University of Laneaster

L. J. White , The Automobile Industry since 1945, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, C. K. Rowley , Steel and Public Policy. London: McGraw-Hill, 1971 J. B. Heath (ed.), Department of Trade and Industry, International Conference on monopolies, mergers and restrictive practices, Papers and reports, Cambridge. 1969. London: C. F. Pratten , Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971 A. Singh . Takeovers, their relevance to the stock market and the theory of the firm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971 D. Coombes , State Enterprise. Business or Politics? London: Allen & Unwin, 1971     

A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures

Summary. We characterize strategy-proof social choice procedures when choice sets need not be singletons. Sets are compared by leximin. For a strategy-proof rule g, there is a positive integer k such that either (i) the choice sets g(r) for all profiles r have the same cardinality k and there is an individual i such that g(r) is the set of alternatives that are the k highest ranking in i's preference ordering, or (ii) all sets of cardinality 1 to k are chosen and there is a coalition L of cardinality k such that g(r) is the union of the tops for the individuals in L. There do not exist any strategy-proof rules such that the choice sets are all of cardinality to k where . Received: November 8, 1999; revised version: September 18, 2001     

A Sraffian interpretation of classical monetary controversies

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the contrasting views of inflation, exchange rate misalignments and determinants of gold flows held by different branches of the classical school during the first half of the nineteenth century. The properties of money neutrality and money endogeneity within the classical system are studied by reinterpreting these controversies through the analytical framework of the surplus approach as reconstructed by Sraffa [Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960] and his followers.     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: The Cambridge Revolution: Success or Failure?: A Critical Analysis of Cambridge Theories of Value and Distribution. By M. Blaug. Intergovernmental Relations in Australia.Edited by R. L. Mathews. Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure. Edited by D. Wedderburn. British Immigrants and Australia: A Psycho-social Inquiry. By A. Richardson. The Australian Capital Market. Edited by R. R. Hirst and R. H. Wallace. Australian Urban and Regional Development. By F. J. B. Stilwell. The Image of Australia. By C. D. W. Goodwin.     

THE SECOND‐PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA*

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+ 1)st‐price sealed‐bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.     

Stochastic stability in a double auction

In a k-double auction, a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively. Exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask, the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with probability (1−k). We show that the stable equilibria of a complete information k-double approximate an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with the seller's bargaining power decreasing in k.Note that ceteris paribus, the payoffs of the seller of the one-shot game increase in k. Nevertheless, as the stochastically stable equilibrium price decreases in k, choosing the seller's favorite price with a relatively higher probability in individual encounters makes him worse off in the long run.     

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCE ESTIMATION WITH NONPARAMETRIC CONTROL VARIABLES*

This article extends the pairwise difference estimators for various semilinear limited dependent variable models proposed by Honoré and Powell (Identification and Inference in Econometric Models. Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) to permit the regressor appearing in the nonparametric component to itself depend upon a conditional expectation that is nonparametrically estimated. This permits the estimation approach to be applied to nonlinear models with sample selectivity and/or endogeneity, in which a “control variable” for selectivity or endogeneity is nonparametrically estimated. We develop the relevant asymptotic theory for the proposed estimators and we illustrate the theory to derive the asymptotic distribution of the estimator for the partially linear logit model.     

Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k₁ objects are sold in the first round and k₂ in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k₁+k₂ objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters.     

Improving market timing of time series momentum in the Chinese stock market

ABSTRACT

This paper is the first study to present firm-level evidence that the time-series momentum (TSMOM) strategies with look-back-period k of 10 to 200 days outperform the buy-and-hold strategy (BH) on individual stocks in the Chinese stock market. We document that the optimal k* generating the best performance is different across assets and varies over time. We hence propose a model to predict the asset-specific and time-dependent k*, and examine the performance of the TSMOM strategies with the predicted k*. Our analysis shows that using the time-varying predicted k* substantially improves the predictability of the TSMOM strategies. Our new model and findings shed the light on trading strategy for both academia and applied investment practitioners.     

Political aspects of the capital controversies and capitalist crises

The Cambridge controversies about the theory of capital were ultimately underpinned by a clash between two different visions of capitalism, the neoclassical view, according to which distribution depends on the supply and demand curves of capital and labor, and the post Keynesian view, according to which distribution depends on political and institutional factors instead. I shall argue that the distinction between “meritocratic capitalism” and “patrimonial capitalism,” which underpins the discussions surrounding Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, is also connected to those two different visions of capitalism, which were behind the Cambridge controversies. These two visions of capitalism have important implications for our understanding of political power over workers, and also to our understanding of political power over land and its natural resources. The role of land and natural resources was not discussed in the Cambridge controversies, but is addressed in Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities, and is implied in Piketty’s inclusion of land in his definition of capital, which brings in a geographical dimension to our understanding of capitalism and capitalist crises, as I shall argue.     

Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization

This note presents an alternative parameterization of any scoring rule that satisfies the score-expansion property. This parameterization is based on the vector that specifies, for every number of alternatives k, k ≥ 3, the minimal size of a coalition that can veto an alternative which is preferred by everybody outside the coalition. Our result sheds new light on the commonly used plurality and Borda rules, as well as the inverse plurality rule and any “vote for t alternatives rule”.     

A Note on the Probability of k Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games

A formula is derived for the probability that a "randomly selected" n-person matrix game has exactly k pure strategy equilibria. It is shown that for all n ≥ 2, this probability converges to e⁻¹/k! as the sizes of the strategy sets of at least two players increase without bound. Thus the number of pure strategy equilibria in large random n-person matrix games is approximately Poisson distributed with mean one. The latter is a known result obtained by a new proof in this note. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model

This paper analyzes the Silicon Valley model as a novel economic institution in the domain of technological product system innovation. We analyze the informational relationship as well as governance relationships between venture capitalists and a cluster of entrepreneurial firms. The informational conditions that make the Silicon Valley model efficient are identified, leading to an understanding of the significance of standardized interfaces, modularization, and information encapsulation. We then examine the governance/incentive aspect by integrating the models of Aoki (Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) and Baldwin and Clark (Design Rules—Vol. 1: The Power of Modularity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). The paper concludes by evaluating the applicability of the model to other localities and industries. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 759–786. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, and RIETI, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0013, Japan; and Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, L23, O32, P51, P52.     

Pre-disciplinary and Post-disciplinary Perspectives

David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Vivek Chibber, Locked In Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton University Press, 2003)

Yongping Wu, A Political Explanation of Economic Growth: State Survival, Bureaucratic Politics, and Private Enterprises in the Making of Taiwan's Economy, 1950–1985 (Harvard University Press, 2005)     

Topological upper limits of mixed Nash equilibria

Our purpose in this article is to prove that given any integer n ≥ 2 and any non-empty compact Polish spaces S ₁, ..., S _n , if for any u ∈ C( S ₁ × ... × S _n , R) ⁿ , we denote by MNE(u) the set of mixed Nash equilibria of (S ₁, ..., S _n , u), then MNE(u) is a non-empty compact subset of P(S ₁) × ... × P(S _n ) and if u ^k → u in C(S ₁ × ... × S _n , R) ⁿ as k → ∞, then lim sup _{k → ∞} MNE (u ^k ) MNE(u). The author would like to thank the referee for offering critical comments on this paper.     

The asymptotic shapley value for a simple market game

We consider the game in which b buyers each seek to purchase 1 unit of an indivisible good from s sellers, each of whom has k units to sell. The good is worth 0 to each seller and 1 to each buyer. Using the central limit theorem, and implicitly convergence to tied down Brownian motion, we find a closed form solution for the limiting Shapley value as s and b increase without bound. This asymptotic value depends upon the seller size k, the limiting ratio b/ks of buyers to items for sale, and the limiting ratio of the excess supply relative to the square root of the number of market participants. This work was sponsered in part by NSF Grant DMS-03-01795.     

Compensating for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence

We conduct experiments on common value auctions with rationing. In each auction, the good is randomly allocated to one of the k highest bidders, at the (k+1)st highest price. When k>1, bidders are rationed. As the degree of rationing increases, the equilibrium bid function increases. Consistent with prior literature, we find that bidders suffer from the winner's curse and lose money on average. However, bids in the experiments do adjust in the appropriate direction as the degree of rationing changes, providing support for the comparative statics implications of the theory. Our results are consistent with subjects having an intuitive understanding of the winner's curse, but being unable to compute the equilibrium bid levels.     

Auctions in which losers set the price

We study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the second-price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays, and the price only depends on the losers' bids. In particular, we show that the kth price auction generates higher revenue than the second-price auction, for all k>2. If rationing is allowed, with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders, then the (t+1)st price auction yields the lowest revenue among all auctions with rationing in which only the winners pay and the unit price only depends on the losers' bids. Finally, we compute bidding functions and revenue of the kth price auction, with and without rationing, for an illustrative example much used in the experimental literature to study first-price, second-price and English auctions.     

Applying digital analysis to detect fraud: an empirical analysis of US marine industry

Firms have tendency to window dress their financial statements by reporting earnings to achieve reference points represented by N × 10 ^k . Such practice of reporting rounded earnings is likely due to (1) firms may believe that investors perceive a reported earnings of $1.99 million to be significantly less than $2.0 million; and/or (2) contracts between firms and stakeholders are likely to express earnings in round numbers. Auditors have employed more sophisticated digital analysis such as Benford's law, as part of their fraud detection processes. This study investigated the window dressing behaviour among firms in the US marine industry. The findings of the study suggest that window dressing is a significant practice among the marine firms. However, the extent of the pervasiveness of such behaviour is less severe among marine firms than among all publicly-listed firms in the entire US economy, suggesting that the quality of financial statements of marine companies is higher than the overall population of public companies.     

The most ordinally egalitarian of random voting rules

Aziz and Stursberg propose an “Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation” rule (ESR), a generalization of Serial rule, one of the most discussed mechanisms in the random assignment problem, to the more general random social choice domain. This article provides an alternative definition, or characterization, of ESR as the unique most ordinally egalitarian one. Specifically, given a lottery p over alternatives, for each agent i the author considers the total probability share in p of objects from her first k indifference classes. ESR is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (calculated for all i, k). Serial rule is known to be characterized by the same property. Thus, the author provides an alternative way to show that ESR, indeed, coincides with Serial rule on the assignment domain. Moreover, since both rules are defined as the unique most ordinally egalitarian ones, the result shows that ESR is “the right way” to think about generalizing Serial rule.