How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.     

Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks

When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two‐period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income, as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump‐sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However, in other cases a negative tax on capital is welfare‐improving.     

Tax avoidance and intra-family transfers

We study how taxes on intra-family transfers (bequests and gifts) affect parents' transfers to their children. Our focus is on the incentives for tax avoidance. These issues are important for families and their welfare, as well as for governments and their possibilities of raising revenue from transfer taxes. Using a theoretical model, we show how altruistic parents avoid taxes by changing the timing of transfers when inter vivos gifts are taxed separately from bequests (which is the case in many developed countries). The excess burden per tax dollar of the transfer taxes is sometimes infinitely large because of tax avoidance. All tax avoidance is eliminated if bequests and gifts from the same donor are jointly taxed.     

Income Distribution and Redistribution

Abstract:

It seems that some observable structural trends in recent decades such as globalization, skills-biased technological advances and level of unionization all over the world have been affected by income distribution, in addition to other economic variables. The latest trends in the 2000s exhibited a widening gap between the rich and the poor not only in some of the already high inequality countries, but also in traditionally low inequality countries. In order to mitigate inequality, many countries have followed redistribution policies (taxes and transfers). In this article, we will mainly focus on the effects of redistribution policies consisting of income taxes and social transfers on income inequality using the micro data in Turkey. Additionally, since financial crises have been becoming more important with increasing frequency of crises all over the world, we also search for the effects of crises on inequality and the degree of mitigation of redistributive policies, especially during the Global Recession.     

Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative. We also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature. We show that under weak conditions, it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement. The average asset income tax in this system is zero.     

Fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone: an SVAR analysis

We compute the value of fiscal multipliers (for government primary expenditure, Income and wealth taxes and for Production and import taxes) in the Eurozone countries since the creation of the currency union (2000Q1-2016Q4), in order to understand how the values can vary according to the public debt level, the pace of economic growth, and the output gap. Imposing quarterly fiscal shocks, the results showed that government expenditure had a positive effect on output, with an annual accumulated multiplier of 0.44, whereas tax multipliers presented negative signs: the Income and wealth and the Production and import taxes stood at ?0.11 and ?0.55, respectively. Furthermore, the spending multiplier showed a higher value for countries with lower levels of public debt, during recessions, and in countries with negative output gaps. On the other hand, tax shocks seemed to be recessive in highly indebted countries and those facing positive output gaps.     

Public Employment and Regional Risk Sharing*

We provide an empirical analysis of regional risk sharing in Norway over the period 1977–90. The approach of Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) is extended to take public employment into account as a possible shock absorber. The other channels of risk sharing are capital markets and commuting, taxes and transfers, and credit markets. The estimated degree of regional consumption insurance is very high. We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is full interregional risk sharing in the short term. Public employment absorbs up to 25 percent of private sector output shocks in our analyses. Generally, central government insurance against regional shocks is relatively more important, the more permanent the shocks are, and vice versa for market‐based risk‐sharing channels.     

Government debt and optimal monetary and fiscal policy

How do different levels of government debt affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policies? And what do these optimal policies imply for the evolution of government debt over time? To provide an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a fiscal authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distortionary labor income taxes and determines the level of public goods provision. Higher government debt levels make it optimal to reduce public spending, so as to dampen the adverse incentive effects of distortionary taxes, but also strongly influence the optimal stabilization response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels give rise to larger risks to the fiscal budget and to tax rates. This makes it optimal to reduce government debt over time. The optimal speed of debt reduction is missed when using first-order approximations to optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively significant in a second-order approximation, especially when technology movements are largely unpredictable in nature.     

Risk sharing role of foreign aid in developing countries

The effects of foreign aid on economic growth have been extensively investigated over the past 40 years. However, even though foreign aid can be a significant source of insurance against domestic output shocks for developing countries, its risk-sharing role has not been well explored. Using a sample of 22 developing countries over the period 2003–2013, we estimate the degree of income smoothing generated by foreign aid serving as an effective channel of international income smoothing. In particular, for the period 2003–2008, we estimate that foreign aid offset about 4% of the domestic output shocks. Furthermore, we investigate the determinants of the extent of risk sharing via foreign aid, recognizing the diversification of the originating countries as a key factor. Surprisingly, humanitarian aid seems to have a negative effect, which might be explained by its predominant role in the short run.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVEN FEDERATIONS

Although fiscal policies of central governments sometimes provide modest insurance against regional income shocks, this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policy among provincial governments can easily overwhelm these stabilizing effects. We examine the cyclicality of budget items among provincial governments in seven federations, showing that own-source taxes are generally highly procyclical, and contrary to common wisdom, revenue sharing and discretionary transfers are either acyclical or procyclical. Constituent governments are thus left alone to smooth their own shocks, and we document the extent to which various restraints on borrowing and saving undermine their ability to do so. The resulting procyclicality of provincial fiscal policy is likely to have important implications in a world where demands for countercyclical fiscal policy are increasing but considerable fiscal responsibilities are being devolved to subnational governments.     

Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers

In this paper we analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.     

Income insurance and the determinants of income insurance via foreign asset revenues and foreign liability payments

We document that the net factor income smoothing channel in OECD countries is primarily driven by net financial asset income, while the other two sub‐components (net compensation of employees and net taxes on imports) turn out to be ineffective. Once factor income inflows are distinguished from outflows, empirical evidence suggests a non-significant effect of inflows in terms of income smoothing as opposed to a positive and significant role of factor income outflows. Factor income outflows also appear to be robust with respect to positive output shocks, while neither factor inflows nor factor outflows provide insurance against negative output shocks. In terms of the determinants of income smoothing, results indicate that an increase in foreign equity and debt liabilities positively affect the extent of smoothing via factor income outflows. Whereas, contrary to the current literature, an increase in foreign asset holding does not have a positive impact on smoothing via factor income inflows. European investors' tendency of allocating a sizeable portion of their assets within the Euro zone is shown to undermine income smoothing.     

On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy

This paper assesses the relevance of the exchange rate regime for stabilization policy. Using both fiscal and monetary policy, we conclude that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant. This is the case independently of the severity of price rigidities, independently of asymmetries across countries in shocks and transmission mechanisms. The only relevant conditions are on the mobility of labor and financial assets. The results can be summarized with the claim that every currency area is an optimal currency area. However, with labor mobility or tradable state-contingent assets, additional policy instruments would be required to establish the irrelevance result.     

Four Levers of Redistribution: The Impact of Tax and Transfer Systems on Inequality Reduction

We use harmonized survey data from the Luxembourg Income Study to assess the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers across 22 OECD countries over the 1999–2016 period. After imputing missing tax data (employer social-security contributions), we measure the reduction in income inequality from four key levers of tax and transfer systems: the average tax rate, tax progressivity, the average transfer rate, and transfer targeting. Our methodological improvements produce the following results. First, tax redistribution dominates transfer redistribution (excluding pensions) in most countries. Second, targeting explains very little of the cross-country variation in inequality reduction. In contrast, both tax progressivity and the average tax rate have large impacts on redistribution. Last, there seem to be political tradeoffs: high average tax rates are not found together with highly progressive tax systems.     

Rents, military elites, and political democracy

In autocratic regimes the military elite is in a position to extract rents, because without the support of the military the government is in general not able to sustain itself. In this paper, we empirically confirm the negative relation between transfers to the military and the degree of democracy for developing countries. We use an instrumental variable approach to account for the simultaneity that arises since the degree of democracy is itself a function of transfers to the military.     

Can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from working when exposed to shocks?

Income shocks on poor households are known to induce parents to take their children out of school and send them to work when other risk-coping instruments are insufficient. State dependence in school attendance further implies that these responses to short-run shocks have long-term consequences on children's human capital development. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, where the condition is on school attendance, have been shown to be effective in increasing educational achievements and reducing child work. We ask the question here of whether or not children who benefit from conditional transfers are protected from the impacts of shocks on school enrollment and work. We develop a model of a household's decision regarding child school and work under conditions of a school re-entry cost, conditional transfers, and exposure to shocks. We take model predictions to the data using a panel from Mexico's Progresa experience with randomized treatment. Results show that there is strong state dependence in school enrollment. We find that the conditional transfers helped protect enrollment, but did not refrain parents from increasing child work in response to shocks. These results reveal that CCT programs can provide an additional benefit to recipients in acting as safety nets for the schooling of the poor.     

What goes up sometimes stays up: shocks and institutions as determinants of unemployment persistence

We analyse the determinants of unemployment persistence in four OECD countries by estimating a structural Bayesian VAR with an informative prior based on an insiders/outsiders model. We explicitly insert unemployment benefits and labour taxes so that our identification is not affected by the Faust and Leeper (1997) critique. We find widespread hysteresis: demand shocks play a dominant role in explaining unemployment also in the medium‐run. Moreover real wages have low sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations and to labour market disequilibria. Our results emphasise the real power of the unions and their interactions with structural shocks and other institutions as crucial determinants of hysteresis.     

Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget

In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize the agents' residual surplus, that is, the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity. We find that, under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions, an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents, that is, it will be budget-balanced. Specifically, optimal mechanisms have a simple “posted price” or “option” form. In the bilateral trade environment, we obtain optimality of posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions.     

Clientelism and fiscal redistribution: Evidence across countries

This article marshals empirical evidence from a cross-section of up to 87 countries to consider the impact of clientelism on fiscal redistribution in the form of direct taxes and public transfers. Clientelism may directly undermine fiscal redistribution towards poorer individuals because their political support is cheaper to buy, political patrons will limit redistribution to keep clients dependent and, moreover, will eschew fiscal policies that target broad categories of citizens based on explicit criteria, and favor instead private benefits that they can disburse to individual clients with a relatively high degree of discretion. The empirical analysis controls for a range of potentially confounding covariates, explores various transmission channels and accounts for the real possibility that more extensive redistributive programs may undermine the strength of clientelism. The results strongly suggest that clientelism is inimical to income redistribution towards the poor through taxes and transfers and, moreover, identify reduced public good provision as one indirect channel through which clientelism may undermine fiscal redistribution.     

Strategic inefficiencies and federal redistribution during uncoordinated response to pandemic waves

Optimal policy during an epidemic calls for depressed economic activity to slow down the outbreak. Sometimes, these decisions are left to local authorities (e.g. states). This creates an externality, as the outbreak does not respect states’ boundaries. The externality directly exacerbates the outbreak. Indirectly, it creates a free-rider problem, because local policymakers pass the cost of fighting the outbreak on to other states. A standard system of distortionary taxes and lump-sum transfers can implement the optimal allocation, with higher tax rates required if states behave strategically. A strategic system of taxes and transfers, rewarding states which depress their economies more than average, improves the outcomes by creating a race-to-the-bottom type of response. In a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal tax rate is lower if states behave strategically.