A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals

We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries.     

How ‘Little’ Outsourcing Creates A Large Skill Premium: A Model of North‐to‐South Manufacturing Outsourcing

This paper develops a general equilibrium model that shows that a small volume of North–South ¹ trade (i.e. 2% of Northern GDP) could have caused the observed rise in the skill premium, thus resolving the ‘small trade volume paradox’ in the skill premium debate. We apply the concept of ‘trade in tasks’ of Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg to analyze the nature of North‐to‐South manufacturing outsourcing. As a conceptual innovation, we carefully distinguish two different implicit assumptions of the Heckscher–Ohlin model: ‘factor immobility’ versus ‘task inseparability’. We show that outsourcing, as a form of trade in tasks, essentially attains ‘task separability’ while apparently retaining factor immobility, thus rendering the traditional Heckscher–Ohlin framework obsolete for analyzing current North–South trade. We argue that this change in the nature of trade calls for new thinking in economics and public policy‐making.     

Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in a Product‐cycle Model of Skills Accumulation

This paper examines the effects of stronger intellectual property rights protection in the South based on a North–South general‐equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI). Two types of innovation are considered – innovation targeting all products and innovation targeting only imitated products. We show that for both types of innovation, there will be increases in the innovation rate and Northern wage inequality and a decrease in the proportion of Northern unskilled labor if imitation intensity is sufficiently low. As regards the pattern of production, the extent of FDI will increase while the extent of Northern production and Southern production will decrease.     

Foreign direct investment and international trade in a continuum Ricardian trade model

We develop a continuum Ricardian trade model to capture both North–South trade and technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We show that there is a unique range of products produced in the South by MNEs. In the case of an infinitely elastic supply of expatriates, if the ability of Southern workers in absorbing Northern technology increases, then (a) the range of MNE production increases, (b) Northern workers's welfare and Southern workers' welfare change in opposite directions, and (c) the world aggregate welfare increases under certain conditions. We explore issues such as North–South wage gaps, FDI policies and the product cycle. We also derive results under a general supply of expatriates.     

North South Trade and Supervision of the Social Quality of Goods from the South

This text presents a duopolistic North/South model where the Southern firm can choose to produce ethically or not and to lie or not about the real social quality of its production. The goods from the South are assumed to be ethically unsound (i.e. dubious social content) while those from the North ethically sound. We then study the consequences of monitoring ethics in the North on the nature (fair or unfair) and the volume of North–South trade. On the one hand, an increase in the probability of inspection of goods from the South leads to an increase in imports to the North from the South. This result goes against the idea that this kind of social monitoring is akin to a protectionist measure. On the other hand, if monitoring is large enough that leads the Southern firm to produce ethically and the trade to be fair.     

Trade, product cycles, and inequality within and between countries

Abstract.  This paper incorporates Northern product innovation and product‐cycle‐driven technology transfer into the continuum‐of‐goods Heckscher‐Ohlin model. The creation of very skill‐intensive goods induces the North to transfer production of older, less skill‐intensive goods to the South. These relocated goods are the most skill intensive by Southern standards. Hence, product cycles raise the relative demand for skilled workers and thus wage inequality within both regions. This runs contrary to the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem, but accords well with the fact that wage inequality has risen in both Northern and Southern countries. Moreover, product cycles increase income inequality between countries. JEL classification: F1     

Outsourcing under Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property

The paper examines possible reasons behind expanded outsourcing by modeling outsourcing decisions when intellectual property rights are imperfectly protected. Firms in the North develop higher quality levels of existing products and then decide whether to shift some stages of production to the South. Production in the South lowers costs but entails risk of imitation by Southern firms. In this setting, a lower risk of imitation or larger labor supplies can cause increased outsourcing, a higher rate of innovation, and a lower Northern relative wage. Damage due to lower incomes can be offset by gains in terms of better quality products.     

Endogenous Imitation and Technology Absorption in a Model of North–South Trade

Abstract

This paper considers the transfer of technology from the North to the South that occurs through trade in high-technology goods and explicitly models the ‘reverse-engineering’ process that allows the South to assimilate new technologies. A key finding of this study is that the South's rate of growth is dictated by the size of the country's human capital, which determines its absorptive capacity and its ability to assimilate knowledge from the North. We find that while a Southern country that is poor in human capital can only imitate, Southern countries that possess sufficiently large human capital endowments, beyond a certain threshold, signal the onset of innovation. We also find that the North enjoys a higher rate of innovation and growth with trade than without. North's gains are the highest when it trades with a human-capital ‘poor’ South, because imitation increases South's demand for Northern intermediates. But trade with the Southern countries that are human capital rich (and therefore involved in innovation), dampens their demand for Northern imports, adversely affecting North's growth. The model predicts growth convergence between the North and a South that is well passed the threshold for innovation.     

Intellectual property rights and skills accumulation: A product-cycle model of FDI and outsourcing

This study investigates the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South on innovation, skills accumulation, wage inequality, and patterns of production based on a North–South general-equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI) and international outsourcing. We find that stronger Southern IPR protection raises the extent of outsourcing and reduces the extent of FDI. This increases the proportion of unskilled Southerners and mitigates Southern wage inequality. In the North, stronger Southern IPR protection raises the proportion of skilled Northerners and wage inequality. The effects of international specialization, R&D cost, and Northern population are also examined.     

Patent Enforcement, Innovation and Welfare

This paper analyzes how the Southern patent enforcement affects the Northern firm's choice of licensing, subsidiary production or exports for serving the Southern market, and the innovation rate in the North and ultimately the welfare in the South. We show that for imperfect patent enforcement, licensing contract leads to more innovation in the North relative to subsidiary or exports. When both subsidiary and exports are very costly options, no patent enforcement in the South is best for the South. However, when either subsidiary operation or exports can be organized cheaply, the Southern government chooses some positive degree of patent enforcement. We also establish that strengthening of patent enforcement in the South may lead to more licensing and less subsidiary operations or exports.     

知识产权保护与“南方”国家的自主创新激励

本文构建了一个扩展的具有自主创新的南北产品周期模型,讨论了知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体影响。本文发现,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体效应依赖于南方的初始技能劳动水平和北方创新性质导致的市场结构。在垂直创新的寡头市场,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新没有激励效应,它对南北双方都造成伤害;在水平创新的垄断竞争市场,当南方技能劳动短缺时,严格知识产权保护在短期有利于南北双方,但并不激励南方自主创新。当南方技能劳动充裕时,适度的知识产权保护会激励南方的自主创新,并在长期对南北双方都有利。研究发现,南方存在一个最优知识产权保护强度,其依赖南方的技能水平以及市场的竞争程度。     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.     

A North–South model of outsourcing and growth

In this paper, I formulate a simple North–South R&D‐based growth model where final goods firms in the North endogenously determine the range of international outsourcing of intermediate goods to the South. I show that a fall in the trade cost (through trade liberalization) of intermediate goods in the North: (i) reduces the wage of the North relative to that of the South; (ii) increases the outsourced variety of intermediate goods in the North; and (iii) stimulates Northern R&D activity and economic growth in both countries. By conducting welfare analysis, I also show that a decline in the trade cost of intermediate goods in the North improves welfare in the South more than in the North.     

Globalization,Skill Accumulation and the Skill Premium

We analyze the impact of globalization upon the skill premium (inequality) in advanced countries from a two‐goods North–South model with skill accumulation. Globalization consists of an increase in the size of the South. Its impact on inequality depends on its intensity and on the pre‐globalization proportion of skilled workers. The post‐globalization inequality is a non‐monotonic function of the pre‐globalization proportion of skilled workers and of the globalization intensity. The impact is different for the generation in work and for the following generations. There is a threshold value of the skill endowment under (above) which inequality is lower (higher) after than before globalization.     

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

North–South Integration and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment

We investigate how North–South integration affects the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two regions. The theoretical analysis suggests that integration affects the incentives of partner and nonpartner Northern countries to locate in the South differently and may lead to investment diversion from the Northern partner. We test our propositions using data from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the first major North–South integration scheme. We find that NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico has increased since the inception of NAFTA above what is implied by other determinants of FDI and the global upward trend during this time. Other countries have not increased their use of Mexico as an export platform. We also find no evidence that inward US FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of different model and econometric specifications as well as the skill data used.     

Value-added exports and the skill premium: Evidence from China’s international and regional production networks

The present study examines the impact of value-added exports on the skill premium in a large developing country. We distinguish two margins of value-added trade: direct exporting measures the economic activities of de jure exporters, while indirect exporting reflects the induced demand for suppliers for exporters. We integrate China’1s internal and external production networks and draw empirical evidence from both population and economic censuses. Our findings show that aggregate value-added export intensity is associated with a higher skill premium, but it encompasses two contrasting effects: the direct exporting channel increases the skill premium, whereas the indirect channel decreases it. The latter channel has been neglected in existing published studies, which can lead to an overestimation of the positive relationship between exports and inequality in the South. We discuss the possible mechanisms and important implications.     

Intellectual property rights,technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.