Illustrating the importance of Austrian business cycle theory: A reply to Murphy,Barnett, and Block; A call for quantitative study

Murphy et al. (2009) criticize Young’s (2005) test of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) using US industry-level quarterly job reallocation data and the federal funds rate as a monetary policy indicator. I argue that not only are Murphy et al.’s specific criticisms misguided; more importantly, they all but completely rule out the type of empirical study that Young (2005) advocates: specifically, one that (1) is quantitative and distinguishes between statistical and economic significance and (2) attempts to exploit a hypothesis that is both a prediction of ABCT and not a prediction of competing monetary theories of the cycle. I argue that empirical studies embodying (1) and (2) are critical to ABCT as a research program. Furthermore, I review the existing econometric studies of ABCT from the last 10 years and conclude that there is much room for improvement along these lines.     

Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights

This essay is on the Indian constitution and extends and responds to the work of Singh (Constitutional Political Economy 17:17, 2006) in the analysis of economic rights. The veto player framework is used to analyze the development of economic rights which was diminished and civil rights (through Public Interest Litigation) which was expanded since Indian independence. The Congleton Model (Constitutional Political Economy 12:193–215, 2001) and Tsebelis Model (British Journal of Political Science 25(3):298–325, 1995) on veto players are used to develop the hypotheses and analyze the evolution of the Indian constitution.     

Sustainable markets with short sales

Market objectives can conflict with long-term goals. Behind the conflict is the impatience axiom introduced by T. Koopmans to describe choices over time. The conflict is resolved here by introducing a new concept, sustainable markets. These differ from Arrow-Debreu markets in that traders have sustainable preferences and no bounds on short sales. Sustainable preferences are sensitive to the basic needs of the present without sacrificing the needs of future generations and embody the essence of sustainable development (Chichilnisky in Soc Choice Welf 13(2):231–257, 1996a; Res Energy Econ 73(4):467–491, 1996b). Theorems 1 and 2 show that limited arbitrage is a necessary and sufficient condition describing diversity and ensuring the existence of a sustainable market equilibrium where the invisible hand delivers sustainable as well as efficient solutions (Chichilnisky in Econ Theory 95:79–108, 1995; Chichilnisky and Heal in Econ Theory 12:163–176, 1998). In sustainable markets prices have a new role: they reflect both the value of instantaneous consumption and the value of the long-run future. The latter are connected to the independence of the axiom of choice at the foundations of mathematics (Godel 1940).     

Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the “Coase theorem”

This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition.     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

Consumer specialization and the Romantic transformation of the British Grand Tour of Europe

This paper posits that significant changes in 19th century British recreational travel patterns resulted from a change in the manner in which tourists used entertaining stimuli in order to attain pleasure. Consumers no longer merely viewed arousing stimuli, but attempted to use them to produce emotional states of being which they could partially modify to intensify pleasurable feelings (Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain, William Heinemann, 2003). The impetus for this modification stemmed from an increasing awareness that emotional responses could be to some degree self-cultivated, as embodied in the Romantic ethos that become popular at the time via the emergence of the paperback novel and magazine industry (Campbell, The romantic ethic and the spirit of modern consumerism, Blackwell, 1987). By learning how to manipulate and modify mental images in a way that may not necessarily correspond with objective reality, Romantic tourists learned to elicit pleasure through engaging of their imagination. Such a change in the mode of pleasure seeking had important long run economic consequences for tourist regions throughout the European continent.     

On economic growth and minimum wages

We offer an analysis of the existence of a positive relationship between minimum wages and economic growth in a simple one-sector overlapping generations economy à la Romer (J Polit Econ 94:1002–1037, 1986), in the case of both homogeneous and heterogeneous labour and without considering any growth-sustaining externalities which the minimum wage can generate. Assuming also the existence of unemployment benefits financed with balanced-budget consumption taxes not conditional upon age, we show that the minimum wage can promote economic growth and welfare despite the occurrence of unemployment. There may also exist a growth- and welfare-maximising minimum wage.     

Spatial Welfare Economics Versus Ecological Footprint: A Sensitivity Analysis Introducing Strong Sustainability

The aim of this paper is a sensitivity analysis with the core-periphery model of ‘new economic geography’ put forward in Grazi et al. (Environ Resour Econ 38:135–153, 2007). This model comprises interregional trade, agglomeration advantages and resource (land) use or environmental externalities. Grazi et al. (2007, GBR) compare a social welfare (SW) indicator with the ecological footprint (EF) indicator for measuring spatial sustainability of a set of land use configurations. Their main result is that the SW and the EF indicator can yield completely different rankings and only for extreme parameterizations of environmental externalities the rankings coincide. We adapt the model by interpreting total natural land as a resource constraint and differentiate between weak and strong sustainability. In a sensitivity analysis we show that the main results of GBR (2007) correspond to the case of weak sustainability in our adapted model version. In the case of strong sustainability our adapted model version shows the same welfare rankings for both indicators without the extreme parameterization that is necessary to obtain the same results in the original GBR (2007) model.     

Toward a Horizonal Theory of Justice: Efficiency,Equity, Rights and Capabilities in a Free Market Economy

The theory of planning horizons and their relation to pricing, conscience and learning has been explored in some detail in terms of efficiency attributes and ecological health (Jennings 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 39:365-373, 2005, 2007a, b, 2008a). This paper addresses the equity implications of planning horizons in terms of the social role and importance of justice, rights and capabilities in a free market economy. From my earlier work, cooperation—not competition—is seen as the means to longer and broader horizons in an efficiency frame, mitigating any alleged tradeoff against equity issues. The impact of longer horizons on fairness and justice in terms of intentions and outcomes along with rights and capabilities still remains unexplored. This paper reviews the normative aspects of planning horizons, showing how ethical and ecological conscience spreads with horizon effects, strengthening goals of fairness and the internalization of social effects. In this setting, capabilities and empowerment are enhanced by respect for human rights, as social conscience spreads through interhorizonal complementarities. The features of a long-horizon world differ from myopic contexts, specifically in the relation of efficiency to other goals. This paper examines that difference in terms of its equity aspects, with regard to social justice and the role of rights and capabilities in economic cultures.     

Concordian Economics: Tools to Return Relevance to Economics

With the help of planes and solids, this paper presents an enlargement of the field of observation of economic theory. Through this transformation, the distribution of ownership rights to money and wealth assumes a central position in economic analysis. Thus social relevance is returned to economics. The validity of this operation is confirmed by the return of the millenarian field of economic justice to its traditional function as guidance to economic policy. The paper then presents four sets of economic rights and responsibilities that offer the potential of translating principles of economic justice into the complexities of the modern world.

Specialists and citizens all: A reply to Boettke,Koppl, and Holcombe

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

How Can a Cartel Be Detected?

There is a long history of analyzing the workability of markets regarding concentration ratios as indicators of workability. In this paper, we discuss a comparatively new concept, the Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) Concept, introduced by Grossekettler (1982, 1999, 2005, 2008). The CFD-concept analyzes real market processes by means of time series analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently or not. Furthermore, the concept can be used as a tool for detecting cartels. Therefore, we develop a System of Cartel Markers which can be used to analyze real markets. We analyze the German cement industry as an example of a cartel and find significant differences to the competitive benchmark.     

Regulatory economics and the journal of regulatory economics: a 30-year retrospective

Over the 30 year history of the Rutgers University CRRI Eastern Conference the regulatory scene has changed dramatically. In 1989 the first Issue of the Journal of Regulatory Economics appeared. This paper builds on Crew and Kleindorfer (J Regul Econ 21(1):5–22, 2002), which reviewed 20 years in the development of regulatory economics. In addition, this aricle outlines the history and assesses the significance of the JRE in the literature of regulatory economics.     

Recreation demand estimation and valuation in spatially connected systems

Recreation demand models frequently are used to explain outdoor recreation behavior and to estimate willingness to pay for changes in environmental quality at recreation sites. Among the most commonly used recreation demand models are site choice models based on the multinomial logit framework, which account for the spatial relationships between each recreator's home and multiple alternative destinations thereby capturing the substitution possibilities among recreation sites. However, standard applications of this framework typically do not account for the possibility of spatial connections among the sites via movements of the target species, such as fish in connected water bodies in recreational angling applications or terrestrial species in hunting or wildlife viewing applications. In this paper we examine aspects of environmental valuation and natural resource dynamics that generally are addressed separately. Specifically, we show that in such spatially connected systems, a “reduced form” application of the standard site choice modeling approach, using proxy measures of environmental quality rather than direct measures of species abundances, can produce biased estimates of willingness to pay for environmental improvements. Furthermore, we show that under some conditions poorly targeted environmental improvements in spatially connected systems can lead to welfare decreases. In such systems a structural model of recreator site choices and species sorting behavior and population dynamics may be required to fully account for the spatial linkages among sites and the feedback effects between recreators and the target species.     

The joint dynamics of inflation, unemployment and interest rate in the United States since 1980

In this paper, by using a combination of long-run and short-run restrictions, we identify a small structural VECM which includes inflation, unemployment and the federal funds rate and study the dynamic interactions at different frequencies among these variables. Our results show that: (a) in accordance with the traditional view of economic fluctuations, aggregate demand shocks and monetary policy shocks push inflation and unemployment in opposite directions in the short run; (b) the permanent supply shock explains the long-run movement of inflation and unemployment. These conclusions are at odds with the prediction of “natural-rate” models but are consistent with the idea of a propagation mechanism which links productivity shocks to inflation and unemployment at medium and low frequencies. Thus, with respect to some recent studies (e.g. Beyer and Farmer, ECB Working Paper 121, 2002, and Ireland, J Monet Econ 44:279–291, 1999), we offer a different interpretation of the low-frequency comovements between inflation and unemployment characterizing the US economy in the last decades.

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms

An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.     

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

We report four repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) low and medium control treatments with 476 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. We largely confirm the existence of hidden costs of control but, contrary to the original study, hidden costs of control are usually not substantial enough to significantly undermine the effectiveness of economic incentives. Our subjects were asked, at the end of the experimental session, to complete a questionnaire in which they had to state their work motivation in hypothetical scenarios. Our questionnaires are identical to the ones administered in Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) questionnaire study. In contrast to the game play data, our questionnaire data are similar to those of the original questionnaire study. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we report an extension with 228 subjects where performance-contingent earnings are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a flat participation fee. We observe that hidden costs significantly outweigh benefits of control under hypothetical incentives.     

Risk aversion and framing effects

We present a new experimental evidence of how framing affects decisions in the context of a lottery choice experiment for measuring risk aversion. We investigate framing effects by replicating the Holt and Laury’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 92:1644–1655, 2002) procedure for measuring risk aversion under various frames. We first examine treatments where participants are confronted with the 10 decisions to be made either simultaneously or sequentially. The second treatment variable is the order of appearance of the ten lottery pairs. Probabilities of winning are ranked either in increasing, decreasing, or in random order. Lastly, payoffs were increased by a factor of ten in additional treatments. The rate of inconsistencies was significantly higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in increasing and random than in decreasing treatment. Both experience and salient incentives induce a dramatic decrease in inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand, risk aversion was significantly higher in sequential than in simultaneous treatment, in decreasing and random than in increasing treatment, in high than in low payoff condition. These findings suggest that subjects use available information which has no value for normative theories, like throwing a glance at the whole connected set of pairwise choices before making each decision in a connected set of lottery pairs.     

Building systems

A system is a set of elements which are connected in particular ways. The formal general equilibrium model is an extreme case in which every element is directly connected to every other and in which all potential external connections, including connections from the future, are incorporated in the data. The foundational assumption of this paper is that viable systems must be selectively connected, and that viable large systems are highly-decomposable assemblies of smaller systems. As Simon argued, quasi-decomposability has made evolution possible from the beginning of the universe. Economies are evolutionary systems, in which human intentionality is a novel feature which modifies but does not supersede the processes of novelty generation, selection and diffusion. The microfoundations for this study are found in the characteristics of the human brain as a system of selective connections. Human knowledge consists of domain-limited patterns imposed on events. Organization—selective connections—is thus basic; but the potential for human knowledge is greatly enhanced by specialisation between domains, combined with variation within each. Co-ordination and development, so often separated in economic theory, are interconnected; they are both ordered processes—not states, in which markets (alongside many other institutions) are prime sources of order.     

The Economic Surplus as a Fund for Social Change and Postneoliberal Governance

The central problem in capitalism today is not one of scarce resources clashing against innate, insatiable wants. Rather, the modern problem of monopoly capitalism is one of abundance of production clashing against scarcity of consumers. Indeed, sustaining growth while fighting against excess capacity proves to be the biggest battle in business today, fought by the capitalist power structure with the tools of neoliberalism and globalization. The economic surplus, roughly sketched, represents that gap between productive resources and consumption, and thus represents the abundance that is possible given current technology. The argument set forth is that the economic surplus remains a powerful tool in describing economic relationships and social justice issues within the context of the Great Capitalist Restoration, but more importantly, that the economic surplus represents a tool for social change. The potential for socially just amelioration and change within post-neoliberal governance is explored with explicit reference to the qualitative and instrumental framework proposed by Ron Stanfield in his somewhat overlooked but incredibly important piece, “The Fund for Social Change” (1992).