Globalization,Tax Distortions,and Public‐Sector Retrenchment*

It is widely perceived that globalization inevitably leads to a retrenchment of tax‐financed public‐sector activities. The argument is that tax distortions increase when production is more easily relocated across countries (the elasticity argument). We question this perception in a model that captures standard mechanisms from trade and open‐economy models. Importantly, the retrenchment argument overlooks the fact that the basic effect of integration (i.e., gains from trade) tends to lower the marginal costs of public funds. Moreover, the elasticity argument is not unambiguously supported, and there is no race to the bottom as a result of the perceived terms‐of‐trade effects of non‐cooperative fiscal policies.     

The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

Reshaping the schooling system: The role of immigration

This paper studies how the schooling system may be impacted by the number and skill type of immigrants. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become segregated. Wealthy locals are more likely to choose private schools and vote for a lower tax rate to finance public education. In contrast, high-skilled immigrants tend to reinforce the public system. The optimal immigration policy is highly skill-biased. The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedites redistribution toward the less-skilled local households through both a stronger fiscal support for public education and a reduction in the skill wage premium.     

Institutionalism and Fiscal Policy at Midcentury

This article analyzes the career and contributions of Roy Blough (1901–2000) as a case study of Wisconsin institutionalism in government policy-making at midcentury. As a faculty member at Cincinnati, Chicago and Columbia, editor of the National Tax Journal, director of the research division of the U.S. Treasury and member of the Council of Economic Advisors, Blough played a significant role in the development of fiscal policy. The article also considers Blough’s contributions to tax policy and his views on Keynesian public finance. It further identifies the contributions of Wisconsin institutionalism to modern fiscal policy.     

The Fiscal Impact of Immigrants in Austria – A Generational Accounting Analysis

In this paper, we employ generational accounting to analyse the inter-temporal stance of Austrian public finance in 1998 as well as the inter-temporal fiscal impact of immigration to Austria. Immigrants affect inter-temporal fiscal balance in essentially two ways. Firstly, they have a demographic effect in enlarging the population (and thus the tax base) and in altering its age- (and gender-) composition. Secondly, they change the fiscal characteristics of age cohorts due to a representative immigrant exhibiting higher or lower tax and transfer payments than a representative native of the same age and gender. The overall fiscal effect of immigration is found positive, under the assumption that the age and fiscal characteristics of future immigrants resemble those of the current immigrant population in Austria. This is due to a favourable age composition and lower per capita net transfer receipts during retirement age, which compensate for lower per capita net tax payments during working age. However, immigration is not likely to achieve inter-temporal fiscal balance, even if immigration increases or migrants are screened by skill or age.     

The Economic Agenda: a View from the US

The paper surveys the agenda needed to restore noninflationary growth in industrial countries. The role of fiscal policy as short‐run stimulus both on the spending side and on the tax side is discussed. The author comments on trade, specifically the new trade round, and international finance. Long‐run fiscal imbalances due to aging are analyzed. The role of fiscal institutions such as the European Growth and Stability Pact, the Japanese bad‐loan problem, and structural problems are put into the perspective that advanced economies should nurture their reforms globally so as to provide successful examples of reforms and prove helpful trading partners.     

Fiscal Policy and Equitable Growth

This paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by exploring a case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures with distortionary tax finance: public production services, public consumption services, and state-contingent redistributive transfers. The paper shows that in a general-equilibrium model with given exogenous fiscal policy, a nonmonotonic relation exists between the suboptimal long-run growth rate in a competitive economy and distortionary tax rates. When fiscal policy is endogenously chosen at a social optimum, the relation between the rate of growth and tax rates is always negative. These two properties suggest that an alternative set of government policy instruments affects the response of private sector investment to fiscal policy. Moreover, the different properties of exogenous and endogenous fiscal policy theoretically account for the difference in the relation between economic growth and fiscal policy in empirical studies.     

Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.     

Optimal Commodity Taxes in Australia

The recent changes to commodity taxes in Australia have led to renewed interest in a classic question in public finance: should the tax rates be uniform or differentiated? This article attempts to answer this question by calculating optimal commodity taxes in Australia for a nine‐item disaggregation. The estimates point to non‐uniform commodity taxes, even from the viewpoint of an inequality‐insensitive tax planner. The optimal commodity taxes bear little resemblance with the pre‐GST or post‐GST tax rates. No less significant is our observation that even the purely efficiency‐driven optimal commodity taxes imply lower real expenditure inequality than the actual taxes.     

Public Preferences for Government Spending Priorities: Survey Evidence from Germany

Employing data from a representative survey conducted in Germany, this paper examines public preferences for the size and composition of government expenditure. We focus on public attitudes towards taxes, public debt incurrence and public spending in six different policy areas. Our findings suggest, first, that individual preferences for the use of additional tax money can be categorised as either capital‐oriented expenditure or public debt reduction. Second, we find that fiscal preferences differ along various dimensions. Specifically, personal economic well‐being, economic literacy, confidence in politicians, political ideology and time preference are significantly related to individual attitudes towards public spending, taxes and debt. The magnitude of the effects is particularly large for time preference, economic knowledge and party preference. Third, public preferences for public spending priorities are only marginally affected when considering a public budget constraint.     

Supply-Side Economics of Germany's Year 2000 Tax Reform: A Quantitative Assessment

Abstract. The paper provides an assessment of supply‐side economics following Germany's year 2000 tax reform. Investigated are a corporate tax cut, deteriorating depreciation allowances and imputation rules, and a private income tax cut. For this purpose, a neoclassical growth model is augmented by various fiscal policy parameters and endogenous corporate finance and calibrated with German data. The model is used to evaluate consequences of Germany's tax reform on production, firm finance and leverage, investment, consumption and welfare of a representative household.     

Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization

Trade integration and the increasing mobility of firms have raised the need for international coordination in corporate tax. In this paper, we study the ability of fiscal equalization to avoid the misallocation of capital across asymmetric countries arising from tax competition. Such a reform respects the principle according to which the tax decision is entirely left up to the nation and links nations engaged in strategic tax policy by transfers. We use a model of trade and location where firms produce under imperfect competition. Our analysis suggests that falling trade costs increase the distortion created by tax competition in the international allocation of production. However, we show that fiscal equalization based on differences in tax revenues or tax base can implement a more efficient tax wedge and spatial allocation of the tax base.     

Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy in Latin America over the period 1990 ‐ 2015

Latin American countries experienced important changes in the 2000s. The implementation of fiscal reforms, public debt reduction and the high level of accumulated reserves gave them more policy space than in the past. As a result, Latin American countries were able to implement countercyclical policies to face the negative economic and social consequences associated with the recent macroeconomic shock. Some countries performed better than others. In particular, Social Democratic and Centrist governments enjoyed more fiscal space; they had realized larger budget surpluses over the good years and were able to cope with the crisis without impairing their fiscal conditions. Yet, Latin America has experienced a public finance deterioration in the most recent years. While governments are showing an increasing ability on taxation they are still facing some problems on the expenditure side. As a result, fiscal policy returned acyclical after the period of the crisis. The sustainability of public accounts may be strengthened increasing tax pressure on the richest, reducing tax evasion and improving current spending efficiency. However, the increasing political problems are putting many questions about future trends of public finance in the region.     

Institutionalism and New Trade Theory: Rethinking Comparative Advantage and Trade Policy

Gomory and Baumol (2000), and Samuelson (2004) have raised concerns about international trade’s future impact on U.S. national income. The focus is how globalization may affect the size and distribution across countries of gains from trade. Though their analysis is developed using a pure trade theoretical framework, it has strands in common with institutionalist thinking. Their findings spotlight the need for a new U.S. trade policy agenda aimed at maximizing the U.S. share of gains from trade, and complementing conventional Keynesian open economy macroeconomic analysis.     

Fiscal policy under a minimum‐time objective

In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the fiscal policy driven by a minimum‐time objective of economic development. We find that in equilibrium government should levy the highest possible consumption taxes, reduce public expenditures to the lowest possible level, and keep labor income tax rate and capital income tax rate satisfy a substitution relationship at the balanced budget constraint. We also identify the condition under which income tax rate should be set to zero. We further find that the equilibrium fiscal policy is equivalent to the growth‐maximizing fiscal policy, whereas it generally deviates from the welfare‐maximizing fiscal policy. We hence identify a circumstance where setting the policy goal of reaching an economic‐performance target as soon as possible cannot be justified in the sense of maximizing the welfare of households.     

Regulation and rent‐seeking: The role of the distribution of political and economic power

It is shown that the joint distribution of economic and political power plays a key role in determining regulatory and tax policies of national and subnational governments. If both economic and political power are evenly distributed across individuals, then regulatory and tax policies are efficient, but if they are unevenly distributed and positively correlated, then regulatory policy is used by subnational governments to redistribute income in favor of individuals with higher economic and political power at the expense of productivity and output. Consequently, the national government has to raise the tax rate to finance public expenditure. Moreover, if there exists a positive correlation between economic and political power, then the higher the fiscal gap, the larger the gap between equilibrium and efficient policies because subnational governments underestimate more the fall of public revenues caused by inefficient policies.     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Fiscal policy and economic activity in South Asia

This paper analyzes whether fiscal policy in South Asia amplifies or smoothens business cycle fluctuations. It estimates several econometric models to explore the cyclicality of government spending and tax buoyancy. In South Asia, tax revenue increases less than one to one with changes in gross domestic product (GDP), but public spending increases more than proportionally. For each percentage point change in GDP growth, government expenditure changes by 1.3 percentage points. While changes in tax revenue have no significant impact on economic activity, the government spending multiplier is positive and significant: each additional US dollar (USD) of spending leads to an immediate increase in GDP of 0.2 USD and to an increase of 0.4 USD in the medium run. The impact of public spending on economic activity is entirely due to capital expenditure, which is also more procyclical. Procyclical public spending and a positive expenditure multiplier imply that fiscal policy in South Asia amplifies boom‐and‐bust cycles. These results are in line with those of other emerging markets and developing economies and robust to different model specifications and estimation strategies.     

Protectionism under Trump: The China Shock,Deplorables, and the First White President

This paper uses USA county‐level electoral data to examine the 2016 turn to protectionism. The hypothesis that support for protectionism was purely a response to globalization is rejected. Exposure to trade competition encouraged a shift to the Republican candidate, but this effect is mediated by race, diversity, education, and age. If the turn toward protectionism is due to economic dislocation, then public policy interventions could mitigate the impact and support the re‐establishment of a political consensus for open trade. If, however, the drivers are identity or cultural values, then the scope for constructive policy intervention is unclear.     

Incentive effects of fiscal rules on the finance minister's behavior: Evidence from revenue projections in Swiss Cantons

Predicting available tax revenue accurately is a key step of fiscal policy. It has recently been shown that revenue projection errors have a direct impact on fiscal deficits. In this paper, we explore the relationship between the ideology of the finance minister and tax revenue projection errors, and assess how the stringency of fiscal rules alters this relationship. We use a panel dataset of 26 Swiss cantons over the period 1980–2007 as well as a new dataset of 99 finance ministers at the cantonal level. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that the allocation of the departments – including the department of finance – to the elected politicians is a random process from the point of view of the voters. We identify a rather counter-intuitive positive effect of the ideology of the finance minister on tax revenue projection errors in the sense that a more left-wing finance minister produces relatively more conservative forecasts. We also find that fiscal rules reduce the effect of ideology on tax revenue projection errors. These results suggest that left-wing finance ministers need to curb deficits relatively more in order to signal the same level of competence to the voters than right-wing finance ministers. They also suggest that fiscal rules render the signal less informative to the voters and thereby reduce the incentive for left-wing finance ministers to be more conservative in their projections.