Reflections on critical realism in political economy

This paper studies critical realism in political economy. Thefocal points are two important tensions in critical realism.The first tension relates generally to the status and importanceof philosophy and the scope of critical realism. The secondtension relates specifically to critical realism in politicaleconomy. Firstly, two perspectives within critical realism inpolitical economy are separated: a Marxist current and a broadheterodox current. Secondly, these two perspectives within criticalrealism are contrasted and discussed on the basis of a criticalstance towards philosophical reductionism. Thirdly, it is arguedthat reconciliation between central aspects of the two perspectivesis both feasible and desirable, and finally, neo-Marxist politicaleconomy is pinpointed as a critical-constructive and developmentalmediation for critical realism in political economy.     

Critical Realism,Feminist Epistemology,and the Emancipatory Potential of Science: A Comment on Lawson and Harding

In a recent contribution to this Journal , Tony Lawson (1999) claims that the methodological framework of critical realism fits the "explanatory and emancipatory projects" of feminist economics. This essay challenges his claim on the basis that a "naive" notion of science underlies critical realism. It argues that for feminist economists, a rethinking of traditional notions of scientific inquiry is just as important as the rethinking of methodology, and that one cannot be done without the other.     

Economics and Reality: A philosophical critique of transcendental realism

In Economics and Reality Tony Lawson seeks to criticise and offer an alternative to mainstream economic theorising. The book draws upon the work of Bhaskar, advocating a form of realism termed transcendental realism, in opposition to the empirical realism taken to underpin mainstream theorising. However, the specific objections advanced by Lawson against empirical realism are frequently confused and confusing. Lawson's own appeal to structures suffers from lack of definition, and empirical realism seems more applicable to Keynesian, not mainstream, economics. The claim that the social sciences can be modelled on the natural sciences is not particularly illuminating.     

William James's psychological pragmatism: habit, belief and purposive human behaviour

Modern institutional economists look to pragmatism for: (1)an evolutionary philosophy of knowledge; and (2) a foundationof a theory of human nature. These two elements are combinedin William James, who was both a philosopher of pragmatism anda pioneering experimental psychologist. The author shows firsthow William James added psychological depth to the pragmatictradition as it was left by C. S. Peirce, and offers a reconciliationof their respective theories of truth. The second part of theessay explores James's views on psychology, concentrating onthe relation to pragmatic philosophy and the question of habit.The last section compares this to human nature as seen in modernevolutionary biology, in brain science and in the philosophyof rationality in the social sciences.     

Economics, realism and reality: a comparison of Maki and Lawson

There is presently considerable debate about the applicationand interpretation of realism in economics. Interest in thisarea of the philosophy and methodology of economics has intensifiedover the last twenty years, especially owing to the substantialcontributions by Uskali Mäki and Tony Lawson, respectively.Although their work falls under the same banner of realism ineconomics, their projects differ significantly in many importantrespects. This review tries to clarify the contrasting approachesof each author and explains the main reasons for the differencesbetween them. The emphasis is on clarification of their respectivepositions rather than a comprehensive critical evaluation assuch.     

Joan Robinson: a personal note

Abstract

In a contribution to this journal, Bernard Walters &; David Young offer a brief sketch of critical realism and three objections to it. This reply starts with three points of clarification to their sketch before going on to tackle their objections.     

Driven to abstraction? Critical realism and the search for the 'inner connection' of social phenomena

This paper examines critically the method of abstraction offeredby critical realism. Our main argument is that critical realismfails to articulate the synthetic side to abstraction. For thisreason, the critical realist method is unable to capture the‘inner connection’ of social phenomena. We arguethat critical realism is prone to extend a method (partially)applicable to the local and specific level of analysis to thehistorical level. The paper develops a method of abstraction,‘systematic abstraction’, that is appropriate tothis historical level. We argue that systematic abstractionconstitutes a radical addition to critical realism, one whichchallenges the fundamental precepts of the critical realistapproach to abstraction.     

Boettke,The Austrian School and the Reclamation of Reality in Modern Economics

In a series of recent papers, the prominent Austrian economist Peter Boettke has criticised orthodox economics for its lack of realism. This paper situates Boettkes critique in the context provided by recent developments in the methodology of economics, most notably critical realism. While there is a good deal of common ground between Boettkes approach and critical realism, the latter also helps to reveal some of the limitations of the variant of Austrian economics to which Boettke subscribes. Suggestions are made as to how critical realists and Austrians such as Boettke might move forward together in developing a more realistic, relevant and fruitful approach to economic analysis.     

Critical Realism as a Basis for Economic Methodology: A critique

This paper considers the claim that critical realism provides a convincing critique of mainstream economics and offers a sound methodological basis for an alternative approach. It argues that critical realism presents a tendentious definition of positivism and a characterisation of mainstream economics that is misleading, and that it misrepresents the nature and purpose of the work of Hume and modern Humean philosophers. It also argues that critical realism's bold ontological claims lack epistemological support. The paper concludes that critical realism does not provide a compelling basis for economic methodology.     

批判实在论与经济实证研究深层化问题初探

根据对批判实在论和实证研究深层化的分析研究,表明马克思的抽象法是溯因推理或回溯法的先驱方法.批判实在论的方法在实证研究深层化中具有显著地位和作用,为方法的多元论和反对单纯的数学演绎逻辑提供了一种新的依据.     

Was Keynes a Realist?

Lawson (1989a) has interpreted Keynes as a philosophical realist, adhering to the view that the economy has a constant inner structure. Against this it is claimed below that, although Keynes speaks about realism, it is not in this sense, but in the common sense way of referring to actually observable entities of an economic model. In addition, it can be shown that Keynes's views can be interpreted as instrumentalist—he emphasises characteristics such as usefulness and convenience, besides and instead of truth. Thus, truth and truthlike concepts do not, in Keynes's thinking, have the paramount position that they have in realist philosophy.     

Transforming economics into what? Heterodox economics and critical realism

The volume under review consists of comments on critical realismby heterodox economists. This paper addresses a number of themesfrom the book, e.g., history and reflexivity, sometimes expandingon the authors' comments on critical realism, other times respondingto them on behalf of critical realists. It considers the goalsof critical realism and ask to what extent the book furthersthem. It concludes that the high level of abstraction at whichcritical realism operates encourages those commenting on itto do so at a similarly high level of abstraction. As it stands,critical realism and the contributions to the book are too divorcedfrom the concerns of concrete economic theorising to be of greatuse to practising heterodox economists.     

Structure,agency and causality in post-revival Austrian economics: tensions and resolutions

Abstract

This paper aims to illustrate the benefits that accrue from critical realism's sustained, explicit reflection about ontological issues. The paper pursues this aim by examining the work of radical subjectivist Austrian economists as it has developed since the post-1974 revival in the fortunes of the Austrian school, focusing in particular on their account of the generation of socio-economic order in decentralized market economies. Ambiguities and tensions can be discerned in the radical subjectivist account of the causal forces at work in the market process. It is argued that the conceptual resources required for resolving those tensions and ambiguities are to be found in critical realism. The final section of the paper draws out some of the broader implications of the suggested resolution for radical subjectivist Austrian economics.     

On some criticisms of critical realism in economics

Methodological comments on critical realism in economics haveproliferated over the past decade—typically focusing onTony Lawson's Economics and Reality and Reorienting Economics,which constitute the core of this project. In the present paperwe select a series of important, mostly very recent argumentsagainst critical realism in economics and assess their meritsand demerits.     

Undesirable versus desirable societies

The idea behind this paper is simple: While devising an image of a future society appears to be difficult— one that actually would be universally accepted as desirable—figuring out what we should avoid is probably a sensible first step. Framing the images of undesirable societies is, therefore, a necessary ingredient of any strategy for action.This essay has eight sections. In section 1, the general problem of desirable vs undesirable societies is sketched out. Section 2 deals with a critical analysis of some current societal projects that are considered desirable. In section 3, the shifting foundations of individual vs group images of future societies are briefly introduced. The main conclusion stemming from this part accents the need for considering two different issues when the desirability of a particular image is explored: the structure of the desired society and the desired rules of negotiation of what is or is not desirable in both the present and future. Section 4 focuses on some specific group images of what should be—namely on class, national, and global (or world) levels. In section 5, some conjectures concerning the general relationship between societal structures and rules for dialogue that can define such structures are presented. Section 6 deals with a special type of resonance—called here desirability resonance— as a framework for understanding societal dynamics. In section 7, the problem of assessing the roads leading to the desirable societies is explored, with emphasis on the difficulties of a (positive) idealized long- term planning. A new type of long-term planning (called here critical long-term planning), focussing especially on what is to be avoided as undesirable, is introduced in section 8 as a suggestion for a frame for a possible theory of negative strategic awareness in social choice.     

International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

Economics in Context

Academic departmentalization has limited the dimensionality and thus the richness of analysis in the social sciences. The author examines the case of a modern economics as an example. He reviews the ideas of Williamson (2000), who cites the limits of scope in the New Institutional Economics; Buchanan, who lays bare the ethical foundations of political economy in his constitutional economics; and Adam Smith, whose moral philosophy reflects a fully dimensional analysis. The author cites examples of how modern economic analysis can be enhanced by a reintegration with the other social sciences.     

Causal Laws,Functional Relations and Tendencies

This paper draws upon critical realism to argue that the widespread use of functional relations and laws in economics is misconceived. This misconception stems from the inappropriate use of a deductivist mode of theorising; an empirical realist ontology; and a notion of causality as mere regularity or constant conjunction, all of which are associated with functional relations and laws. Not only does critical realism identify the cause of the misconception, it sustains an alternative causal/explanatory mode of theorising; a stratified ontology; a notion of causality as powers; and an alternative notion of law as tendency. Marx's ideas on the tendencies to employment and unemployment are used as an example of economic theory consistent with these alternatives.     

Rhetoric vs realism in economic methodology: a critical assessment of recent contributions

This paper reviews the relatively new debate on rhetoric andrealism in economic methodology, concentrating on its main exponents:Deirdre McCloskey on the side of rhetoric, Tony Lawson as theadvocate of critical realism, and Uskali Mäki, arguingfor a combination of rhetoric and realism. The review highlightsa blind spot in the debate, namely the opportunity to rethinkcritically the project of epistemology.