开放条件下粮食政策实施的福利经济分析

本文研究目的在于建立一个结合关税配额制度、粮食补贴政策和生态退耕政策的粮食部门均衡模型GSEM,来模拟比较不同政策调整对粮食部门社会福利影响,从而对存在明显目标冲突的粮食政策进行调整优化.研究结论显示,关税配额制度和生态退耕政策会减少粮食部门社会福利,粮食补贴政策可以提高粮食部门福利,能够弥补市场开放对生产者福利损失,其中直接补贴政策中的面积补贴方式最有效率.     

Smuggling and Bhagwati's Nonequivalence Between Tariffs and Quotas

The authors extend Professor Bhagwati's analysis about the nonequivalence between trade policy instruments when domestic production is monopolized and the terms of trade are endogenous, by allowing for smuggling. They show that the dominance of the ad valorem tariff over the quota is not robust. Tariffication can lower welfare even when the level of illegal imports is quite small. However, tariffication with a specific tariff is always beneficial because the specific tariff dominates the ad valorem tariff and the quota with or without smuggling. Smuggling (or the threat) also tends to lower the second–best tariff/quota, and increases welfare when imports are restricted by a quota, but lowers it under a tariff.     

On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint

This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue. It shows that the domestic welfare ranking of the two trade policies crucially depends on the relative costs of the domestic and foreign firms; when the domestic firm's relative costs are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota regime generally leads to a higher welfare level than that of an equivalent tariff regime. This finding contrasts sharply with the conclusions of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977 ), where it was found that a tariff regime always generates higher domestic welfare.     

Tariffs and privatization policy in a bilateral trade with corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a global business strategy and thus it provides significant welfare implications for designing optimal policies. This paper investigates the impact of CSR on policy interaction between tariffs and privatization in an international bilateral trade model. We find that CSR is closely related to the government's policy decisions on tariffs. In particular, we find that the strategic tariff for increasing domestic welfare is always higher (lower) than the efficient tariff for improving global welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). We also show that a privatization policy raises tariff and worsens (improves) domestic welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). Finally, we demonstrate that both countries choose a nationalization policy even though the privatization policy is globally optimal when the degree of CSR is high.     

The Mercantilist Index of Trade Policy*

We introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff/quota structure. Our index overcomes the problems of the trade‐weighted average tariff: It avoids substitution bias, correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers, and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark. Empirical applications to international cross section and time‐series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results: Trade‐weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade‐volume‐equivalent index; this in turn always underestimates the welfare‐equivalent index.     

PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT PROTECTION*

In this paper we ask how to construct a tariff or quota schedule which depends on the behavior of a domestic monopsonistic monopolist in order to achieve the best tradeoff between two objectives of a government. We consider various political and economic tradeoffs which could face the policy maker: aggregate welfare versus industry profits, output and imports; and trade barrier revenue versus industry profits and domestic price. In all cases considered, performance contingent protection which takes the form either of a tariff which depends on domestic output or a quota which depends on the price charged is generally superior to a fixed tariff or quota and is sufficient to achieve optimality.     

Disguised Protectionism, Global Trade Rules and Alien Invasive Species

Current international law strongly favors policies designed to make imports safer (e.g., in terms of invasive species) over policies explicitly designed to discourage imports. We show that this preference may be counterproductive. A externality in trade is incorporated into a political-economy model of policy formation. Nations can address the externality by inspecting cargo and imposing a fine on contaminated imports. We compare the equilibrium when inspection is the only policy option relative to the equilibrium that emerging when nations may also manipulate the tariff. Ruling out the tariff causes socially excessive stringency in general, social welfare losses if domestic supply is highly inelastic, and in some circumstances an increase in the real tariff, measured as the difference between world and domestic prices.     

碳排放配额政策的环境效应和贸易效应研究

基于不完全市场竞争理论,构建了两个对称国家碳排放配额政策选择与企业碳减排选择的两阶段博弈模型,运用逆向求解法求得了均衡解,并通过进一步分析碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的福利效应,得出了两国政府碳排放配额政策选择的激励相容条件和参与约束条件,确定了全局稳定均衡最优解及其条件;此外,还分析了两国政府碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的环境效应和贸易效应。结果表明：从福利效应来看,许可交易碳排放权合作政策是全局稳定最优解,可以资源的有效配置,实现Pareto改进;从环境效应来看,许可交易碳排放权合作政策也是严格占优的,有助于减少各国和全球净污染排放量;从贸易效应来看,碳排放配额许可交易政策好于许可交易碳排放权合作政策。因此,北-北型对称国家会优先选择许可交易碳排放权合作政策,南一南型对称国家在一定时期内仍然会优先选择碳排放配额许可交易政策,南-南或北-北型对称国家之间容易实现碳排放政策合作,实现全球环境合作还有待时日。     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

A welfare analysis of tariffs and equivalent quotas under demand uncertainty: Implications for tariffication

Under market demand uncertainty, we show that quotas can result in a welfare advantage over tariffs for an importing country despite that its government does not capture any quota rents. Specifically, the conditions under which an equivalent quota yields higher expected welfare than a tariff are shown to depend on a set of economic variables. These variables include the initial tariff rate, the relative efficiency in production between home and foreign firms, the probability distribution of random demand shocks that make the quota binding or non-binding under uncertainty, as well as the variance of the stochastic market demand. The analysis of this paper has welfare implications for tariffication.     

Foreign-Investment Tax and Tariff Policies in Developing Countries

In this paper we examine the welfare effects of tax on foreign capital and tariff policies for a small open economy with sectoral unemployment. The individually and jointly optimal tax and tariff rates in the absence or presence of international tax credits are derived. A subsidy on foreign capital coupled with a tariff can be jointly optimal when tax credits are absent in the source country. However, the capital subsidy policy may fail to hold when the foreign country follows a tax credit system.     

Tariffs,R&D,and two merger policies

We compare welfare-increasing and consumer-surplus-increasing merger policies in an oligopoly when merging firms face endogenous trade policies, and engage in cost-reducing R&D activity. As R&D becomes less efficient, the equilibrium market structures (EMS) become less concentrated under both merger policies. When R&D is very efficient, monopoly becomes the EMS under the welfare-increasing merger policy. This occurs as the absence of tariff and efficient R&D under monopoly limit the price increase and the gain in profits outweighs the loss in consumer surplus and tariff revenue. The results suggest that trade policies should take into account merger policies and industries' R&D efficiency. The results also show that global welfare maximization requires global merger policy coordination.     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

Grid Parity and Cost Reduction Incentives for “Green Producers” in Electricity Markets

In an electricity market, a feed-in tariff promotes attainment of a so-called “green quota” through a system of subsidies designed to ensure renewable energy investors a “normal rate-of-return”. However, the subsidies should track technological advances closely with the expectation that they will be phased out when the renewable technology reaches an appropriate “maturity threshold” (i.e., grid parity). Grid parity is typically defined as the point where the levelized cost of electricity equals the price of purchasing electricity from the grid. However, it has been recognized that this definition of grid parity is flawed due to the intermittent nature of many renewable resources. We propose a definition which allows us to distinguish between grid parity and least-cost grid parity. We demonstrate that under a green quota and an emissions cap, welfare may be higher if the policy maker forgoes least-cost grid parity and phases out the feed-in system sooner rather than later. We show that while green producer cost reduction incentives under the feed-in tariff are perverse, they can be restored by offering a “menu” of values of the policy variables and allowing full discretion in terms of the decision to engage in cost-padding, pure waste, etc.     

Competitive General Equilibrium with Finite Change and Theory of Policy Making

We visit the non‐equivalence of tariff and quota in higher dimensional finite change trade models when goods outnumber factors of production. Under competitive conditions, exogenous shocks (e.g., exposure to international trade) support the production of only a subset of commodities. If we try to protect some of the vanishing goods, tariff and quota will have different results when a tariff turns out to be a more restrictive policy than a quota, contrary to the conventional wisdom.     

State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff‐rate quotas under import “state trading enterprises” (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in‐quota or out‐of‐quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out‐of‐quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines.     

Dynamic Interactions in Trade Policy in a Differential Game Model of Tariff Protection

This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.     

Quantitative Import Restrictions and Optimal Capital Taxes Under a System of Tax Credits

This paper examines the optimal capital tax policy under quantitative import constraints, and international capital tax credits. For a small capital-importing country, the optimal capital tax equals the foreign tax under a quota, and equals or exceeds the foreign tax under a VER. For a small capital-exporting country, the optimal policy towards capital is a zero tax under a quota, and a tax or a subsidy under a VER. Also examined are the welfare effects of capital taxes and trade liberalization, and the joint setting of the two policies, when both instruments are available to the government.