Credit supply and corporate innovation

We present evidence that banking development plays a key role in technological progress. We focus on manufacturing firms' innovative performance, measured by patent-based metrics, and employ exogenous variations in banking development arising from the staggered deregulation of banking activities across US states during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that interstate banking deregulation had significant beneficial effects on the quantity and quality of innovation activities, especially for firms highly dependent on external capital and located closer to entering banks. Furthermore, we find that these results are strongly driven by a greater ability of deregulated banks to geographically diversify credit risk.     

Bond Market Access,Credit Quality,and Capital Structure: Canadian Evidence

We examine the impact of bond market access (measured by having a credit rating) on leverage for Canadian high credit quality (HQ) and low credit quality (LQ) firms, and find that the leverage impact is more pronounced for LQ firms. The results are similar for U.S. firms. Our results are confirmed when we control for the firm's credit quality, examine the change in leverage around rating initiation, and account for the issue size effect. A similar leverage impact for Canadian and U.S. LQ firms suggests that the Canada‐U.S. bond market integration has mitigated the financial constraints for Canadian LQ firms.     

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.     

The Effects of Reversible Investment on Capital Structure and Credit Risks

We propose a structural model with an optimal switching of diffusion regimes that integrates a wide range of investment reversibility. The default boundary and switching thresholds are endogenously determined, and they enable us to comprehend the interrelated problems of the investment decision, capital structure, and credit risks. We examine not only the under/overinvestment but also the under/overdisinvestment. The leverage ratio decreases when the firm has an option to invest in a reversible project, which can alleviate the capital structure puzzle. Furthermore, the model significantly reduces the wide dispersion of yield spreads depending on the credit grade of bonds.     

Bank Lending Standards and Access to Lines of Credit

This paper examines how changes in bank lending standards are related to the availability of bank lines of credit for private and comparable public firms. Overall, we find that access to lines of credit is more contingent on bank lending standards for private than for public firms. The impact of bank lending standards is however asymmetric: while private firms are less likely than public firms to gain access to new lines when credit market conditions are tight, we find no difference between public and private firms in terms of their use or retention of pre‐existing lines. We also find that private firms without lines of credit use more trade credit when bank lending standards are tight, which is suggestive of a supply effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that “credit crunches” are likely to have a disproportionate impact on private firms. However, pre‐existing banking relationships appear to mitigate the impact of these contractions on private firms.     

Credit crises, money and contractions: An historical view

The relatively infrequent nature of major credit distress events makes an historical approach particularly useful. Using a combination of historical narrative and econometric techniques, we identify major periods of credit distress from 1875 to 2007, examine the extent to which credit distress arises as part of the transmission of monetary policy, and document the subsequent effect on output. Using turning points defined by the Harding-Pagan algorithm, we identify and compare the timing, duration, amplitude and co-movement of cycles in money, credit and output. Regressions show that financial distress events exacerbate business cycle downturns both in the 19th and 20th centuries and that a confluence of such events makes recessions even worse.     

Credit Rationing and Credit View: Empirical Evidence from an Ethical Bank in Italy

Attempts have been made in the empirical literature to identify credit rationing and its determinants using balance sheet data or evidence from corporate surveys. However, observational equivalence, identification problems, and interview biases are serious problems in these studies. We analyze directly the determinants of credit rationing in credit files by examining the difference between the amounts demanded by and supplied to each borrower, as shown by official bank records. Our findings provide microeconomic evidence that supports the credit view hypothesis by showing that the European Central Bank refinancing rate is significantly and positively related to partial (but not total) credit rationing. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that this variable affects the total volume of bank loans.     

Trade Credit Use as Firms Approach Default

Using a sample of distressed firms with information about suppliers, we document an average fall in the use of trade credit as firms approach bankruptcy compared to a control sample of nonbankrupt firms. However, we uncover a large degree of heterogeneity across suppliers. Suppliers facing high switching costs maintain their business ties with the distressed firms as they approach bankruptcy, and provide them more trade credit. Suppliers in concentrated markets provide temporary support to their clients. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that switching costs are fundamental to explain whether suppliers provide liquidity to their distressed clients or not.     

Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.     

Evidence on the effects of bank competition on firm borrowing and investment

This paper presents evidence on the financial and real effects of bank competition using a large panel of privately held firms. I trace the firm-level impact of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which increased the competitiveness of U.S. banking markets. Following the deregulation, newly formed firms used significantly less external debt, were smaller, and realized higher returns on assets, consistent with their investing less due to greater financial constraints. These effects diminish as firms age, ultimately reversing sign. The differential impact that banking market reforms may have on newer and more established firms is underscored.     

An Empirical Study of International Spillover of Sovereign Risk to Bank Credit Risk

The severity and complexity of the recent financial crisis has motivated the need for understanding the relationships between sovereign ratings and bank credit ratings. This is the first study to examine the impact of the “international” spillover of sovereign risk to bank credit risk through both a ratings channel and an asset holdings channel. In the first case, the downgrade of sovereign ratings in GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) countries leads to rating downgrades of banks in the peripheral countries. The second channel indicates that larger asset holdings of GIIPS debt increases the credit risk of cross‐border banks, and hence, the probabilities of downgrade.     

Director Networks and Credit Ratings

We explore the effect of director social capital, directors with large and influential networks, on credit ratings. Using a sample of 11,172 firm‐year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than both firm financial data and probabilities of default predict. Near‐investment grade firms improve their forward‐looking ratings when their board is more connected. Last, we find that larger director networks are more beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are robust to controls for endogeneity. Tests confirm that causality runs from connected boards to credit ratings.     

The Co‐movement of Credit Default Swap,Bond and Stock Markets: an Empirical Analysis

We analyse the relationship between credit default swap (CDS), bond and stock markets during 2000–2002. Focusing on the intertemporal co‐movement, we examine monthly, weekly and daily lead‐lag relationships in a vector autoregressive model and the adjustment between markets caused by cointegration. First, we find that stock returns lead CDS and bond spread changes. Second, CDS spread changes Granger cause bond spread changes for a higher number of firms than vice versa. Third, the CDS market is more sensitive to the stock market than the bond market and the strength of the co‐movement increases the lower the credit quality and the larger the bond issues. Finally, the CDS market contributes more to price discovery than the bond market and this effect is stronger for US than for European firms.     

The Risk Map: A new tool for validating risk models

This paper presents a new method to validate risk models: the Risk Map. This method jointly accounts for the number and the magnitude of extreme losses and graphically summarizes all information about the performance of a risk model. It relies on the concept of a super exception, which is defined as a situation in which the loss exceeds both the standard Value-at-Risk (VaR) and a VaR defined at an extremely low probability. We then formally test whether the sequences of exceptions and super exceptions are rejected by standard model validation tests. We show that the Risk Map can be used to validate market, credit, operational, or systemic risk estimates (VaR, stressed VaR, expected shortfall, and CoVaR) or to assess the performance of the margin system of a clearing house.     

信用与资本——开发性金融研究

资本是关系到当下和长远发展的重要命题,而信用是实现从财富到资本转化的关键要素。本文从四个维度考察信用与资本的关系。一是关于信用的产生和演进,指出了信用产生的两个必要条件,并从社会财富三个阶段来审视信用和资本相互作用的演进过程。二是信用的性质和功能。讨论了信用的基本性质,以及规范商品和资本交易、促进资本形成以及信用的金融功能等基础性功能,并进一步讨论了信用的证券化功能以及金融市场建设功能。三是当前信用体系面对的新挑战和新问题。首先提出了美元外汇储备在一定意义上是美元信用对中国储蓄的证券化,是全球信用美元化的组成,在资本匮乏阶段是必要选择,而当下需要对财富和资本寻找新的载体,需要考虑和实现减少对美元的依赖。其次,从深化对国家信用的运用角度对解决问题的路径进行了思考,初步提出了通过发行以国家信用为基础的股权证券化工具,解决长期资本不足问题,应对当前挑战的设想。四是在回顾和总结部分,本文指出,信用的形态会随着资本发展而不断演进,从个人到企业、国家再到国际,从债务信用升级为命运信用即股权信用,乃至尚未出现的国际股权信用,是未来信用发展的方向。     

Gender Bias and Credit Access

We extract an exogenous measure of gender bias from survey responses by descendants of U.S. immigrants on questions about the role of women in society. We then use data on around 6,000 small business firms from 17 countries and find that in high‐gender‐bias countries, female entrepreneurs are more likely to opt out of the loan application process and to resort to informal finance, even though banks do not appear to actively discriminate against them. These results are not driven by credit risk differences between female‐ and male‐owned firms or by any idiosyncrasies in the set of countries in our sample.     

A Reexamination of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss Model

We reexamine Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing by simultaneously considering adverse selection and moral hazard. If returns of the projects are ranked by first‐order stochastic dominance, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard exists. If the projects have equalized expected returns, moral hazard does not exist, and credit rationing due to adverse selection occurs under extreme conditions. If the projects are ranked by second‐order stochastic dominance (SSD), adverse selection and moral hazard may coexist, logically restoring credit rationing, but SSD imposes strict limitations on lenders’ ability to classify borrowers. In general, our results do not support significance of credit rationing.     

The Influence of a Credit Rating Change on Dividend and Investment Policy Interactions

We examine firms’ alterations in dividend and investment activities following credit rating changes. We find that downgraded firms reduce both dividends and investments more than no‐rating‐change firms. However, a silver lining of this doubly negative impact for shareholders is an increase in investment efficiency in firms that are most likely to overinvest. For upgraded firms, investments increase, but dividend outlays do not, compared to firms without rating changes. Our findings of asymmetric dividend stickiness and symmetric investment changes on a credit shock suggest that dividends and investments should not always be considered competing uses of funds.     

The Impact of House Prices on Consumer Credit: Evidence from an Internet Bank

This paper shows that house price fluctuations can have a significant impact on credit availability. Data from Prosper.com, a peer‐to‐peer lending site that matches borrowers and lenders to provide unsecured consumer loans, indicate that homeowners in states with declining house prices experience higher interest rates, greater credit rationing, and faster delinquency. We find especially large effects for subprime borrowers whose balance sheets are likely most exposed to asset price declines. This evidence suggests that asset price fluctuations can play an important role in determining credit conditions and are thus a potentially significant mechanism for propagating macroeconomic shocks.     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.