One-Way Treaty with the World: The U.S. Withholding Tax and the Netherlands Antilles

This paper chronicles the experiences of the U.S. withholding tax on interest income. In 1984, the U.S. repealed its 30 percent withholding tax on interest income paid to foreign persons or corporations. While the tax raised little revenue, it had imposed substantial implicit costs on U.S. corporate borrowers. Since, prior to repeal, domestically issued bonds were subject either to withholding or strict information requirements, many U.S. multinationals raised funds through foreign finance subsidiaries, primarily in the Netherlands Antilles, to avoid the tax. Although the withholding tax rate was effectively reduced to zero in the U.S., this paper demonstrates that interest flows were highly sensitive to their after-tax cost.     

How do CEO incentives affect corporate tax planning and financial reporting of income taxes?

We examine how different accounting metrics used to evaluate CEO performance for annual bonuses affect the level of corporate tax planning as well as financial reporting for income taxes. We predict and find that firms using cash flow metrics report lower GAAP and cash effective tax rates (ETR) than firms using earnings metrics. We also find that firms using after-tax earnings metrics report lower GAAP ETRs but similar cash ETRs as firms using pre-tax earnings metrics. Further analyses show that firms using after-tax earnings metrics are more likely to designate foreign earnings as permanently reinvested and have lower discretionary reserves for tax uncertainty. Hence, it appears that both types of firms engage in similar levels of tax planning, but firms evaluating CEOs with after tax-earnings metrics incentivize different financial reporting choices.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

Tax planning,corporate governance and equity value

Tax planning by firms is a highly significant activity. After audit fees, tax related services are the largest source of fee income for UK accounting firms. When viewed in terms of its impact, tax planning is the major source of the corporation tax gap amongst large firms (HMRC, 2010). Although traditionally tax planning has been viewed as benefiting shareholders via increased after tax earnings, more recently the underlying motivation has been questioned. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that when an information asymmetry exists between managers and shareholders with respect to tax planning, it can facilitate managers acting in their own interests resulting in a negative association between tax planning and firm value. Using a sample of UK quoted firms from 2005 to 2007 and data drawn from International Accounting Standard 12 Income Taxes (IASB, 2010) Effective Tax Rate (ETR) reconciliations, this paper reports such a negative relationship. Further, the relationship is robust to the inclusion of corporate governance measures which could be expected to moderate the potential implications of a tax related shareholder–manager information asymmetry. An innovation of this paper is in using the ETR reconciliations to examine sub-categories of tax planning activities. The paper contributes to the debate of who determines, and benefits from tax planning conducted by firms. Its findings have direct policy relevance for shareholders and tax administrations in monitoring and controlling firms’ tax planning activities.     

Currency Denomination of Intercompany Debt and Multinational Taxes

For multinational companies (MNCs) with foreign subsidiaries, the currency denomination of intercompany debt can have important effects on both taxes and financial statements. This paper analyzes the choice between an intercompany loan denominated in the home currency and one denominated in the subsidiary's functional currency. Using U.S. rules for financial accounting and taxes, the author demonstrates the expected impact of the loan's currency denomination on the expected level and variability of an MNCs overall taxes in the case where it has excess foreign tax credits.
The author's analysis shows that the foreign currency loan denomination leads to lower expected tax if the foreign withholding tax rate on interest is higher than the parent's home income tax rate. At the same time, the parent currency denomination leads to lower expected taxes if the parent's home income tax rate is higher than the foreign withholding tax rate on interest. Moreover, if an MNCs excess foreign tax credits are attributable to the subsidiary, the foreign currency loan denomination leads to lower variability in overall taxes. But in cases where the excess foreign tax credits arise from other foreign operations, the parent currency denomination leads to lower variability of overall tax.     

Earnings,institutional investors,tax avoidance,and firm value: Evidence from Taiwan

This study examines the valuation of earnings from China and Taiwan by foreign and domestic institutional investors across a sample of Taiwanese electronics firms. We further compare the valuation of firm earnings reported in tax havens and non-tax havens, and whether these firms have changed tax avoidance activities since 2004 when the Taiwanese government enacted stricter auditing of transfer pricing regulation.Our findings show that both operating income from the home country and investment income are positively associated with firm value. Operating income from China, however, is not significantly related to firm value when institutional ownership of the firm exceeds fifty percent. This result indicates that operating income is valued differently, depending on the location from which the income was generated. Non-operating income enhances firm value regardless of the revenue source. We also report that foreign institutional investors favor operating income from domestic and investment sources over earnings generated from non-domestic sources and other non-operating income. Furthermore, our results suggest that firms rearrange reported profits from subsidiaries located in tax havens to affiliates in other countries following the transfer pricing audit guide Taiwan implemented in 2004. Results also indicate firms may have been shifting profits to other low-tax-rate countries, or to countries which do not require firms to pay taxes, even if they are not doing business in that country.     

International tax arbitrage via corporate income splitting

Abstract

If capital for corporate finance was available from a common global pool and at zero transaction cost, then does after-tax arbitrage require harmonization of income tax rates across jurisdictions? This paper shows that the answer is in the negative. When a corporation has the choice of deciding the fraction of income that it distributes as dividends with the remainder held for future capitalization, then such choice brings about arbitrage in after-tax rates of return to investors facing a common pre-tax return but different rates of income taxes. Policy implications are drawn from this result.     

Income Shifting and International Transfer Pricing: A Three-Country Example

There is a long held belief that international transfer pricing (ITP) is used by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to minimize global tax liability. On the one hand, this is a rational economic response to market imperfections created by national governments. An alternative view decries such actions as anti-competitive and an abuse of power. This article ex-amines the potential benefit to enterprises of ITP manipulation when a real world combination of fiscal rules are simultaneously applied in practice. The countervailing impact of different national rules appears to result in ITP having a minor significance on parent after-tax income. Differential rates cause minor benefits but the absence of a form of tax, such as withholding tax, can provide substantial opportunities to maximize global after-tax income through the choice of transfer price. ITP can therefore provide benefits when national jurisdictions do not have consistent forms of taxation. In all the scenarios explored, major variations are apparent in the after-tax income of subsidiaries operating under different combinations of fiscal regimes and ITP policies. The tension between head-quarter and subsidiary management may be most pronounced when a subsidiary is located in a jurisdiction not having a complete range of tax forms.     

Using Financial Accounting Data to Examine the Effect of Foreign Operations Located in Tax Havens and Other Countries on U.S. Multinational Firms' Tax Rates

This paper investigates the effect tax havens and other foreign jurisdictions have on the income tax rates of multinational firms based in the United States. We develop a new regression methodology using financial accounting data to estimate the average worldwide, federal, and foreign tax rates on worldwide, federal, and foreign pretax book income for a large sample of U.S. firms with and without tax haven operations. We find that on average U.S. firms that disclosed material operations in at least one tax haven country have a worldwide tax burden on worldwide income that is approximately 1.5 percentage points lower than firms without operations in at least one tax haven country. Our results also show that U.S. firms face a 4.4% current federal tax rate on foreign income whether or not they have tax haven operations. Finally, we find that U.S. firms with operations in some tax haven countries have higher federal tax rates on foreign income than other firms. This result suggests that in some cases, tax haven operations may increase U.S. tax collections at the expense of foreign country tax collections.     

Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation

US corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets. This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the magnitude of US multinational cash holdings are, in part, a consequence of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms facing higher repatriation taxes hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. In addition, less financially constrained firms and those that are more technology intensive exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.     

Taxes and dividends: The UK evidence

This paper provides empirical evidence on the simultaneous effects of both corporation and personal income taxes on dividend payment adjustments and on the behaviour of share prices on the ex-dividend dates. The results show that companies set their dividend policies to minimise their tax liability and to maximise the after-tax return of their shareholders. In particular, firms that are unable to deduct the advanced corporation tax from their tax liability are found to pay low dividends. In addition, consistent with the tax hypothesis, we find that the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains results in a decrease in ex-day share prices by significantly less than the amount of the dividend. There is no evidence of a tax-induced dividend clientele.     

关于新一轮个人所得税调整的思考——工资薪金改革角度的探讨

近些年以来,个人所得税的改革一直都是大众所关心的话题。本文首先对此次新一轮个人所得税的改革做一个简单的回顾,通过较为详细的数据对比,分析了年终奖在缴纳个人所得税时,存在奖金增加反而税后收入减少的现象,然后以新、旧个人所得税法间的比较为出发点,对新个人所得税法可能产生的诸多影响进行简单的探讨。     

An analysis of the tradeoff between tax deferred earnings in iras and preferential capital gains

This paper extends prior research in evaluating the decision of whether to invest in a mutual fund either outright or through one of the three available IRAs: the deductible IRA, the Roth IRA, and the nondeductible IRA. We provide mathematical models for after-tax accumulations for each of the investments that are a function of return, the percentage of the return currently taxable to the investor, the time horizon of the investment, the capital gain tax rate, and the ordinary income tax rate. The Roth IRA and the deductible IRA always dominate investments in the nondeductible IRA or through outright investment. However, in comparing the nondeductible IRA and outright investments, the outcome is dependent on the investment goals of the mutual fund and whether it generates substantial dividend distributions or capital gain distributions. Mutual funds with small dividend and capital gain distributions may accumulate larger amounts if held outright while mutual funds that pay substantial dividends or make substantial capital gain distributions accumulate larger after-tax amounts when invested in a nondeductible IRA.     

The fleeting nature of permanent reinvestment: Accounting for the undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries

Over the last decade, an increasing percentage of the profits reported by U.S. corporations were earned by their foreign subsidiaries and retained outside the United States resulting in the deferral of income taxes. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provided a temporary federal tax incentive to remit such earnings, which resulted in the repatriation of $140 billion by the 30 firms comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average. An analysis of the financial reporting disclosures made by these firms reveals that a tax expense was not fully recognized on a substantial portion of the earnings until repatriation because of an exception for foreign reinvestments deemed to be essentially permanent in duration. The implications of the currently acceptable accounting for undistributed foreign earnings are discussed as well as recommendations to improve the relevancy and reliability of the disclosures required for this exception to comprehensive recognition of deferred taxes.     

Investor valuations of Japan’s adoption of a territorial tax regime: quantifying the direct and competitive effects of international tax reform

This paper examines the impact of Japan’s 2009 adoption of a territorial tax regime using event study methods which leverage individual firm characteristics to identify underlying drivers of market reactions. Differences in Japanese firms’ foreign and domestic effective tax rates yield an aggregate capitalization effect of \(\yen \)4.3 trillion, while firms with less prior foreign exposure and fewer opportunities for tax avoidance experienced relatively larger abnormal returns. We attribute these results to tax savings on existing undistributed foreign earnings, enhanced opportunities for international expansion, and cultural biases against tax planning. Spillovers to the US (through tax or firm competition) appear insignificant.     

Restricted interest deductibility and multinationals’ use of internal debt finance

This paper reconsiders the role of interest deductibility for internal debt financing of multinational corporations (MNCs). We provide quasi-experimental evidence using restrictions on interest deductibility through thin-capitalization rules. Explicitly distinguishing between firms subject to a binding restriction and unrestricted firms, a panel data sample selection model is used to explore the tax sensitivity of the capital structure of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs. Our results confirm that the tax incentive for using internal loans is effectively removed for restricted subsidiaries. While internal debt financing of unrestricted subsidiaries positively responds to taxes, the effects are relatively small.     

Effects of Progressive Taxes under Decentralized Bargaining and Heterogeneous Labor

We consider changes in income tax progressivity in an economy where workers' productivities differ and workers and firms bargain individually over wages. With given employment a pure increase in tax progressivity reduces wages by reducing workers' relative bargaining power. When average taxes also increase, after-tax wages are unambiguously reduced, while the effects on gross wages and firm profitability are ambiguous. We next endogenize employment and firm entry under a uniform worker productivity distribution and the government's only policy instrument is a linear income tax. While a first-best solution then is ruled out, a second-best solution can be implemented using a family of linear tax functions, where a more progressive tax implies a higher tax revenue to the government. We show that the government can increase its tax revenue, and reduce after-tax income differences, without any additional disturbance to allocation.     

提高企业所得税征管质量和效率的探讨

目前在企业所得税征管方面还存在许多问题.提高企业所得税征管质量和效率的措施包括:加强企业所得税日常管理工作;加大对税务人员的培训力度;加大对纳税人关联企业交易往来的监控;严格审核纳税人申报的财产损失;提高税务稽查选案的准确率;保证税务稽查有的放矢,提高税务稽查的质量和效率.