The effects of lower mobile termination rates in South Africa

The effects of a 90% reduction in mobile termination rates (MTRs) are evaluated over the period between 2009 and 2017 in South Africa. Prepaid prices and quality-adjusted postpaid prices declined by over 40%. However, only approximately 30% of the decline in prepaid prices and 60% of the reduction in quality-adjusted postpaid prices can be explained by lower MTR costs. On-net and off-net prepaid prices converged as MTR costs dropped. Regulators concerned about high retail prices and differences between on-net and off-net prices should reduce MTRs.     

The impact of regulating mobile termination rates and MNO-MVNO relationships on retail prices

A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) provides mobile telecommunication services by eluding the constraints of the radio communication infrastructure and establishing an agreement with a hosting network operator (HNO) for the use of its spectrum. Thus, MVNOs offer a wide range of mobile services and directly compete with every mobile network operator (MNO). This paper studies the economic justifications for potential regulatory intervention that defines the level of mobile termination rates (MTRs) and negotiations and agreements among MVNOs and HNOs. The results show that symmetric MTR reduction leads to competition growth among operators, forcing every operator to reduce retail prices and, consequently, to enhancing consumer welfare. The paper also finds that a collaborative strategy adopted by an HNO and an MVNO is advantageous for both and induces a reduction in retail prices, thus weakening other MNOs.     

Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?

This paper develops a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNO's) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNO's. In the absence of international alliances, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, international alliances are endogenously formed since they serve as a commitment device to soften competition on the retail market, leading to excessively high roaming per‐call prices.     

The effects of price deregulation on maize marketing margins in South Africa

There has been continuous controversy over the impact of food market reforms on food security in Africa. In South Africa, the government and media have often questioned the effects of price deregulation of maize meal, the major staple food, on consumers. This article determines the effect of retail price deregulation on the size of maize milling/retail margins in South Africa. Regression models of monthly milling/retail margins are run from the period May 1976 to December 2004. To assess the robustness of our findings, we estimate several different models of structural change, vary the sample period to examine the sensitivity of findings to unusual weather and market conditions in the region during episodes between 2001 and 2004, and run the models using different estimation techniques, OLS with Newey-West robust estimators and Feasible General Least Squares. In virtually all models, the results indicate that real maize milling/retailing margins in South Africa have increased by at least 20% since the deregulation of retail prices in 1991. Moreover, there is evidence of trend growth in the size of the milling margin over time. Simulations indicate that the deregulation of maize meal prices has entailed a transfer of at least US$179 million/year from consumers to agents in the marketing system. Further study is needed to understand why this outcome in South Africa differs from findings in other countries in the region concerning the effects of reform on food marketing margins.     

Net neutrality and market power: The case of South Africa

Net neutrality rules have been implemented in many developed countries, often in response to concerns over network operator market power and potential blocking or throttling of content. However, developing countries typically have significantly lower levels of internet penetration and usage. Market power in respect of internet access looks quite different given that mobile is the predominant means of connection and there are often three or more mobile operators. In South Africa, there is a quasi-monopoly in the paid satellite broadcasting market and broadband providers zero-rating content from third parties (such as Netflix) may bring about more competition. We test the main theories of harm arising in the net neutrality debate, including network operator market power and exclusion among content providers using data on the number of announced prefixes and peers and IP addresses and considering examples of bundling and zero-rating conduct by operators. We find that net neutrality rules are less likely to be required in South Africa and other developing countries and that strict enforcement of such rules could in fact hinder competition in markets for content, telecommunications networks and other related markets.     

Can a margin squeeze indicate the need for deregulation? The case of fixed network voice telephony markets

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection.     

Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned

This paper analyzes the evolution of prices and competition in intra-EU international roaming markets. It addresses three main research questions: (i) to what extent have market forces by themselves brought competition to retail roaming markets? (ii) Has the evolution of market dynamics in wholesale roaming improved competition? (iii) Is wholesale regulation sufficient to lead to a reduction in retail roaming prices? Data show that there has been little price-based competition both at wholesale and retail levels, despite prices being well above costs and the significant margins allowed by regulation. Available data from the period preceding the entry into force of the first EU roaming regulation also point to the same conclusion. Lack of competitive pressure in retail roaming markets and inelastic demand give little incentives for retail roaming service providers to lower prices. Wholesale international roaming markets have complex competition dynamics. They are characterized by the reciprocity of wholesale roaming agreements and traffic internalization inside transnational groups. These circumstances limit price competition at the wholesale level. The traditional regulatory approach applied to electronic communication markets has been primarily focused on wholesale regulation. However, empirical evidence shows that even if wholesale charges are reduced, retail roaming markets continue to operate at very high retail margins (for example, more than 200% retail mark-up over wholesale charges for data roaming services and incoming calls). This proves that in international roaming markets wholesale charge reductions are not necessarily passed on to retail prices. It can thus be inferred that wholesale price regulation alone is in most cases not sufficient to ensure that benefits are passed through to end users.     

Impact of roaming regulation on revenues and prices of mobile operators in the EU

We use a difference-in-differences approach to assess the impact of the EU roaming regulation on mobile operators’ average revenues per user (ARPU) and the retail prices of mobile services. Our results suggest that due to the regulation the ARPU of EU mobile operators decreased since 2007 on average by 9.1%. When considering purchasing power parities, the decline of ARPU is estimated on average at 5.8%, but in this case we cannot reject that there was no decrease at all. We also find that the impact of the regulation on ARPU depends on traffic imbalances, which may be related to tourism flows, and has a stronger negative impact on operators from countries with a surplus in tourism traffic. There is however no difference in the impact of the regulation on cross-country and national operators. Moreover, our results suggest that the Roam Like at Home (RLAH) regulation implemented in June 2017 had no impact on the tariffs of national mobile plans.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.     

Could marine resources provide a short-term solution to declining fish supply in SADC inland countries? The case of horse mackerel

Food insecurity, usually manifested as protein deficiency, is a growing problem in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. In the land-locked countries where fish is an important component of the dietary protein, one of the factors contributing to this phenomenon is the declining per caput supply against growing populations. In such instances, national production from capture fisheries or aquaculture has not kept pace with population growth. Meanwhile, some of the maritime states in the region such as Namibia, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique have abundant under-utilised fish resources which, if brought into production, could help in reducing this imbalance, provided that the economic, technological and marketing constraints pertaining to exploitation of the low-value species in question can be overcome. Of the species in question (horse mackerel in Namibia and South Africa, round herring in South Africa, anchovy in Mozambique and sardines in Angola), horse mackerel from Namibia holds the best promise of being easily brought into play in the short term. A precedent exists whereby entrepreneurs from Zimbabwe and also from Malawi and Zambia have been importing horse mackerel from Namibia since the early 1990s. But in order to boost production substantially for export human consumption, the support and facilitation of the governments concerned would be vital. This should be in the areas of appropriate research and studies necessary to overcome the constraints, development of infrastructure and putting in place enabling policies.     

Termination notice of mobile network operator customers after a tariff switch: An empirical study of postpaid subscribers in Germany

Proactive subscriber churn management strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs) require that steps are taken to keep customers before they hand over a formal notice of termination to their provider. Therefore, several studies have analyzed how MNO customers who gave a termination announcement differ from individuals who did not communicate this message. However, no work has examined such differences among subscribers who recently switched to another tariff of their MNO. Therefore, this paper explores socio-demographic, service consumption and tariff change differences between contract cancellation “announcers” and “non-announcers” in a sample of 1810 postpaid customers who had changed their rate plan not long ago. Cancellation announcers were more likely to be males who decreased their mobile voice consumption after their tariff switch, had already attempted to churn in the past, had moved from an unmetered to a metered rate type, paid higher monthly bill amounts and received no discounts on their current rate plan that was introduced on the market some time ago. Among subscribers who gave a termination notice, early (late) cancellation announcers were more likely to be older (younger) customers with a growing (shrinking) SMS consumption after their tariff switch, had not attempted (had already tried) to leave their current MNO in the past, and were in a rate plan that was (not) recently introduced. The findings contribute to the literature on mobile customer retention and have implications for practitioners and scholars.     

International roaming in the EU: Current overview,challenges, opportunities and solutions

As technology evolves and globalization continues, the need for reasonably priced roaming services has never been higher. In 2007, the European Commission (EC) introduced a first set of regulatory decisions to cap the maximal roaming fee end users have to pay for voice services. In the years after, additional price caps have been introduced for SMS and data, initially only for end users, in a later stage also for the wholesale tariff. The final step, Roaming Like at Home (RLAH), will start to take effect in June 2017; from then on end users will pay the same price (for voice, SMS and data) when roaming like in their domestic country.The effect of RLAH on the business case of each mobile operator is hard to predict, as the different national markets are extremely heterogeneous and operators face large discrepancies in terms of roaming usage and network costs due to different travelling patterns and various other reasons that cannot be harmonized (geography, economics, working force, usage history, etc.). Furthermore, competition in the telecom market will no longer be a purely national matter, as the decision to abolish roaming tariffs will fully open up cross-border competition.This paper aims at providing insights in the effect of RLAH for both the end user as well as the mobile operators. Following a literature survey approach, including an overview of the roaming regulation process from 2007 up to now, the paper discusses possible effects the RLAH initiative might trigger, going from lower wholesale prices for mobile operators to higher retail prices for end users. Additionally, as the European Commission strives for a digital single market, this paper presents a number of technical solutions (carrier portability, software-based SIMs, cross-border IMSI, Roaming like a Local, Wi-Fi offloading) that may pose a - partial or full - alternative for roaming and explains how these may impact cross-border competition both positively and negatively. The solutions are assessed against two axes: (1) generating the best possible outcome for the end customers (in all countries) and (2) ensuring the best level playing field for (virtual) mobile operators in Europe, which will of course involve trade-offs on different levels.     

Demand for coffee in Sweden: The role of prices, preferences and market power

There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.     

The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets

I analyze a model of dynamic competition between retail platforms in the presence of consumer lock-in. Two different revenue models are considered, one in which platforms set final retail prices and one in which the suppliers set final retail prices. Platforms have long-term (or strategic) pricing incentives but suppliers do not, which implies that the inter-temporal price path faced by consumers depends on the revenue model in place. When suppliers set prices instead of platforms, prices may be higher in early periods but lower in later periods, suggesting that appropriate antitrust enforcement ought to consider more than initial price changes when an industry shifts to the agency model. Indeed, consumers may (but need not) prefer the agency model even when prices increase in initial periods. A potential downside of the agency model is that it may align the incentives of suppliers and platforms and thereby encourage platforms to lower the competitiveness of the supplier market, harming consumers; no such incentives exist under the wholesale model. I relate my results to events in the market for electronic books.     

Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: Theory and applications

This paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms, elastic subscriber demand, off-net price discrimination, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. We characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm- and market-level network effects. The model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates, market maturity, and retail pricing strategies. We show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading, in particular concerning the effects of termination rates.     

Putting the 2007/2008 global food crisis in longer-term perspective: Trends in staple food affordability in urban Zambia and Kenya

Staple food prices in cities in eastern and southern Africa rose sharply between late 2007 and early 2009, leading to estimates of massive increases in food insecurity and hunger. However, in assessing the impacts of soaring food prices on urban consumers’ access to food it is important to consider food price changes relative to changes in per capita incomes. In this study, we use the case studies of Zambia and Kenya, where data are available on food prices, wage rates, incomes, and other indicators of urban purchasing power to answer two main questions: (i) how did staple food purchasing power at the height of the food price crisis compare to levels over the last 15 years? and (ii) did the food price crisis exacerbate an already declining trend in staple food purchasing power, or did it reverse a trend of stable or improving staple food affordability? Results indicate that staple food purchasing power in urban Zambia and Kenya improved markedly in the 10–12 years prior to the food price crisis. Most measures of bread and maize meal affordability at the start of the crisis in 2007 were at levels 1.0–4.3 times higher than in the mid-1990s. These gains for urban consumers were slashed but not completely reversed during the food crisis. Between 2007 and 2009, maize meal and bread were still more affordable in urban Zambia than all periods between 1994 and 2003. In urban Kenya, staple food purchasing power as of 2008/2009 was comparable to levels in 2000/2001–2004/2005 according to some indicators, while other measures suggest that the food price crisis reduced staple food purchasing power to levels lower than any other year in the period 1994/1995–2007/2008.     

Vertical relations,pass-through,and market definition: Evidence from grocery retailing

We examine how different pass-through rates from input prices to retail prices and different vertical contracts affect upstream market definition. Simple theoretical considerations suggest that vertical restraints induce higher pass-through rates and thus lead to a larger upstream market definition when compared to linear wholesale pricing, given that contracts with linear pricing are associated with lower pass-through rates under imperfect competition. Data from grocery retailing is used to quantify the empirical implications of our theoretical assertion. We find that resale price maintenance leads to larger upstream market definitions than linear pricing. We therefore advise competition authorities to carefully model vertical market structures, whenever they expect incomplete pass-through to be important.     

The competition among mobile network operators in the telecommunication supply chain

In the mobile telecommunication sector, the high competitiveness has increased the complexity of strategic interactions among operators. As the vertical integration has become anything but a choice and not a compelling technical solution, the contest takes place at different levels of the components of the operator value chain: the network infrastructure, the service development and supply, and the relationship with consumers.Mobile virtual network operators act as retailers and concentrate on the last segment of the value chain by establishing commercial agreements with hosting network operators, which act as manufacturers, to get access to radio communications infrastructure. Productive processes of mobile services offered by operators are different and this difference is imperceptible to customers. Processes difference mainly consists in the infrastructural diversity of the operators and implies different consequences on each network service element.A model has been defined to analyze the consequences of such diversity in the competition among HNOs, MNOs, and MVNOs by focusing the attention on the characteristics of the call path, in dependence of the types of operators. In fact, many variables interact to define the call path, such as marginal costs and revenues, infrastructural investments, and interconnection charges among operators. The analysis of the results, obtained by the model, gives information on variations of retail prices, market shares, and profit allotment, to adopt the proper strategies. In particular, the model results shed light on how certain MVNOs should enter the markets and adopt a collaborative strategy with HNOs. The model owns the capability of being applied to different contexts, thus representing for the regulator a potential instrument of relevant usefulness.     

Flex cars and competition in fuel retail markets

We study how the diffusion of flex (bi-fuel) cars affected competition on ethanol and gasoline retail markets. We propose a model of price competition in which the two fuels become closer substitutes as flex cars penetration grows. We use a large panel of weekly prices at the station level to show that fuel prices and margins have fallen in response to this change. This finding is evidence of market power in fuel retail and indicates that innovations that increase consumer choice benefit even those who choose not to adopt them.