法人治理结构是改制的核心

什么是法人治理结构？ 现代公司制有两个最基本的特征：一是公司在法律上具有独立法人地位,拥有由股东投入的股本形成的法人财产;二是公司由一个公司治理结构（亦称法人治理结构）来经营和管理,它体现了所有权与经营权的分离。通过这种治理结构,既要保证股东作为所有者对公司的最终控制权,又要由所有者信托董事会作为代理人对高层经理进行战略指导和有效监督。因此,建立公司治理结构是公司利益密切相关的人之间组成的一整套利益制衡关系。由这个结构来决定公司的目标设立、目标实施和监查运营的方式。应能为董事会和管理层提供适当的…     

公司治理与内部控制

一、公司治理的涵义 公司治理是所有者对经营者的一种监督与制衡机制，即通过一种制度安排来合理地配置所有者与经营者之间的权力与责任关系，其最终目标是保证企业进行科学的决策和提高公司的业绩，从而使股东利益达到最大化，防止经营者对所有者利益的背离。公司治理不仅包括“静态”的治理结构，还应包括“动态”的治理机制。“静态”的公司治理结构是公司制度的核心，良好的公司治理结构是提高企业经营管理效率的基本要素。     

依据《公司法》构建有效公司治理结构相关探讨

现代企业制度下形成的委托代理关系要求企业建立法人治理结构,由企业的经营者代所有者行使管理的职能,并接受所有者的检查和监督,因此构成"三会一层"的公司治理结构。本文对新《公司法》对公司治理结构修订内容进行了总结,并提出应依据新《公司法》建立行之有效的公司治理结构。     

公司治理结构对会计监督的影响

一、公司治理结构与会计监督的关系公司治理结构是指所有者、董事会和高级执行人员三者之间权力分配和制衡关系的一种制度安排,具体表现为上述三者之间形成一定的制衡关系。通过这一结构,所有者将自己的资产交由公司董事会托管,公司     

从“后设市场”看我国批发业的定位

企业的融资结构与企业的治理结构密切相关 ,公司治理的有效性在很大程度上取决于资本结构。因此 ,融资方式的选择 ,资本结构决定对公司治理的影响。公司资本结构是公司各利益相关者特别是所有者和管理者之间博弈的结果 ,是公司治理安排的核心内容     

国有商业银行的治理结构缺陷及其完善途径探讨

本文认为国有商业银行的公司治理结构存在所有者缺位、股权结构不合理、内部人控制、委托-代理链条过长等问题,提出通过产权制度改革、完善公司治理架构、改革银行组织体系以及健全公司外部治理机制等途径来完善国有商业银行的公司治理结构。     

国有商业银行的治理结构缺陷及其完善途径探讨

本文认为国有商业银行的公司治理结构存在所有者缺位、股权结构不合理、内部人控制、委托-代理链条过长等问题,提出通过产权制度改革、完善公司治理架构、改革银行组织体系以及健全公司外部治理机制等途径来完善国有商业银行的公司治理结构.     

国有企业公司治理结构对策研究

完善公司治理结构是现代企业制度的重要环节,公司治理结构具有极其丰富的含义,其功能主要体现在权力配置与制衡,激励与约束等方面。我国国有企业公司治理结构普遍存在所有者缺位,内部人控制等问题,优化公司治理结构必须从建立健全现代产权制度、稳步推进股权多元化、改进外部治理机制和环境等方面入手。     

谈如何正确认识股权激励制度

一、要认识到股票期权激励作用的发挥是有条件的第一,完善的公司治理结构.股权激励是公司所有者用以激励经理人员努力工作,提升股东价值的一种手段,因此,它首先必须掌握在所有者手中,只有具备规范的公司治理结构才能保证所有者的利益不被侵害.其次,只有在完善的公司治理结构之下,才可以保证股权激励对公司治理结构的影响,对公司决策力量的平衡能真正发挥作用,使得参与者产生提升效率的动机,提高股东利益.第二,有效的证券市场.股权激励能成为对公司经理乃至员工进行有效激励的薪酬形式,必要的条件是股价在相当程度上反映了上市公司未来的盈利能力,同时员工的努力可以基本控制公司业绩的变化趋势,外界干扰的影响可以控制在一定的范围之内.在一个有效的证券市场中,由于股票价格能够反映公司未来的盈利能力,由此股票价格就可以成为对高层经理人员业绩进行度量评价的指标.     

试析网络经济对公司治理结构的影响

网络经济的出现以及信息网络技术的应用 ,使公司运营所处的环境发生了巨大变化 ,并对公司治理结构提出了新的挑战。在这种情况下 ,调整公司治理结构 ,设计新型公司治理机制 ,变得十分必要。对公司的治理就是要提供一套解决这种所有者与经营者利益冲突的机制或制度安排。     

Limiting Laissez Faire Profits: The Financial Implications

Traditional corporate finance endorses the principle of stockholder wealth maximization as the purpose of business. In light of recent scandals and legislation, businesses are increasingly expected to use financial resources in a manner which benefits society and not just the owners of the firm. This imputation of a corporate soul will necessarily reduce investor returns, which has at least two major financial implications for the firm and the economy. The first is that it may cause investors to change their required rates of return and thereby change the amount of capital available to firms (in␣particular), and the economy (in general). The second is that it may implicitly replace equity with debt in the capital structure of firms, with all that implies for financing and corporate governance. The purpose of this article is to examine these implications and evaluate their sometimes counterintuitive consequences.     

人力资本观念变革与财务理论体系创新

人力资本所有者(包括核心人力资本所有者与一般人力资本所有者)在知识经济时代将取得与物质资本所有者平等的地位,甚至胜过物质资本所有者,并将与物质资本所有者共同分享企业剩余索取权,从而使人力资本所有者的激励与约束成为企业治理的关键问题。人力资本观念变革促使企业治理理论产生深刻变化,而财务治理是企业治理的核心,因而人力资本观念的变革必将引起包含财务治理在内的财务理论体系的深刻变化。“以人为本”的思想向财务理论全方位渗透,触发了“人本财务”范畴的提出,进而推动财务理论体系的创新。     

Corporate governance in publicly traded small firms: A study of Canadian venture exchange companies

Most evidence regarding the determinants and effects of corporate governance practices is based on large firms. Herein, we explore these issues in the context of small publicly traded Canadian companies. We exploit the fact that such firms were not subject to corporate governance guidelines prior to 2005 and thus analyze the determinants of voluntary governance practice choices, as well as the effects of those practices on firm performance. Using a unique data set, we construct a corporate governance index for each firm. We measure performance by two variables: quality of accounting earnings and financial performance. The results indicate that corporate governance does matter for smaller traded Canadian firms. We find that both accounting and financial performance are positively related to corporate governance; however, their underlying mechanisms may differ somewhat. Given this result, it would be natural to expect all firms to choose higher levels of governance. However, our results also suggest small firms face resource constraints that limit their choices. We conclude that good governance is an important driver of small firm performance that cannot be neglected by the owners and managers of these firms.     

East meets west—Corporate governance in Asian emerging markets: A literature review and research agenda

This review examines how corporate governance mechanisms in the Asian emerging markets (AEMs) context affect firm-level outcomes. Literature about characteristics of the main corporate governance actors (boards and owners), their effects on firm-level outcomes, and contingency factors in AEMs offers interesting first insights. I synthetize these results and develop a research agenda that proposes how AEM corporate governance research should extend (but not ignore) agency theory, how AEM research about firm effects of corporate governance could take a stakeholder-oriented perspective, and how research could utilize the AEM institutional context to model contingency factors and extend our theoretical understanding of corporate governance.     

资本导向的公司治理模式识别和权变模型研究

本文认为,立足于由人力资本和物质资本构成的新资本观,根据资本权变因素,公司治理模式可划分为资本雇佣劳动型、劳动雇佣资本型、劳资双方共同治理型和利益相关资本多元共同治理型;依据实施监控的主体,公司治理可划分为股东主导型治理、债权人主导型治理、经理主导型治理、员工主导型治理和利益相关者共同治理。人力资本的谈判力是人力资本收益分配的主要权变因素,人力资本参与企业收益分配的过程是人力资本与物质资本博弈的过程,人力资本参与收益分配的方式和程度是双方博弈的直接产物。     

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in improving firm performance through the channel of corporate investment decisions. We find that the interaction effect between institutional ownership and capital expenditures is significantly related to firm performance. We examine this relationship for different types of institutional investors, and find that investment advisors are most effective monitors in improving firm performance through corporate investment. Moreover, we find that the monitoring role of institutional investors becomes more important when internal governance is weak. Institutional ownership and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms (including CEO incentive compensation and control, shareholder right provisions, and board of director monitoring) operate as substitutes, rather than complements, in improving capital expenditure decisions. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Private Firms and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Economic and Management Perspective

This article provides a definition of corporate␣governance and highlights the challenges in adapting understanding of governance to the privately-held firm. We emphasize the need to develop the scope of governance in privately-held firms beyond the traditional agency theory focus in the financial economics literature relating to large publicly-listed corporations. There is a need to draw on and integrate an array of theoretical perspectives from both economics and other social science disciplines as well. We present a schematic model of corporate governance which places the contributions presented in the special issue in context and which serves as a guide to highlighting gaps in the research base. We review the principal issues relating to corporate governance in privately-held firms which relate to: governance in different organizational contexts (institutional context; the industrial sector within which the firm finds itself, the ownership context of the firm, and the stage within the firm’s life-cycle); the scope of corporate governance; and other internal governance mechanisms to be considered We identify areas for further research on corporate governance in privately-held firms with respect to processes of governance, organizational contexts, assumptions about the owners, executive remuneration, financial reporting, the nature of the dependent variable relating to the expected outcome of different approaches to governance and various methodological issues. We suggest a need to develop governance codes for privately-held firms that are flexible enough to take account of the different types of governance needs of firms at different stages in their life-cycle.      

The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper traces the growing power of pension funds to provide managerial oversight of the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. Increasingly pension funds are exercising their legitimate rights as owners to raise the corporate governance standards of the firms they invest in. Within corporate governance generally, pension funds are shifting their attention away from managerial accountability and toward measures that increase transparency in firm-level decision-making. Pension funds use transparency to ensure that shareholders are the primary interest being served by the firm. Transparency not only aligns managers and owners, it also raises issues of firm behaviour that allow other stakeholders to engage the corporation more broadly. I contend that secrecy is economically inefficient. When organizations are opaque and interests are secret, decision-making can and does distort efficiency. I examine recent pension fund corporate governance campaigns with particular reference to the California Public Employees Retirement System. Dr. Hebb is a senior research associate at the Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard University and the Oxford University Centre for the Environment. She is researching the role of US public sector pension funds and urban revitalization as lead investigator on a two-year Rockefeller and Ford Foundation grant. Her doctoral work at Oxford University examined the impact of pension fund corporate engagement on the corporate governance, social and environmental standards of firm behaviour. She was a Clarendon Scholar at Oxford University and was awarded the prestigious William E. Taylor Fellowship (2003) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Government of Canada. Dr. Hebb is also a recipient of the York University Schulich School of Business National Research in Financial Services and Public Policy Scholarship (Canada). Dr. Hebb is also the Director of the Capital Strategies Program at the Carleton Centre for Community Innovation (3ci), Carleton University, Canada. Here her work focuses on the financial and non-financial impact of pension fund economically targeted investment in Canada as part of a three-year SSHRC Initiatives in the New Economy grant.     

我国CEO任期与企业绩效关系实证研究

上市公司采用经营权和所有权分离的治理结构,使CEO无形中成为企业战略投资等重大决策的实际拥有者,CEO通过行使其权力对组织绩效产生重大影响。以沪市的197家制造类企业为样本,运用截面数据回归的方法,研究这些企业的CEO的任期长短与组织绩效之间的关系。研究结果最后表明,CEO的任期和组织绩效之间存在着倒U字型非线性关系。     

The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure on Financial Performance: Evidence from the GCC Islamic Banking Sector

We examine corporate governance diversity within a Coasian framework of stakeholder rights, where the central role of governance is to ensure that necessary firm-specific investments are made. This Coasian perspective on stakeholder theory offers a unifying framework towards a global theory of comparative corporate governance, bridging the gap between economic theories of the firm and stakeholder theory, also offering an economics-based alternative to agency theory that explicitly accounts for stakeholder rights. The Coasian perspective encompasses a diversity of corporate governance systems, but does not imply a unique global corporate governance benchmark. We posit that governance is firm dependent and endogenous conditional on the constraints imposed by a national governance system; consequently, there should be no systematic relationship between governance and firm performance once the national constraints are controlled for. However, the same national corporate governance system constraints confer comparative advantages to firms whose efficient levels of firm-specific investments are favored.