Enhanced equity-credit modelling for contingent convertibles

Contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds are characterized by forced equity conversion under either an accounting or regulatory trigger. The accounting trigger occurs when the capital ratio of the issuing bank falls below some contractual threshold. Under the regulatory trigger, sometimes called the point-of-non-viability (PONV) trigger, the regulatory authority may enforce equity conversion when the financial health of the bank deteriorates to certain distressed level. In this paper, we propose an equity-credit modelling of the joint process of the stock price and the capital ratio that integrates both a structural approach for the accounting trigger and a reduced-form approach for the PONV trigger of equity conversion. We also construct effective Fortet algorithms and finite difference schemes for numerical pricing of CoCo bonds under various forms of equity conversion pay-off. The pricing properties of CoCo bonds are examined under different assumptions for the state-dependent intensity of the PONV trigger, the contractual specifications and market conditions.     

Increasing profitability through contingent convertible capital: Empirical evidence from European banks

This study investigates the effects of using additional tier 1 (AT1) capital instruments on bank profitability. It is motivated by the fact that the use of contingent convertible bonds (CoCo bonds) instead of equity offers a tax shield and incentives for efficient risk taking. I empirically analyze a panel dataset of 231 banks from EEA countries as well as Switzerland from 2014 to 2018. My analysis shows that the potential tax shield partly determines the use of CoCo bonds, and that the use of CoCo bonds instead of equity as AT1 capital significantly increases bank profitability.     

Are contingent convertibles going-concern capital?

Contingent convertibles (CoCos) are intended to either convert to new equity or be written down prior to failure while a bank is a going-concern. Yet, in the first actual test case, CoCos never converted before its bank failed. We develop a model that predicts that CoCos lead to less (more) extreme stock returns and have yields greater than (similar to) standard subordinated debt yields if investors do (do not) expect them to convert or be written down prior to failure. These predictions are tested using data on CoCos issued by European banks during 2011 to 2017. We find evidence that equity conversion CoCos reduce stock return variance and several other measures of downside risk, consistent with the perception that they are going-concern capital. However, we also provide event study evidence that recent regulatory actions reduced the CoCo–subordinated debt yield spread, which indicates a diminished investor belief that CoCos are going-concern capital.     

How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*

As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.     

Multiple Trigger CoCos: Contingent Debt Without Death Spiral Risk

This paper starts with the observation that the average issue size during 2012 of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds was more than $1 bn. Typically a CoCo is converted into shares when a pre‐defined capital ratio such as the core tier 1 ratio (CT1) drops below a minimum level. In some other cases, the contingent convertibles investors will suffer from a pre‐defined haircut instead of a conversion into shares. Investors could dynamically hedge the equity exposure embedded within a contingent convertible by taking an offsetting short position in the underlying shares. This dynamic hedging can in some circumstances have a negative impact on the share price of the bank. It could indeed lead to a spiral of falling share prices. This so‐called death spiral effect can only be avoided if the size of the contingent convertible is moderate compared to the amount of outstanding public traded shares. In this contribution we advocate the use of contingent debt where there is more than one conversion trigger. Banks should move away from one large single CoCo issue towards issues with multiple accounting triggers spread across an extended range. This will alleviate the death spiral risk. The expected dynamic behavior of a CoCo bond has been modeled using a credit derivates approach. From these models we then quantify the equity sensitivity and the negative gamma resulting from the design of a contingent convertible and illustrate the possible pitfalls of a death spiral on the share price.     

Close form pricing formulas for Coupon Cancellable CoCos

Contingent Convertibles (“CoCos”) are contingent capital instruments which convert into shares, or have a principal write down, if a trigger event takes place. CoCos exhibit the undesirable so-called death-spiral effect: by actively hedging the equity risk, investors can (unintentionally) force the conversion by making the share price deteriorate and eventually trigger the conversion.In this paper we introduce and analyse Coupon Cancellable CoCos (“CoCa CoCos”), a new type of CoCo where coupons can be cancelled during the lifetime of the note. We provide closed-form pricing formulas for CoCa CoCos, we study the impact of coupon cancellations in the price of the bond and we show that death-spiral effect is reduced.     

Does model complexity improve pricing accuracy? The case of CoCos

Review of Derivatives Research - In this study, we analyze whether model complexity improves accuracy of CoCo pricing models. We compare the out-of-sample pricing ability of four models using a...     

Underwritten Dividend Reinvestment Plans and Conflicts of Interest

We examine conflicts of interests arising from the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in underwritten dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs). A DRIP is a type of SEO that enables shareholders automatically to reinvest their dividend entitlements in the issuing company's shares. The underwriters have an incentive to sell stock during the DRIP pricing period in order to hedge price risk and/or to reduce the price at which shares are issued. Using individual brokers’ transactions, we show that underwriting brokers engage in an abnormally high level of selling during the issue pricing period. Comparison of pricing period returns between stocks with underwritten DRIPs and a matched sample of non‐underwritten DRIPs shows that significantly more negative returns accrue to firms that have their issues underwritten.     

On the propensity to issue contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds

In this paper, we analyze the determinants of CoCo bond issuance. We find evidence that banks that issue CoCos are typically large. Moreover, in the case of BRICS and other emerging economies, we find evidence that banks are also highly leveraged, aiming to meet the Basel III rules and replace debt with equity funding. Also, we study the strength of the regulatory component in the CoCo issuance through analysis of tax deductibility in the UK, countercyclical capital buffer, subsamples of global systemically important banks and Basel III implementation.     

我国资本市场可转债定价及后市走势研究

从1992年发行第一只可转换公司债券(以下简称“可转债”)至今,中国可转债市场已经历了二十多年的发展。自诞生以来,中国监管机构对可转债的发行要求不断明确,配套监管措施不断完善,可转债市场迅速发展,发行规模不断提高。然而,在2017年以前,虽然可转债的发行规模增长迅速,但其融资总额占资本市场股权产品总融资规模的比重仍处于较低水平。究其原因,一方面是因为可转债的发行主体仅限于上市公司,股权融资存在较大的不确定性;同时可转债的定价条款过于复杂,市场接受程度较低。随着2017年证监会对可转债产品的审核标准进一步明确,可转债发行规模高速增长,目前已成为资本市场上不可忽视的品种。为确定可转债定价方式,本文以“广汽转债”历年来的市场价格为数据基础,以B-S模型为分析模型,通过实证分析寻求影响可转债定价的主要因素,对未来可转债定价的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Variable Purchase Options

This paper examines the design and pricing of an innovative derivative asset known as a variable purchase option (“VPO“). A VPO is a call option issued by a corporation on a stochastic number of shares of its common stock. The key feature of the security is that it is ex-ante certain to be exercised by rational investors at maturity, at which time the corporation is certain to issue a fixed dollar amount of new equity capital. A VPO therefore provides a corporation with an alternative to underwriting as a means to guarantee the success of a future equity offering. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Property Investment and Property Development Firm Performance Around Initial Public Offerings and Rights Offerings: U.K. Evidence

In contrast to the well-documented underperformance of equity issuers, property investment firms undertaking initial public offerings and rights issues have performed indistinguishably from similar nonissuing firms. Property development companies that issued equity over the same period performed significantly worse than nonissuing firms. The major difference between property development and property investment firms is that property investment firms hold portfolios of real estate assets and thus have more certain prices. The lower pricing uncertainty of property investment firms results in normal long-run performance. Tests of the cognitive bias hypothesis provide only weak support of this explanation, while size and book-market effects are unable to account for the performance of property investment and development companies. The findings of underperformance for rights issues suggest that timing equity issues to take advantage of new shareholders may not be linked to the existence of cognitive bias. An important finding for the international growth in securitized real estate markets is that no evidence is found suggesting equity issues of securitized real estate firms should be avoided.     

Game changer? The impact of the VW emission-cheating scandal on the interrelation between large automakers’ equity and credit markets

This paper investigates the change in the securities market pricing behavior of 16 large, global automakers following disclosure of the Volkswagen (VW) emission-cheating scandal on September 18, 2015, when the EPA issued a notice of violation to VW, stating that VW had intentionally circumvented the US clean air rules for diesel automobile emissions. We contend that this event unblocked an informational cascade, in that much of the information was already known to outside parties, yet no significant market response occurred until the September 18 EPA notice. We also find a significant change in the evolution of equity and credit default swap (CDS) prices in the automobile industry consistent with more-informed trading in the equity market. A test of economic significance further supports this finding by showing a decrease in the profitability of a trading rule based on a predictive relation between CDS spread changes and lagged equity returns.     

Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis?

A recent proposal to enhance banking stability recommends the use of contingent convertibles (CoCos). Since these hybrid securities are mandatorily converted into equity when banks are in need of a recapitalization, they are credited for reducing banks’ likelihood of financial distress. In this paper, we show within a continuous-time framework that this allegedly beneficial impact hinges critically on the assumption of complete contracts. If contracts are incomplete in the sense that manager-owners enjoy discretion over the risk of the investment program, our analysis shows that CoCo bonds always distort risk taking incentives. Our main contribution is to demonstrate that there exist conditions under which CoCo bond financing increases investors’ wealth, but also increases the bank’s probability of financial distress, so that the banking system as a whole will be destabilized. Thus, individually rational decisions can have systemically undesirable outcomes. Further results indicate that CoCos should be used only in conjunction with devices to control risk shifting incentives.     

Foreign exchange risk pricing and equity market segmentation in Africa

This work is the first to investigate simultaneously the occurrence of unconditional currency risk pricing and equity market segmentation in Africa’s major stock markets. The multi-factor asset pricing theory provides the theoretical framework for our model. We find strong evidence suggesting that Africa’s equity markets are partially segmented. However, we find insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that foreign exchange risk is not unconditionally priced in Africa’s stock markets. This result is robust to alternative foreign exchange rate-adjusted return measures. These findings suggest that international investors can diversify into Africa’s equity markets without worrying about unconditional risks associated with foreign exchange rate fluctuations.     

CoCo Bonds,Conversion Prices and Risk Shifting Incentives. How Does the Conversion Ratio Affect Management's Behaviour?

The aim of this paper is to analyze risk shifting incentives for managers and shareholders of the financial institution issuing a CoCo bond. We assess the role of the conversion price settlement in enhancing both shareholders’ and management's discipline. Three recent contingent reverse convertible deals are analyzed, with the intention of showing how shareholder conversion returns are linked to the conversion ratio. The findings demonstrate that, in the case of an ingoing or ongoing crisis, a poor settlement of the conversion ratio could exacerbate both debt overhang and risk shifting issues. This will end in discouraging bank management from issuing new equity and from investing in low risk assets. We argue that a contingent bond triggered on Basel III capital requirement ratios and having a significantly discounted conversion price reduces risk shifting incentives. Moreover, we illustrate how the unexpected wealth transfers between CoCo bondholders and shareholders tends to zero when the bond face value is higher than the current stock market price and there is a concentration of bond subscribers. Accordingly, regulators should consider and oversee not only the conversion trigger but also all the other features of a contingent capital security, especially the conversion ratio.     

Factor pricing in commodity futures and the role of liquidity

This paper empirically investigates the pricing factors and their associated risk premiums of commodity futures. Existing pricing factors in equity and bond markets, including market premium and term structure, are tested in commodity futures markets. Hedging pressure in commodity futures markets and momentum effects is also considered. This study combines these factors to discuss their importance in explaining commodity future returns, while the literature has studied these factors separately. One of the important pricing factors in equity and bond markets is liquidity, but its role as a pricing factor in commodity futures markets has not yet been studied. To our knowledge, this research is the first to study liquidity as a pricing factor in commodity futures. The risk premiums of two momentum factors and speculators’ hedging pressure range from 2% to 3% per month and are greater than the risk premiums of roll yield (0.8%) and liquidity (0.5%). The result of a significant liquidity premium suggests that liquidity is priced in commodity futures.     

Are liquidity and corporate control priced by shareholders? Empirical evidence from Swiss dual class shares

Stadard asset pricing models generally exclude corporate control and liquidity considerations as joint explanatory factors of the stock price formation process. This empirical study investigates their influence on Swiss Bearer and Registered share prices issued by the same firm. It is shown that the statistical properties of both shares' returns differ without implying profitable arbitrage opportunities. A multifactor model of the ‘premium’ between Bearer and Registered stock prices is then proposed and tested. The results show that the freely negotiable equity book value, the existence of dominant shareholder positions and ownership transfer regime changes are significant variables in explaining the dual class share price differential.     

Black–Scholes versus artificial neural networks in pricing FTSE 100 options

This paper compares the performance of Black–Scholes with an artificial neural network (ANN) in pricing European‐style call options on the FTSE 100 index. It is the first extensive study of the performance of ANNs in pricing UK options, and the first to allow for dividends in the closed‐form model. For out‐of‐the‐money options, the ANN is clearly superior to Black–Scholes. For in‐the‐money options, if the sample space is restricted by excluding deep in‐the‐money and long maturity options (3.4% of total volume), then the performance of the ANN is comparable to that of Black–Scholes. The superiority of the ANN is a surprising result, given that European‐style equity options are the home ground of Black–Scholes, and suggests that ANNs may have an important role to play in pricing other options for which there is either no closed‐form model, or the closed‐form model is less successful than is Black–Scholes for equity options. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE MARKET'S PRICING OF DEBT IPOs

Based on the authors' recent study published in the Journal of Financial Economics , this article summarizes new evidence on the first-day and aftermarket price performance of a firm's first public offer of bonds after its equity IPO. Unlike equity IPOs, such bond IPOs are not underpriced on average. However, bonds that are more equity-like (junk bonds) are underpriced at the initial offer whereas high-grade debt is actually overpriced. This finding supports the view that riskier debt issues have a larger equity component and, as a consequence, a higher degree of information asymmetry.
The authors' study also showed that less prestigious underwriters are associated with more underpriced offers, and that the issuer's stock market listing plays an important role in determining the first-day price performance of bond IPOs. The degree of underpricing is lower for bonds issued by firms whose equity is listed on NYSE/AMEX than for bonds issued by firms listed on Nasdaq. Finally, the aftermarket performance for the full sample and various subsamples is consistent with bond market efficiency in the sense that, once prices adjust after the first day of trading, there are no clearly exploitable opportunities for excess returns.