Utility and production externalities, equilibrium efficiency and leisure specification

This paper analyzes the implications that the specification of the leisure activity has on the equilibrium efficiency in a two-sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. We consider external effects of consumption and leisure in utility, and sector-specific externalities associated to physical and human capital in production. The optimal tax policy to correct for the distortions caused by the externalities is characterized under all the typical leisure specifications considered in the literature: home production, quality time and raw time. We show that the optimal policy depends markedly on the leisure specification.     

Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium

Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy.     

Consumer anticipation of income tax changes

The paper synthesizes existing consumption theories to suggest that consumers modify their consumption, savings, debt, and asset acquisition behavior in advance of well-publicized changes in federal personal income tax changes. Existing cross-section and time series data document such adjustments prior to enactment of the 1964, 1968, and 1975 federal income tax revisions. Uncertainty reinforces tax-increase anticipation effects and moderates tax decrease anticipation effects. Further, the response to actual tax changes is reduced, and may even be offset, by consumers' anticipatory actions. The theory and data presented help resolve controversy surrounding the effectiveness of the 1968 tax increase.     

Utility and entropy

Summary. In this paper we study an astonishing similarity between the utility representation problem in economics and the entropy representation problem in thermodynamics. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: October 16, 2000     

A portfolio choice model with utility from anticipation of future consumption and stock market mean reversion

This paper studies a consumption and portfolio choice problem of a long-lived investor who derives pleasure not only from current consumption, but also from the contemplation of future consumption. The model assumes that all effects of future consumption on current well being are assumed to enter through a single variable—namely, the “stock of future consumption”—analogously to habit-formation models. The main implications of the model concern the incentives for savings, and the fundamental sources of risk in financial markets. It is shown that, when the stock market exhibits mean reversion, deriving utility from anticipation of future consumption has a tremendous effect on portfolio choice. In particular, mean allocation to stocks is much lower under the proposed preferences relative to the standard preferences, especially for high risk averse investors.     

Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility

The notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium suffers from three inherent difficulties. First, given the equilibrium strategies of other players, there are many best replies. Second, the equilibrium is unstable. Third, comparative statics results are counterintuitive. We demonstrate that these difficulties all have their origin in von Neumann and Morgenstern′s expected utility. In contrast, players with "quadratic utility" have unique best replies and the Nash equilibrium appears to yield intuitive comparative statics results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Capital-enhanced equilibrium exchange rate: evidence from India

This article examines the validity of the capital-enhanced equilibrium exchange rate (CHEER) approach using quarterly data ranging from 1993Q1 to 2016Q2. Using unit root break test and structural break cointegration technique, our overall results indicated that the CHEER is invalidated once a structural break is accounted for in the cointegration relationship. The rejection of the validity could be attributed to the asymmetry in the capital flows and exchange rates being not fully flexible.     

Improving the industrial anticipation of current scientific activity

There is now widespread realization that new scientific findings are the foundations of much of tomorrow's technical and economic growth. How might one shorten awareness of scientific progress and possible applications? Several concepts are suggested—a) speculations of scientists involved, b) analysis of current government funding of research projects (per Klingman), c) retrospective analysis of the evolution of a scientific field to identify precedent influential factors, d) normative forecasts of scientists reviewing their field (“what could be”), e) normative forecasts of scientists seeking support for new work (“what should be”), and f) analysis of current “artifacts” of science. It is argued that vigorous study along these lines could speed some industrial and governmental response to ongoing work on scientific frontiers.     

Self-Flagellation and Utility Maximization

Abstract

Economic models explain human behavior only to the degree that the underlying assumptions of the model are fulfilled. Consumer theory of rational choice has been applied to a wide array of situations. This paper examines the results of the model when a consumer considers bundles of goods, some of which may affect her self image. Under these conditions, wrong decisions are not easily corrected, but can more easily be reversed if the individual is able to forgive herself for having made the wrong decision.     

Self-rewards and personal motivation

Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation. We show that in a model with time-inconsistent and reference-dependent preferences, self-rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self-control problems. We also discuss the different types of self-rewards the individual can use, such as vice goods and virtue goods, and analyze which types of goods the individual prefers.     

Non-paternalistic Altruism and Utility Interdependence

This paper clarifies the notion of non-paternalistic altruism through the use of utility aggregators. It presents conditions for the existence of non-paternalistically altruistic utility functions and provides a complete characterization of such utility functions. The results are used to generalize the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics and to prove the existence of an equilibrium in a game of voluntary gift-giving.
JEL Classification Nos.: D11, D64.     

Incomplete Insurance and Non-expected Utility

This paper shows that the estimation of non-expected utility (Kreps–Porteus preference) based on the representative agent model is less robust with respect to the departure from complete markets than is the expected utility for the following reasons. First, the precautionary saving caused by uninsured shocks may be evaluated incorrectly. Second, the portfolio held by individual household includes not only marketable assets, but also non-marketable assets (e.g. human capital) in the context of incomplete markets. Third, returns on marketable assets may not provide sufficient information for recovering relevant parameters. The estimated parameters available from the existing empirical research are consistent with the biasedness of parameters implied by this study.
JEL Classification: E44, G12.     

Technological generalizations and leitbilder—the anticipation of technological opportunities

Recent national technology foresight studies as well as the Millennium Project of the American Council for the United Nations University are very much based on “nodes of discussion.” These short statements are called, e.g., topics, issues, or developments. This article provides a framework for the classification and analysis of nodes related to future technological development. Key concepts of the article are “technological generalization” and “leitbild.” The topics in the technology foresight Delphi studies can be seen as different kinds of generalizations from already realized technological developments. Leitbild is a German word. Its most general meaning is a guiding image. Like a common vision, a leitbild creates a shared overall goal, offers orientation toward one long-term overall goal, and provides a basis for different professions and disciplines to work in the same direction. The analysis of leitbilder and emerging technological paradigms might contribute to the construction of topics and issues and to the argumentation processes related to them.     

Mistaken self-perception and equilibrium

Summary. Motivated by real-world information economics problems and by experimental findings on overconfidence, this paper introduces a general epistemic construction to model strategic interaction with incomplete information, where the players self-perception may be mistaken. This allows us to rigorously describe equilibrium play, by formulating appropriate equilibrium concepts. We show that there always exist objective equilibria, where the players correctly anticipate each others strategies without attempting to make sense of them, and that these outcomes coincide with the equilibria of an associated Bayesian game with subjective priors. In population games, these equilibria can also be always introspectively rationalized by the players, despite their possibly mistaken self-perception.Received: Received: May, 12, 2003; revised version: 3 December 2004, Revised: 3 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: J31, D82, D83.I thank Massimiliano Amarante, Eddie Dekel, Massimo Marinacci, Jean Francois Mertens, Giuseppe Moscarini, Paolo Siconolfi, Marciano Siniscalchi, Joel Sobel, and an anonymous referee.     

Environmental performance and equilibrium

Abstract.  In this paper we show why firms' or industries' rankings in terms of environmental performance depend not only on the technology but also on market equilibrium. Between two industries committed to the same environmental constraint, the more eco-efficient is the one with the higher output level. By comparing industries and firms, we show that the rankings are not robust, for they are affected by market outcome. The role of eco-efficiency in firms' profitability in equilibrium is also scrutinized. All this shows that the usual eco-efficiency indicators are inadequate. To tackle this problem, we propose a sound indicator.     

Econometrics and equilibrium models

In Rational Econometric Man, Edward Nell and Karim Errouaki present a welcome and timely case for the view that econometrics and econometric model-building may not be the magic tools to solve all empirical questions despite what many seem to have thought they were in the 1960s. Here I examine some possible problems with econometric models that have to do with their usually taking the form of equilibrium models. Some of these problems were recognized by Trygve Haavelmo decades ago. And as Aris Spanos has recently discussed, the problems are often the result of what we say in our textbooks. Some problems have to do with what we mean by econometric parameters and others with how we use probabilities.     

Evolution and correlated equilibrium

Given a normal form game and a signal generating process, we construct an expanded game in the spirit of Aumann (Econometrica 55(1):1–18, 1987) in which agents condition their strategic choices on perceived signals. We collect results on evolutionary selection dynamics of Ritzberger and Weibull (Econometrica 63(6):1371–1399, 1995), Swinkels (J Econ Theory 57(2):306–332, 1992b) and Samuelson and Zhang (J Econ Theory 57:363–391, 1992) to apply them to normal form games with payoff irrelevant signals. We suggest a selection dynamic for the evolution of signals and characterize the set of signal distributions and induced payoffs for sets that are asymptotically stable with respect to this evolutionary selection on signals.