Some Truths about Ostriches: Who Doesn't Prepay Their Mortgages and Why They Don't

Prepayment estimation is essential in forecasting expected mortgage cash flow patterns. Accordingly, mortgage and mortgage-backed security prices are highly dependent on prepayment assumptions. Yet borrower prepayment behavior appears to be highly irrational, in the sense that many borrowers prepay their mortgages when it is not optimal to do so and fail to prepay their mortgages when the prepayment option is substantially in the money. In this paper, we explore the latter phenomenon, using a large data set of loans originated during the relatively high-rate 1980s that have failed to prepay by year-end 1996. As a control group, we examine similar loans that did prepay during the refinancing boom of 1993. By coupling Case–Shiller house price index information at the zip-code level, we can analyze the effect of broader housing market trends, especially housing appreciation, on borrower prepayment behavior. Although housing prices did decline significantly during the late 1980s and early 1990s in many areas of the United States, we find evidence that only about 25% of non-refinancing households might have been constrained by declining collateral values. Household demographic characteristics may provide some further explanation for this apparently non-optimizing behavior; however, we do not have a complete explanation.     

Why Do Mortgage Markets Matter?

1999 saw the return of large scale mortgage equity - ie mortgage borrowing to finance consumption rather than house purchase - for the first time for a decade. Recent developments of the OEF macroeconometric model of the UK economy have focused on the determination of mortgage lending, looking in particular at the impact of downpayment constraints - ie the deposit borrowers have to put down when they buy a house. In this article, Geoffrey Meen uses this model to analyse the effects of mortgages on: (i) the cycle in the UK housing market at a national level; (ii) regional house price differentials; and (iii) aggregate savings and consumer behaviour.     

Mortgage default in an estimated model of the U.S. housing market

This paper models the housing sector, mortgages and endogenous default in a DSGE setting with nominal and real rigidities. We use data for the period 1981–2006 to estimate our model using Bayesian techniques. We analyze how an increase in risk in the mortgage market raises the default rate and spreads to the rest of the economy, creating a recession. In our model two shocks are well suited to replicate the subprime crisis and the Great Recession: the mortgage risk shock and the housing demand shock. Next we use our estimated model to evaluate a policy that reduces the principal of underwater mortgages. This policy is successful in stabilizing the mortgage market and makes all agents better off.     

Credit rationing, race, and the mortgage market

This study applies microdata from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to evaluate the effects of borrower race and default risk in mortgage lending. The empirical analysis is based on a probit model of whether borrowers obtain FHA or conventional mortgages; the former are fully insured and are characterized by easier downpayment constraints, but are typically more expensive. Hence, households borrowing through the FHA will tend to be credit constrained in the conventional market. Results of the analysis indicate that variables which proxy lender concerns about default risk and cost have an important effect on the type of loan borrowers obtain. Empirical estimates also suggest that minority households are significantly less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites, even after controlling for various proxies of default risk. These results suggest that race effects in mortgage lending may persist for reasons unrelated to borrower default risk.     

Spillover effects of subprime mortgage originations: The effects of single-family mortgage credit expansion on the multifamily rental market

The dramatic expansion in subprime mortgage credit fueled a remarkable boom and bust in the US housing market and created a global financial crisis. Even though considerable research examines the housing and mortgage markets during the previous decade, how the expansion in mortgage credit affected the rental market remains unclear; and yet, over 30 percent of all U.S. households reside in the rental market. Our study fills this gap by showing how the multifamily rental market was adversely affected by the development of subprime lending in the single-family market before the advent of the 2007/2008 subprime induced financial crisis. We provide evidence for a fundamentals based linkage by which the effect of an innovation in one market (i.e, the growth in subprime mortgage originations) is propagated through to another market. Using a large database of residential rental lease payment records, our results confirm that the expansion in subprime lending corresponds with an overall decline in the quality of rental payments. Finally, we present evidence showing that the financial performance of multifamily rental properties reflected the increase in rental lease defaults.     

The supply of mortgage lending

This paper estimates the elasticity of supply of mortgage lending and tests the impact of the “availability” of funds on the markets for new housing and mortgage loans. Depending upon whether mortgage relative to total lending or the mortgage, Aaa bond yield differential is taken as the left-hand variable, the supply elasticity is found to be about 1 or about 5. No compelling evidence is found, however, that either federal agency purchases of mortgages or disintermediation has had an impact upon the supply of mortgage loans. The latter is more consistent with a relatively elastic supply of mortgage funds than with segmented mortgage markets. Examination of the determinants of both real house prices and of private residential construction also fails to reveal any significant impact of federal agency purchases or of disintermediation. It would appear, however, that real house prices are highly responsive to interest rates and that the elasticity of supply of new housing is about 5. Fluctuations in new construction would thus appear to be explainable by fluctuations in interest rates.     

Stock Market Response to the Financial Regulations in the Mortgage‐Lending Market in Korea

This study investigates the economic impact of the financial regulations that aimed to control the housing market in Korea during the reign of late President Ro's Administration, which had diligently fought against the then speculative bubble in the Korean real‐estate market. We test for the validity of the general prediction that the financial regulations in the form of the loan‐to‐value (LTV) and debt‐to‐income (DTI) restrictions would have adverse impacts on the value of the firms operating in the mortgage‐lending industry. In this event study, we select two critical days as event dates and check whether the stock prices of the financial firms react negatively to the announcements of the regulations. Overall, the initial imposition of the DTI restrictions (i.e., the first event) adversely affects those banks that possess a relatively large number of mortgage loans in their asset portfolio. By contrast, banks that hold a small number of mortgage loans appear to benefit from the risk‐reducing effect of the DTI regulation. Subsequently, the reinforcement of the LTV and DTI rules (i.e., the second event) has negative impacts on the banks with large mortgage loans. The degree of this adverse effect is greater in the second event than in the first event (i.e., the DTI restrictions). The reinforced regulations also unfavorably affect the savings banks with large mortgage loans but to a lesser degree compared with their counterparts in the banks. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of the financial regulations has negligible impacts on the banks and the savings banks with smaller mortgage loans.     

Breeding one's own sub-prime crisis: The labour market effects on financial system stability

Crisis may spread through economy via the propagating mechanisms of the labour market - households becoming delinquent due to an initial unemployment shock may be unable to continue servicing obligations versus the financial system. With large debts - e.g. mortgages - such defaults pose a threat to financial system stability. In this paper we use the Polish household budget surveys to simulate the impact of changes in the labour market status of household members on the ability of the household to service its mortgage payments. The simulation results are subsequently aggregated to facilitate a macro-level interpretation of the findings. We simulate various scenarios of labour market deterioration. Finally, we also introduce a policy instrument into the simulations providing, in a fiscally neutral manner, additional stability to the financial system. Based on robustness checks, the findings seem to be reliable. The results suggest that even with shares of debtors among consumers as low as in Poland, the propagation mechanism may indeed result in a considerable threat, while the fiscally neutral instrument is effective and well-suited to be addressed in providing additional stability to the financial system.     

Interest rates, income, and home improvement decisions

The demand for additional housing is modeled demonstrating that higher interest rates make home improvements more attractive relative to moving when homeowners hold fixed rate mortgages. Technological constraints on home improvements make improving less attractive relative to moving when incomes have risen. Empirical evidence using cross-sectional data is presented suggesting that the probability of making home improvements is positively related to increases in the current interest rate and negatively related to increases in income. An explanation is offered for the recent rise in home improvement expenditures in the face of slower economic growth and higher mortgage interest rates.     

The Impact of Interest Rates and The Housing Market on The UK Economy

The Chancellor has asked Professor David Miles to examine the UK market for longer-term fixed rate mortgages. This paper by Adrian Cooper, which is part of a study commissioned by the Miles Review, presents the results of a series of simulations using the OEF Model of the UK economy to investigate the contribution of the housing market to macroeconomic volatility and the implications of changing the structure of mortgage finance from the current variable rate system linked to short-term interest rates to a fixed rate system linked to long rates. The main findings are that the housing market has been a contributor to past volatility in the UK economy, and that moving to a fixed rate structure would reduce the impact of a change in interest rates on key macroeconomic indicators.     

Economic Outlook 1991 – 1995: The London Business School with Gower Publishing: THE HOUSING MAFUCJIT IN RECESSION : A PAINFUL ADJUSTMENT TO ERM DISCIPLINE

We, together with almost every other commentator on the UK housing market, forecast a recovery of house prices and turnover during 1991. These hopes have been disappointed. This Forecast Release addresses some of the questions raised by this prolonged weakness in the housing market. Why did we, and so many others mis-judge the outlook for house prices and housing investment? Are there structural problems, especially those associated with the adjustment to the inflationary discipline of the E M, which are preventing a revival? When will recoverly take place and can there ever be a house-price boom similar to 1984–1988 again? One reason for the unanticipated weakness of the housing market is the growing problem of mortgage arrears and possessions. This can be expected to produce at least some temporary weakening of house prices as a reaction to the current volume of empty properties being put onto the market. There is a more fundamental reason for the current weakness of house prices. Unlike previous house price booms and busts, the present recession offers no relief to the hard-pressed borrower in the form of a rapid inflation of average earnings. Difficulties with mortgage repayments, for highly indebted households, are set to continue for some time. These lessons are not being lost, either on prospective purchasers who are’ being discouraged from taking out substantial mortgages in relation to their incomes, or on mortgage lenders who are being much more prudent in the setting of mortgage to- income and mortgage-to-price limits. The result is a long overdue adjustment of British attitudes towards own er-occupation.     

Structural prepayment risk behavior of the underlying mortgages for residential mortgage life insurance in a developing market

Since 1998 all residential mortgages in China have been adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). However, the borrower’s motivation for prepayment is different from that in the US or other developed mortgage markets. In the US, mortgage insurance plays an imperative role in covering some of the risk typically faced by housing finance institutions. However, China’s residential mortgage life insurance (RMLI) market is in its infancy. It offers the insured mortgagor a life-insurance death benefit, arising from only illness or accident, settling the insured’s outstanding residential mortgage balance. Prepayments of some RMLIs’ underlying mortgages are observed, leading to a premature termination of both the residential mortgage and the insurance commitment to settle the outstanding mortgage balance even though the insured has not yet passed away. Because such prepayments significantly influence the pricing of the RMLI, it is imperative to know more about the prepayment rate of occurrence and the prepayment characteristics of the underlying residential mortgages in terms of observable macro economic factors, loan specific factors and borrower specific characteristics. Hence, this study investigates the prepayment risk behavior of the underlying mortgages for RMLIs, utilizing a pilot study of 1000 Shanghai residential mortgagors who took up RMLIs between January 1999 and December 2003. This study uses the Cox proportional hazard model to investigate RMLI-mortgage prepayment risk behavior. The resultant hazard rate is dependent on four primary factors: combined monthly income of the co-borrowers, growth in the gross domestic product, number of co-borrowers and initial loan-to-value ratio.     

Housing investment: What makes it so volatile? Theory and evidence from OECD countries

This paper explains how mortgage market liberalization can introduce greater volatility in the housing market, which is a stylized fact documented from OECD countries, with a DSGE model where households face a credit constraint and housing is used as collateral. The housing collateral constraint creates a link between the housing market and borrowing capacity, a link that amplifies the response of housing demand to technology shocks and strengthens in economies with more liberalized mortgage markets.     

The housing market and the monetary transmission mechanism in the UK, in and out of EMU

This paper, prepared for the No Campaign, uses the OEF Global Macroeconometric Model to assess the impact of the housing market on the UK's convergence with the Eurozone. The OEF Model provides the ideal framework for such analysis, as it incorporates a detailed system for forecasting UK house prices, transactions, mortgage borrowing and their interaction with consumer spending and the wider economy, within the context of a model of the Eurozone economy. Our analysis suggests that, if the government were to wish to take the UK into EMU, action to reduce the impact of changes in interest rates on the housing market would be beneficial in improving the UK's economic stability.     

论个人住房贷款发展的困境、原因及化解

近期，国内商业银行出现了普遍的“额度荒”问题，大多研究认为这一现象是周期性和短期性的。但其实是商业银行经营的内外环境发生了根本的变化，如存贷款利率市场化加速，传统的房贷业务不适应银行经营环境的变化。房贷“额度荒”反映的是商业性金融追求盈利与政策性金融的冲突，本质上则是政策性住房银行缺失的结果。发达国家在位房需求增长较快时期均通过成立政纂性住房金融机构来满足住房融资需求，我国也要成立真正的政策性住房银行，这才是解决房贷困境的根本出路。     

Subprime mortgages and the housing bubble

This paper explores the link between the house-price expectations of mortgage lenders and the extent of subprime lending. It argues that bubble conditions in the housing market are likely to spur subprime lending, with favorable price expectations easing the default concerns of lenders and thus increasing their willingness to extend loans to risky borrowers. Since the demand created by subprime lending feeds back onto house prices, such lending also helps to fuel an emerging housing bubble. These ideas are illustrated in a theoretical model, and tentative support is found in empirical work exploring the connection between price expectations and the extent of subprime lending.     

Canada's Housing Bubble Story: Mortgage Securitization,the State,and the Global Financial Crisis

Canada's experience during and after the financial crisis appears to distinguish it from its international peers. Canadian real estate sales and values experienced record increases since the global financial crisis emerged in 2008, rather than declines, and Canada did not witness any bank failures. The dominant trope concerning Canada's financial and housing markets is that they are sound, prudent, appropriately regulated and ‘boring but effective’. It is widely assumed that Canadian banks did not need, nor receive, a ‘bailout’, that mortgage lending standards remained high, and that the securitization of mortgages was not widespread. The truth, however, does not accord with this mainstream view. In fact, the Canadian financial and housing markets reveal marked similarities with their international peers. Canada's banks needed, and received, a substantial ‘bailout’, while federal policies before and after the financial crisis resulted in the massive growth of mortgage securitization and record household indebtedness. This article documents the growth of Canada's housing bubble, the history of mortgage securitization, and of government policies implemented before and after the crisis. Instead of making the Canadian financial and housing sectors more resilient and sustainable, the outcomes of state responses are best understood as regressively redistributive.     

浅论对住房抵押贷款保险的认识

众所周知,购买住房消费是金额巨大且手续及为复杂的商品交易。对于相当大的一部分家庭来说,购买商品住房,仍然严重存在着资金不足的问题。住房抵押贷款的出现为房地产市场的发展注入了极大的活力,却无疑加大了贷款银行的风险。住房抵押贷款保险的出台使银行、房地产公司、保险公司和购房者均实现了"多赢",为推动房地产业的和谐发展作出了巨大的贡献。     

A micro view on home equity withdrawal and its determinants: Evidence from Dutch households

For most households, home ownership is the largest wealth component that has become more accessible through innovation and deregulation in mortgage markets. This paper studies the factors driving home equity withdrawal (HEW) at the household level using Dutch survey data. In the Netherlands, house prices were growing fast and mortgage expenses are to a large extent tax deductible. Expectations and perceptions do seem to play an important role in HEW. Withdrawers tend to be more positive about house price developments and – although having lower income – less concerned about their future economic situation. HEW can have a significant impact on both households and the economy, with most of the equity released being reinvested in the housing sector and only a small share used to finance consumption expenditure.     

Impairment and negative equity in the Irish mortgage market

Amongst the many housing markets across the OECD presently experiencing difficulties, the Irish case stands out. Between 2004 and 2007, a significant house price bubble emerged in Ireland, while the real economy was enjoying persistently strong growth rates. The sharp decline in house prices post 2007 coupled with the significant increase in unemployment has generated a combination of difficulties for the Irish residential market. To date, much of the analysis and discussion of the Irish market has tended to focus on either the concept of mortgage repayment distress or potential negative equity. By examining the issue of credit default in the Irish mortgage market, we focus on the interaction between delinquency (repayment distress) and solvency (negative equity). Building on earlier work, which used the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), we marry existing estimates of repayment distress with estimates of negative equity for a representative sample of Irish households. Using copula modelling we then examine the dependence structure across the distributions of mortgage delinquency and solvency for these households. As a result, we are in a position to estimate the probability that a household experiencing repayment distress might also be in negative equity.