Optimal taxation with home production

Optimal taxes for Europe and the U.S. are derived in a realistically calibrated model in which agents buy consumption goods and services and use home capital and labor to produce household services. The optimal tax rate on services is substantially lower than the tax rate on goods. Specifically, the planner cannot tax home production directly and instead lowers the tax rate on market services to increase the relative price of home production. The optimal tax rate on the return to home capital is strictly positive and the welfare gains from switching to optimal taxes are large.     

Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment

This paper concerns redistribution via nonlinear income taxation in an overlapping generations model with two ability-types. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by involuntary unemployment. We show that the policy instruments that are used to calculate the marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type give rise to intertemporal tax base effects. In addition, since the relationship between the employment and the capital stock implies intertemporal production inefficiency at the second best optimum, imperfect competition in the labor market may itself justify capital income taxation.      

Optimal taxation in the presence of bailouts

The termination of a representative financial firm due to excessive leverage may lead to substantial bankruptcy costs. A government in the tradition of Ramsey (1927) may be inclined to provide transfers to the firm so as to prevent its liquidation and the associated deadweight costs. It is shown that the optimal taxation policy to finance such transfers exhibits procyclicality and history dependence, even in a complete market. These results are in contrast with pre-existing literature on optimal fiscal policy, and are driven by the endogeneity of the transfer payments that are required to salvage the financial firm.     

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28     

Disability insurance and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. JEL Classification H55 · H23 · E62     

The theory of optimal taxation: what is the policy relevance?

The paper discusses the implications of optimal tax theory for the debates on uniform commodity taxation and neutral capital income taxation. While strong administrative and political economy arguments in favor of uniform and neutral taxation remain, recent advances in optimal tax theory suggest that the information needed to implement the differentiated taxation prescribed by optimal tax theory may be easier to obtain than previously believed. The paper also points to the strong similarity between optimal commodity tax rules and the rules for optimal source-based capital income taxation.      

Optimal human capital policies

We analyze optimal income taxes and optimal schooling subsidies in a dynamic private information economy with observable human capital accumulation. We show that under plausible conditions the marginal schooling subsidies are positive and that they are zero at both endpoints of the skill distribution.We compute the optimal policies and evaluate their impact over the transition and at the steady state. We find that the optimal schooling policies are significantly smaller than the optimal marginal income taxes. If optimal schooling policies are introduced jointly with optimal income taxes then their welfare and aggregate effects are small. However, if income taxes are not set optimally then the optimal schooling policies have significant welfare and aggregate effects.     

Intangible investment and Ramsey capital taxation

The standard analysis of optimal fiscal policy aggregates different types of assets into a unique capital good and all types of capital taxes into a unique capital tax. This paper considers a disaggregated framework: an economy with corporate and dividend taxes, where firms invest in both tangible and intangible assets (which can be expensed or sweat). In our setup, firms can always respond to changes in the timing of taxation. We find that the optimal long-run policy features zero corporate taxes and positive dividend taxes, with labor and dividend taxes being identical. Moreover, the initial capital levy is relatively small.     

Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.      

Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy

A two-sector trade model with specific factors and perfect international capital mobility is used to analyze the optimal mix of factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy that faces domestic or international constraints on its tax instruments. In the unconstrained benchmark case, the small country will tax specific factors and domestic consumption but chooses zero tax rates for a selective production tax (i.e., an origin-based commodity tax) and a source-based tax on capital income. When commodity taxation must follow a combination of origin and destination principles, then this mixed commodity tax rate will be positive and its production effects are partly compensated in the optimum by a capital subsidy. These international restrictions interact with domestic constraints when rents accruing to fixed factors cannot be taxed by a separate instrument, and a positive tax rate on capital serves as an indirect way of rent taxation.     

Free trade taxation and protectionist taxation

The goal of this paper is to seek new insight regarding international tax policy by recasting it in parallel with the theory of international trade. This is accomplished by defining a free trade taxation regime as one that is consistent with an efficient worldwide allocation of capital, and evaluating within this perspective various aspects of tax policy, such as value-added (axes, integration, income shifting, and the choice of worldwide or territorial system of taxes.Compatibility with free trade is not the only standard against which to judge an international tax system. Nevertheless, as national economies become more integrated the importance of international taxation for the efficient functioning of capital markets will become a central policy issue.     

Optimal income transfers

A substantial literature addresses the design of transfer programs and policies, including the negative income tax, other means-tested transfers, the earned income tax credit, categorical assistance, and work inducements. This work is largely independent of that on the optimal nonlinear income tax, yet formulations of such a tax necessarily address how low-income individuals should be treated. This paper draws on the optimal income taxation literature to illuminate the analysis of transfer programs, including the level and shape of marginal tax rates (including phase-outs), the structure of categorical assistance, and the role of work inducements in an optimal income transfer scheme. JEL Classification H21 · H53 · I38     

Nordic dual income taxation of entrepreneurs

The paper shows how entrepreneurial taxes interact with the career choice of individuals, the quality of entrepreneurs, and their investment behavior. It is particularly relevant to differentiate the early effects on start-up enterprises with substantial uncertainty from the tax effects on mature firms where the uncertainty is resolved. Conditions are derived for the Nordic dual income tax to be neutral and they are found to be stringent. Profit expectations matter. The Nordic dual encourages (discourages) the establishment of new enterprises by entrepreneurs who anticipate high (low) profitability.     

最优所得税理论与我国个人所得税的实践

最优所得税理论一诞生,就受到了广泛关注。一些学者用不同模型阐述了最优所得税理论。虽毋须严格按照这些模型来设计我国的个人所得税制度,但其模型所体现的税制设计理念或思想对现阶段我国个人所得税制度的设计具有一定的参考价值。     

Seasonal and stochastic effects in commodity forward curves

In this paper we develop a new model for the dynamics of forward curves of commodities exhibiting seasonalities, such as natural gas, electricity or agricultural commodities. In the existing literature on the subject, the first state variable in multi-factor models is the commodity price, which combines seasonal and stochastic features and may be unobservable. We propose to use instead the average forward price, which is devoid of seasonality and conveys a more robust representation of the current forward curve level. The second factor in the model is a quantity analogous to the stochastic convenience yield, which accounts for the random changes in the forward curve shape. The well-known cost-of-carry relationship is significantly improved by introducing a deterministic seasonal premium within the convenience yield. We develop model estimation procedures and apply them to a number of energy markets.     

Capital taxation and accumulation in a growing world economy with deficit finance

Prior analyses of the incidence of capital taxation have assumed that the government budget is balanced and changes in capital taxes affect either other taxes, transfers, or government expenditures. The general conclusion is that an increase in the capital tax rate will increase the gross-of-tax interest rate and decrease capital accumulation. This article examines the steady-state effects of capital taxation on the gross-of-tax interest rate and capital accumulation within a two-country model of overlapping generations, which allows capital taxation to directly affect government budget deficits. It is shown that, under the residence tax system, if the after-tax-interest rate is greater than the growth rate, an increase in the capital tax rate willdecrease the gross interest rate andincrease the capital-labor ratio. This result holds even under the territorial tax system, with some additional assumptions.     

Time-saving goods,time inequalities and optimal commodity taxation

International Tax and Public Finance - Time-saving goods are defined as market goods that reduce home labor requirements (e.g., restaurants; washing machines). Assuming that time savings are...