中国企业海外直接投资非市场因素影响实证研究

文章应用回归模型研究中国企业海外直接投资的非市场因素作用机制,发现我国对外直接投资战略作为一种正式制度安排,许多中国企业在开始全球化之前,并不具备所有权优势。可是,影响海外直接投资的非市场因素却使中国企业培育出特殊的非市场能力;作为非市场因素的国家行为影响海外直接投资的区位选择;受传统商业文化的影响,中国企业通过建立个人关系网络,降低市场不确定性和交易成本;同发展中国家签订的双边投资协议,可以促进中国海外直接投资。     

施工企业海外项目风险的应对之策

在我国施工企业海外项目投资的过程中,会面临政治、经济、技术、自然条件等各种各样的不确定性风险。风险所造成损失的,对经营活动构成巨大的威胁和阻碍。施工企业根据风险类型,制定出风险防范或应对策略,以此规避风险或降低风险带来的损失。     

我国对外直接投资主体的选择和培育

随着我国国际竞争水平的迅速提高和国家"走出去"战略的逐步实施,我国对外直接投资呈现出强劲的增长势头。本文结合发展中国家对外直接投资理论,通过对我国海外直接投资的分析,探讨了我国对外直接投资的主体问题。根据发展中国家对外直接投资理论,我国民营企业具有海外直接投资的特有优势,国家应大力扶持、培育其发展,使之成为对外直接投资的主体。     

浅议企业集团发展规划在海外施工队伍中的实施

自2000年国家实施海外发展规划以来,随着中国海外投资额的增加,海外施工队伍建设规模不断扩大,业务逐步扩张。企业集团发展规划在海外施工队伍发展战略中地位日益突出,如何应用好企业集团发展规划是其持续发展的动力。本文结合海外集团战略的特殊性与海外施工队伍经营活动内外环境的特点,介绍和论述了企业集团战略在海外施工队伍的应用,并就存在的问题提出应对的策略和进一步完善的建议。     

对外投资中的国家风险防范

国家风险是指投资者在从事国际投资活动过程中,因东道国或国际政治、经济因素影响所造成的投资经济损失的可能性。在国际投资活动中,一旦东道国出现较大的国家风险,往往会给海外投资者造成严重的经济损失,使他们的生产和经营活动难以正常进行,或在政策和法律方面受到歧视,甚至整个企业资产被征用或没收。我国目前对外投资尚处于初级阶段,尤其要重视研究和防范国家风险,尽可能将这种风险减少到最低程序,以     

试论中国企业在非洲矿产的投资方式、风险分析及应对策略

非洲拥有世界上最丰富的矿产资源，其优势独一无二，这吸引了大量的海外投资者。中国企业在实施“走出去”战略的过程中，也纷纷把投资方向瞄准了非洲。随着中非关系的日益深化，将来还会有更多的中国企业蹯入非洲的国土。文章就中国企业在非洲矿产业的投资方式、风险分析及应对策略进行了深入研究。为促进中国企业更好地投资非洲，深入实施中国企业的“走出去”战略，我国政府应该为企业提供全面充分的信息服务，为我国矿企业海外资源的投资保驾护航。     

转型期国有中小型饭店面临的挑战与应对策略

本文分析了转型期国有中小型饭店面临的挑战,提出国有中小型饭店的发展战略模式和道路,阐述了国有中小型饭店通过改革应对挑战,实现健康持续发展的策略和措施。     

我国企业海外并购定价理论与实践研究

在国家"走出去"战略的支持下,我国越来越多的企业开始通过海外并购实施国际化战略。相关数据显示,我国企业海外投资规模不断扩大,海外并购比例逐渐增加。但是,也出现了一些海外并购不成功的案例,其中盲目定价是主要原因。针对我国企业海外并购定价的困境,本文梳理总结了海外并购定价的理论与方法,并结合我国企业海外并购的实践,分析了我国企业海外并购定价问题,提出了具有指导性的对策建议。     

国家竞争优势战略指导下提高我国外贸竞争力研究

从经济总量看，外贸对我国经济增长的贡献率在20％以上，如何提高外贸竞争力是我国应对全球金融危机保证经济增长的重大问题。运用波特的国家竞争优势战略理论，结合我国对外贸易现状进行分析，得出我国外贸企业竞争优势存在高级要素和专门要素缺乏、需求层次差距大、缺乏相关产业支持等问题，应实施国家竞争优势战略，提升我国外贸竞争力水平。     

跨国公司投资独资化对我国企业技术创新的影响及对策

近些年来,随着中国投资环境的变化,跨国公司在华投资模式逐步由合资模式向独资模式转变。面对独资化对我国企业产生的双重影响,企业应依靠技术创新,提高自主创新能力,加强核心竞争力的培养,并通过与跨国公司战略联盟等策略将独资化的负面影响降低到最小限度。本文将从跨国公司在华独资的趋势及原因出发,通过其对我国企业创新能力的双重影响的分析,提出我国企业应对策略。     

The Business(es) of the Chinese State

The state industrial sector is the Achilles heel of China's otherwise remarkable economic performance over the past two decades. Most other countries in transition from socialism have transformed SOEs into commercial entities through systematic, market‐driven restructuring and privatisation to become more efficient and competitive. In China, a series of innovative, if often administrative, insitutional reforms since 1978 have begun to achieve the Chinese authorities' goal of ‘separating governemtn from business.’ But the Chinese State still maintains ownership of key enterprises, and government agencies carry out shareholder functions typically performed by private owners in a market economy. Although privatisation and restructuring of SOEs is occurring, it mostly pertains to small and medium sized firms. For the principal businesses, by contrast, the creation of large state enterprise groups and holding companies (and experiments in other forms of ‘state asset management’) have become the main form of restructuring. Today, China's SOEs still account for more than one‐quarter of national production, two‐thirds of total assets, more than half of urban employment and almost three‐quarters of investment. While direct budgetary subsidies have declined, explicit and implicit subsidies are still making their way to prop up loss‐making SOEs through the financial system and other routes. At the same time, SOEs are still producing non‐marketable products, resulting in a sizeable inventory overhang. These inefficiencies and distortions represent a drain on the country's resources and thus present a challenge to the Chinese leadership for reform. This paper sheds light on these challenges by analysing the incentives and constraints on China's SOE reform programme. Four critical aspects of the reforms are highlighted and evaluated against the backdrop of international experience: clarification of property rights; establishment of large group/holding companies and other new organisational structures; improved corporate governance incentives; and implementation of international financial accounting and auditing practices. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.     

国企领导人制度“去行政化”的市场逻辑与改革路径

转型期国企领导人制度行政化的实践弊端日渐显现,已经成为完善国有企业现代企业制度、健全公司法人治理结构的主要掣肘。推行国企领导人制度“去行政化”改革,必须坚持党管干部原则,准确把握“去行政化”的实践要求,处理好增量改革与存量改革的关系,在国企分类管理前提下,逐步建立与社会主义市场体制与现代企业制度相适应,权责明确,能进能出,能上能下,收入能增能减的选人用人新机制。     

How Does Corporate Governance Affect Loan Collateral? Evidence from Chinese SOEs and Non‐SOEs

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the collateral requirements for firms' bank loans in China. We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large shareholders face lower collateral requirements, which is more pronounced in non‐state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in SOEs. Regarding board characteristics, we find that smaller board size, more independent directors, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman, and larger supervisory board size can reduce a firm's use of collateral; the effect of all the preceding characteristics is more pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China, corporate governance structures are able to affect bank‐lending decisions in respect of collateral requirements and that the influence depends on the controlling shareholder type and associated agency problems.     

区域创新生态系统视角下高质量发展的思路与对策

区域创新生态系统是深入实施国家重大区域发展战略的重要支撑。本文从区域创新生态系统视角出发,聚焦高质量发展,分析了我国良性区域创新生态系统的基本建设特征,并立足于创新生态系统建设剖析了现阶段我国区域高质量发展面临的问题,最后从优化人才激励政策、筹划高端平台、完善服务体系和营造创新氛围等方面,提出深入推进我国高质量发展的思路与对策。     

Outward Foreign Direct Investment by Chinese National Oil Companies

Developed countries have become increasingly suspicious about the rapid growth of Chinese investments in their home countries and abroad, commonly citing potential threats to national security and global governance as the main sources of anxieties. As a result, policy measures in some developed markets have been put in place to create additional regulation and oversight, specifically in highly regulated and strategic industries, such as the oil sector. This article refutes a number of popular myths about Chinese investments in the global oil industry, and suggests a more rigorous dialogue with the Chinese authorities relating to their integration into international institutions.     

Performance of domestic and foreign-invested enterprises in China

Despite increasing attention paid to China's enterprise reform since the late 1970s, relatively little is known about the performance of reformed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and newly formed private firms vis-à-vis foreign firms in China. In this study, we examine the performance of domestic Chinese firms in various ownership categories versus foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) based on two nation-wide surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1998 and 2002. We found that both domestic non-state-owned firms and foreign-invested enterprises performed better than state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, three categories of Chinese firms—privately owned, collectively owned, and shareholding—had higher performance levels than the foreign-invested enterprises.     

党组织参与治理对上市公司慈善捐赠的影响

利用我国A股非金融类上市公司2008—2017年数据,采用“双向进入”、“交叉任职”两个指标衡量党组织参与企业治理的情况,实证检验其对企业慈善捐赠行为的影响。结果发现,党组织“双向进入”和“交叉任职”与企业是否捐赠、捐赠水平均呈显著正向关系。此外,上述作用在国有企业与非国有企业中均存在,但与中央国有企业相比,党组织参与治理对企业捐赠的促进效应在地方国有企业中更为明显。研究还发现,党组织参与治理对企业慈善捐赠的促进作用并不以损害企业价值为代价,反而会提高公司经营绩效和价值,并且党组织参与治理对企业捐赠的促进作用并非以获取更多的政府补贴为目的。研究表明,党组织参与治理促进了企业的捐赠行为,这一结论有助于进一步理解党组织在公司治理中的地位与作用。     

Globalisation and Industrial Policy: The Case of China

After a quarter of a century of industrial policy, China's objective of nurturing a group of globally competitive state‐owned enterprises appears to have succeeded beyond most expectations. However, China's SOEs are far from catching up with the world's leading firms. Protection through state ownership in a massive, fast‐growing economy has permitted China's SOEs to earn large profits and achieve high market capitalisations, but this is not the same thing as building globally competitive firms. The fact that China's industrial policy has been unsuccessful after a quarter of a century of intense effort demonstrates how difficult it is to construct an industrial policy in the era of capitalist globalisation, which has produced intense global industrial concentration across large parts of the global value chain. Although the detailed content of the next stage of reform of China's large state‐owned enterprises is unclear, China's determination to build a group of globally competitive large companies remains undimmed.     

State‐owned Enterprises,Exporting and Productivity in China: A Stochastic Dominance Approach

A popular explanation for China's rapid economic growth in recent years has been the dramatic increase in the number of private domestic‐ and foreign‐owned firms and a decline in the state‐owned sector. However, recent evidence suggests that China's state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) are in fact stronger than ever. In this paper, we examine over 78,000 manufacturing firms between 2002 and 2006 to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and the degree of firm‐level exposure to export markets and firm‐level productivity. Using a conditional stochastic dominance approach, we reveal that although our results largely adhere to prior expectations, the performance of SOEs differs markedly between those that export and those that supply the domestic market only. It appears that China's internationally focused SOEs have become formidable global competitors.     

Political uncertainty and investments by private and state-owned enterprises

We study corporate investments around national elections in India. Investment rates drop by a nonsignificant 2.2% for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in election years. The decrease is significantly larger for private firms, which record an investment drop of 7.4%. The decrease in investment for private firms is likely attributable to political uncertainty. SOEs balance political uncertainty with the desire to woo voters who want government investments. Investments in election years are perceived positively for both private firms and for SOEs. Increased investment by SOEs and reduction in investment by private firms during election years are associated with improved investment efficiency.