Uncovering the hidden transaction costs of market power: A property rights approach to strategic positioning

A central construct in competitive strategy research is market power, the ability to raise price above marginal cost. Positioning research focuses on attempts to build, protect, and exercise market power. However, this approach contains hidden assumptions about transaction costs. Parties made worse off by the exercise of market power can negotiate, bargain, form coalitions, and otherwise contract around the focal firm's attempts to appropriate monopoly profits—depending on transaction costs. We build on property rights economics to explain how transaction costs affect positioning and offer propositions about successful positioning in an environment with transaction costs.     

Numeraire portfolios and utility-based price systems under proportional transaction costs

In a discrete-time incomplete financial market with proportional transaction costs and with independent and bounded returns, we prove the existence of a consistent price system that can be written as the expectation of the discounted claim under the real-world probability measure P and not just under a martingale measure. In fact, the claim is then discounted by some specific dynamic portfolio called the numeraire portfolio as in the classical case of markets without transaction costs. For that specific numeraire, P will be a martingale measure. Naturally, the concept of a numeraire portfolio has here to be adapted to the concept of consistent price systems for markets with transaction costs. Moreover, again as in the classical case, the numeraire portfolio can be chosen as log-optimal portfolio. The same analysis works for power utility functions. However, then a change of measure is necessary. This paper applies methods from stochastic dynamic programming to finance.     

Property rights theory,transaction costs theory,and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management

Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource‐based theory. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Property rights,transaction costs,and the limits of the market

Economics of Governance - To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the design of the property rights on either a good whose consensual transfer...     

Financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs

We analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk. We show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios. Intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs. In the absence of asset risk, intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends, and never sell assets. If the economy is subject to transaction costs, the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare. We also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies.     

Option pricing and replication with transaction costs and dividends

This paper derives optimal perfect hedging portfolios in the presence of transaction costs within the binomial model of stock returns, for a market maker that establishes bid and ask prices for American call options on stocks paying dividends prior to expiration. It is shown that, while the option holder's optimal exercise policy at the ex-dividend date varies according to the stock price, there are intervals of values for such a price where the optimal policy would depend on the holder's preferences. Nonetheless, the perfect hedging assumption still allows the derivation of optimal hedging portfolios for both long and short positions of a market maker on the option.     

Competitive price paths of an exhaustible resource with increasing extraction costs

The paper analyzes the competitive growth paths of an economy with an exhaustible resource which is subject to increasing extraction costs, assuming perfect foresight. It establishes equivalence among the competitive present-value maximization condition for deposit holders, the generalized Hotelling rule, and the Ricardian royalty-price structure. It also proves uniqueness of a competitive growth path for the case where a backstop technology exists, in order to give some validity to the assumption of perfect foresight.     

Equilibria,stability and asymptotic dominance in a speculative market with heterogeneous traders

We consider a pure exchange economy where one risky and one riskless security are traded in discrete time. Individual demands are expressed as fractions of individual wealth and depend on traders’ forecasts about future price movement.Introducing the ‘Equilibrium Market Line’ as the locus of all possible equilibrium returns, we show that, irrespectively of the number of traders and of their investment behavior, the economy possesses isolated equilibria where a single agent dominates the market and continuous manifolds of equilibria where many agents hold finite wealth shares. Moreover, we prove that no global dominance order relation among strategies can be defined.     

Bid-ask dynamic pricing in financial markets with transaction costs and liquidity risk

According to the classic no arbitrage theory of asset pricing, in a frictionless market a No Free Lunch dynamic price process associated with any essentially bounded asset is a martingale under an equivalent probability measure. However, real financial markets are not frictionless. We introduce an axiomatic approach of Time Consistent Pricing Procedure (TCPP), in a model free setting, to assign to every financial position a dynamic ask (resp. bid) price process. Taking into account both transaction costs and liquidity risk this leads to the convexity (resp. concavity) of the ask (resp. bid) price. We prove that the No Free Lunch condition for a TCPP is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent probability measure R that transforms a process between the bid price process and the ask price process of every financial instrument into a martingale. Furthermore we prove that the ask (resp. bid) price process associated with every financial instrument is then a R super-martingale (resp. R sub-martingale) which has a càdlàg version.     

Multiproduct price competition with heterogeneous consumers and nonconvex costs

This paper extends the oligopolistic model of price competition to environments with multiple goods, heterogeneous consumers, and arbitrary continuous cost functions. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with an endogenous sharing rule is proven to exist. It is also shown that, in environments with fixed costs and constant marginal costs, all (symmetric and asymmetric) equilibria exhibit price dispersion across stores. Furthermore, the paper identifies scenarios in which prices will necessarily be random. In these markets, stores keep each other guessing because, given the fixed costs, they would incur a loss if their price strategies were anticipated and beaten by competitors. This is interpreted as an important economic feature that is possibly behind random price promotions such as weekly specials.     

Revisiting agency and transaction costs theory predictions on vertical financial ownership and contracting: electronic integration as an organizational form choice

This paper provides an organizational economics foundation to guide managers in matching the comparatively more efficient organizational mode with transactional characteristics such as: (1) the degree of (human capital) asset specificity involved in the transaction, (2) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and (3) the number of trading partners (suppliers and buyers) in the vertical supply chain. The key role of technology, and more specifically the e‐business infrastructure and its effects on organizational mode choice, is highlighted. The main results from this analysis suggest that changes in information technology are changing the nature of transaction costs leading to more efficient management through an electronic integration solution thus favoring contracting and outsourcing than would have been technologically possible when Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies (Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press: New York, 1975) was published. It is emphasized that the transaction cost economics principles are durable but that the breathless advances in information technology, especially in the past decade, have comparatively favored lower transaction costs of markets over hierarchies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transaction costs and market efficiency: Evidence from commission deregulation

This study analyzes the impacts of explicit transaction costs on weak-form market efficiency within the context of the brokerage commission deregulation in Japan in October 1999, which led to lower commission rates across the market. Applying two alternative statistical tests to both daily and weekly data, we find that return randomness (unpredictability) increases significantly for stocks listed in Japan, but not for the Japanese stocks dually listed in the United States, which are immune to the deregulation. These results suggest an inefficiency loss or an efficiency gain in the Japanese equity market following the deregulation, insofar as randomness proxies for efficiency.     

The effects of dollar appreciation on sectoral labor market adjustments: Theory and evidence

We examine the extent to which exchange rate fluctuations affect sectoral employment and wages in the United States. We introduce a theoretical rational expectation model that decomposes movements in the exchange rate into anticipated and unanticipated components. The model demonstrates the effects of demand and supply channels on the response of the nominal wage and labor employment to changes in the exchange rate. The evidence indicates that the deflationary effect dominates on industrial nominal wage in manufacturing and transportation industries in the face of dollar appreciation. More importantly, there is evidence of a decrease in employment growth in several industries in response to dollar appreciation, which is statistically significant in construction and at the aggregate level. This evidence is consistent with a decrease in labor demand given the loss of competitiveness of U.S. products following dollar appreciation. There are negative effects of dollar appreciation on labor market conditions in the United States. Nonetheless, dollar appreciation is consistent with an increase in employment growth in the mining sector where the share of imports is the largest among U.S. industries.     

Agents interaction and price dynamics: evidence from the laboratory

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - Using data collected from an experimental double auction market, we study the dynamics of interaction among traders. Our focus is on the effect...     

Asset price and wealth dynamics in a financial market with heterogeneous agents

This paper considers a discrete-time model of a financial market with one risky asset and one risk-free asset, where the asset price and wealth dynamics are determined by the interaction of two groups of agents, fundamentalists and chartists. In each period each group allocates its wealth between the risky asset and the safe asset according to myopic expected utility maximization, but the two groups have heterogeneous beliefs about the price change over the next period: the chartists are trend extrapolators, while the fundamentalists expect that the price will return to the fundamental. We assume that investors’ optimal demand for the risky asset depends on wealth, as a result of CRRA utility. A market maker is assumed to adjust the market price at the end of each trading period, based on excess demand and on changes of the underlying reference price. The model results in a nonlinear discrete-time dynamical system, with growing price and wealth processes, but it is reduced to a stationary system in terms of asset returns and wealth shares of the two groups. It is shown that the long-run market dynamics are highly dependent on the parameters which characterize agents’ behaviour as well as on the initial condition. Moreover, for wide ranges of the parameters a (locally) stable fundamental steady state coexists with a stable ‘non-fundamental’ steady state, or with a stable closed orbit, where only chartists survive in the long run: such cases require the numerical and graphical investigation of the basins of attraction. Other dynamic scenarios include periodic orbits and more complex attractors, where in general both types of agents survive in the long run, with time-varying wealth fractions.     

Intertemporal consumption choices,transaction costs and limited participation in financial markets: reconciling data and theory

This paper builds a unifying framework based on the theory of intertemporal consumption choices that brings together the limited participation‐based explanation of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model's poor empirical performance and the transaction costs‐based explanation of incomplete portfolios. Using the implications of the consumption model and observed household consumption and portfolio choices, we identify the preference parameters of interest and a lower bound for the costs rationalizing non‐participation in financial markets. Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey and assuming isoelastic preferences, we estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion at 1.7 and a cost bound of 0.4% of non‐durable consumption. Our estimate of the preference parameter is theoretically plausible and the bound sufficiently small to be likely to be exceeded by the actual total (observable and unobservable) costs of participating in financial markets. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time on market and sales price of residential housing: A note

This note extends the study of Kalra and Chan (1994). A simultaneous TOBIT equations model is established to address the simultaneity nature of time on the market (TOM) and sales price (SP) in the presence of censored sample bias. We find that both TOM and SP are positively related to each other.     

Counterfactual distributions with sample selection adjustments: Econometric theory and an application to the Netherlands

Several recent papers use the quantile regression decomposition method of Machado and Mata [Machado, J.A.F. and Mata, J. (2005). Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using quantile regression, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20, 445–65.] to analyze the gender gap across log wage distributions. In this paper, we prove that this procedure yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the quantiles of the counterfactual distribution that it is designed to simulate. Since employment rates often differ substantially by gender, sample selection is potentially a serious issue for such studies. To address this issue, we extend the Machado–Mata technique to account for selection. We illustrate our approach to adjusting for sample selection by analyzing the gender log wage gap for full-time workers in the Netherlands.     

Alignment of strategic priorities and performance: an integration of operations and strategic management perspectives

In theory, strategic priorities at the functional level align with and support business level strategies. Alignment of priorities is presumed to contribute to enhanced organizational performance, just as misalignment is expected to undermine performance. This study further develops and tests these theoretical conventions by examining the perceptions of general managers and manufacturing managers regarding manufacturing priorities of their business units. Based on a sample of matched pairs of manufacturing managers and general managers from 98 manufacturing plants, the hypotheses regarding the alignment–performance relationship are tested. Specifically, we tested whether the performance of the manufacturing unit is enhanced when general managers and manufacturing managers agree on strategic priorities. Furthermore, the influence of organizational factors on the relationship between alignment and performance of the manufacturing unit is studied. Results support our hypotheses that certain organizational variables moderate the relationship between alignment of priorities and manufacturing performance.