realize that the Neoclassical Samuelsonian Paradigm no longer represents the common language of their profession. The spread of the complexity approach and the dissolving notion of ‘mainstream’ are here interpreted as indicative of a changing economics. A short foray into the features of the process of change completes my arguments by showing that the shift from one paradigm to another has many interrelated dimensions, and that there may be rigidities internalizing changes.     

The New Economics of Labor Migration: Beware of Neoclassicals Bearing Gifts

Abstract

Until the emergence of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) in the 1980s, migration scholars were largely divided into two main theoretical camps, viz. the neoclassical and historical-structural approaches to migration. Against this background, the NELM presented itself as a theoretical ‘third way’ between the two latter approaches, and purported to reconcile agency and structure in a way previously unachieved by either of them. While those pretensions gained a fair amount of acceptance and popularity, this paper argues that they are fundamentally misleading, and that the NELM is little more than a slightly more sophisticated avatar of the neoclassical approach to migration, whose fundamental weaknesses it has not, and cannot, shed. This paper further argues that, in so doing, the NELM effectively constitutes migration theory's own instance of economics imperialism, i.e. the attempt to advance the fundamental tenets of neoclassical economics (methodological individualism and the assumption of optimizing rationality) within the context of the study and interpretation of various social phenomena. In order to put forth these arguments, this paper provides a summary presentation of the standard neoclassical theory of migration, the historical-structural heterodoxy and the NELM; highlights why it is that the NELM should be regarded as a ‘reworked’ version of the neoclassical theoretical framework and discusses its inception in the context of the ‘information-theoretic revolution’ in economics; and argues for a new and improved ‘historical-structural synthesis’ as a more satisfactory alternative to both the NELM and the standard neoclassical theory.     

Distinguishing characteristics of ahuman economics

What are the requirements for an economics that is compatible with, and affirmative of, a meaninful image of human nature? Where does conventional economic theory show its most glaring deficiencies in this respect? What are the core human values that need to inform economic thought capable of guiding us in the design and construction of a more humane economic system? Why is the bulk of contemporary heterodox economic thinking antagonistic to the project of a human-centered economics? These are the basic questions addressed and explored in this article.     

Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II.     

The Histonomic Approach to Economics: Beyond Pure Theory and Pure Experience

This article starts off with the distinction between logico-deductive and empirico-deductive approaches to economic theory. The logicodeductive approach, for instance neoclassical economics, uses an axiomatic framework that has only little empirical substance. The empirico-deductive approach, for instance, Ricardian economics, attempts to state economic theory as a “typical” structure of reality. It appears that the latter approach touches reality more closely and is more sensitive to intellectual enrichment and to substantial empirical evidence. However, both approaches operate within the basic assumption applied in classical physics, that theory must represent an invariant structure of reality—highlighting in this case economic phenomena that do not change over time. In the following, the induction issue is given new life, suggesting its validity under the non-conventional assumptions ofvariancy and time-asymmetry. A “histonomic” approach stressing the importance of making theoretical (-nomic) statements about economic phenomena that are basically historical (histo-) in their non-classical properties of variancy and time-asymmetry is favored.     

Menger’s causal-realist analysis in modern economics

Carl Menger pioneered a unique theoretical research method which served as the foundation of the early Austrian school of economics. Menger’s causal-realist analysis was revived and formalized just before and after World War 2 by Ludwig von Mises as the “praxeological method.” Murray Rothbard, a student of von Mises’, utilized the method in formulating a comprehensive system of economic theory in his treatise, Man Economy, and State published in the early 1960s. Rothbard’s treatise became the foundational work for the “Austrian revival” in the 1970s. In this paper, we address several issues related to the role of Menger’s method in modern economics. First, ample evidence is adduced that von Mises and Rothbard each expressed a surprising ambivalence with respect to his own work in relation to the early Austrian school. Second, von Mises viewed Rothbard’s treatise as beginning a new epoch in economic theory. Third, contrary to the conventional view, a careful analysis of his treatise shows that Rothbard drew heavily on the contemporary neoclassical literature in developing his theoretical system and that his intent was never to set up a heterodox movement to challenge mainstream economics. Rather, his main aim was to consistently apply the praxeological method to rescue economics from what he considered the alien methodology of positivism, which was imported into economics after World War 2. Lastly, I will tentatively suggest that the term “Austrian economics” as the designation for the intellectual movement that coalesced in the early 1970s may now have outlived its usefulness. This term, which initially served an important strategic purpose in promoting the revival of the broad Mengerian tradition, may have come to obscure the meaning and importance of the praxeological research paradigm that Menger originated.     

The economics of Frank H. Knight: An Austrian interpretation

This paper interprets, in the modern Austrian economics perspective, Frank H. Knight's three core contributions; namely, economic methodology, theories of human action, uncertainty and entrepreneurship. Though Knight is regarded as one of the founding fathers of the Chicago School of economics, this paper argues that Knight's contributions are essentially Austrian. Influenced by William James, Henri Bergson and Max Weber, Knight's subjectivist economics can be seen as a link between Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises in the history of Austrian subjectivism. This paper further suggests that Knight may be more appropriately located in the Austrian-German School, for the reason that the term “Austrian School” is too narrow to accommodate german influences. This paper concludes that Knight's legacies have left much to be appreciated by neoclassical mainstream economists in general and Austrian economists in particular. The author thanks Dian Kwan for her proof reading in this essay.     

Neoliberal ordnungstheorie and constitutional economics

Various new theoretical approaches, such as the economics of property rights, economic analysis of law or constitutional economics, have led to a renaissance of institutional theory. To a large extent, this renaissance emerged independently of the old institutionalism. In Germany, institutional analysis has a long and autonomous tradition, which has not been given proper international recognition. This applies especially to the neoliberal Ordnungstheorie, of which Walter Eucken is generally acknowledged to be the leading representative. This article examines the methodological and theoretical similarities and differences between Eucken's Ordnungstheorie and Buchanan's Constitutional Economics. I am indebted to Jack Wiseman for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

The economics of ageing and the political economy of old age

Economic discussion of ageing has been largely neoclassical in approach. Ageing has become a specialism within population economics, which is itself a specialism within the neoclassical mainstream. An alternative view has come from authors in sociology and social policy, who have produced their own ‘political economy of old age’. In contrast with neoclassical individualism, sociological depictions of ageing have stressed the social construction of old age and the structured dependency of the elderly. Non-neoclassical economists have had little to say about ageing, despite some relevant work in the early days of Keynesianism. This paper argues that a combination of structural ideas from sociology and disequilibrium ideas from Keynesian and non-neoclassical economics can provide a suitable framework for the economics of ageing.