控股股东和财务杠杆的激励功能

以上海证券交易所的747家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,检验了财务杠杆与公司价值之间的经验关系,考察了控股股东性质对财务杠杆价值效应的影响.结果发现,财务杠杆对公司价值(成长性)具有显著的积极效应;另外,控股股东性质对财务杠杆的价值效应和激励功能具有显著的影响,财务杠杆在法人控股的公司中能够发挥更有效的激励作用.     

钢企行业亏损的剖析——基于经营杠杆和财务杠杆的角度

笔者以国内领头钢企的行业特征为基础,引入经营杠杆和财务杠杆的概念、传导机制、作用等建立传导机制模型,从杠杆的角度去剖析钢企亏损的必然性,并提出建议,望对当前企业利用财务杠杆经营杠杆进行企业管理有所裨益。     

资本结构的激励功能和投资者保护:来自沪港上市公司的比较证据

本文实证分析并比较了在上海和香港两地的上市公司资本结构激励功能的差异。分析表明，财务杠杆对大陆上市公司和香港上市公司的市场价值均具有显著的积极效应。而香港上市公司的资本结构激励功能显著地强于大陆上市公司，财务杠杆所产生的债务压力在香港上市，公司中能够发挥更有效的激励作用。研究结果显示，香港证券市场能够为投资者提供更有力的保护机制。     

大股东控制、财务杠杆与公司价值——国有及民营上市公司治理的比较研究

本文以2002～2004年的上市公司为样本,研究了第一大股东持股比例、财务杠杆与公司价值之间的关系.研究发现,国有控制上市公司与民营控制上市公司公司价值并无显著差异;国有控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值呈U形关系,民营控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值则呈倒U形关系;国有控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值负相关,民营控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值则正相关.其政策含义是,政府应该继续贯彻"抓大放小"的战略方针;监管部门应该关注持股比例较高的民营上市公司第一大股东的资金来源及其行为特征,防止其对公司其他利益相关者的侵害行为;银行贷款应对国有及民营企业一视同仁,银行需要加强对国有控制上市公司贷款的监督.     

债务期限结构、公司价值和债权人保护

以上市公司为研究样本,考察债务期限结构对公司价值的影响力,分析债务期限结构的管理激励差异,经验结果显示,短期财务杠杆具有更强的管理激励,能够更有效地迫使管理者改善经营效率和提升公司价值。结论表明,我国的制度环境能够为短期债权人提供更有效的保护机制,债务的流动性是影响资本结构激励功能的关键因素。     

财务契约理论的演化与分类探析

一、引言 财务契约包括股权契约、债务契约和管理者报酬契约.股权契约规定股东的权利、义务和利益协调机制;债务契约规定债权人权利、义务和债权相机治理机制;管理者报酬契约规定管理者权利、义务和报酬.由此可见,财务契约与公司融资、公司治理和财务管理之间关系非常密切.财务契约不仅是公司取得融资的基本保障,而且规定了股东、债权人、管理者之问的责权利关系,奠定了公司治理和财务管理的结构基础和机制基础.     

基于贡献三因素论的企业增值额分配财务公平测度研究

企业作为价值创造的实体，在要素市场定价不尽完美的情况下应结合贡献者对价值创造的贡献度对“蛋糕”进行公平的财务分配。本文基于劳动、资本、管理三个可观测角度对我国汽车业上市公司与德国汽车公司的增值额分配财务公平进行比较研究，并对公司税费负担、高管激励、劳动者报酬等提出系列政策建议。     

从财务杠杆效应谈企业负债经营探寻

在中国现代经济的发展中,中小企业的数量与日俱增。大多数公司因管理不善而出现负债,但一些公司高管巧妙地利用这笔债务进行融资,并充分利用财务杠杆来解决其资金不足的问题。目前,越来越多的公司采用财务杠杆原理,在此背景下,本文从财务杠杆的角度分析和阐明了负债经营的重要性,更好地利用企业的财务杠杆解决其资本问题,提高其外部竞争力,改善其发展,促进企业的整体进步。     

财务杠杆原理在汽车类上市公司的应用研究

财务杠杆在公司财务管理中扮演着重要的角色,一方面它可以提高公司效益,另一方面它可以控制财务风险。本论文先对财务杠杆理论进行了综述,接着选取中国汽车行业的20家上市公司,以2010年的财务数据为样本,借助于Excel中的图表功能对其财务杠杆水平进行了计算与分析。数据分析表明,汽车行业的财务杠杆系数处于一个安全经营区间,资产负债率也比较适中,汽车行业合理地运用了财务杠杆。     

财务杠杆理论的应用

财务杠杆理论的有效应用必须建立在对财务杠杆概念的全面理解基础上,合理确定应用策略,科学地应用财务杠杆理论,有效地实现其应有价值。一、财务杠杆概念财务杠杆是杠杆原理在财务活动中的引申,财务杠杆的核心是杠杆。目前,对财务杠杆概念的描述大体有以下几种:     

独立董事制度的有效性:基于盈余管理视角

本文从盈余管理的视角研究我国独立董事制度的有效性,为我国独立董事制度的完善提供实证支持.结果发现,具有会计专业能力的上市公司独立董事人数越多,盈余管理程度越低;独立董事薪酬越高,上市公司盈余管理程度越高.但没有发现独立董事比例、履职环境与其盈余管理程度具有显著的相关关系.     

股市波动对基金管理费报酬的影响研究——基于中介效应的分析

利用中介效应分析方法检验了理论假设:股市波动对基金管理费报酬有积极的影响,基金业绩在股市波动对基金管理费报酬的影响中存在正的中介效应,即基金有能力在股市波动中发掘机会来提高业绩,从而提高管理费报酬。实证结果表明,在没有增加基金业绩情况下,股市波动对基金管理费报酬具有积极影响,此结论从股市波动的视角证明了基金管理费激励机制并不是激励相容的。根据实证结果,可以从基金类型多样化、扩大管理费率范围和加强投资者教育等三个方面完善基金管理费激励机制。     

Do companies compare employees’ salaries? Evidence from stated-owned enterprise group

The mechanism by which enterprises set salaries is vitally important to employees and is especially relevant to the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper investigates the effect of comparing employee compensation based on a sample of A-share SOE groups from 2008 to 2018. We find that when employee compensation at one company sharply increases, the employee compensation of other companies controlled by the same group will increase sharply in the following year. Further analysis shows that when employees’ sense of unfair compensation is stronger, when employees are less replaceable and when enterprises’ ability to pay is stronger, the effect of employee pay comparison is stronger. Increased employee salary does not improve enterprise performance, however, suggesting that such salary adjustment is ineffective. This paper expands the research on employee compensation and provides useful insights for optimizing the design of compensation contracts and promoting compensation reform in SOEs.     

中国工商银行人力资源管理体制改革研究

随着中国银行业的全面开放,工商银行面临前所未有的机遇和挑战。为改善公司治理结构,构建有效的激励约束机制,提升人力资源管理水平,中国工商银行亟须构建一个职务能上能下、人员能进能出、收入能高能低、员工与企业共同发展的市场化人力资源管理体系。要建立完善的岗位制度,奠定科学的人力资源管理基础;科学规划人员规模,建立通畅有序的人员管理机制;完善员工职务晋升体系,拓展员工晋升通道;改革员工培训体制,提升员工人力资本价值;健全业绩评价机制,建立以价值为导向的绩效管理体系;深化薪酬激励机制改革,建立市场化薪酬管理体系;建立高效的人力资源管理运营机制。     

对推进基层商业银行绩效考核机制建设的思考

近年来,我国商业银行股份制改革不断深入,建立能够全面考核员工工作业绩,有效促进战略发展目标的实现,提升核心竞争力的绩效考核机制,已经成为各家商业银行完善公司治理结构建设的核心课题之一。目前,随着各家商业银行不断推进机构扁平化管理,加强对各业务条线的量化考核,绩效考核机制也正处于不断改进和完善的过程之中。建立科学合理有效的绩效考核机制,有助于商业银行引导员工的行为方向与银行战略目标保持一致,提高内部管理水平,提高员工的工作效率,推进人才的培育和成长。     

Who should set CEO pay? The press? Congress? Shareholders?

Populist fervor in an election year has transformed executive compensation from a business issue into a political one. Critics, led by Graef Crystal, author of In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, charge that CEOs are ripping off shareholders with their outrageous salaries while running U.S. corporations into the ground. Politicians claim overpaid CEOs are the root cause of the U.S. competitiveness problem. Add a recessionary business climate to the fact that some CEOs earn 130 times more than their lowest paid employees, and you have the makings of a populist rebellion. In a bid to appease voters, Congress is considering several bills that would limit the deductibility of "excessive executive salaries," the SEC has opened the issue to shareholder comment, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board is looking at new accounting standards for granting stock options to executives as part of company compensation schemes. Andrew R. Brownstein and Morris J. Panner say it's time to put the debate back where it belongs--in a business context. The real question is not are executives paid too much, but are shareholders getting their money's worth. Most U.S. corporations use stock compensation to link company long-term performance to executive salaries. And because of the staggering market performance of U.S. corporations in the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of CEOs are actually paid in line with their performance. Rather than cut executive pay, Brownstein and Panner suggest that corporations extend incentive-based compensation plans to all employees, thus narrowing the salary gap and establishing pay for performance at every level of the organization.     

商业银行运营效率与董事会治理

本文在对中国16家上市商业银行绩效进行前沿效率分析的基础上,建立以董事会规模、外部董事监事占比、CEO薪酬和管理层人均薪酬为基础的二元选择模型,对中国商业银行运营效率同董事会治理的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,独立董事在商业银行公司治理中的作用并不明显,CEO薪酬和董事会规模对商业银行业绩并无显著影响,董事会规模过大无...     

Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

会计师事务所人力资本与薪资对其经营绩效之影响

知识经济时代,人力资本与薪酬诱因设计是影响会计师事务所经营绩效的关键因素。人力资本与薪酬诱因设计是否随着会计师事务所经营环境竞争日益激烈,而更有助于经营绩效的提高,目前仍缺乏相关证据。有鉴于此,本研究采用2004至2007年「会计师事务所服务业调查报告」之普查资料,探讨会计师事务所人力资本、薪资与经营绩效三者间之关联性。实证发现:实证结果显示,会计师事务所人力资本越高,则薪资水平越高;会计师事务所薪资水平越高,则经营绩效越好;会计师事务所人力资本越高,则经营绩效越好;员工薪资在人力资本与经营绩效间之间扮演着中介之角色。在审计市场环境日益艰困情况下,研究结果可提供会计师事务所的经营者在决策时一个有用之参考。