Workplace democracy in the lab

While intuition suggests that empowering workers to have some say in the control of the firm is likely to have beneficial effects, empirical evidence of such effects is hard to come by because of numerous confounding factors in the naturally occurring data. We report evidence from a real‐effort experiment confirming that worker performance is sensitive to the process used to select the compensation contract. Groups of workers that voted to determine their compensation scheme provided significantly more effort than groups that had no say in how they would be compensated. This effect is robust to controls for the compensation scheme implemented, worker characteristics such as ability and gender, and possible sorting.     

Autonomy in the industrial R&D lab

This article distinguishes between “strategic autonomy” (the freedom to set one's own research agenda) and “operational autonomy” (the freedom, once a problem has been set, to attack it by means determined by oneself, within given resource constraints). The article argues, and presents some preliminary corroborating data, that technical careers in the R&D lab should start lower on strategic than on operational autonomy, that operational autonomy should show initial fairly rapid increase, which should be followed by increases in strategic autonomy, and that thereafter a number of different career paths should be available for technical employees. Most labs, however, seem to espouse a philosophy of strategic autonomy combined with operational controls, which creates dilemmas and contradictions in the technical career, particularly at its start. It is proposed that these two aspects of autonomy can usefully be thought of as a two-dimensional grid. Different positions on this grid seem to fit with different orientations and different tasks, and require different strategies for career management. The article ends with a discussion of these management implications.     

The heterogeneous expectations hypothesis: Some evidence from the lab

This paper surveys learning-to-forecast experiments (LtFEs) with human subjects to test theories of expectations and learning. Subjects must repeatedly forecast a market price, whose realization is an aggregation of individual expectations. Emphasis is given to how individual forecasting rules interact at the micro-level and which structure they cocreate at the aggregate, macro-level. In particular, we focus on the question wether the evidence from laboratory experiments is consistent with heterogeneous expectations.     

Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets

This paper studies the stability of the intertemporal coordination dynamics when the common knowledge of individual expectations of future prices is perturbed in a neighborhood of a perfect foresight equilibrium. The main forces that affect stability are: (i) the effect of a change in asset demand on second period spot market prices, and (ii) the effect on asset demand of a small change in second period prices. In an intertemporal market game whose interior Markov perfect equilibria correspond to perfect foresight equilibria, it is shown that though M-rationalizability implies the stability of the intertemporal dynamics, the converse is not always true.     

Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets

This paper studies the stability of the intertemporal coordination dynamics when the common knowledge of individual expectations of future prices is perturbed in a neighborhood of a perfect foresight equilibrium. The main forces that affect stability are: (i) the effect of a change in asset demand on second period spot market prices, and (ii) the effect on asset demand of a small change in second period prices. In an intertemporal market game whose interior Markov perfect equilibria correspond to perfect foresight equilibria, it is shown that though M-rationalizability implies the stability of the intertemporal dynamics, the converse is not always true.     

Equilibrium with coordination

The obvious equilibrium concepts in the simplest institutions for transferring ownership of commodities—bilateral exchange—are neither Nash equilibria nor cooperative equilibria. To study such equilibria as special cases of equilibria of a social system it is necessary to introduce coordination. Two or more agents coordinate their actions, if, when they consider an alternative to a state, they take as given—for agents with whom they coordinate—the alternative state. If there is no coordination we obtain Nash equilibrium as a special case. If there is complete coordination we obtain optimality as a special case. The main result is an existence theorem for a social system with coordination. This theorem is then applied to prove existence of exchange equilibria in an economy with bilateral exchange.     

On the existence of equilibrium in social systems with coordination

Social systems with coordination were introduced by Vind (1983) as a general model of economic institutions. The present paper gives a general existence theorem for equilibria in social systems with coordination extending Vind's result.     

浅谈人机工程学解决电子商务实验室的温度

文章讨论了实验室设计中存在的人机工程学问题,目的是使我们在设计电子商务实验室时尽量符合人机工程学的要求以解决实验室的温度问题,满足学习者生理和心理的需要,以使学习者能在优越的环境中学习得更舒适、更高效。     

Equilibria with coordination failures

This paper extends the literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. This makes it possible to address coordination failures for cases with price indexation or more general price linkages between commodities. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a unified treatment to all cases considered in the literature so far. At a QCE the expected trade opportunities on supply and demand are completely determined by a rationing vector satisfying that the prevailing price system maximizes the value of the rationing vector within the set of admissible prices. When the set of admissible prices is compact, we show the existence of a connected set of QCEs. This set connects two trivial no-trade equilibria, one with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities and one with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities. Moreover, the set contains for every commodity a generalized Drèze equilibrium, being a QCE at which for that commodity no binding trade opportunities on both supply and demand are expected, and also a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium at which no binding constraints on demand opportunities are expected and for at least one commodity also not on supply. We apply this main result to several special cases, and also discuss the case of an unbounded set of admissible prices.     

供应链合作伙伴达到协同的根本动因分析

运用博弈理论，建立了供应商与生产商，制造商和销售商合作博弈模型，揭示供应链伙伴怎样合作才能使整个供应链收益最大，达到协同，发现供应链达到协同的根本动因。     

Theoretical perspectives on the coordination of supply chains

Supply-chain coordination relies on the availability of prompt and accurate information that is visible to all actors in the supply chain. However, new demands on the supply-chain system require changes to information flow and exchange. We undertake a case study of three automotive supply chains that face such new demands resulting from the introduction of an order-driven supply-chain strategy. We use our case study findings to evaluate the applicability of three different theoretical lenses on the multi-faceted interactions between information, physical flow, and the complex rationales driving supply-chain evolution: the resource-based view (RBV), the concept of complex adaptive systems (CAS), and adaptive structuration theory (AST). We find that each theory has a separate realm of applicability and while complimentary in nature, provides distinct insight on the structural shift in the supply-chain system. More specifically, we find that AST, a theory prominent in the social sciences, provides novel insights to supply-chain research at the firm level, particularly with respect to the difficulties in using IT systems to drive systemic change. It complements both the system-level perspective offered by the complex adaptive systems theory, as well as the concept of dynamic capabilities originating in the resourced-based view. The paper concludes with wider implications for future research in supply and value chain management.     

空间规划协调理论研究综述

我国空间规划体系涵盖不同部门与不同形式的多种规划,对于各种规划之间如何协调与融合是大家一直都比较关注的问题,关于两规、三规、四规甚至多规协调的说法日益增多。本文对多年来相关文献进行梳理综述,旨在明确主体功能区规划的基础地位,以期结束空间规划群龙无首的割据状态,促进以主体功能区规划为基础的各类规划统一衔接的空间规划体系的形成。     

物流运作中的有效损控

物流作业中的“损失”通常是指由于各种意外事故、火灾、偷盗或不当的库内作业造成的库存损坏所导致的非计划内开销的费用。物流中心内可能发生“损失”的范围主要有五个：作业人员的安全和健康、火灾、偷盗、产品的损坏和污染以及危险品的存储和搬运等。     

上市公司利润操纵的方法

上市公司利润操纵一般是指上市公司为了某种目的，运用各种手段人为调节利润的行为。一般认为，公司采取会计政策的选择或其他手段通过增加或减少损益类科目，人为抬高或压低利润的行为，就是利润操纵。学术界对利润操纵概念的主要分歧在于，利润操纵到底是不是违法违规行为。一种观点认为，利润操纵中有一部分是采用合规的方式来调节利润，而另一部分则是违法违规行为。有些利润操纵行为违反了会计方面的有关法律法规，但有相当一部分利润操纵行为并不违反法律法规，这使得对利润操纵行为的辨别更为困难。另一种观点认为，利润操纵就是通过违法违规方式调节利润，     

派遣员工招聘录用的有效经验

随着社会多元化发展，人才使用的方式也愈趋灵活，许多企业采用人才派遣的形式招录员工，节约用人成本。为了充分满足客户的不同需求，人力资源服务机构将人才派遣服务作为其主要业务内容之一。同时，需要制定规范的招聘录用操作流程，以保证优质服务，保障稳定的客户源。     

Efficient spatial allocation in the quadratic assignment problem

Koopmans and Beckmann found that the competitive mechanism cannot sustain an assignment of indivisible plants to spatially distinct sites when intermediate product flows are required and transportation costs between sites are positive. Hartwick claims to have found valid counterexamples to this result. This paper demonstrates that while counterexamples to the Koopmans-Beckmann result do exist, Hartwick's examples are inappropriate. A correct example of a price-sustainable integer assignment is provided.     

Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation

In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provides a game–theoretic foundation to Rocheteau and Wright (2005)׳s competitive search monetary equilibrium, is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment, which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework. We find that the inflation tax is harmful – with cash holdings, production and welfare all falling as inflation rises – and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates. For instance, for inflation rates between 0% and 5%, welfare in the two markets we consider (2[seller]×2[buyer] and 3×2) falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage–point rise in inflation, compared with 0.4 percent over the range from 5% to 30%. Our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated, even under low inflation.     

推进三方协调保障企业发展

□劳动关系三方协调机制是当今市场经济国家为促进劳动关系的协调发展而普遍采用的组织和制度。1990年,全国人大常委会批准了国际劳工组织第144号公约《三方协商促进履行国际劳工标准公约》,表明我国开始建立劳动关系三方协调机制。2c01年8月,我国劳动和社会保障部、中华全国总工会、中国企业联合会中国企业家协会在北京召开了国家协调劳动关系三方会议第一次会议,制定了《国家协调劳动关系三方会议制度》标志着我国劳动关系三方协调机制正式建立。2003年8月三方在珠海市召开了“全国推进三方协调劳动关系工作经验交流会”,各省、市三方机制会议的负责人均出席了会议,十几个省、市的有关代表作了经验介绍。会议期间,劳动和社会保障部副部长王东进、全国总工会副主席孙宝树、中国企业联合会中国企业家协会副会长陈兰通均作了重要讲话。通过这次会议必将实质性地推动我国劳动关系三方协调机制的实施。(见第11页)     

When does coordination pay?

In a continuous-time model of two symmetric open economies, with a floating exchange rate, we find that the pay-off to macroeconomic policy coordination depends systematically on how heterogeneous is their inflation experience. While monetary policy coordination improves welfare in handling a common rate of underlying inflation, it exacerbates the ‘time consistency’ problem arising when there are differences (as is illustrated diagrammatically). Since the principle of ‘certainty equivalence’ applies to time-consistent policy in linear quadratic models, we are also able to give a stochastic interpretation of the deterministic results.