国际多市场寡头条件下的贸易政策和产业政策

国际多市场寡头是Bulow( 1 985)提出的多市场寡头概念在国际贸易领域的自然延伸。在本文中 ,市场之间联系的纽带是本国企业具有规模收益递减的生产技术。本文的主要结论是 ,第一 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行价格竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预组合包括国内生产补贴与出口税 ,它们对本国福利的作用是一致的。第二 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行数量竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预政策组合包括国内生产补贴与出口补贴 ,它们作用于本国福利的方向是不一致的 ,这时 ,本国政府用国内生产补贴执行反托拉斯职能 ,用出口补贴执行利润转移职能。第三 ,作为模型的一个应用 ,本文论证了出口退税政策会加剧国内市场的扭曲 ;而且它不一定能够提高本国福利。     

THE NUMBER OF FIRMS AND THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

Incorporating home firms' lobbying in a country into a third market model of oligopoly, this paper studies how such lobbying affects the government's strategic export policy scheme. We pay special attention to the home firms' lobby formation and its effect on domestic welfare. The home firms can organize a lobby more easily when the number of their rival foreign firms is larger than that of them, and/or when the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. The strategic export policy under lobbying cannot improve the domestic welfare, which depends on the number of firms, the government's concern about political donation and the level of socially wasted lobbying costs.     

Strategic interoperability standards and trade taxes

In a two-country international trade framework, the paper considers the interplay between the governments' incentives for conducting traditional trade policies and their incentives for the policies toward compatibility between the products of the firms competing in the international market. The model assumes that one domestic and one foreign firm supply partially incompatible products for the home country market while consumers value both variety and a network externality. Motivated by the benefits of the network externality, the home government sets a standard requiring the foreign firm to guarantee a minimum level of compatibility between its own product and the product of the domestic rival. The paper analyzes the home country standard setting and import tariff policies as well as the incentives of the foreign country for imposing the export tax and conducting a policy which enhances the degree of compatibility between the rival products in the export market.     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

Does a ‘non-committed’ government always generate lower social welfare than its ‘committed’ counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters

We show that social welfare in the setup where the government lacks the full ability to commit to its trade policies may exceed the social welfare when the government possesses full commitment power if consumer surplus is part of the social welfare function. This is never the case in the standard, “third market” framework of strategic trade policy. We provide two examples in which consumer surplus matters: the “home market” and the “intra-industry trade” setup. The policy instruments under consideration are import tariffs and export subsidies and there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm.     

Optimal Trade Policy under Homogeneous Bertrand Competition*

In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re‐examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.     

Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of Protection

This paper makes the point that an import-competing industry may not want maximal protection. The reason is that a high level of protection encourages inward foreign direct investment, which could be even less desirable than import competition. A government captured by the domestic import-competing industry consequently will set the level of protection low enough to limit direct foreign entry. This paper also establishes results regarding the form of protection. Voluntary export restraints are shown to be the domestic industry's desired means of protection, because leaving export rents with foreigners inhibits foreign direct investment.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

LOBBYING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy-maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy-maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy-maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy-maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.     

Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

This paper investigates strategic export intervention in a final-good industry which uses an intermediate good supplied by a foreign monopolist. An export tax-cum-subsidy leads to horizontal and vertical rent extraction. The optimal government intervention in the final-good market is shown to depend on the pricing scheme employed by the intermediate-good producer.     

Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13     

出口退税政策对我国纺织行业结构调整的实证分析

出口退税是国家对出口商品已征收的国内税实行部分或全部退还给出口商的一种政策措施.近年来,随着国内、国际经济形势的转变,国家多次下调纺织业的产品出口退税率,这对纺织业的结构调整产生了一定影响.截取1993至2006年间的数据进行回归分析,以此评价出口退税政策的客观效果.结论是:出口退税率的多次调整对纺织业的出口影响并不十分显著,据此国家更应结合其他政策措施来调整优化纺织业的产业结构.     

Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion

We examine the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment in a two-period Cournot oligopoly game with learning by doing. The inability of firms and governments to precommit to future actions encourages strategic behaviour which justifies an optimal first-period export tax relative to the profit-shifting benchmark of an export subsidy. In the linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with government precommitment but decreasing in it without, in apparent contradiction to the infant-industry argument. Extensions to active foreign policy, distortionary taxation and Bertrand competition are also considered.     

政府补贴、行业竞争与企业出口技术复杂度

政府补贴作为经济发展的"有形之手",在我国出口技术结构升级中扮演何种角色呢?其内在影响机制又是如何呢?文章基于中国工业企业数据和中国海关统计数据库,利用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)和倍差法考察了政府补贴和行业竞争对企业出口技术复杂度的影响效应及渠道.研究表明:政府补贴抑制了企业出口技术复杂度的提升,而行业竞争促进了企业出口技术复杂度的提升;不同竞争程度的企业样本中,政府对低竞争行业的企业出口技术复杂度的抑制效应显著高于中高竞争行业,这说明行业竞争度的提高有利于纠正政府补贴对出口技术复杂度的抑制效应.进一步的影响机制分析表明:政府补贴促进出口技术结构升级的渠道为研发激励效应,且这种激励效应只在中高竞争行业样本中是显著存在的;从成本渠道考察发现,政府补贴有利于企业出口价格指数的降低,从而对出口技术复杂度的提升产生显著的成本扭曲效应.文章的结论意味着,不能一味地对企业进行补贴,而应该构建有效的激励机制与成本倒逼机制,让企业通过内生动力而非价格竞争形成企业出口技术复杂度的升级.     

我国经济发展方式转变的工业结构分析

本文根据全国经济普查数据公报、全国R&D资源清查公报和国民经济统计公报，首先对工业在整个产业结构中的地位和特征进行了具体分析，其次对存在问题的原因进行了分析，认为体制机制是中介原因，更重要的是必须把工业发展存在的重大问题放在我国从农业国向工业国转型，实现工业现代化的大背景下，从发展道路、发展战略、发展方式和具体的发展条件和发展政策下来解释，要看到我国工业化也遵循从量变到结构变化再到质变的发展过程。本文认为，我国工业现代化进程的量变和结构变化已经到达了一个临界状态，进而我国产业结构战略性调整至少要遵循四个原则，同时要加快推进工业转型升级，解决扭曲的产业激励政策，消化和规制过剩产能，完善金融体制机制，降低企业财务成本。     

On Assisting Domestic Industries under Bertrand Competition

In a homogeneous‐good duopoly game with a home and a foreign firm, which compete on prices, it has been shown that the optimal way to assist the domestic industry is by a production subsidy. The argument here is that the subsidy is used to keep potential competitive pressure on the foreign firm. This paper analyzes under which conditions this threat of entry of a subsidized home firm is credible. It is shown that in markets where the firms move before the government, a subsidy is not credible and dominated by a tariff in terms of welfare.     

Antidumping Regulations: Anti‐Competitive and Anti‐Export

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an antidumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the home firm to reduce the degree of competition in the home market. The home firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the home firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the home market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.     

Military aid,direct intervention and counterterrorism

We analyze the choice often faced by countries of whether to directly intervene to counter an external terrorist threat or to subsidize a foreign government to do it. We present a model which analyzes this policy choice where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself and in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidizing the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself and risking destabilizing the foreign country. Using a calibrated model, we are able to show that direct intervention is only an equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not good substitutes in the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. A higher relative military efficiency by the home country makes intervention more likely.