集体行动逻辑、乡土社会嵌入与农村社区公共产品供给——基于演化博弈的分析框架

本文以集体行动理论与社会嵌入理论为基石,以演化博弈为分析工具,通过解构乡土社会嵌入对集体行动逻辑的生成机制,构建农村社区成员自组织参与社区公共产品供给的总体框架。在总体框架下,基于不同的乡土社会嵌入条件,农村社区成员自组织参与社区公共产品供给的博弈收益、策略选择迥然相异,弱社区记忆的社区成员仅仅作为"经济人"理性地计算来自于公共产品供给的直接性收益,而强社区记忆的社区成员同时也作为"社会人"权衡通过参与公共产品供给所形成的关联性收益。本文的结论是,在一定条件下,强社区记忆的农村社区能够收敛于合作互惠的演化稳定均衡,而弱社区记忆的农村社区无法有效组织公共产品供给的集体行动。     

社区更新的合作治理机制研究——以广州市泮塘五约社区微改造为例

随着国家和社会治理体制创新的不断推进,在公共事务管理过程中,传统的以政府部门为主导的治理模式已逐渐向多元化主体合作治理模式转变.本文以合作治理机制理论框架为分析基础,选取广州市泮塘五约社区微改造的合作治理项目为研究案例,分析了在我国社区更新改造中,政府、社区、社会组织等多元主体如何形成合作参与及采取集体行动的过程,对社...     

社区体育对社会资本的构造性功能

社区体育不仅可以满足社区成员的体育需求,而且可以增加社区的社会资本.社区体育对社会资本的构造性功能主要体现在减弱人们集体行动困境、构筑人格性网络、形成社区互惠规范和发挥社会资本资源属性等四个方面.     

怨恨解释、动员结构和理性选择——有关中国都市地区集体行动发生可能性的分析

本文首先在社会运动和集体行为的研究传统中,综合出了一个理论的解释框架,用于解释集体行动之所以产生的宏观过程以及个体行动者之所以选择参与的微观过程.其次,作者提出了一个有关中国都市地区集体行动的类型学,以考察各种形式的集体行动未来发生的可能性.最后,作者希望把各个社会群体的利益表达和需求保卫列为公众政治参与的一个主要内容,从而为实现以下几个目标奠定基础(1)促进中国都市地区的集体行动和利益表达的非暴力化和平解决;(2)既保护了弱势群体的利益,又提升了现有政体的合法性;(3)上述公共政治的参与渠道能够固定下来成为利益表达和需求满足的常规机制,从而为后续的政治改革提供一个契机.     

社区参与视角下民族村寨旅游可持续发展评估

社区的有效参与对民族村寨旅游业的可持续发展起着举足轻重的作用.由社区村民参与旅游可持续发展评估,将促进社区村民理解并自觉地按照可持续发展理念来参与村寨旅游活动,且评估结果更切合村寨实际并易于村民认可.从社区参与视角出发,以贵州黔东南郎德上寨为例,根据系统性、科学性、可操作性与动态性原则,在与村民充分沟通的背景下,设计了由25个指标构成的村寨可持续发展指标体系框架及调查问卷.研究了社区参与的民族村寨旅游可持续发展评估方法,为其他村寨的社区参与旅游可持续发展提供了有益的借鉴.     

社会力量参与社区矫正的积极性引导及参与路径研究

社会力量指不具备执法地位的社区矫正工作者。当前社会力量参与社区矫正还存在诸多问题。要使社会力量充分发挥其应有作用,首先要做好全方位的宣传。其次,要通过立法明确社会力量参与社区矫正的协助义务、通过政府购买方式解决社会工作者的后顾之忧、完善社区矫正志愿者的参与机制。最后,通过建立社区矫正网络、设置社区矫正职业资格准入制度、成立社区矫正志愿者协会等方式在全社会形成支持系统,更好地促进社区矫正的发展。     

小组工作介入城市社区居民参与问题研究——以沈阳市D社区为例

推动城市社区居民积极参与社区事务是社区治理取得成效的关键。目前我国对城市社区居民参与问题的研究大多从加强政策制度、参与激励机制等外部动力着手,忽略了居民参与内生动力的挖掘。以沈阳市D社区为研究对象,从社会工作专业角度出发,运用小组工作的专业方法提升居民参与意识、搭建居民参与平台、增强居民参与能力。通过小组介入成效评估发现,小组工作在改善居民参与意识不高、参与平台建设迟滞、参与能力不足等问题中取得了显著成效。     

农村非正式组织能影响公共基础设施供给吗——基于H村的个案研究

农村公共基础设施供给是新农村建设的重中之重,而农村社区中自发成长的非正式组织对农村公共基础设施的供给也可能产生重要影响。不同类型的非正式组织会通过不同的方式参与公共基础设施供给进程,宗族与宗教组织会深刻影响农村社区的社会记忆和惯例,这是形成一致性集体行动的传统根源;经济社会分化产生的利益集团拥有强大的能量来影响社区发展,但其影响方向有可能与社区发展目标背道而驰;互助团体的作用方式是基于社会资本的积累,进而影响人们的道德观念。研究结果表明,非正式组织对公共基础设施供给的影响方式取决于自身的行动目标是否与正式组织的目标相一致,因此,摒弃落后的观念和制度,继承和发扬能够健康运行的非正式组织和制度,是农村基层民主建设的重要目标。     

西方集体行动理论的演化与进展

集体利益的公共产品特性导致成员普遍的搭便车行为,形成"集体行动的困境".如何克服搭便车、走出集体行动的困境,就成为集体行动理论研究的核心内容.西方对集体行动的研究成果非常丰富,但是不同学者之间观点针锋相对、分歧很大.本文把各种观点主要归类为集体行动的理性选择理论、意识形态理论和社会资本理论三种理论流派.各种理论流派各有所长,但都有一定的局限性.     

村庄规模、收入不均等性与村庄集体行动——以安徽省102个村庄的农田灌溉设施建设为例

本文基于集体行动理论框架,利用安徽省稻谷主产区村级调查数据分析村庄规模、收入不均等性、户均耕地规模以及外出打工户数比例等因素对村庄农田灌溉设施建设之集体行动的影响。结果表明:村庄规模和收入不均等性对村庄集体行动的影响方向都是先正后负,呈"倒U型"特征,即只有在村庄规模和收入不均等性处于中等水平时,村庄集体行动才容易形成;户均耕地规模对村庄集体行动具有明显促进作用,外出打工户比例对村庄集体行动存在抑制效应。本文分析结论具有重要政策含义:一是应合理设置村庄规模,不宜过小或过大;二是应认同适度的收入差距,防止收入均等化和两极分化;三是应加快农村剩余劳动力转移,为户均耕地规模扩张创造有利条件。     

Management of common property resources: Limits to voluntary collective action

This paper finds that the voluntary collective action may be an alternative to market and government in the management of common property resources. In developing countries, the people's capabilities to harness the preserved commons and the fairness in the appropriation of benefits from them are the limits on the voluntary collective action. It shows that collective action is possible if an outside agency plays the role of a catalyst in mitigating these limits. It also shows that there can be mutually beneficial sharing arrangements between government and village communities for the management of local forest resources. The standard result that common and state property resources turn into open access resources as population grows also holds good for the natural resources jointly managed by government and people.     

公共池塘资源自主治理理论与我国农村社区公共产品治理的研究

埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆的公共池塘资源自主治理理论完善了准公共产品理论,结合社会资本因素的集体行动及制度供给理论给我们提供了研究农村社区公共产品供给及治理新的视角。基于此,在简要回顾目前国内农村社区公共产品治理研究及其不足之处的基础上,借鉴公共池塘资源自主治理理论,提出今后我国农村社区公共产品治理研究中需要进一步加强研究的内容及方向,以促进农村公共事业的可持续发展。     

农地制度:所有权问题还是委托-代理问题?

村委会作为农村基层唯一合乎法定体制的正规制度安排,承担着政府代理人、集体产权代理人、社区管理者相互矛盾冲突的三项职能。这一制度设计缺陷,引发了对土地集体所有、家庭经营制度的深入探讨。本文通过对土地职能、村委会角色与职能冲突及集体所有制问题的讨论,提出了土地集体所有家庭经营制度的治理结构问题,认为集体所有是均分土地的基本前提,而土地均分又是保障“人人有饭吃”的制度基础。在社会保障制度不完善的条件下,土地集体所有是既有的现实选择,这就使集体所有治理结构中存在的委托—代理关系,随着农户经济结构的转型正成为农村改革与发展面临的新问题。     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

群体规范、集体行动发生与共享资源合作治理

特定群体面临共享资源自发治理的需求时,需要通过群体合作的集体行动来实现,因而集体行动的主要特征是共享资源治理的成本分摊和收益分享问题。本文从近年来逐渐受到重视的群体规范对于集体行动实现的影响机制入手,在清晰界定群体规范的含义基础上分析其在集体行动中的作用机制,并且通过模型说明群体规范的内生性形成问题,从而完整的得出群体规范促进集体行动实现的一般性理论,以期对当今社会和谐治理给出政策含义。     

社区主导型乡村旅游发展的博弈论——从个人理性到集体理性

我国社区主导型乡村旅游发展尚处于初级阶段,却已经显现出旅游市场的无序竞争和公共资源过度利用及破坏等公地悲剧问题。文章运用博弈论方法分析,认为这些问题是村民与村民之间以及村民与游客之间基于个人理性的相互博弈的结果。从长期来看,集体理性更符合村民长期利益最大化的心理需求,社区村民的博弈具有从个人理性向集体理性转变的机制和驱动力。为了避免和缓解公地悲剧的发生,缩短从个人理性到集体理性转变的时间距离,必须依赖于外部力量的引导以及合理的制度安排,文章提出了相应制度保障措施。     

政府、企业与公众环保行为博弈分析

党的十七大明确提出将节约资源和保护环境作为国家的一项基本国策,其中也包括公众参与机制建设和"全民环保"的新理念.将公众置于社会大系统之中,其参与环保行为多是依赖政府设计的制度框架,与企业环保行为间博弈选择的结果.在政府不参与模型中,公众也不会自觉参与环保,企业更不会停止污染,必将导致"公地悲剧";而在政府参与模型中,政府的奖励与惩罚力度又会直接影响到公众参与的人数和参与成本,进而影响到企业环保行为的选择.由此提出制度设计方面的政策建议,以期推进更广泛程度的公众参与.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

Commons and cooperatives: A new governance of collective action

The Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) is emerging as a social movement capable of moving society beyond the imbalances of the capitalist market economy and its top‐down regulation by the state. But the SSE's progress has been slow while unresolved challenges (e.g., climate, inequality) continue to intensify. Among communitarian responses to these challenges, the commons have shown great potential as a shared governance mechanism for the responsible management of common‐pool resources. To the extent that this success encourages broader applicability for commons, we focus also on commoning as crucial social practice rooted in collective action and adaptive governance. Adding this dimension of activism opens the possibility of enriching the SSE both in theory and practice for the purpose of strengthening its institutional make‐up, in particular cooperatives occupying a central position in SSE. Commoning enables us to conceive of tangible connections between commons and cooperatives as complementary modes of anti‐capitalist organization. We can illustrate this complementarity by analyzing how Ostrom's “design principles” for commons can help strengthen the ICA's Cooperative Principles. Useful lessons can be learned from concrete examples of commons–cooperative alliances, such as Ecuador's Buen Vivir initiative, the Enercoop PACA project in France, and Oakland's OmniCommons space.