The First Step of the Capital Flow from Institutions to Entrepreneurs: the Criteria for Sorting Venture Capital Funds

We contribute to the knowledge of the capital flow from institutional investors via venture capital (VC) funds as intermediaries to their final destination, entrepreneurial ventures. To this end, we conduct a world‐wide survey among limited partners to determine the importance of several criteria when they select VC funds. We find the top criteria to be the expected deal flow and access to transactions, a VC fund's historic track record, his local market experience, the match of the experience of team members with the proposed investment strategy, the team's reputation, and the mechanisms proposed to align interest between the investors and the VC funds. A principal component analysis reveals three latent drivers in the selection process: ‘Local Expertise and Incentive Structure’, ‘Investment Strategy and Expected Implementation’, and ‘Prestige/Standing vs. Cost’. It becomes evident that limited partners search for teams which are able to implement a certain strategy at a given cost. Thereby, they focus on an incentive structure that limits agency costs.     

Adverse Selection,Investor Experience and Security Choice in Venture Capital Finance: Evidence from Germany

This article analyses 336 German venture capital transactions from 1990 to 2005 and seeks to determine why selected financial securities differ across deals. We find that a broad array of financial instruments is used, covering straight equity, mezzanine and debt‐like securities. Based on the chosen financial securities’ upside potential and downside protection characteristics, we provide an explanation for the differing use of these securities. Our results show that investors’ deal experience, adverse selection risks and economic prospects in the public equity market influence the selection of financial securities.     

Pay now or pay later? The economics within the private equity partnership

The economics of partnerships have been of enduring interest to economists, yet it is not clear what profit sharing within a private partnership should look like. We examine over 700 private equity partnerships and show that the allocation of fund economics to individual partners varies drastically, even among the most senior partners, and appears divorced from past success as an investor, being instead related to status as a founder. A smaller share of carried interest and ownership—and inequality in fund economics more generally—is associated with departures of senior partners which, in turn is negatively related to the funds’ ability to raise additional capital.     

The globalization of angel investments: Evidence across countries

This paper examines the role of investments by angel groups across a heterogeneous set of 21 countries with varying entrepreneurship ecosystems. Exploiting quasi-random assignment of deals around the groups’ funding thresholds, we find a positive impact of funding on firm growth, performance, survival, and follow-on fundraising, which is independent of the level of venture activity and entrepreneur-friendliness in the country. However, the maturity of startups that apply for funding (and are ultimately funded) inversely correlates with the entrepreneurship-friendliness of the country. This may reflect self-censoring by early-stage firms that do not expect to receive funding in these environments.     

资源稀缺、技术冲击与风险投资退出时机

本文从风险投资市场资源稀缺的特征出发,建立了一个风险投资退出时机选择模型,在此基础上,运用2004-2011年中国风险投资退出的季度数据考察了技术冲击和市场利率等因素变化对风险投资退出时机的影响。研究发现：（1）资源稀缺的程度与风险投资退出时机的选择有着非常紧密的联系;（2）市场利率的变化对风险投资的退出行为的影响具有不对称性：市场利率下降可能会导致风险投资加速退出质量较差的风险企业,同时却更长时间地持有质量较好的风险企业;（3）技术进步会增加风险企业的数量,提高风险投资市场上风险企业的平均质量,加速风险投资退出。     

IPOs,trade sales and liquidations: Modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis

This paper examines the dynamics of exit options for US venture capital funds. Using a sample of more than 20,000 investment rounds, we analyze the time to ‘IPO’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘liquidation’ for 6000 VC-backed firms. We model these exit times using competing risks models, which allow for a joint analysis of exit type and exit timing. The hazard rate for IPOs are clearly non-monotonic with respect to time. As time flows, VC-backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau, non-exited investments have fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. This sharply contrasts with trade sale exits, where the hazard rate is less time-varying. We further provide evidence on the impact of economic factors such as syndicate size and composition, geographical location and VC value adding, on exit outcomes.     

Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey

We review the theory and evidence on venture capital (VC) and other private equity: why professional private equity exists, what private equity managers do with their portfolio companies, what returns they earn, who earns more and why, what determines the design of contracts signed between (i) private equity managers and their portfolio companies and (ii) private equity managers and their investors (limited partners), and how/whether these contractual designs affect outcomes. Findings highlight the importance of private ownership, and information asymmetry and illiquidity associated with it, as a key explanatory factor of what makes private equity different from other asset classes.     

Venture Capital Backing and Overvaluation: Evidence from the High‐Tech Bubble

We investigate the association between venture capital (VC) backing and the likelihood of firm overvaluation in the high‐tech bubble period. We find strong evidence that a VC‐backed firm is more likely than a non‐VC‐backed firm to be overvalued during the bubble period. A further investigation suggests that such an association exists only for VC‐backed firms that have gone public recently and VC‐backed firms over which venture capitalists (VCs) have high ownership or control. But outside the bubble period, all the differences in overvaluation between VC‐backed and non‐VC‐backed firms disappear. Our findings provide additional evidence supporting VC opportunism in boom periods.     

The performance of corporate alliances: Evidence from oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico

I use data on oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico to measure how a corporate alliance—a group of firms that jointly develops an offshore tract—performs relative to a solo firm. I employ a regression discontinuity strategy based on bids in first-price sealed-bid auctions for the rights to develop leases. By focusing on leases where one organizational form narrowly outbids the other, I measure drilling outcomes while controlling for the endogenous matching of projects and organizational forms. Solo firm leases are less profitable than alliance leases because alliance members combine their information and expertise.     

Mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.     

Breaking down the barriers: Competition,syndicate structure,and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.     

Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty,reduced monitoring,and bad acquisitions

We show that acquisitions initiated during periods of high merger activity (“merger waves”) are accompanied by poorer quality of analysts' forecasts, greater uncertainty, and weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. These conditions imply reduced monitoring and lower penalties for initiating inefficient mergers. Therefore, merger waves may foster agency-driven behavior, which, along with managerial herding, could lead to worse mergers. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the average long-term performance of acquisitions initiated during merger waves is significantly worse. We also find that corporate governance of in-wave acquirers is weaker, suggesting that agency problems may be present in merger wave acquisitions.     

Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity

This paper examines the impact of the conglomerate form on the scale and novelty of corporate Research and Development (R&D) activity. I exploit a quasi-experiment involving failed mergers to generate exogenous variation in acquisition outcomes of target firms. A difference-in-differences estimation reveals that, relative to failed targets, firms acquired in diversifying mergers produce both a smaller number of innovations and also less-novel innovations, where innovations are measured using patent-based metrics. The treatment effect is amplified if the acquiring conglomerate operates a more active internal capital market and is largely driven by inventors becoming less productive after the merger rather than inventor exits. Concurrently, acquirers move R&D activity outside the boundary of the firm via the use of strategic alliances and joint ventures. There is complementary evidence that conglomerates with more novel R&D tend to operate with decentralized R&D budgets. These findings suggest that conglomerate organizational form affects the allocation and productivity of resources.     

Venture capitalists, investment appraisal and accounting information: a comparative study of the USA, UK, France, Belgium and Holland

The differences between the information used for the pre‐investment valuation and the valuation methods used by venture capital investors in five countries (USA, UK, France, Belgium and Holland) are empirically studied. The analysis is based on postal questionnaire surveys of representative samples of senior venture capitalists in each country. Differences are found, which may be attributed to the dominant corporate governance mechanism or the level of development of the venture capital market. Between‐country differences persist even after taking into account between‐country differences in the relative importance of investment stages and venture capital types. Apparently similar systems and venture capital markets place varying emphases on different valuation methods, with theoretically 'correct' methods not always being preferred in practice. The findings of the study highlight the need for venture capital firms entering non‐domestic markets to invest considerable effort in understanding the operation of these markets if they are to exploit fully their perceived competitive advantages and minimize the likelihood of repeating the problems experienced by venture capital entrants into foreign markets in the late 1980s.     

Agency Problems and the Performance of Venture-backed IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies,Lock-up Periods,and Bank Ownership

Abstract

The agency problems for initial public offerings are well documented in the literature. The objective of this research is to investigate the potential conflicts of interest for the ‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany. Of special interest are venture-backed IPOs and those in which banks acted as venture capitalist, underwriter, and provided analyst recommendations. High initial returns and outperformance are observed over the first 6 months of trading, which decreases significantly over the subsequent 18 months. The individual performance depends on the VC's underwriter and bank affiliation, exit behaviour, and lock-up commitment. Venture capitalists, and especially banks, timed their exit well. This indicates some serious agency problems in the German IPO market.     

Foreign bank entry,credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from Poland

Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.     

Democratizing entry: Banking deregulations,financing constraints,and entrepreneurship

We examine entrepreneurship and creative destruction following US banking deregulations using US Census Bureau data. US banking reforms brought about exceptional growth in both entrepreneurship and business closures. Most of the closures, however, were the new ventures themselves. Although we find evidence for the standard story of creative destruction, the most pronounced impact was a massive increase in churning among new entrants. We argue that creative destruction requires many business failures along with the few great successes. The successes are difficult to identify ex ante, which is why democratizing entry is an important trait of well-functioning capital markets.     

Exits,Performance, and Late Stage Private Equity: the Case of UK Management Buy‐outs

Using a hand‐collected dataset of 1,225 buy‐outs, we examine post buy‐out and post exit long term abnormal operating performance of UK management buy‐outs, during the period 1980–2009. Our univariate and panel data analysis of post buy‐out performance conclusively show positive changes in output. We also find strong evidence for improvements in employment and output and a lack of significant changes in efficiency and profitability following initial public offerings (IPO) exits. IPOs from the main London Stock Exchange (LSE) market outperform their counterparts from the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) only in terms of changes in output. For secondary management buy outs (SMBOs), performance declines during the first buy‐out but in the second buy‐out performance stabilises until year three, after which profitability and efficiency fall while employment increases. Although private equity (PE) backed buy‐outs do not exhibit either post buy‐out or post exit underperformance, they fail to over‐perform their non‐PE backed counterparts. In the subsample of buy‐outs exiting via IPOs on the AIM, PE firms do not outperform non‐PE buy‐outs. Our findings highlight the importance of tracing the overall performance of buy‐outs over a longer period and controlling for sample selection bias related to the provision of PE backing.     

Financial development,corporate governance and cost of equity capital

Existing research suggests that external governance is more relevant than internal governance in affecting a firm’s value. We contribute to the literature by explicitly examining the interactive role played by country-level financial development and legal institutions in influencing the impact of firm-level governance on the cost of equity capital. Using a comprehensive sample of 7380 firm years drawn from 22 developed countries, we show that firm-level corporate governance attributes affect the cost of equity capital primarily in the Common Law countries with high levels of financial development. Our study is the first to highlight the complementary effects of legal origin, financial development and firm-level governance attributes in influencing the cost of equity capital.