An empirical analysis of property appraisal and mortgage redlining

The recent literature advances a hypothesis that addresses the possibility of mortgage redlining caused by a dynamic information externality in property appraisals and mortgage lending. In particular, Lang and Nakamura (1993) hypothesize that because property appraisals depend on past transactions, appraisals in neighborhoods where transactions were infrequent tend to be less precise. The greater uncertainty about house valuation in such neighborhoods can lead mortgage lenders to impose stringent requirements on borrowers. Lang and Nakamura's article, like most economic analysis of property appraisals, is theoretical. Using a sample of mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae, we present preliminary research results that cast doubt on appraisal behavioral rules such as weighted averages or backward-looking expectations on which Lang and Nakamura and other theoretical studies are based. Instead, our results refocus attention on the moral hazard issues of appraisal. We find that in more than 80 percent of the cases, the appraisal is between 0 and 5 percent above the transaction purchase price, in only 5 percent of the cases is the appraisal lower, and in 30 percent of the cases, the appraisal and transaction prices are identical. It would take a strong statistical model to generate such occurrences. Our resutls also indicate that appraisal outcomes are used as a risk factor with different weights for loans with different characteristics (loan-to-value ratios and house prices). The results suggest that more empirical investigation of appraisal practices be conducted to verify the validity of conventional wisdom embedded in theoretical studies, and we offer an econometric framework toward this end.     

汇丰控股积极应对次级按揭贷款危机

多种因素导致风险积累与爆发 美国此次次级按揭贷款危机是由经济增长放缓、住房信贷增长过快、自然灾害等多种因素造成的.     

Housing,mortgage bailout guarantees and the macro economy

What are the macroeconomic and distributional effects of government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (e.g., Fannie Mae)? A model with heterogeneous, infinitely lived households and competitive housing and mortgage markets is constructed to evaluate this question. Households can default on their mortgages via foreclosure. The bailout guarantee is a tax-financed mortgage interest rate subsidy. Eliminating this subsidy leads to a large decline in mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare by 0.5% in consumption equivalent variation, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: it hurts low-income and low-asset households.     

Modeling conventional residential mortgage refinancings

This article models fixed-rate mortgage refinancings and offers an empirical test of the model. The model relates the probability that a household prepays its residential mortgage to both financial and economic variables. The financial variables included in the model measure the value of the embedded call option present in conventional fixed-rate mortgage loans. The economic variables measure the household's propensity to prepay for housing consumption adjustment reasons. Our main empirical finding is that increased interst-rate volatility significantly decreases prepayment probability. In addition, we find some statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that prepayment rates increase with increases in household income, increases in household size, and vary by age of household head and regionally.     

次贷危机与我国金融安全

随着美国次贷危机的蔓延,资产证券化的风险对金融安全的影响不容忽视。本文结合对美国次贷危机诱因及目前资产证券化风险的分析,提出防范风险的核心是建立一套与我国金融安全相适应的一系列机制。     

Modeling loan commitments

Loan commitments represent more than 82 percent of all commercial and industrial loans by domestic banks. This paper develops a valuation model for loan commitments incorporating early exercise, multiple fees, partial exercise and credit risk. The model is analytically tractable and easy to implement. Using a sample of commercial paper backup credit lines from the Dealscan database, we show that our model prices closely match loan commitment market prices.     

住房抵押贷款提前还贷风险管理研究

从现代金融和风险管理角度看,住房抵押贷款提前还贷对商业银行是一种期权性风险,对其收取违约金并非国际惯例,也并不是有效的风险补偿方式。商业银行应适应市场竞争需要,接受风险转嫁并提供风险管理服务,运用风险定价技术在按揭交易价格中对提前还贷风险进行补偿。对于已承担的风险,商业银行应构建抵押贷款提前还贷的数据库,通过表内对冲和市场对冲,推出多样化的住房抵押贷款方式,积极推进住房抵押贷款证券化,从而最终增强银行的盈利来源和核心竞争力。     

The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance

We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers’ influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads.     

Race,Ethnicity, and Credit Card Marketing

There is a vast literature on discrepancies in consumer credit related to race and ethnicity. I explore a pattern that was first identified in aggregate data by Han, Keys, and Li ( 2011 ) in their study of credit access: Blacks were approximately 27% less likely to receive offers from credit card lenders during the sample period, even after controlling for variables such as credit history, household income, and local economic conditions. Hispanics were 17% less likely to receive an offer, after including controls. The discrepancy is robust to lender‐specific regressions and the inclusion of a large number of explanatory variables. My findings imply that marketing is an important area for analysis of discrimination in consumer credit. Due to the likely need for confidential information in further analysis, investigation by an appropriate regulatory agency such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau would be useful.     

Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting

Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers’ use of “discretion” in the loan rate setting process. We find that “discretion” is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for “discretion” over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, “discretion” plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans.     

城区特征对商业银行住房抵押贷款决策的影响：国外研究综述与启示

城区特征通过多种途径影响商业银行的住房抵押贷款决策。商业银行可以根据城区特征判断一个城区的住房抵押贷款的违约风险,进而确定对该城区的最低首付款比例或拒贷率。本文通过分析国外城区特征对商业银行住房抵押贷款决策的影响机制,联系我国实际情况,指出我国商业银行根据城区特征进行住房抵押贷款决策具有合理性,建议商业银行密切关注城区住房价格波动率,并且政府应该限制中低收入城区商业银行的数量。     

The closing rate on residential mortgage commitments: An econometric analysis

Mortgage lenders routinely guarantee rates and points for periods of 60 days or more and hedge the inherent interest rate risk by selling the proportion of mortgages expected to close in forward markets. This article presents a model of the decision to close on the mortgage and demonstrates that the estimates of the model increase the precision of closing rate forecasts. The analysis indicates that changes in mortgage rates are important determinants of the closing rate for fixed-rate mortgages (FRM) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM). Other important factors include whether the mortgage is for a new purchase, for owner occupancy, and for a single-family house, and what the overall level of mortgage rates and the loan-to-value ratio are and whether the rate guarantee was granted at the application date or later.     

Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage,business and consumer loan portfolios

This paper uses dynamic panel data methods to examine the determinants of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the Greek banking sector, separately for each loan category (consumer loans, business loans and mortgages). The study is motivated by the hypothesis that both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables have an effect on loan quality and that these effects vary between different loan categories. The results show that, for all loan categories, NPLs in the Greek banking system can be explained mainly by macroeconomic variables (GDP, unemployment, interest rates, public debt) and management quality. Differences in the quantitative impact of macroeconomic factors among loan categories are evident, with non-performing mortgages being the least responsive to changes in the macroeconomic conditions.     

Portfolio performance manipulation in collateralized loan obligations

We examine the discretionary activities that CLO managers engage in to pass monthly overcollateralization (OC) tests. These tests require a CLO's loan portfolio value, scaled by the CLO notes’ principal balance, to be above a certain threshold. Using CLOs’ granular disclosures, we develop model-free estimates for discretionary loan fair valuation and transaction-based proxies for strategic loan trading. We find a positive association between these discretionary activities and the probability of avoiding an OC test violation. This association varies predictably with junior noteholders’ influence and CLO market conditions. Strategic trading—but not discretionary fair valuation—relates to worse future CLO performance.     

Predicting performance in the savings and loan association industry

The purpose of this study is to develop a system for identifying serious financial problems in savings and loan associations. A ‘serious problem S&L’ is defined as one for which the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation provides financial assistance or where the S&L is supervisorly merged with a sounder institution. The technique used is to compare operating characteristics of problem S&L's with those of S&L's in various degrees of good standing. The results of the study show that a 12-variable econometric system is both accurate and practical for at least three semi-annual periods preceding the serious problem data. The system involves (1) quadratic discriminant analysis, and (2) a composite S&L rating based on three two-group discriminant models.     

审视内部评级体系:风险权重、风险偏好与银行业务策略

内部评级法下,违约概率、违约损失率、违约暴露、期限是风险加权资产计算的重要参数,假设资本总量不变的前提下,4个重要参数的变化都会对资本充足率产生影响。本文按照内部评级法的资产分类方法,通过分别分析每个参数的变化对各类资产风险权重的不同影响,提出实施内部评级法以后银行业务策略应该关注的问题。     

Strategic default,workout, and commercial mortgage valuation

This paper extends existing equilibrium commercial mortgage pricing models by endogenizing negotiated workout into the usual noncooperative lending game. Workout is a feasible subgame strategy for the lender to play whenever foreclosure transaction costs exist for either party to a loan transaction. In particular, negotiated workout solutions Pareto dominate the foreclosure alternative when default occurs. To obtain our results, we embed a cooperative bargaining game within a noncooperative mortgage loan/default game. We also address the valuation wedge problem that occurs when foreclosure transaction costs are introduced. Through the notion of replacement game equilibrium, we find symmetric mortgage pricing solutions that eliminate the valuation wedge and thus suggest that lending will occur in commercial real estate mortgage markets even when foreclosure transaction costs exist.     

Macroeconomic Conditions, Firm Characteristics, and Credit Spreads

We study a structural model that allows us to examine how credit spreads are affected by the interaction of macroeconomic conditions and firm characteristics. Unlike most other structural models, our model explicitly incorporates equilibrium macroeconomic dynamics and models a firm's cash flow as primitive processes. Corporate securities are priced as contingent claims written on cash flows. Default occurs when the firm's cash flow cannot cover the interest payments and the recovery rate is dependent on the economic condition at default. Our model produces the following predictions: (i) credit spread is mostly negatively correlated with interest rate; (ii) credit spread yield curves are upward sloping for low-grade bonds; (iii) firm characteristics have significant effects on credit spreads and these effects also vary with economic conditions. These predictions are consistent with the available empirical evidence and generate implications for further empirical investigation.     

Interbank market integration, loan rates, and firm leverage

This paper investigates the effect of interbank market integration on small firm finance in the build-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We use a comprehensive data set that contains contract terms on individual loans to 6047 firms across 14 European countries between 1998:01 and 2005:12. We account for the selection that arises in the loan request and approval process. Our findings imply that integration of interbank markets resulted in less stringent borrowing constraints and in substantially lower loan rates. The decrease was strongest in markets with competitive banking sectors. We also find that in the most rapidly integrating markets, firms became substantially overleveraged during the build-up to the crisis.     

美国次贷危机:背景、原因与发展

一、美国的金融市场 按借贷期限的长短,金融市场可以分为货币市场(一年以下)和资本市场(一年以上)两大类.资本市场又可以进一步分为债务市场和股票市场,或分为债券市场、股票市场和住房抵押贷款市场.