Exchange Rate Changes and Inflation in Post‐Crisis Asian Economies: Vector Autoregression Analysis of the Exchange Rate Pass‐Through

Macro‐economic consequences of large currency depreciations among the crisis‐hit Asian economies varied from one country to another. Inflation did not soar after the Asian currency crisis of 1997–98 in most crisis‐hit countries except Indonesia where high inflation followed a very large nominal depreciation of the rupiah. The high inflation meant a loss of price competitive advantage, a key for economic recovery from a crisis. This paper examines the pass‐through effects of exchange rate changes on the domestic prices in the East Asian economies using a vector autoregression analysis. The main results are as follows: (i) the degree of exchange rate pass‐through to import prices was quite high in the crisis‐hit economies; (ii) the pass‐through to Consumer Price Index (CPI) was generally low, with a notable exception of Indonesia; and (iii) in Indonesia, both the impulse response of monetary policy variables to exchange rate shocks and that of CPI to monetary policy shocks were positive, large, and statistically significant. Thus, Indonesia's accommodative monetary policy, coupled with the high degree of CPI responsiveness to exchange rate changes was an important factor in the inflation‐depreciation spiral in the wake of the currency crisis.     

Stock returns’ sensitivities to crisis shocks: Evidence from developed and emerging markets

We consider three “crisis shocks” related to key features of the 2007–2008 crisis, for emerging and developed economies: (1) the collapse of global trade, (2) the contraction of credit supply, and (3) selling pressure on firms’ equity. Using an international cross-section of firms, we find that returns’ sensitivities to these shocks imply large and statistically significant influences on residual equity returns during the crisis period (after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns). Similar analysis for several placebo periods shows that these effects are generally less severe or absent in non-crisis periods. Relative to developed economies, emerging markets are more responsive to global trade conditions (in crisis and in placebo periods), but less responsive to selling pressures. An analysis of portfolios of firms during various placebo periods indicates that investors are not compensated for the risks associated with the crisis shocks. Finally, a month-by-month analysis of returns during the crisis period shows that the time variation of the importance of each of the sensitivities to shocks tracks related changes in the global economic environment.     

基于Logit模型的新兴经济体主权债务危机预警研究

当前新兴经济体对全球经济增长贡献持续增加,在世界经济中的地位和作用日益突出。伴随新兴经济体经济规模的快速增长,其债务规模也在迅速扩大,随之而来的债务风险问题日益受到国际关注。特别是2008年以来,希腊等新兴经济体债务危机频频发生,对世界经济增长与金融稳定产生了巨大影响。因此,研究构建新兴经济体主权债务危机预警系统显得十分迫切和重要。本文阐述债务危机形成机理和影响,梳理债务危机相关理论和文献;讨论债务危机预警手段及相关标准选择,总结归纳多种研究模型和方法的优缺点,并说明本文采用Logit模型研究问题的依据和过程;基于Logit模型,选取拉丁美洲、亚洲、非洲共十个新兴经济体1980-2017年数据进行债务危机预警实证分析。研究结果表明,Logit方法能够以较高准确率发出预警信号,对新兴经济体债务危机有着良好预警能力;最后,本文根据研究结论给出相应启示与建议。     

Measuring the effects of dollar appreciation on Asia: A FAVAR approach

Exchange rate shocks have mixed effects on economic activity in both theory and empirical VAR models. In this paper, we extend the empirical literature by considering the implications of a positive shock to the U.S. dollar in a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model for the U.S. and three large Asian economies: Korea, Japan and China. The FAVAR framework allows us to represent a country’s aggregate economic activity by a latent factor, generated from a broad set of underlying observable economic indicators. To control for global conditions, we also include in the FAVAR a “global conditions index,” which is another latent factor generated from the economic indicators of major trading partners. We find that a dollar appreciation shock reduces economic activity and inflation not only for the U.S. economy, but also for all three Asian economies. This result, which is robust to a number of alternative specifications, suggests that in spite of their disparate economic structures and policy regimes, the dollar appreciation shock affects the Asian economies primarily through its impact on U.S. aggregate demand; and this demand channel dominates the expenditure-switching channel that affects a country’s export competitiveness.     

Session V: Macro Perspectives: Bigger Problems than Corporate Governance

Columbia Business School's well‐known authority on value‐based investing begins by attributing today's economic problems to a “global economic dislocation,” one that is rooted in the ongoing—and in Greenwald's view, inevitable—decline of manufacturing and displacement by services. Like the other example of dislocation in modern times, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 2008 global financial crisis and protracted recession— still very much with us—are viewed as originating in the sharp decline of a major “sector” of the global economy. In the Depression of the ‘30s it was agriculture; in the recent financial crisis it was manufacturing. In both cases, technological advances and economy‐wide productivity increases led to huge increases in stock and financial asset prices—but also to sharp drops in the prices of farm and manufactured goods, and massive overcapacity and ruinous competition in both sectors. According to the author, the working off of overcapacity in the agricultural sector was accomplished largely by the effect of World War II in moving huge numbers off the farm and into the mainly urban industrial sector at government expense. This labor force relocation, which occurred in all developed economies, was essential to a global economic transformation that for the next 50 years provided high productivity growth and greater equality of income and wealth. More recently, however, the global economy has been confronted with the challenge of accomplishing a transition from manufacturing to services that will feature lower productivity growth and more inequality. Foreseeing a long, difficult process, Greenwald's biggest concern is that government intervention will distract businesses from making this transition effectively—which means continuing to operate as efficiently as possible, downsizing when necessary—and so make the problems worse. And while business focuses on preserving its own efficiency and value, Greenwald urges governments to look for more cost‐effective ways—for example, expanded use in the U.S. of the Earned Income Tax Credit—to cushion workers from the consequences. Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps, while agreeing with much of Greenwald's analysis, has a different explanation of the U.S. productivity dilemma. Innovation is viewed as the primary driver of the prosperity of the advanced economies. Higher income and wealth matter less than job satisfaction, participation, and an array of non‐material “modern values” that have somehow been lost and that, for Phelps, are the key to restoring economic growth and “mass flourishing.”     

信贷危机后 通货紧缩将成为西方经济体主要风险

该文首先简要回顾了信贷危机发生以来全球市场的状况,进而分析了信贷危机对美国消费市场、新兴经济体和全球商品市场的影响,指出商品市场剧烈波动、严峻的通货膨胀对新兴经济体的威胁及其采取的对策;最后该文对通胀前景表示乐观,但认为信贷危机将导致世界经济的萎缩,同时认为通货紧缩将再度成为西方面临的主要风险。     

International transmission and business-cycle effects of financial stress

We analyze the international transmission of financial stress and its effects on global economic activity. Our analysis is based on country-specific monthly financial stress indices (FSIs) over the sample period 1970–2012 for 20 major economies. First, we show that co-movement between the FSIs increases during major financial crises and towards the end of our sample period. Second, we show that the risk of large financial stress spillovers to an economy increases with its level of economic openness. Third, we show – using a global VAR (GVAR) model – that (i) a financial stress shock in the US quickly transmits internationally, (ii) financial stress shocks have lagged but persistent negative effects on economic activity, and (iii) that a negative US demand shock induces only limited financial stress on a global scale. Finally, we show that spillovers of financial stress run mainly from advanced to emerging economies and not in the opposite direction.     

Contagion in financial markets after September 11: myth or reality?

Major global events can lead to a change in the cross‐country correlation of assets. Using stock prices from 25 economies, we test whether the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, resulted in a contagion—an increase in correlation across global financial markets. Unlike prior works on contagion, we model the intrinsic heteroskedasticity. Our results indicate that international stock markets, particularly in Europe, responded more closely to U.S. stock market shocks in the three to six months after the crisis than before. Our evidence suggests that the benefits of international diversification in times of crisis are substantially diminished.     

The Core,Periphery, and Beyond: Stock Market Comovements among EU and Non‐EU Countries

Using linear and nonlinear correlations, copulas, quantile dependence and lower tail dependence, we find that (1) equity markets of the advanced European Union (EU) countries comove more closely with each other than with the peripheral economies, (2) comovements with non‐EU countries are lower, (3) relative comovement structure before, during, and after the global financial crisis has been very stable, and (4) the level of comovements remained virtually the same between the crisis and post‐crisis periods. Our results are robust to controlling for Fama‐French, U.S. and global risk factors, as well as monetary policy, market interest rates, exchange rates, and uncertainty.     

How the UK economy weathered the financial storm

Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the UK had the largest banking sector asset to GDP ratio among large countries, and had experienced rapid real property price increases as well as a persistent current account deficit in the preceding decade. These factors, together with its role as an international financial centre, made the UK economy particularly vulnerable to the onset of the global financial crisis. Although the initial drop in real GDP was steep, we provide evidence that the economy has weathered the financial storm better than many feared, and has fared no worse than its peer group of major economies. In this paper we assess the reasons underlying this outcome, including the possibility of exaggerated vulnerabilities, global economic recovery, the flexible supply side of the UK economy, as well as fiscal, financial and monetary policy interventions. Our analysis suggests that all of these factors played a role in cushioning the impact on the UK real economy, leading to a more benign outcome than most observers expected.     

2011年全球经济与市场回顾和2012年展望

2011年,受欧洲主权债务危机不断蔓延的影响,发达国家经济复苏缓慢并呈现逐步分化趋势,新兴市场国家作为全球经济复苏主引擎的作用仍然突出,但也面临着经济增长趋缓的困扰。2012年,由于欧债危机隐患未除、全球金融系统依然脆弱以及发达国家自身结构性问题远未解决,全球经济方向将面临较大不确定性。未来新兴市场经济体有望继续充当全球经济复苏的主要动力,但增速将趋于放缓。发达经济体将维持宽松的货币政策,并将迫于财政赤字压力采取财政紧缩措施,而新兴经济体预计将实施相对稳健的货币政策与较为宽松的财政政策,以应对通货膨胀和经济增速趋缓的双重压力。     

Returns and volatility spillover in the European banking industry during global financial crisis: Flight to perceived quality or contagion?

This paper empirically investigates return, volatility and leverage spillover effects between banking industrial stock markets of the major economies (ME) (Germany, UK and US) and the smaller stressed European Union countries (SE), (Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) from 2002 to 2014 which includes the global financial crisis period (2007–2014). Thus the paper investigates the influence of the global crisis on the spillover between the banking industrial stock markets of Europe and the US. We apply a multivariate GARCH–GJR framework to investigate the effects of the financial crisis with respect to spillover. Our results indicate an increase in both means and volatility spillover between the major economies and the stressed EU economies from the pre-crisis to the crisis period. During the pre-crisis period there is ample evidence of spillover from Germany, UK and the US to the smaller EU economies. Little evidence of a significant spillover from the smaller economies to the major economies is found during this period. We find that return and volatility transmission mechanisms between the major economies and the smaller EU countries are asymmetric during the crisis period. During the crisis, the level and amount of spillover from the major economies increase. But now there is also clear evidence of spillover from smaller EU economies to the major economies, this is especially true for Germany and the UK. Evidence of spillover effects suggests the existence of exploitable trading strategies and has important implications to investors in the areas of option pricing, portfolio optimization and risk management.     

Currency crises and monetary policy: A study on advanced and emerging economies

The studies regarding the appropriate monetary policy response in defending the domestic currency following a currency crisis do not gather around a robust answer. This study tries to emphasize the notion that there is no single policy applicable for all currency crises happened and happening in the global world. The approach of the study is presenting empirical evidence by focusing separately on the advanced and emerging economies and proving that the monetary policy response for the emerging economies should be different from the advanced economies, depending mainly on the vulnerabilities of these economies preceding and during the crisis periods. The study includes twenty four economies, in which fifteen of them are emerging and nine of them are advanced, for the crisis periods between 1986 and 2009. The main finding of the study is that the tight monetary policy is effective in the advanced economies, and detrimental in the emerging economies faced financial turbulence. The monetary policy has no significance in recent crisis episodes both for advanced and emerging economies. Advanced economies besides having more independent central banking, lower country riskiness and almost no default history; mainly have second generation model weaknesses which cause the increased interest rates to be successful in stabilizing the exchange rates. For the emerging economies the third generation model weaknesses play a major role together with the first generation model vulnerabilities. Thus the major policy implication follows that the policy makers should take into account the economic fragilities during the crisis in implementing the monetary policy.     

全球经济新格局与中国企业海外投资机遇与风险

次贷危机以来,全球政治经济格局出现新的变化,以美国为代表的发达经济体在世界经济中的优势地位有所下降,以中国为代表的新兴经济体国力则相对增强,跨国公司全球化战略和供应链体系正经历着一次新的调整,并与世界经济的结构性调整相互交织,这为中国企业向海外拓展提供了良好机遇。与此同时,中国巨额外汇储备也为中国企业进行海外投资提供了坚实的资金基础。但是,海外投资东道国经济增长的放缓也使得国家风险增大,这使得中国企业进行海外投资时面临了一定的风险。     

Rescue packages and bank lending

This paper examines whether the rescue measures adopted during the global financial crisis helped to sustain the supply of bank lending. The analysis proposes a setup that allows testing for structural shifts in the bank lending equation, and employs a novel dataset covering large international banks headquartered in 14 major advanced economies for the period 1995–2010. While stronger capitalisation sustains loan growth in normal times, banks during a crisis can turn additional capital into greater lending only once their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold. This suggests that recapitalisations may not translate into greater credit supply until bank balance sheets are sufficiently strengthened.     

The determinants of vulnerability to the global financial crisis 2008 to 2009: Credit growth and other sources of risk

In this paper, we identify initial macroeconomic and financial market conditions that help explain the distinct response of the real economy of a particular country to the recent global financial crisis. Using four measures of crisis severity, we examine a data set with over 90 potential explanatory factors employing techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Four findings are of particular note. First, we find empirical evidence for the pivotal role of pre-crisis credit growth in shaping the real economy's response to the crisis. Specifically, a 1% increase in pre-crisis lending translates into a 0.2% increase in the cumulative loss in real output. Moreover, the combination of pronounced growth in lending ahead of the crisis and the country's exposure to external funding from advanced economies is shown to intensify the real downturn. Economies with booming real activity before the crisis are found to be less resilient to the global shock. Buoyant growth in real GDP in parallel with strong growth of credit particularly exacerbated the effects of the recent crisis on the real economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of holding international reserves in explaining the response of the real economy to the crisis. The accumulation of international reserves mitigated the harmful effects of financial stress on the real economy, in particular when domestic funding via credit is abundant. The results are shown to be robust to several estimation techniques, including those allowing for cross-country spillovers.     

International spillovers from Euro area and US credit and demand shocks: A focus on emerging Europe

In this paper, we examine the international effects of contractions in loan supply, loan demand and aggregate demand in the euro area and the USA. All three shocks have been at the forefront in spreading stress during the period of the global financial crisis and in particular so to countries that are strongly integrated with the euro area. We find that these shocks decrease international output and total credit to a varying degree. Loan demand and aggregate demand shocks in the euro area trigger significant negative spillovers on output in most other regions. Evidence for global negative output effects of euro area loan supply shocks is fraught with considerable estimation uncertainty. When these three types of shocks emanate from the USA, we find significant negative spillovers on output also for loan supply shocks. In general, international effects on total credit are an order of magnitude larger than those on output, with again more evidence that is significant for US than euro area shocks. Last, and taking a regional stance, our results indicate that economies from emerging Europe are most vulnerable to all shocks considered. Through their strong economic integration with the euro area, these economies are likewise exposed to euro area and US shocks, and spillover effects are often larger than the domestic response in the country of shock-origin.     

How resilient and countercyclical were emerging economies during the global financial crisis?

By studying the cross-country incidence of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, we document a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging economies suffered growth collapses (relative to the pre-crisis levels) comparable to those experienced by developed economies, even when they continued growing. Afterwards, most economies returned to their pre-crisis growth rates. Although emerging economies were not able to avoid the collapse originated in the U.S. and then transmitted across countries, they were more resilient during the global crisis than during past crises. Namely, they resumed their higher growth rates earlier and converged more quickly to their pre-crisis growth trend. Moreover, breaking with the past, emerging economies did not fall more than developed economies during the global crisis and were able to conduct countercyclical policies, thus becoming more similar to developed economies.     

Export Sophistication: A Dynamic Panel Data Approach

In this article, we analyze export sophistication based on a large panel dataset (2001–2015; 101 countries) and using various estimation algorithms. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we evaluate the bias properties of estimators and show that GMM-type estimators outperform instrumental-variable and fixed-effects estimators. Based on our analysis we document that GDP per capita and the size of the economy exhibit significant and positive effects on export sophistication; weak institutional quality exhibits negative effect. We also show that export sophistication is path-dependent and stable even during a major economic crisis, which is especially important for emerging and developing economies.     

The reaction of the U.S. and the European Monetary Union to recent global financial crises

This paper analyzes the responses of the United States and the economies of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to the financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009. The crisis illuminates the fundamental structural problems within the EMU, the European Union and the United States and the scale and scope of interconnections among the world economy. The paper focuses on the reactions of the real sector to the financial disturbances in these economies. Both comparative static and dynamic methodologies are used in order to appraise the scope and pace of adjustments in response to the global crisis.