Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization

We investigate whether mutual fund families strategically transfer performance across member funds to favor those more likely to increase overall family profits. We find that “high family value” funds (i.e., high fees or high past performers) overperform at the expense of “low value” funds. Such a performance gap is above the one existing between similar funds not affiliated with the same family. Better allocations of underpriced initial public offering deals and opposite trades across member funds partly explain why high value funds overperform. Our findings highlight how the family organization prevalent in the mutual fund industry generates distortions in delegated asset management.     

Why Does Performance Persistence Vary Among Closed-End Funds?

This study extends the research on closed-end fund performance persistence by investigating whether the persistence of both net asset value (NAV) and market price returns of U.S. registered closed-end funds is related to various fund characteristics. The sample consists of 505 closed-end funds, which are investigated over the period from January 1976 to December 1996. The analysis tests whether persistence is related to the fund characteristics size, goal, management fees, turnover, fund family membership, fund experience, and the exchange on which a fund is traded. The results vary across holding periods used to calculate persistence but are similar with respect to the NAV and market price returns. Funds with lower expense ratios and funds traded on the NYSE show more persistence of strong NAV and market price performance.     

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.     

Volatility timing in mutual funds: evidence from daily returns

I use daily mutual fund returns to shed new light on the questionof whether or not mutual fund managers are successful markettimers. Previous studies find that funds are unable to timethe market return. I study the funds' ability to time marketvolatility. I show that volatility timing is an important factorin the returns of mutual funds and has led to higher risk-adjustedreturns. The returns of surviving funds are especially sensitiveto market volatility; those of nonsurvivors are not.     

Are specialist funds “special”?

In this paper, I explore the relation between portfolio overlap and performance diversity. Using data on actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds, I find that the pairwise portfolio overlap between individual funds has increased over time and is significant compared to various randomized benchmarks. These findings motivate the main question of this paper, namely whether specialist funds (those with low levels of portfolio overlap with other funds) differ significantly from funds with high levels of overlap. Here, I find that these specialists differ with regard to certain portfolio‐ and fund‐specific characteristics, but they do not appear to outperform other funds.     

The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers

This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers’ incentives with investors’ interests. I show empirically that managers’ compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers’ compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style‐average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance.     

Changing Names with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows

We examine whether mutual funds change their names to take advantage of current hot investment styles, and what effects these name changes have on inflows to the funds, and to the funds' subsequent returns. We find that the year after a fund changes its name to reflect a current hot style, the fund experiences an average cumulative abnormal flow of 28%, with no improvement in performance. The increase in flows is similar across funds whose holdings match the style implied by their new name and those whose holdings do not, suggesting that investors are irrationally influenced by cosmetic effects.     

Do Managerial Skills Vary Across Fund Managers? Results Using European Mutual Funds

This paper uses stochastic dominance techniques to examine whether managerial skills vary across fund managers in European equity funds. The use of these techniques allows us to compare different investment alternatives in an uncertain setting under very simple assumptions regarding investor behaviour. The results for style-adjusted returns are consistent with varying degrees of managerial skill and cannot be explained by the impact of the choice of style-adjustment procedure, country, fee policy, and fund age, fund size or survivorship bias. This result allows us to conclude that style-adjusted returns may provide a reliable guide for selecting European investment funds.     

Mutual fund performance and fund prospectus clarity

We conduct a cross-sectional examination of the writing clarity (readability) of mutual fund prospectuses from 20 major US mutual fund families. We focus on the language in the objective/strategy and principal risks sections, using Flesch scores and word counts to measure writing clarity. There is considerable variation in readability among funds and fund families. Flesch readability scores do not vary across fund objective, but within funds, risk discussions are more clear than are discussions of objective/strategy. Generally, the readability of a fund's risk discussion is lower for load funds than no-load funds, and readability increases with fund size and beta and decreases with raw and risk-adjusted three-year returns.     

Decomposing the persistence of international equity flows

The portfolio flows of institutional investors are widely known to be persistent. What is less well-known, however, is the source of this persistence. One possibility is the ‘informed trading hypothesis:’ that persistence arises from autocorrelated trades of individual investors who believe they have information about value and who face an imperfectly liquid market. Another possibility is that there are asynchroneities with respect to investment decisions across funds, across investments, or both. These asynchroneities could be due to wealth effects (across investments for a single fund), investor herding (across funds for a single investment), or generalized contagion (across funds and across investments). We use daily data on institutional flows into 21 developed countries by 471 funds to measure and decompose aggregate flow persistence. We find that the informed trading hypothesis explains about 75% of total persistence, and that the remaining amount is attributable entirely to cross-fund own-country persistence. While asynchroneities across funds investing in the same country are important, asynchroneities across countries, either within a given fund, or across funds, are not important. The cross-fund flow lags we identify might result from different fund investment processes, or from some funds mimicking others' decisions. We reject the hypothesis that wealth effects explain persistence.     

The Determinants and Implications of Mutual Fund Cash Holdings: Theory and Evidence

In this article, I examine the determinants and implications of equity mutual fund cash holdings. In cross-sectional tests, I find evidence generally supportive of a static trade-off model developed in the article. In particular, small-cap funds and funds with more-volatile fund flows hold more cash. However, I do not find that fund managers with better stock-picking skills hold less cash. Aggregate cash holdings by equity mutual funds are persistent and positively related to lagged aggregate fund flows. Aggregate cash holdings do not forecast future market returns, suggesting that equity funds as a whole do not have market timing skills.     

Market timing: A global endeavor

This paper employs daily fund and index data, the classical Treynor and Mazuy timing model, and two multi-factor extensions to measure the market timing ability of global asset allocation funds. These funds differ from traditional global or international funds in that they face fewer investment constraints and are known to actively shift funds across a wide variety of asset classes. When using the classical Treynor and Mazuy timing models, I find evidence of poor market timing ability. However, this evidence disappears when timing ability is examined using two multi-factor models. The results from Treynor and Mazuy are spurious since both multi-factor extensions do a much better job in explaining the variation in average fund returns.     

Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows

This paper investigates the performance and capital inflows of private equity partnerships. Average fund returns (net of fees) approximately equal the S&P 500 although substantial heterogeneity across funds exists. Returns persist strongly across subsequent funds of a partnership. Better performing partnerships are more likely to raise follow‐on funds and larger funds. This relationship is concave, so top performing partnerships grow proportionally less than average performers. At the industry level, market entry and fund performance are procyclical; however, established funds are less sensitive to cycles than new entrants. Several of these results differ markedly from those for mutual funds.     

Diversification in the hedge fund industry

We provide evidence of a significant relation between diversification and performance in the hedge fund industry. Measuring diversification across four distinct dimensions, we find a significant positive relation between hedge fund performance and diversification across sectors and asset classes. We show that on a risk adjusted basis, hedge funds that diversify across sectors and asset classes outperform other funds by an average of 1.1% per year. However, diversification across styles and geographies exhibits a significant negative association with hedge fund returns. Funds that diversify across styles and geographies underperform other funds by an average of 1% per year. For fund of hedge funds, we find a significant positive relation between performance and diversification across sectors. However, diversifying across asset classes and geographies is found to exhibit a negative relation with fund performance. Finally, we find that the motive to engage in diversification is consistent with managerial incentive structure in the hedge fund industry.     

Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.     

Mutual fund performance with learning across funds

The average level and cross-sectional variability of fund alphas are estimated from a large sample of mutual funds. This information is incorporated, along with the usual regression estimate of alpha, in a (roughly) precision-weighted average measure of individual fund performance. Substantial “learning across funds” is documented, with significant effects on investment decisions. In a Bayesian framework, this form of learning is inconsistent with the assumption, made in the past literature, of prior independence across funds. Independence can be viewed as an extreme scenario in which the true cross-sectional distribution of alphas is presumed to be known a priori.     

Real Estate Fund Flows and the Flow-Performance Relationship

Convexity in the flow-performance relationship of traditional asset class mutual funds is widely documented, however it cannot be assumed to hold for alternative asset classes. This paper addresses this shortcoming in the literature by examining the flow-performance relationship for real estate funds, specifically open-end, direct-property funds. This investment vehicle is designed to provide the risk-return benefits of private market real estate and is available to retail investors in many countries across the globe. An understanding of fund flow dynamics associated with this investment vehicle is of particular interest due to the liquidity risk associated with holding an inherently illiquid asset in an open-end structure. Our analysis draws on the theoretical foundations provided in the literature on mutual fund flows, performance chasing, liquidity risk, participation costs and dynamics across market cycles. We focus on German real estate funds from 1990 to 2010 as this is the largest market globally and there is a high level of confidence in the data. The results show that real estate fund investors chase past performance at the aggregate level and the relationship between flows and relative performance is asymmetric (i.e., convex) at the individual fund level. Fund-level liquidity risk tends to weaken convexity, while sensitivity increases with higher participation costs. We find the flow-performance relationship varies across time, though our interpretation is asset and investment vehicle specific. The implications are applicable to investors and fund managers of open-end, direct-property funds and, more broadly, other alternative asset funds where the underlying asset may not be liquid.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

Convenience in the mutual fund industry

I examine the role of convenience in the mutual fund industry. I find that investors pay more for relatively convenient funds, and that the flows to convenient funds are less responsive to performance. These findings suggest that investors do not evaluate mutual funds independently, but rather that investors select a primary fund, likely based on beliefs about managerial ability, and then select funds which are relatively convenient to this primary fund.     

Is corporate social responsibility sufficient enough to explain the investment by socially responsible funds?

I propose an explanation for investment decisions by socially responsible investment funds (SRI) on the firms with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR). Different from the previous literature, I use a unique and comprehensive measure that considers both firm CSR ratings and fund CSR perception. I show SRI mutual funds increase their ownership about 15 % for one unit increase in the firm CSR score when those funds are highly sensitive to CSR. This finding is more pronounced for employee relations and society areas of CSR. The results also hold for a broader range of mutual funds. While industry concentration does not have influence on the fund investment, SRI funds particularly choose socially responsible firms operating in construction, transportation, personal services, and financial sector. I show the funds with CSR sensitivity underperform the market in general and fail to improve their portfolio performance after they invest in the firms with high CSR.