The Ethics of Emissions Trading

This article defends three ethical arguments against emissions trading. The first argument alleges that emissions trading is morally objectionable, because it ‘commodifies’ the atmosphere. The second argument involves various objections to attaching prices to units of emissions – loosely speaking, the objection is to pricing that which is priceless or should not be priced. The third argument turns on the idea that if a large cut in emissions is to be made by society overall, everyone should ‘do their bit’ by making a particular kind of sacrifice rather than paying others to do it instead. Some general conclusions concern the limitations of confining the analysis to idealised emissions trading, the difficulty in separating ‘economistic’ thinking about policy delivery from policy choice and the need to focus questions of justice on consumers rather than on producers.     

Contract-Based Trading Programs in Environmental Regulation

Emissions trading markets have been successful in addressing pollution problems where regulated entities can be treated in a similar manner and precise control of emissions quantities across time and space is not critical. In other situations, trading must account for individual circumstances, complexity, and the patchwork of existing regulations. In these circumstances trading systems have elements of contracts, in that transactions are unique and must be negotiated and approved individually. Such programs imply a high payoff to improved environmental information and to innovations in trading systems that allow making better use of such information. (JEL Q21 , Q25 , Q28 )     

碳排放权交易定价研究综述

《京都议定书》的问世使碳排放权在低碳经济时代成为一种稀缺商品,而该"商品"的定价问题就是碳排放权交易体系的核心关注点。文章对排放权定价的研究现状进行了系统综述,内容主要包括:碳排放权交易的基本定义、碳排放权定价理论以及国外和国内对碳排放权定价的研究现状。其中,国外对碳排放权定价的研究主要集中在碳排放权价格影响因素和定价模型两方面;国内的研究除影响因素和定价模型外,还对碳排放权的定价基础—碳货币和中国碳排放权的定价策略展开过讨论。文章拟通过较为系统的介绍,以期为未来碳交易定价的相关研究提供一定的参考。     

Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market

This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with N strategic agents. Agents receive random stock endowments at each period and trade to share dividend risk. Endowments are the only private information in the model. We find that agents trade slowly even when the time between trades goes to 0. In fact, welfare loss due to strategic behaviour increases as the time between trades decreases. In the limit when the time between trades goes to 0, welfare loss is of order 1/ N , and not 1/ N ² as in the static models of the double auctions literature. The model is very tractable and closed-form solutions are obtained in a special case.     

自愿减排对构建国内碳排放交易市场的作用和对策

自愿减排指自愿碳减排市场中,个人、企业、政府为了对自己排放的温室气体作出抵偿,力图实现"碳中和",而购买碳信用额的一种交易模式。目前,我国尚未形成真正意义上的碳排放交易市场,自愿减排是建立碳排放交易市场前的有力尝试,具有重要意义。从自愿碳减排的角度,分析了自愿碳减排在建立国内碳排放交易市场中的重要作用,结合自愿碳减排现状,分析其不足之处并提出了相应的对策。     

Emissions Trading with Updated Allocation: Effects on Entry/Exit and Distribution

Allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects. It is well known that cost-efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner, e.g., based on emissions levels before the start of the system (‘grandfathering’). Böhringer and Lange (Eur Econ Rev 49:2041–2055, 2005) show that a cost-effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated (‘updating’), given that banking and borrowing are prohibited. In this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering, and how it affects profits for new and existing firms. We find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar: First, the incentives to entry and exit are identical. Second, the total value of free quotas to existing firms, based on emissions before the system starts, is also identical without any auctioning. With updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering, but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances. The two effects exactly cancel each other out. If there is some combination of auction and free allocation, the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same. Entry and exit incentives are still equal.     

Strategic Investment in Climate Friendly Technologies: The Impact of Global Emissions Trading

Our point of departure is that a group of industrialized countries invest in research and development (R&D) of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement technologies. R&D investments influence the future GHG abatement choices of both industrialized and developing countries. We distinguish between investments that reduce industrialized countries’ abatement costs and investments that reduce developing countries’ abatement costs. Unlike earlier contributions, we include global trading in emission permits. This changes the nature of the game. With global permit trading, industrialized countries should in many cases invest strategically in technologies that only reduce abatement costs at home. This comes in addition to investments abroad. Second, we show that R&D investments always decrease total emissions. Finally, we find that the developing region receiving investments always benefits.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

欧盟与湖北碳交易市场的互相关性——基于MF-X-DMA的研究

本文运用多重分形降趋势移动平均互相关分析法(MF-X-DMA)考察欧洲联盟碳交易市场与中国湖北碳交易市场之间的互相关性及其多重分形特征。通过实证研究发现,欧盟碳交易市场与湖北碳交易市场之间存在显著的互相关性且具有多重分形特征。同时,在市场出现剧烈波动时,两个碳交易市场之间的联动效应更为明显;湖北碳交易市场的多重分形特征显著,分形强度大于欧盟市场,且后者的自相关性不存在明显的多重分形特征。此外,以湖北碳交易市场为代表的中国新兴碳市场,市场成熟度不高,其涉及的短期相关性极易受到外部因素的影响。     

Emissions Trading and Profitability: The Swedish Pulp and Paper Industry

The purpose of this paper is to develop models with and without potential emissions trading and to compare industry profits under the two regimes. The model in which emissions trading is permitted is a nonparametric industry frontier model in the spirit of Färe et al. (1992). It is relative to this model that industry profit is computed. This profit is compared to the profit without emissions trading to give an estimate of the potential gains that can be realised by allowing for emissions trading. The model, which is applied to data for the Swedish pulp and paper industry, suggests that this industry would have had up to 6% (1%) higher profits in 1989 (1990) if emissions trading had been used instead of individual permits to achieve the same total emissions target. Currently there is no permit trading in this industry so our results only model the potential gains that can be made.     

排污权交易政策的评价标准研究

排污权交易政策的相关问题在我国学术界、政府环保决策部门已成为热点。结合美国排污权交易政策的演进特点,对排污权交易政策优劣的一般评价标准进行分析,研究建立我国高效排污权交易制度的基本要求。     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

Assessing the performance of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme

The UK’s Climate Change Programme introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gases. Firms in over 40 industrial sectors which have negotiated “Climate Change Agreements” setting quantitative energy efficiency targets can use the ETS to trade over-and under-compliance with these targets. In parallel, a limited number of firms have become major participants in the ETS as a result of an auction of subsidies for additional abatement commitments. The paper describes the UK arrangements and assesses the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of the ETS, drawing on evidence of participants’ behaviour both in the incentive auction, and in subsequent trading.     

Emissions Trading Mode in America and China and Its Future

The emissions trading is a kind of sustainable development measures that is based on market mechanism, and its growing is closely connected with the market development level. The level of American emissions permits market is relatively high, and also predicts the prospect of professional bourse pattern. Most of emissions permits transactions in China are organized by government environment authority, which make it lack of market function. Emissions permits is a kind of property rights. It is important and profitable, while the emissions trading market obviously possesses the two-class of original allocation and second-time transfer. But there are some decisive differences between emissions permits and ordinary transaction object, so the specialized bourse for emissions trading should be built.     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

International Emissions Trading and Induced Carbon-Saving Technological Change: Effects of Restricting the Trade in Carbon Rights

This paper examines the implications of restricting the tradability of carbon rights in the presence of induced technological change. Unlike earlier approaches aimed at exploring the tradability-technology linkage, we focus on climate-relevant “carbon-saving” technological change. This is achieved by incorporating endogenous investment in carbon productivity into the RICE-99 integrated assessment model of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Simulation analysis of various emission reduction scenarios with several restrictions on emissions trading reveals a pronounced dichotomy of effects across regions: Restrictions to trading raise the investments in carbon productivity in permit demanding regions while reducing them in permit supplying regions. In terms of per capita consumption, permit demanding regions lose and permit supplying regions gain from restrictions. In scenarios that involve “hot air,” restrictions to trade lower overall emissions, which results in reduced climate damage for most regions. Reduced damage, in turn, reduces the incentive to invest in carbon productivity.     

支持排污权交易的权证流通系统功能模型研究

排污权交易是通过市场机制来控制环境污染的重要手段,建立一套完整、精确的排污权证流通管理信息系统是排污权交易制度有效运行的保障.文章在分析权证流通系统特点、排污权证分配与交易流程以及权证流通系统功能需求的基础上,给出了一个支持排污权交易的权证流通系统功能结构模型,为系统开发打下了基础.     

The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes

This paper computes the change in welfare associated with the introduction of incentives. We calculate by how much the welfare gains of increased output due to incentives outweigh workers' disutility from increased effort. We accomplish this by studying the use of incentives by a firm in the check-clearing industry. Using this firm's production records, we model and estimate the worker's dynamic effort decision problem. We find that the firm's incentive scheme has a large effect on productivity, raising it by 12% over the sample period for the average worker. Using our parameter estimates, we show that the cost of increased effort due to incentives is equal to the dollar value of a 5% rise in productivity. Welfare is measured as the output produced minus the cost of effort; hence, the net increase in the average worker's welfare due to the introduction of the firm's bonus plan is 7%. Under a first-best scheme, we find that the net increase in welfare is 9%.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

碳排放权交易会计的国际进展及借鉴

随着《京都议定书》的签署,发展低碳经济、建设碳排放权交易市场在我国拉开序幕,碳排放权成为一种具有流通性的稀缺资源,开始试点交易。但是,我国至今还未颁布关于碳排放权交易的会计准则。通过对欧盟碳排放权与美国排污权相关会计处理方式分析研究,归纳比较碳排放权交易会计处理的几种观点,并为发展我国碳排放权交易会计提出建议。