Tax Principles,Product Differentiation and the Nature of Competition

We analyze the choice between the origin and destination principles of taxation when there is product differentiation and Bertrand competition. If taxes are redistributed to consumers and demand is linear the origin principle dominates the destination principle whatever the degree of product differentiation and extent of economic integration. With nonlinear demand the origin principle dominates if there is sufficient economic integration. When the social value assigned to tax revenue is higher than the private value, the destination principle dominates for intermediate values of product differentiation and economic integration. The same results are also shown to hold with Cournot competition. JEL Code: F12, H20     

How fast to run in the Red Queen race?

This paper creates a market ecosystem, via an agent‐based model, that combines the dynamic features of the Red Queen effect with well‐accepted business world performance indicators. Essentially, firms are tasked with remaining ‘alive’ by adapting to their environment through implementing a competitive response of innovating or imitating. An analysis of the firms’ behaviours delivers a deep understanding of the drivers of innovative behaviour within the economy. The key findings of the paper are (1) that concentrated markets are not entirely detrimental to innovative behaviour, with the blend of firm type being a more important consideration, and (2) that the rate at which an innovation impairs existing markets affects the activity levels of the firms within the population. The model's results are validated against a matching study based on real‐world data.     

Regulators as ‘agents’: power and personality in risk regulation and a role for agent‐based simulation

We critically examine how evidence and knowledge are brokered between the various actors (agents) in regulatory decisions on risk. Following a précis of context and regulatory process, we explore the role power and personality might play as evidence is synthesised and used to inform risk decisions, providing a review of the relevant literature from applied psychology, agent‐based simulation and regulatory science. We make a case for the adoption of agent‐based tools for addressing the sufficiency of evidence and resolving uncertainty in regulatory decisions. Referring to other environmental applications of agent‐based decision‐making, we propose how an agent model might represent power structures and personality characteristics with the attending implications for the brokering of regulatory science. This critical review has implications for the structuring of evidence that informs environmental decisions and the personal traits required of modern regulators operating in facilitative regulatory settings.     

Competition and Integration among Stock Exchanges in Europe: Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access

The economic theory of network externalities and a simple-game theoretical framework are used to explore the issue of competition among stock exchanges and the possibility of consolidation in the European stock-exchange industry. The paper shows the existence of equilibria where exchanges may decide, even unilaterally, to achieve full compatibility through implicit mergers and remote access, specialising only in trading or listing services. Thus the consolidation of European exchanges into one may occur with a welfare-efficient outcome or with a lock-in to a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, due to the network externalities and the different starting points of the various exchanges. 'Implicit mergers' among exchanges together with remote access are always weakly (in half of the cases, strictly) more efficient than the actual competition. This finding also sheds light on the existence and efficacy, of ATS and rating agencies, which can be viewed respectfully as exchanges specialising in trading and listing services.     

IPO waves, product market competition, and the going public decision: Theory and evidence

We develop a new rationale for initial public offering (IPO) waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.     

How Much Is Too Much: Are Merger Premiums Too High?

Is it too much to pay target firm shareholders a 50% premium on top of market price? Or is it too much to pay a 100% premium when pursuing mergers and acquisitions? How much is too much? In this paper, we examine how the extent of merger premiums paid impacts both the long‐run and announcement period stock returns of acquiring firms. We find no evidence that acquirers paying high premiums underperform those paying relatively low premiums in three years following mergers, and the result is robust after controlling for a variety of firm and deal characteristics. Short term cumulative abnormal returns are moreover positively correlated to the level of the premium paid by acquirers. Our evidence therefore suggests that high merger premiums paid are unlikely to be responsible for acquirers' long‐run post merger underperformance.     

美国混合合并反垄断法规制研究

关于混合合并的问题,美国在不同历史时期的态度是不同的,甚至是互相矛盾的。因此,美国的混合合并经历了合法—非法—基本上合法的一个过程。在这个过程中,尤其是美国视混合合并为非法的时期内,通过一系列的具体案件,美国混合合并理论得到了蓬勃发展。我国应当借鉴美国的经验,在反垄断法的实施过程中来具体分析混合合并行为,从而促进我国反垄断法的发展。     

How Does National Culture Impact Internalization Benefits in Cross‐Border Mergers and Acquisitions?

We examine how cultural differences between bidder and target countries impact internalization benefits in cross‐border takeovers. The value of internalizing intangible assets may increase if cultural differences create high transaction costs. On the other hand, integration difficulties between culturally distant acquirers and targets may reduce the value of internalization. Our results show that greater cultural distance (CD) has a positive influence on the long‐run performance of bidders with high intangibles, suggesting that significant internalization benefits from technological know‐how are realized when CD is great. These findings highlight the importance of national culture when examining internalization benefits in cross‐border mergers.