Dynamic usage of narrowband spectrum

We examine the potential for expansion of the white space spectrum sharing model in the 400 MHz band. As opposed to UHF broadcast spectrum, which contains unassigned or idle segments known as white spaces, the 400 MHz band is characterised by intensive licence usage. However, productive spectrum usage does not guarantee allocative efficiency, which would require knowledge of the highest value service for each licence. 400 MHz frequencies are not priced on opportunity cost. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the economically efficient mix of services to deploy in the 400 MHz band. Drawing parallels with the high-economic value revealed and generated through the operations of unlicensed white space devices in UHF broadcast spectrum, we identify untapped 400 MHz spectrum capacity, which we refer to as narrowband spaces. Encouraging dynamic spectrum usage of narrowband spaces could, similarly to TV white space usage help realise the efficient allocation of the 400 MHz band. However, the narrowband nature of the 400 MHz licences and high licensing turnover imply a significantly different concept of dynamic spectrum access than that considered for TV Bands. The paper discusses regulatory implications and the type of services suited to exploit narrowband spaces.     

The Wi-Fi “congestion crisis”: Regulatory criteria for assessing spectrum congestion claims

“Wi-Fi congestion is a very real and growing problem.” So said then-Chairman of the FCC Genachowski in a recent proceeding, and this sentiment is widely heard. However, we are aware of very few engineering studies that have a bearing on this matter, and their conclusions are equivocal. Beyond this, evidence for “congestion problems” in the 2.4 GHz ISM band is anecdotal at best.While some users no doubt sometimes have service difficulties they ascribe to congestion, that is not sufficient to prove that there is a policy problem. In order to provide a basis for policy decisions, we offer an analysis of congestion metrics and results in the engineering literature. We conclude that there is little consensus on how to measure congestion, and that network metrics are difficult to correlate with user experience.We therefore propose a list of user experience-oriented service impairment criteria that, if met, would demonstrate that congestion exists to a degree that justifies regulatory intervention: For more than one of the key scenarios that are supported by an operator or technology there is a significant increase in the percentage of users who cannot complete a valuable task on a persistent, ubiquitous basis in spite of the use of state-of-the-art engineering/deployment best practices, and users׳ willingness to pay the market rate for the best available service level.Based on our assessment of public reports and experimental data, we conclude that there is currently no evidence for pervasive Wi-Fi congestion. We do not claim that the absence of evidence of congestion amounts to evidence for the absence of congestion. However, we do question the argument that congestion occurring somewhere, sometimes is a justification for regulatory intervention.     

Quantifying the costs of a nationwide public safety wireless network

The existing US public safety wireless infrastructure consists of thousands of disparate systems built by separate local agencies. Problems with interoperability, cost, spectral efficiency, and limited functionality plague these systems but could be significantly reduced through the deployment of a single nationwide network that serves all public safety personnel. Two major efforts towards such a nationwide network are the federal-government-only Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) and an FCC-led effort to create a public-private partnership in the 700 MHz band; the future of both projects is uncertain due in part to concerns surrounding cost. This paper presents a model to estimate cost for two fundamental approaches to a nationwide network: a public-safety-only network and a public–private partnership which serves both public safety and commercial subscribers. We apply this general model to four network scenarios which differ in the amount and band of spectrum allocated as well as the number and type of subscribers (public-safety-only versus commercial and public safety) under three traffic scenarios: voice-only, data-only, and voice and data. We demonstrate that the nation's many small systems could be replaced with a single nationwide network with a small fraction of the tower sites and spectrum. The cost of building this new infrastructure is comparable to what is likely to be spent in just a few years on upgrading and maintaining the existing infrastructure. In addition, we show that these cost estimates are highly dependent on some key system design parameters including the public safety capacity required and signal coverage reliability, which must therefore be well-defined in advance.     

Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices

The remarkable growth of mobile communication has reinforced the significance of the radio spectrum for mobile network operators. The availability of spectrum varies considerably between different countries due to national regulatory decisions. The focus in this paper is on India where operators have access to a limited amount of spectrum. This paper analyses the value of spectrum by estimating the opportunity cost, which is calculated by the savings that can be achieved by acquiring appropriate amount of spectrum rather than investing in additional base stations. The applied approach combines network deployment, user demand levels, cost, and capacity issues, which are integrated in the application in the opportunity cost approach for spectrum. The opportunity cost of spectrum is compared with prices paid at spectrum auctions. The analysis includes a discussion of drivers that determine the willingness to pay for spectrum. The results show that the opportunity cost of spectrum in relation to auction prices is lower than prices operators paid for 3G spectrum in the metro circles (service areas) while the value derived from the opportunity cost is higher than auction prices in the remaining circles.     

Transmitters and receivers' investment to avoid interference: Is there an optimal regime?

The management of interference has been, and still is, the main concern in spectrum policy. Historically, interference has been dealt with by heavy regulation under an administrative control regime. Over the last decades, a new approach has been put forward based on users' property rights, better able to cope with a rapidly changing technological environment. The issue of dealing with interference across bands, however, remains crucial: What obligations should be put on users so as to keep interference at a socially acceptable level? Also, given that some unwanted emissions are bound to occur, how can private parties be provided with the right incentives to invest in high-quality reception technology? This paper assesses how well different regulatory regimes can lead to efficient outcomes. It develops an economic model of spectrum interference and identifies the efficient solution. A regime where spectrum users have the power to enjoin intruding emissions beyond a predefined level (property rights protection) is compared with a regime where users are forced to bear with intruding emissions, but are entitled to economic compensation for the harm suffered (liability rules protection). The analysis suggests that different regimes may perform differently under different circumstances depending on the cause of interference and, critically, on whether the services are organised as an open- or a close-architecture system. This suggests that regulators should pay more attention to the specific features of the different bands, and that the appropriate spectrum management regime should be designed to recognise these differences.     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

Beachfront commons

Technology competition between wireless communication technologies can lead to new, more or less disruptive services. A potentially disruptive technology would be to have unlicensed transmission in the lower UHF bands at power levels up to, e.g. 2 W EIRP. This would give citizens a share of the best spectrum for free use. Tools against congestion could be based on mandatory stochastic channel back-off or, if multiple users are present, on adaptive power and bandwidth control. Compared to the FCC TV white space regulation, no back link would be needed as the spectrum would be used exclusively by wireless devices. In an environment of shrinking interest in terrestrial TV broadcasting, such a regulation is expected to create a new market for high-range consumer devices, competing with licensed communication, while also being suitable for offloading traffic from licensed operations. Furthermore, the approach will allow for efficient digitization of equipment for Programme Making and Special Events (PMSE), but could also be made compatible with novel disaster relief services. To enable accurate interference prediction, it is proposed that, instead of only providing transmitter regulation, receivers should also be regulated, such as be required to adhere to a certain minimum selectivity. The proposal should be taken up in the WRC process.     

Royalties vs. upfront lump-sum fees in data communication environments

Mobile communications markets worldwide, today, are saturated, the number of mobile network operators (MNOs) in market is declining, mobile revenues are stagnant or falling, MNOs are becoming wireless Internet service providers, and economies of scope are strengthening. This paper challenges existing dominant views on spectrum assignment and license fee payments, estimates spectrum fees that MNOs would have paid under royalties and then compares them with upfront lump-sum fees actually paid by 3G licensees. This paper further proposes that governments need to consider assigning additional spectrum to incumbents as needs arise without using auctions and adopting royalties as a way of collecting spectrum fees should they collect them.     

Impact of spectrum management policy on the penetration of 3G technology

Diffusion of 3G cellular technology varies widely across countries and regions. Past studies have shown that lower levels of diffusion of previous technologies and higher levels of income are significant factors in accelerating the take up of 1st and 2nd generation of mobile telephony. In addition, spectrum management policy plays a significant role in shaping 3G diffusion. Regulatory policies regarding spectrum management include mandating band and technology and decisions to hold spectrum auctions. An econometric analysis over a multi-country panel dataset shows that these spectrum management policies do have significant influence on the take-up of 3G. Findings suggest that the presence of multiple technologies for the previous generation is associated with rollout delay. The estimations indicate that countries that mandated a specific frequency band for 3G saw faster roll out, but in the long run those countries experienced a slower growth rate. Also estimations find that 3G diffusion is not significantly affected by the choice of auctions vs. alternative license award processes. Insights gained from this study of the 2G to 3G transition can provide guidance to regulators now contemplating the transition to newer generations.     

Economics at the FCC, 2011–2012: Spectrum Incentive Auctions, Universal Service and Intercarrier Compensation Reform, and Mergers

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission covered a broad range of topics in telecommunications policy. This paper highlights the economic issues that are addressed in the following key areas: spectrum management, universal service and intercarrier compensation reform, and merger review. In spectrum management, the FCC received congressional authority to implement an ??incentive auction?? to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum into flexible-use licenses that will be suitable for mobile wireless service providers. We discuss some important issues in designing the auction. We next address some aspects of the FCC??s comprehensive reforms of intercarrier compensation, which mainly involves call termination rates, and of universal service. Finally, we discuss the economic analysis of two major mergers: AT&T-T-Mobile, which the FCC staff recommended should be referred to an administrative hearing, and Level 3/Global Crossing, which was cleared with no conditions.     

Will 5G lead to more spectrum sharing? Discussing recent developments of the LSA and the CBRS spectrum sharing frameworks

This paper discusses two recent spectrum management frameworks, the Licensed Shared Access (LSA) developed in Europe and the Citizens Broadband Radio Services (CBRS) developed in the United States (US), which build their management approach on spectrum sharing. The importance of these two frameworks, besides their leading normative roles, is that recent debates have shaped them as cases to consider in the adoption of the upcoming fifth generation (5G) of mobile communications technology, in particular in the C-band. A discussion on these two frameworks is organised by following the four-step decision-making guide for spectrum management developed by Pogorel (2007), which requires spectrum authorities to make decisions in four areas of spectrum management: frequency harmonization, technology standardization, type of usage rights and assignment procedures.Notwithstanding the similarities with respect to the four areas of spectrum management considered, the two frameworks differ on their implementation schedules. CBRS leads the way, with a handful of providers receiving government approval to manage spectrum access controllers, and as of mid 2020, scheduled to have allocated spectrum licenses on half of its available spectrum. On the contrary, European countries have shown scarce interest towards implementing the LSA, despite the extensive work carried out by regulatory and standardization bodies.This may suggest that there are external contextual factors which influence the successful implementation of spectrum sharing frameworks. An interesting aspect which deserves further investigation is the institutional context in which decisions related to radio spectrum management are taken. Unlike the US authorities, European institutions do not possess coercive enforcement powers with respect to spectrum sharing. This key difference may contribute to explaining the different speed at which LSA and CBRS are implemented.     

How to build a strategic network: A practitioner-oriented process model for the ICT sector

One critical success factor for the future will be the ability to build and develop strategic networks. This ability is especially vital in the dynamic information and communication technology (ICT) sector, where the development of competitive offerings often requires a coalition of platform and service providers. However, the academic literature has yet to propose a systematic managerial tool for the strategic network building process. Our distinctive contribution is the development of a practitioner-oriented process model for building a strategic network, which is linked to the resource-based view and the value creation system approach. Moreover, we suggest that instead of being a sequential stage-wise process, the construction of a strategic network can be divided into parallel, although not necessarily simultaneous, sub-processes based on the required value activities in the entire business concept. The resulting network-building model is used to provide managerial suggestions for the efficient construction of strategic business networks.     

The digital divide problem: An economic interpretation of the Japanese experience

This study presents an economic analysis of Japan's attempt to address the geographical digital divide problem for broadband and mobile telephone services. To receive broadband service local inhabitants make voluntary contributions, which are matched by a municipal subsidy. The approach is effective in terms of economic efficiency and equity. Importantly, as fixed broadband service is provided locally the benefits are limited to local inhabitants. By contrast, mobile service is provided via a spectrum user fee system. That is, for mobile telecommunication services, no universal service fund exists. The underlying rationale is that subscribers are beneficiaries and commercial decision-making should be left to mobile operators.     

企业战略管理模型：战略—文化—结构

在企业环境日益复杂多变的今天，如何从战略上管理企业已成为一个迫切而重要的问题。本文首先指出战略管理时代的来临，并认为企业战略管理实质上是指对企业的战略性管理。在此基础上，提出了一个以战略、文化、结构为顶点的企业战略管理三角形模型，并阐述了该模型的理论和实践意义。     

Resource integration: Adopting a paradox perspective to inform the management of tensions in customer resource allocation

Service-dominant logic maintains that value is created collaboratively through a process of resource integration. Knowledge-intensive business services, the context for this study, are heavily dependent on customer resources for the fulfilment of the value proposition. Value co-creation is compromised when resources are not allocated in appropriate quality or quantity. While there is a growing body of research identifying antecedents to customer resource input, few studies investigate how customers might overcome barriers to resource allocation, particularly when faced with competing demands. This article uses a paradox perspective to explore the management of tensions affecting resource allocation. Empirically, we draw on interviews with service providers to identify perceived resource deficiencies, and with customers to explore resource allocation management. We show that it is possible to manage resource allocation tensions by devising novel solutions that integrate the two opposing demands. In addition, these solutions can result in an ‘augmented’ resource, particularly if the service provider is permitted to influence customer resource deployment. Finally, these novel solutions can activate an unintended by-product or secondary resource, enhancing the relationship between provider and customer.     

The unfinished history of usage rights for spectrum

The key task in the next stage of spectrum management is to adapt regulation to the prospect of widespread sharing, on a much more sophisticated basis than sharing is used today. There is a role for the regulator to take steps to expand the area of choice within which public and private sector users can operate. This is best done in general by enhancing the flexibility of usage rights, which itself is best achieved by enhancing the freedom to trade them in the dimensions of time, space, level of interference and priority of access, by subdividing, re-aggregating, etc. However, there are considerable transactions cost impediments to trading where unlicensed users are involved. This creates a role for the regulator pro-actively to investigate different allocations, to make provisions for the most promising to occur and to incorporate both in refarming exercises and in primary assignments based on auctions configurations of usage rights, which might favour promising avenues of shared spectrum use.     

商业企业服务品牌建设与经营

在明确服务品牌必须以品牌化的商品为支撑、以个性化的服务为特色、以市场认同为标准、以情感化的营销为载体、以知识化的技能为依托5个基本特征的基础上,阐述了在服务品牌的建设与经营过程中必须考虑的“五要素”及“五度”。提出在现代商业企业培育服务品牌资产、创建良好的服务品牌关系时应该从服务内涵内部化、差异化、建立情感联系、提升服务价值4个战略观点出发,建立商业企业品牌经营的观念,实施以CIS为核心企业形象的策划与宣传,建立以ISO9000为核心的质量管理和质量运行体系。在市场经济的催发下,市场各方主体为了争夺市场份额,抢得生存发展空间,必然产生竞争,为了效益,为了生存而竞争的市场环境使得市场主体创建服务品牌、建设服务品牌,经营品牌成为品牌建设和品牌经营的必然。     

Opportunity cost of spectrum for mobile communications: Evaluation of spectrum prices in Bangladesh

The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the choice of the reserve price made by the telecom regulator to explain the under-performance of spectrum auctions in Bangladesh. The overestimation of the reserve prices for several auctions in Bangladesh including the auction of the 3G – 2100 MHz band in 2013, the 2G - 1800 MHz band in 2015, and the 4G – 1800 and 2100 MHz bands in 2018 is established by comparing the reserve prices to the economic value of spectrum, determined by using the engineering valuation and production function approaches. Possible reasons for the inflation of the reserve price are discussed.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.