公司治理成本的构成与公司治理效率的最优化研究

任何经济体制与结构中的公司治理问题归根结底都在于在既定的公司治理环境及其变迁中获取最优化的公司治理效率。在公司治理收益目标给定的条件之下, 最优化公司治理效率的实现必须基于一套完备有效的公司治理机制, 以在支付必要的公司治理成本的同时最小化公司治理成本的总和。在我国转轨经济中, 公司治理效率的提高应该基于公司治理环境的整体优化以及在此之中的公司治理机制的逐步完善。     

Corporate Governance and the Investment Efficiency of Diversified Corporate Asset Buyers

Many corporate assets are bought and sold each year in the U.S. and most scholars believe these transactions improve economic efficiency. But given the reality that the interests of corporate managers may diverge from those of their shareholders and reflect empire‐building or other managerial entrenchment strategies—and that such agency problems tend to be worse in highly diversified, multi‐divisional companies—the authors tested the proposition that diversified corporate asset buyers with more effective governance structures can be expected to allocate capital more efficiently, as reflected in higher rates of return on operating capital and more favorable market reactions to the announcements of their purchases. Using a sample of diversified U.S. companies that announced large asset purchases between 1988 and 2006, the authors report finding that the investment allocation process following such asset purchases was more consistent with value creation in the case of diversified buyers with more effective governance structures, which were identified by their greater board independence, higher‐quality audit committees, and higher levels of stock ownership by institutional ownership, directors, and CEOs.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.     

The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis

Using a unique dataset based on daily and hourly high-yieldbond transaction prices, we find the informational efficiencyof corporate bond prices is similar to that of the underlyingstocks. We find that stocks do not lead bonds in reflectingfirm-specific information. We further examine price behavioraround earnings news and find that information is quickly incorporatedinto both bond and stock prices, even at short return horizons.Finally, we find that measures of market quality are no poorerfor the bonds in our sample than for the underlying stocks.     

公司治理、融资效率与经济增长

由于不良的公司治理使更多的劳动和资本资源配置到经理的私人收益上，只要劳动所创造的边际私人收益为正，经理人就会减少公司红利或利息，对公司股权融资或债权融资造成不利影响，从而降低融资效率，减少产出，影响经济增长。提高经理人市场和资本市场的完全竞争性，可以有效地降低因公司治理结构的不完善而带来的资源效率的损失，提高融资效率，促进经济增长。     

中国期货经纪公司治理有效性研究

中国期货经纪公司在内部治理方面存在着股权结构不合理、管理层独立性不强、监督机制不完善、独立董事制度尚未完全建立、相关利益主体对公司监控作用较小等问题;在外部治理方面存在信息披露制度落后和市场竞争不充分造成的经理人市场缺失等问题;期货经纪公司的经营业绩与其第一大股东持股比重、期货经纪公司的董事会和监事会规模、外部债权人质量、营业部数量等因素正相关,而期货经纪公司董事长兼任总经理现象则对公司业绩产生负面影响。     

提高大型商业银行公司治理效率的思考

银行公司治理改革取得了明显成效,但效率仍十分低下。应强化董事会的战略决策功能,提高决策效率。科学定位党委的角色,为公司治理各主体发挥作用创造条件。取消监事会,把内审部门划归董事会领导,强化董事会的监督功能,提高监督效率。加强分支行治理,提高公司治理的执行效率。加强企业文化建设,提升公司治理的效率基础。     

Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance

A combined treatment of corporate finance and corporate governance is herein proposed. Debt and equity are treated not mainly as alternative financial instruments, but rather as alternative governance structures. Debt governance works mainly out of rules, while equity governance allows much greater discretion. A project-financing approach is adopted. I argue that whether a project should be financed by debt or by equity depends principally on the characteristics of the assets. Transaction-cost reasoning supports the use of debt (rules) to finance redeployable assets, while non-redeployable assets are financed by equity (discretion). Experiences with leasing and leveraged buyouts are used to illustrate the argument. The article also compares and contrasts the transaction-cost approach with the agency approach to the study of economic organization.     

Informational Efficiency and Information Subsets

This paper proposes a new definition of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis with respect to information, which is more formal and precise than those of Rubinstein 13 , Fama 4 , Jensen 6 , and Beaver 1 , and which fits well as a framework for interpreting the many tests of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis in the literature. Security markets are here considered “efficient with respect to information set ?” if and only if revealing ? to all agents would change neither equilibrium prices nor portfolios. In addition to other desirable features, this definition has the “subset property”: efficiency with respect to ? implies efficiency with respect to any subset of ?.     

Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices

We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry‐adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.     

Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanismson bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impactof shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders)on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholdercontrol is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firmis exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence ofshareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differencesin takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points.Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associatedwith strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bondcovenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interestsdiverge.     

Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices

We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such “cursed” traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage away distortions caused by cursed traders, mixed markets can generate even more trade. Per‐trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear when traders infer others' information from prices, even when they dismiss it as noisier than their own. Making private information public raises rational and “dismissive” volume, but reduces cursed volume given moderate noninformational trading motives.     

内蒙古地区上市公司治理效应分析

本文以内蒙古地区上市公司为样本,从股权结构、董（监）事会以及债务杠杆三方面实证分析了该地区公司治理的状况,发现高层管理的持股与薪酬激励有积极的治理效应。本文还将内蒙古上市公司的治理状况与全国平均水平进行了对比分析,以便寻找其中存在的差距。     

Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking

Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.     

管理者自信会影响投资效率吗——兼论融资融券制度的公司外部治理效应

基于我国2008-2017年A股上市公司数据,研究发现管理者自信通过促进过度投资与投资不足而降低投资效率;进一步检验发现自信不足管理者通过降低过度投资与投资不足而提升投资效率,但过度自信管理者通过促进过度投资和投资不足而降低投资效率。然后采用双重差分模型研究发现相比控制组样本,在引入融资融券制度后,处理组中的融资融券标的企业通过降低过度投资与投资不足而提升了投资效率;融资融券通过降低管理者自信对过度投资的促进作用削弱管理者自信对投资效率的负向影响,上述结果表明实施融资融券制度具有显著的公司外部治理效应。本文的研究发现对于证券监管部门、上市公司及其投资者具有一定的参考意义。     

Corporate Governance and Development

The literature shows that good corporate governance generallypays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It isassociated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity,greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders,although the direction of causality is not always clear. Thelaw and finance literature has documented the important roleof institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement,including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-leveldata, researchers have documented relationships between countries’corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance,valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financingon the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance,firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistanceby entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and politicaleconomy factors at the level of markets and countries partlyexplain why they do not.      

论公司的债权人治理

由于环境的变化和理论的发展,债权人的公司治理角色正在发生实质性的变化,它不但参与了公司治理,而且越来越成为未来公司治理结构的重要力量。本文在介绍债权人权利和债权人参与公司治理实践的基础上,对债权人公司治理的原因和治理效应进行了较深入的探讨。     

Efficiency, Ownership and Market Structure, Corporate Control and Governance in the Turkish Banking Industry

Turkish banks are quite heterogeneous in terms of organizational form, ownership structure, size, age, portfolio concentration, growth prospects and attitude toward risk. They also exhibit strong variations in performance as measured by several efficiency indices. In the light of theoretical advances in corporate finance and financial institutions, this paper is an in-depth cross-sectional analysis of the Turkish banking sector, which explores the various bank, market and regulatory characteristics that may explain the efficiency variations across banks. Consistent with the related hypotheses investigated, the results indicate that a number of independent bank characteristics are significantly correlated with various efficiency measures.     

公司治理和企业价值研究最新进展

中国证监会、国家经贸委于2002年1月发布了<上市公司治理准则>,旨在规范上市公司治理结构.据统计,到2003年6月30日,沪深证券交易所的1250家上市公司中共有1244家配备了独立董事,可见公司治理的重要性已经受到广泛认同.然而令人感兴趣的是,这种改善公司治理的举措是否奏效?在中国的制度环境下,公司治理和企业价值之间到底存在着怎样的关系?     

关于公司财务治理问题的思考

本文认为公司财务治理在公司治理中居于核心地位。尽管存在三种主要模式的公司治理,但不论采用那种模式,只要财权得到有效配置,就能够在很大程度上保证公司治理是有效的。根据对财务信息生成和呈报的影响力,可以把公司财务治理中的利益主体分为两类,第一类是依赖公司内部财务治理保障其利益的主体,第二类是依赖公司外部财务治理保障其利益的主体。第一类利益主体往往利用其在公司内部财务中的优势侵犯第二类利益主体的利益,所以加强公司外部财务治理是必要的。本文还通过对安然公司财务治理问题的分析强调了这一观点。