Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

We consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms $A$ and $B$ in the final good market. Both can produce the required intermediate good, firm $B$ having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing ( $A$ orders the intermediate good from $B$ ) and technology transfer ( $B$ transfers its technology to $A$ ). An outsourcing order is equivalent to building an endogenous capacity and it generates a Stackelberg leadership effect for firm $A,$ which is absent in technology transfer. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts (making both firms better off and all consumers at least weakly better off), but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. It is also shown that if firm $B$ has a relatively large bargaining power in its negotiations with $A,$ then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing.     

On the Stochastic Properties of Carbon Futures Prices

Pricing carbon is a central concern in environmental economics, due to the worldwide importance of emissions trading schemes to regulate pollution. This paper documents the presence of small and large jumps in the stochastic process of the CO $_2$ futures price. The large jumps have a discrete origin, i.e. they can arise from various demand factors or institutional decisions on the tradable permits market. Contrary to the existing literature, we show that the stochastic process of carbon futures prices does not contain a continuous component (Brownian motion). The results are derived by using high-frequency data in the activity signature function framework (Todorov and Tauchen in J Econom 154:125–138, 2010; Todorov and Tauchen in J Bus Econ Stat 29:356–371, 2011). The implication is that the carbon futures price should be modeled as an appropriately sampled, centered Lévy or Poisson process. The pure-jump behavior of the carbon price might be explained by the lower volume of trades on this allowance market (compared to other highly liquid financial markets).     

Scope and scale economies in multi-utilities: evidence from gas,water and electricity combinations

Within the recent debate on liberalization of local public services, the paper investigates the cost properties of a sample of Italian public utilities providing in combination gas, water and electricity. The estimates from a Composite Cost Function econometric model (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992 Pulley, LB and Braunstein, YM. 1992. A composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking. Review of Economics and Statistics, 74: 221–30.  ) are compared with the ones coming from other traditional functional forms such as the Standard Translog, the Generalized Translog, and the Separable Quadratic. The results highlight the presence of global scope and scale economies only for multi-utilities with output levels lower than the ones characterizing the ‘median’ firm. This indicates that relatively small specialized firms would benefit from cost reductions by evolving into multi-utilities providing similar network services such as gas, water and electricity. However, for larger-scale utilities the hypothesis of null cost advantages is not rejected. Thus, it is possible that the recent diversification waves of leading companies are explained by factors other than cost synergies, so that the welfare gains that can be reasonably expected from such examples of horizontal integration, if any, are likely to be very low.     

Getting Cars Off the Road: The Cost-Effectiveness of an Episodic Pollution Control Program

Ground-level ozone remains a serious problem in the United States. Because ozone non-attainment is a summer problem, episodic rather than continuous controls of ozone precursors are possible. We evaluate the costs and emissions reductions of a program that requires people to buy permits to drive on high-ozone days. We estimate the demand function for permits based on a survey of 1,300 households in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Assuming that all vehicle owners comply with the scheme, the permit program would reduce nitrogen oxides ( $\text{ NO }_{\mathrm{x}}$ ) by 42 tons per Code Red day at a permit price of $75. Allowing for non-compliance by 15 % of respondents reduces the effectiveness of the scheme to 33 tons of $\text{ NO }_{\mathrm{x}}$ per day. The cost per ozone season of achieving these reductions is approximately $9 million (2008 USD). Although year-round measures, such as the Tier II emissions standards, might be preferred on benefit-cost grounds, an episodic permit system might be considered as an interim measure before the Tier II emissions standards are fully reflected in the vehicle fleet.     

The Kyoto Protocol,market power,and enforcement

The Kyoto Protocol aims to limit aggregate carbon emissions by participating countries to 1990 emissions levels in aggregate. It also allows for the creation of a permit market in which countries will be able to buy and sell the right to emit carbon dioxide. This paper investigates how market power, held by the countries of the former Soviet Union, and enforcement of the carbon emission limits might affect the abatement and the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. To do so, it uses a modified version of the van Egteren–Weber (1996 Van Egteren, H and Weber, M. 1996. Marketable permits, market power, and cheating. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30: 161–74. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) model to investigate a permit market in the presence of both market power and enforcement difficulties. It then simulates the model, finding that if meeting abatement targets is the goal, regulating the supply side of the market and convex fine schedules are the most effective tools.     

Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system

Should the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances be appointed to a unique supranational regulator or decentralized to several local regulators? To answer this question, we develop a two stage-two country game where environmental regulators set the amount of emission allowances and the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance while the regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. Various, possibly conflicting, spillovers between countries arise in a decentralized setting. We show that decentralization is socially harmful if no asymmetry among institutional settings is introduced and can be suboptimal even when decentralization features lower monitoring costs than a centralized setting. Lower monitoring costs are therefore necessary, but not sufficient, to justify decentralization. Also, our analysis reveals that welfare can be higher under decentralization even if the corresponding environmental quality is worse than under centralization. Indeed, better environmental quality is sufficient but not necessary for higher welfare under decentralization. Finally, we discuss how these results can provide a theoretical rationale for the recent evolution of the EU ETS design.     

Restrictions and identification in a multidimensional risk-sharing problem

We consider $H$ expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment $X\in {\mathbb {R}}^{N}$ and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a function of $X$ ? Can one identify the individual utility functions from the observation of the risk-sharing? We show that when $H\ge \frac{2N}{N-1}$ efficient risk sharings have to satisfy a system of nonlinear PDEs. Under an additional rank condition, we prove an identification theorem.     

The Welfare Impact of Self-supplied Water Pricing in Canada: A Computable General Equilibrium Assessment

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model to assess the welfare cost of changing the method of water allocation in Canada towards one that uses prices to ration demand. We model the introduction of a price on both water that is abstracted as well as water that is consumed (that is abstracted, and not returned to the source). We estimate that reducing water consumption by 25 % would require imposition of a price on water consumption of around $$\$0.21/\text{ m }^{3}$$ . Similarly, introduction of a water abstraction charge of about $$\$0.013/\text{ m }^{3}$$ would be sufficient to reduce water abstraction by 25 %. We find that if revenues from water pricing are returned in lump sum to households, the introduction of water pricing would result in a modest welfare loss. When revenues from water pricing are used to offset existing taxes, we find a gain in welfare corresponding to a ‘strong double dividend.’     

Agent-based modelling of novelty creating behavior and sectoral growth effects—Linking the creative and the destructive side of innovation

For grasping the relationship between novelty creating activities of agents and growth of economic aggregates, a multi-level approach is suggested. The first level specifies the triggering conditions for novelty creating activities for the agents, i.e. firms. Here the behavioral elements and the modes of actions for the firms are portrayed using an agent-based approach (Section?2). On the second level, the consequences of successful innovations and imitations in a given sector of economic activities are dealt with (Section?3). This depends on the frequency of successful novelties and on the way they diffuse in that sector. We use an agent-related functional approach, applying difference equations for depicting the stylized facts of the diffusion dynamics. Only if these different levels of economic dynamics are distinguished as well as related to each other, is it possible to derive aggregate effects of novelties for the whole economy. This will be done by way of computer simulations (Section?4). Conclusions are drawn in Section?5.     

Specification and Aggregation Errors in Environmentally Extended Input–Output Models

This article considers the specification and aggregation errors that arise from estimating embodied $\text{ CO }_{2}$ emissions and embodied water use with environmentally extended national input–output (IO) models, instead of with an environmentally extended international IO model. Model specification errors result from the use of domestic environmental and domestic technology coefficients to estimate emissions or resources that are embodied in international trade. For $\text{ CO }_{2}$ footprints, unacceptably large overestimations arise from using domestic emission coefficients, which are only partly canceled out by using domestic technology coefficients. For water use footprints both specification errors are smaller, but hardly cancel out. Sectoral aggregation errors occur when combining the 129 EXIOPOL industries to 59 EU industries and 10 broad sectors. The latter aggregation creates the largest errors. Spatial aggregation errors arise from combining 43 individual EXIOPOL countries in four broad regions and “the rest of the world”. Substantial, unacceptable errors occur again, now especially in relation to water use.     

Inferior factor in Cournot oligopoly revisited

We reconsider the recent work by Okuguchi (J Econ 101:125–131, 2010) on (possibly asymmetric) Cournotian firms with two production factors, one being inferior for each firm. It is shown there that an increase in the price of the inferior factor does raise the equilibrium industry output. In addition of providing a simpler and more rigorous proof of that result, we generalize it to the case of technologies with $s\ge 2$ factors and also allow some firms not to use the inferior one.     

On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point $x$ of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point $y$ of the polytope such that $x$ is the unique point of the polytope at maximal distance from $y$ . It is proved that if the polytope does not have either exactly two single-best points or exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, then any Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rule is dictatorial. If the polytope has exactly two single-best points, then there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules, which can be described by committee voting (simple games) between the two single-best points. This also holds if there are exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, but in that case, we limit ourselves to describing an example of such a rule. The framework under consideration models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region.     

Essential data, budget sets and rationalization

According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent. An “essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n})$ and a feasibility matrix $\varvec{\alpha }$ . Starting with a standard experiment, in which the economist has access to precise budget sets, we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a utility function rationalizing the experiment, namely, the cyclical consistency of the associated feasibility matrix, is equivalent to the existence, for any budget sets compatible with the deduced essential experiment, of a utility function rationalizing them (and typically depending on them). In other words, the conclusion of the standard rationalizability test, in which the economist takes budget sets for granted, does not depend on the full specification of the underlying budget sets but only on the essential data that these budget sets generate. Starting with an essential experiment $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n}; \varvec{\alpha }$ ) only, we show that the cyclical consistency of $\varvec{\alpha }$ , together with a further consistency condition involving both $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n})$ and $\varvec{\alpha }$ , guarantees the existence of a budget representation and that the essential experiment is rationalizable almost robustly, in the sense that there exists a single utility function which rationalizes at once almost all budget sets which are compatible with $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n}; \varvec{\alpha }$ ). The conditions are also trivially necessary.     

Eco-Efficiency and Convergence in OECD Countries

This paper assesses the convergence in eco-efficiency of a group of 22 OECD countries over the period 1980–2008. In doing so, three air pollutants representing the impact on the environment of economic activities are considered, namely, carbon dioxide ( ${\text{ CO}}_{2}$ ), nitrogen oxides ( ${\text{ NO}}_\mathrm{X}$ ) and sulphur oxides ( ${\text{ SO}}_\mathrm{X}$ ); furthermore, eco-efficiency scores at both country and air-pollutant-specific level are computed using Data Envelopment Analysis techniques. Then, convergence is evaluated using the recent approach by Phillips and Sul Econometrica 75:1771–1855 (2007), which tests for the existence of convergence groups. First, we find that eco-efficiency has improved over the period, with the exception of ${\text{ NO}}_\mathrm{X}$ emissions. Second, Switzerland is the most eco-efficient country, followed by some Scandinavian economies, such as Sweden, Iceland, Norway and Denmark. In contrast, Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, in addition to Hungary, Turkey, Canada and the United States, are among the worst performers. Finally, we find that both the most eco-efficient countries and the worst tend to form clubs of convergence.     

Interrelationships among banks,stock markets and economic growth: an empirical investigation

This article utilizes a simultaneous equations model to study the relationships among economic growth, banking and stock market development. In contrast to conventional instrumental variable approach, we implement the analysis via the methodology of identification through heteroscedasticity. Using Beck and Levine (2004 Beck, T. and Levine, R. (2004) Stock markets, banks and growth:panel evidence, Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 423–42.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) dataset, we find that each of the three variables interacts in important ways. While both are conducive to economic growth, banking development matters more for growth in low-income countries and stock market development is more favourable to growth in high-income or low-inflation ones. The data also reveal coexistence of a positive effect of banking development on stock market development and a negative effect of stock market development on banking development. Besides, the feedback effects of growth on both banking and stock market development are found.     

Estimating Tropical Cyclone Damages Under Climate Change in the Southern Hemisphere Using Reported Damages

This paper estimates the damages from tropical cyclones (TCs) in the Southern Hemisphere under future climate change scenarios based on the historical TC records in Australia. From the best-track TC data, we examine the changes in frequency, intensity, and economic damage of the TCs that made landfall since 1970. From the detailed individual TC reports, damage estimates are constructed based on reported damages. We find that the TC frequency has significantly declined over time. The intensity, however, does not show a significant trend. Average damage per TC has declined significantly from 43 million AUD in the 1970s to 11 million in the 1990s. This paper finds that 1 % decrease in minimum central pressure leads to 32.7 % increase in economic damage, which is more than three times larger than that found in the US hurricane study with regards to maximum wind speeds. For future damage projections, characteristics of the 14,000 TCs generated under seven different AOGCM climate models are applied. All seven climate models predict a decrease in TC frequency in the Southern Hemisphere but intensity predictions vary. By the end of the twenty second century, changes in climate are expected to increase the TC damage under the MRI ( \(+\) 94 %), the MIROC ( \(+\) 73 %), and the CSIRO ( \(+\) 66 %) model due to increased intensity. However, TC damage is expected to fall under the GFDL ( \(-\) 92 %) and the CNRM ( \(-\) 85 %) model due to decreased intensity and frequency. Adaptation will be a key determinant of the future vulnerability to TCs in the Southern Hemisphere.     

The effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy responses to twin crises

We study how effective fiscal and monetary policy responses are during a twin crisis. Using the dataset provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008 Laeven, L and Valencia, F. (2008) Systemic banking crises: a new database. IMF Working Paper No. 08/224 [Google Scholar]), we identify 57 episodes of twin crises. Following the methods proposed in Baldacci et al. (2009 Baldacci, E. 2009. Gupta, S. and Mulas-Granados, C., How effective is fiscal policy response in systemic banking crises?, IMF Working Paper No. 09/160 [Google Scholar]) and Hutchison et al. (2010 Hutchison, M. 2010. Noy, I. and Wang, L., Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops, Journal of International Money and Finance, 29, 973–87 [Google Scholar]), we construct the variables measuring the duration and output cost of a twin crisis. We find that fiscal policy does not seem to be associated with the shortening of a twin crisis. Regarding monetary policy, we find that monetary tightening is associated with the lengthening of a twin crisis duration, consistent with the result in Hutchison et al. (2010 Hutchison, M. 2010. Noy, I. and Wang, L., Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops, Journal of International Money and Finance, 29, 973–87 [Google Scholar]) dealing with a sudden stop crisis. In addition, our results show that while a mild monetary expansion is effective in reducing a twin crisis duration, over-expansionary monetary policy loses its effectiveness.     

Shaping the Relationship Between Economic Development and Carbon Dioxide Emissions at the Local Level: Evidence from Spatial Econometric Models

The debate over the correlation between economic growth and environmental pollution has attracted a great deal of attention from academic researchers and policy makers in recent years. There has been excessive use of spatial econometric models and too much emphasis on statistical procedures in empirical studies. In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by conducting a more rigorous analysis of the relationship between economic growth and \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions in Chinese cities using spatial Durbin models. Our results show that \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions increase monotonically in relation to economic growth at the city level and that the driving effects of economic growth are slightly smaller in central China than in eastern and western China. In addition to economic growth, industry’s share of the economy is a major driver of \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions, while technological improvement, measured by energy intensity per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), and the effectiveness of environmental governance flatten the shape of the environmental Kuznets curve. We provide evidence of local spillover effects of explanatory variables on \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions. Economic competition as well as technological diffusion are found to exist in Chinese cities in relation to \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions. We also find carbon leakage between cities only if the per capita GDP of a given city is less than $493 (in 2010 constant dollars). Results hold when robustness checks are performed. Policy makers should carefully consider regional differences and the inherent spatial interactions between factors when formulating carbon reduction policies.     

Removing biases in forecasts of fishery status

A recent highly cited paper from this journal develops a model predicting maximum sustainable yield ( \(MSY\) ) of a fishery using the historical maximum catch ( \(MaxCatch\) ). The model is parameterized with a small sample of fisheries from the United States, and is subsequently applied globally to estimate the benefits of fishery recovery. That empirical relationship has been adopted for many subsequent high-profile analyses. Unfortunately, the analysis suffers from two important oversights: (1) because the model is non-linear, it suffers from “retransformation bias” and therefore the results significantly understate \(MSY\) and (2) the analysis is parameterized from of a very limited data set and so generalizability of the fitted empirical relationship between \(MSY\) and \(MaxCatch\) to global fisheries is questionable. Here, we rectify both oversights and provide an updated estimate of the relationship between \(MSY\) and \(MaxCatch\) .     

Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange

We characterize the family of efficient, consistent, and strategy-proof rules in house allocation problems. These rules follow an endowment inheritance and trade procedure as in Pápai’s hierarchical exchange rules (Pápai in Econometrica 68, 1403–1433, 2000) and closely resemble Ergin’s priority rules (Ergin in Econometrica 70, 2489–2497, 2002). We prove that if there are at least four objects, these are the only rules that are efficient in two-agent problems, $2$ -consistent, and strategy-proof. A corollary is that these three basic properties together imply the full requirements of efficiency, consistency, group strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness.