Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

An empirical evaluation of the overconfidence hypothesis

Recently, several behavioral finance models based on the overconfidence hypothesis have been proposed to explain anomalous findings, including a short-term continuation (momentum) and a long-term reversal in stock returns. We characterize the overconfidence hypothesis by the following four testable implications: First, if investors are overconfident, they overreact to private information and underreact to public information. Second, market gains make overconfident investors trade more aggressively in subsequent periods. Third, excessive trading of overconfident investors in securities markets contributes to the observed excessive volatility. Fourth, overconfident investors underestimate risk and trade more in riskier securities. To document the presence of overconfidence in financial markets, we empirically evaluate these four hypotheses using aggregate data. Overall, we find empirical evidence in support of the four hypotheses.     

Momentum,Reversals, and Fund Manager Overconfidence

This paper examines the role of investor overconfidence and self‐attribution bias in explaining the momentum effect. We develop a novel measure of overconfidence based on characteristics and trading patterns of US equity mutual fund managers. Stocks held by more overconfident managers experience greater momentum profits and stronger return reversals than stocks held by less overconfident managers. The difference in momentum profits is not compensation for risk nor is it attributable to stock characteristics that influence momentum. Our results are consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) who argue that momentum results from delayed overreaction caused by overconfidence and biased self‐attribution.     

信息不对称、过度自信与股价变动

信息传导的非同步和投资者情绪变化是股票市场的两个典型特征,前者会引发投资者之间出现信息不对称问题,后者主要体现为投资者过度自信,两者共同作用影响股票价格变动。本文将信息不对称和投资者过度自信情绪置于同一个分析框架,建立两阶段动态序贯定价理论模型研究现实市场上信息传导过程中股价变动的内在机制。结果表明:(1)面临新信息的进入,投资者对股票收益预期的调整与均衡价格之间具有正相关关系;(2)面临有利消息时,过度自信投资者比例越大,股票的均衡价格越高,投资收益将越低;面临不利消息时则相反;(3)随着过度自信投资者比例以及过度自信程度升高,市场风险溢价将下降;(4)投资者群体在信息传导过程中出现分化,对股价变动形成异质信念,未获取信息和获取信息但未出现过度自信的投资者认为股价被高估,获取信息且出现过度自信的投资者认为价格被低估,促使更多的交易,引发市场成交量和股价变动;(5)过度自信投资者比例与过度自信程度提高均会对市场效率产生正向影响,而对市场深度具有负向效应。最后,基于理论结果对非对称性和持续性等典型的市场波动性特征进行解释。     

Overconfidence among option traders

The investor overconfidence theory predicts a direct relationship between market‐wide turnover and lagged market return. However, previous research has examined this prediction in the equity market, we focus on trading in the options market. Controlling for stock market cross‐sectional volatility, stock idiosyncratic risk, and option market volatility, we find that option trading turnover is positively related to past stock market return. In addition, call option turnover and call to put ratio are also positively associated with the past stock market return. These findings are consistent with the overconfidence theory. We also find that overconfident investors trade more in the options market than in the equity market. We rule out explanations other than investor overconfidence, such as momentum trading and varying risk preferences, for our findings.     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

Effect of emotion regulation as a de-biasing mechanism on overconfidence in investment behavior

Overconfidence is a bias closely associated with strong positive emotions such as pride. Strong positive emotions can hamper effective decision-making. This paper is predicated on the hypothesis that if investors with a pronounced tendency toward overconfidence can regulate strong positive emotions, they will be able to reduce bias and avoid subpar investment performance. We investigated the relationships among overconfidence, positive emotional reactions, and strategies for regulating emotions after a gain in the stock investment area, where investors succumb to overconfidence and important financial decisions are made. Identifying the differences in cognitive processes and emotion regulation strategies, which more or less overconfident investors exhibit, will in turn provide a de-bias mechanism to reduce overconfidence. The findings of this research will help investors avoid overconfidence by using strategies for emotional regulation reported in this study in order to achieve decision excellence.     

Financial overconfidence over time: Foresight,hindsight, and insight of investors

Financial overconfidence leads to increased trading activity, higher risk taking, and less diversification. In a panel survey of online brokerage clients in the UK, we ask for stock market and portfolio expectations and derive several overconfidence measures from the responses. Overconfidence is identified in the sample in various forms. By matching survey data with participants’ transactions and portfolio holdings, we find an influence of overplacement on trading activity, of overprecision and overestimation on diversification, and of overprecision and overplacement on risk taking. We explore the evolution of overconfidence over time and identify a role of past success and hindsight on subsequent investor overconfidence in line with learning to be overconfident.     

The cost of overconfidence in public information

We investigate the effects of investor overconfidence in public information on cross-sectional asset returns. The results show that investors in the US equity market are overconfident about public signals for mature firms that are relatively easy to price—old, large, and dividend-paying firms, value firms, and firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets, little external financing, and low sales growth. However, the effects of the overconfidence on cross-sectional stock returns are reversed quickly and comprise more than half of the short-term return reversals. The risk-adjusted cost of being overconfident about the noisy public signals, measured by return reversals of hedge portfolios formed on unexpected responses, is over 1.1% per month in the first month after portfolio formation, and is still significant despite the active arbitrage trading in the 2000s.     

Does good luck make people overconfident? Evidence from a natural experiment in the stock market

This paper examines the changes in investors' trading behavior after winning an IPO allotment in China—a purely luck-driven event. We find that these investors subsequently become overconfident: They trade more frequently and lose more money relative to other investors. This effect is stronger when investors are inexperienced and when investors' pre-existing level of overconfidence is low. We also show that investors exhibit a stronger gambling propensity and hold more lottery-like stock after winning an IPO allotment. Our findings are not explained by wealth effects or house money effects. Overall, our evidence indicates that the experience of good luck makes people overconfident about their prospects.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

The mediating effect of REM on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and subsequent firm performance moderated by IFRS adoption: A moderated-mediation analysis

The present paper is pursuing a new direction in the analysis of behavioral finance based on examining whether future performance of the firm is related to overconfidence displayed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We suggest two channels for this relationship, real earnings management (REM) and the mandatory IFRS adoption. First, examining the impact of IFRS adoption on firms’ future performance, we find that overconfident CEOs who do not adopt IFRS exhibit poorer future performance. Other interactions related to overconfidence and IFRS are not significant. Second, examining the relationship between overconfidence and IFRS adoption on REM, we find that overconfident CEOs indulge in higher REM than non-overconfident CEOs. Further, overconfident CEOs who adopt IFRS display greater REM than do those who not adopt IFRS. Therefore, we prove that the indirect effect of CEO overconfidence on the subsequent firm performance through REM is contingent on the mandatory IFRS adoption.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual‐based earnings management, real activities‐based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following, we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to hold in‐the‐money stock options, as rational expected utility maximizers should exercise early to avoid overexposure to company idiosyncratic risks. The results show that before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), companies of overconfident CEOs were more likely than other CEOs to engage in managing earnings through accelerating the timing of cash flow from operations and achieving analyst forecast benchmarks. After SOX, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have income‐increasing discretionary accruals. They remain more likely to engage in real activities management through abnormally high cash flows, and also have abnormally low discretionary expenses. These results are consistent with overconfident CEOs feeling less constrained by SOX, and suggest that this individual characteristic works against regulators’ attempts to constrain earnings management by corporate executives. In contrast, we find that the tendency of overconfident CEOs to manage to targets decreases after SOX, perhaps due to changes in investor behavior in the new regulatory environment.     

Does Trading Improve Individual Investor Performance?

From 52,649 accounts and 10,615,117 transaction records obtained from a renowned brokerage house in Taiwan we find that individual investors purchase 73.4% and sell 64.5% of their stock portfolios each month. This is more than ten times the statistics for their U.S. counterparts. In general, individual investors have positive abnormal returns from factor-based models. However, they would have earned higher returns from following a buy-and-hold strategy. We find a U-shaped rather than a monotonic turnover and performance relation. The results do not support the overconfidence argument proposed by Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) nor does the rational model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We find that investors with large portfolio values tend to be informed traders whose excess trading does create performance value. We also investigate whether men are more overconfident than women and find that even though men trade more excessively than women, men's performance measures are not dramatically lower than women's. Specifically, the own-benchmark adjusted gross return for men is higher than that for women. The regression results indicate that electronic traders rather than men are overconfident.     

Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited

This article presents the growing research area of Behavioural Corporate Finance in the context of one specific example: distortions in corporate investment due to CEO overconfidence. We first review the relevant psychology and experimental evidence on overconfidence. We then summarise the results of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) on the impact of overconfidence on corporate investment. We present supplementary evidence on the relationship between CEOs’ press portrayals and overconfident investment decisions. This alternative approach to measuring overconfidence, developed in Malmendier and Tate (2005b), relies on the perception of outsiders rather than the CEO's own actions. The robustness of the results across such diverse proxies jointly corroborates previous findings and suggests new avenues to measuring executive overconfidence.     

Does news travel slowly before a market crash? The role of margin traders

We investigate how investor overconfidence and attention affect market efficiency around the 2015 Chinese stock market crash. We find that the price delay before the crash is about twice the price delay after the crash. Investors become more sensitive to market movements after the crash. Price delays are larger on market down-days than on up-days before the crash, but the differences are insignificant between up- and down-days after the crash, indicating that negative information travels slowly only when investors are overconfident. Margin traders follow market trends and intensify the pyramiding and de-pyramiding effects caused by market sentiment change.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.