Information, learning, and the stability of fiat money

We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.     

Price setting, price dispersion, and the value of money: or, the law of two prices

We study models combining search, money, price posting, and preference shocks. We show how these features interact to influence the price level and price dispersion. First, price-posting equilibria exist with valued fiat currency. Second, although both are possible, price dispersion is more common than a single price. Third, we prove that generically there cannot be more than two prices. We provide intuition for this law of two prices, show it also holds in some nonmonetary search models, and discuss variations of the assumptions under which it may not hold.     

Informed traders and limit order markets

We consider a dynamic limit order market in which traders optimally choose whether to acquire information about the asset and the type of order to submit. We numerically solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate that the market is a “volatility multiplier”: prices are more volatile than the fundamental value of the asset. This effect increases when the fundamental value has high volatility and with asymmetric information across traders. Changes in the microstructure noise are negatively correlated with changes in the estimated fundamental value, implying that asset betas estimated from high-frequency data will be incorrect.     

Information disclosure in credit markets when banks’ costs are endogenous

In this paper we develop a model of information disclosure among banks based on an endogenous interest rate for externally placed debt. Banks with private credit information are given an opportunity to disclose information prior to competing for borrowers. While disclosure eliminates a bank’s information advantage over its competitors, disclosing information creates a new advantage for the bank in terms of a lower cost of external funds. We find that the incentive for a bank to disclose information is inversely related to the bank’s capital ratio and positively related to the number of other banks that disclose information.     

Information and Liquidity

We study how recognizability affects assets’ acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock certificates, bonds or foreign currency, say. This idea is common in monetary economics, but previous models deliver equilibria where less recognizable assets are always accepted with positive probability, never probability 0. This is inconvenient when prices are determined through bargaining, which is difficult with private information. We construct models where agents reject outright assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Thus, information frictions generate liquidity differences without overly complicating the analysis.     

Information provision in financial markets

We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improving the precision of prior information is a more efficient way to do so. More accurate prior information decreases asymmetric information problems and consequently reduces the informativeness of prices, while a more accurate public signal increases price informativeness. The volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal. Finally, expected welfare can sometimes fall as prior information or the public signal become more precise.     

Unsecured credit markets are not insurance markets

We study the extent to which unsecured credit markets have altered the transmission of increased income risk to consumption variability over the past several decades. We find that unsecured credit markets pass through increased income risk to consumption, irrespective of bankruptcy policy and the information possessed by lenders. If risk sharing has indeed improved over this period, the reasons do not therefore lie in the unsecured credit market.     

Price dispersion, information and learning

We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents’ learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and equilibria with price dispersion entail more learning than equilibria with one price. Price dispersion increases communication about private histories, which in turn increases the overall amount of information in the economy. We also compare ex ante welfare under price dispersion and one price. Our results show that, despite the existence of some meetings where no trade takes place, ex ante welfare under price dispersion may be higher than under one price.     

Discussion of “Information and Liquidity”

I discuss the model of asset liquidity by Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2011, this issue, Forthcoming) . I consider a model with bilateral matching and bargaining in which a perfectly divisible asset serves as means of payment. A recognizability problem is introduced by assuming that the asset can be counterfeited at a positive cost. In contrast to Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright , in equilibrium sellers always accept objects that they do not recognize. The private information problem manifests itself by smaller quantities traded in uninformed matches.     

A theory of socialistic internal capital markets

We develop a model of a two-division firm in which the “strong” division has, on average, higher quality investment opportunities than the “weak” division. We show that, in the presence of agency and information problems, optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division. This leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division. The selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions.     

Information demand and stock market volatility

We study information demand and supply at the firm and market level using data for 30 of the largest stocks traded on NYSE and NASDAQ. Demand is approximated in a novel manner from weekly internet search volume time series drawn from the recently released Google Trends database. Our paper makes contributions in four main directions. First, although information demand and supply tend to be positively correlated, their dynamic interactions do not allow conclusive inferences about the information discovery process. Second, demand for information at the market level is significantly positively related to historical and implied measures of volatility and to trading volume, even after controlling for market return and information supply. Third, information demand increases significantly during periods of higher returns. Fourth, analysis of the expected variance risk premium confirms for the first time empirically the hypothesis that investors demand more information as their level of risk aversion increases.     

Big elephants in small ponds: Do large traders make financial markets more aggressive?

Market participants often suspect that large traders have a disproportionate effect on financial markets, increasing the aggressiveness of market responses. Prior studies have shown that the impact of a large trader on a currency crisis depends positively on his “size” and informational position. By contrast, this article highlights the role that market sentiment has on the impact of a large trader. If the market believes that fundamentals are weak, then the probability of a crisis depends positively on the trader's size but negatively on the precision of his information, with these effects reversed in a generally optimistic market. A large player, therefore, need not make market responses more aggressive.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination Role

We examine uniform and discretionary regimes for reporting information about firm performance from the perspective of a standard setter, in a setting where the precision of reported information is difficult to verify and the reported information can help coordinate decisions by users of the information. The standard setter's task is to choose a reporting regime to maximize the expected decision value of reported information for all users at all firms. The uniform regime requires all firms to report using the same set of reporting methods regardless of the precision of their information, and the discretionary regime allows firms to freely condition their sets of reporting methods on the precision of their information. We show that when unverifiable information precision varies across firms and users' decisions based on reported information have strong strategic complementarities, a uniform regime can have a beneficial social effect as compared to a discretionary reporting regime. Our analysis generates both normative and positive implications for evaluating the necessity and effectiveness of reporting under standards.     

Information acquisition and financial contagion

This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007. Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1–33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.     

Are small investors naive about incentives?

Security analysts tend to bias stock recommendations upward, particularly if they are affiliated with the underwriter. We analyze how investors account for such distortions. Using the NYSE Trades and Quotations database, we find that large traders adjust their trading response downward. While they exert buy pressure following strong buy recommendations, they display no reaction to buy recommendations and selling pressure following hold recommendations. This “discounting” is even more pronounced when the analyst is affiliated with the underwriter. Small traders, instead, follow recommendations literally. They exert positive pressure following both buy and strong buy recommendations and zero pressure following hold recommendations. We discuss possible explanations for the differences in trading response, including information costs and investor naiveté.     

Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading

Using a new empirical model, I estimate the probability of trades being generated by privately informed traders. Inference is drawn on a trade‐by‐trade basis using data samples from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The modeling setup facilitates in‐depth analysis of the estimated probability of informed trading at the intraday level and for stocks with different levels of trading activity. The most important empirical results are: (a) the intradaily pattern of the inferred probability of informed trading is highly correlated with the intradaily pattern of observed quoted spreads, (b) differences in the magnitude of quoted spreads across volume categories are not exclusively related to differences in the level of informed trading, and (c) private information is incorporated faster in the quotes for high‐volume stocks than in the quotes for low‐volume stocks.     

Investment decisions and internal capital markets: Evidence from acquisitions

In this paper, we examine the workings of internal capital markets in diversified firms that engage in related and unrelated corporate acquisitions. Our evidence indicates that bidders invest outside their core business (diversify) when the cash flows of their core business fall behind those of their non-core lines of business. However, bidders invest inside their core business (i.e., undertake non-diversifying investments) when their core business experiences superior cash flows. We also find that bidders whose core business are in industries with low growth prospects engage in diversifying acquisitions while bidders whose core business are in high growth industries undertake non-diversifying acquisitions. The pre-acquisition evidence, then, suggests that firms tend to diversify when the cash flows and the growth opportunities of their core business are considerably lower than those of their non-core business. Subsequent to acquisitions we find that diversifying bidders continue to allocate financial resources from less profitable business segments (i.e., core business) to more profitable business segments (i.e., non-core business). Given the low profitability of diversifying bidders’ core business, this capital resource allocation suggests that diversification increases do not result in capital allocation inefficiencies. The evidence for non-diversifying bidders, however, supports the existence of “corporate socialism” in the sense that there is transfer of funds from the profitable (core) to the less profitable (non-core) business segments in multi-segment bidders. We find that the capital expenditures of bidders’ non-core business segments rely on both core and non-core cash flows.     

Instability of sunspot equilibria in real business cycle models under adaptive learning

We provide conditions under which a general, reduced-form class of real business cycle (RBC) models has rational expectations equilibria that are both indeterminate and stable under adaptive learning. Indeterminacy of equilibrium allows for the possibility that non-fundamental “sunspot” variable realizations can be used to drive the model, and several researchers have offered calibrated structural models where sunspot shocks play such a role. However, we show that the structural restrictions researchers have adopted lead to reduced-form systems that are always unstable under adaptive learning dynamics, thus calling into question the plausibility of these sunspot-driven RBC models.     

Information from Relationship Lending: Evidence from Loan Defaults in China

Using a proprietary database from a large Chinese state‐owned bank, we examine whether information evolved from banking relationships predicts commercial loan default by industrial firms. We find that the bank's relationship information is significantly linked to the incidence of default, and that its contribution to prediction accuracy is larger than any hard information. Furthermore, the effect of relationship information is stronger among firms that have a more sustained banking relationship. Our findings indicate that, at least in the emerging markets, a bank's relationship information still matters for large firms, despite the fact that hard information for such firms is abundant.