Effects of Preannouncements on Analyst and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings News

This study examines the effects of earnings preannouncements on financial analyst and stock price reactions to earnings news. Prior experimental research documents that when the signs of a preannouncement surprise and subsequent earnings announcement surprise are consistent (i.e., both either positive or negative), analysts make larger magnitude revisions to their future period earnings forecasts in response to the total earnings news conveyed in the preannouncement and earnings announcement than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. This study extends this research by examining a sample of actual preannouncements from 1993–1997 to determine whether the effects documented in laboratory settings manifest at the aggregate market level in stock prices and consensus analyst forecast revisions. Results indicate that after controlling for the sign of earnings news, sign of earnings, and sign of the earnings announcement surprise, stock prices and analyst forecast revisions respond more strongly when a preannouncement and subsequent earnings announcement elicit the same surprise signs than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. Further analysis indicates that the consistency of the signs of a preannouncement surprise and earnings announcement surprise is not associated with future earnings, suggesting that the magnified reaction of investors and analysts to consistent surprise signs is not a rational reaction to associations observed in market settings.     

Information misweighting and the cross-section of stock recommendations

This paper provides evidence that analysts whose earnings forecast revisions showed signs of greater exaggeration in the past make recommendation changes that lead to lower abnormal returns than their peers. Interpreting stock recommendations as a forecast of future abnormal returns, I show that this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts who typically exaggerate or overstate the weight of their private information when issuing forecasts also do so when making recommendations. The paper also shows that past earnings forecasts provide incremental information about analysts' recommending behavior beyond that contained in past recommendations.     

证券分析师VS统计模型:证券分析师盈余预测的相对准确性及其决定因素

本文使用2005年35家券商对我国上市公司做出的每股盈余预测数据,考察了证券分析师盈余预测相对于统计模型的相对准确性及其决定因素。我们发现,我国证券分析师做出的盈余预测,同以年度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较小,证券分析师盈余预测具有一定的优势;但同某些以季度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较大,证券分析师盈余预测不具有优势。我们同时考察了决定证券分析师盈余预测相对准确性的决定因素。我们发现,公司每股盈余的波动性越大,公司上市越晚,跟踪公司的分析师越多,证券分析师的优势就越大。我们的研究对证券分析师以及投资者都有一定的启示作用。     

The Quality of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts During the Asian Crisis: Evidence from Singapore

We bring together three disparate strands of literature to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency of security analysts' earnings forecasts in Singapore. We focus specifically on how the increased uncertainty and the negative market sentiment during the period of the Asian crisis affected the quality of earnings forecasts. While we find no evidence of inefficiencies in the pre-crisis period, our results suggest that after the onset of the crisis, analysts (1) issued forecasts that were systematically upward biased; (2) did not fully incorporate the (negative) earnings-related news; and (3) predicted earnings changes which proved too extreme.     

Dispersion in Analyst Forecasts and the Profitability of Earnings Momentum Strategies

This paper shows that the dispersion in analysts' consensus forecasts contains incremental information to predict future stock returns. Consistent with prior research, stock prices in the German market underreact to news about future earnings and drift in the direction suggested by analysts' forecasts revisions. Even higher abnormal returns can be achieved by applying such an earnings momentum strategy to stocks with a low dispersion in analyst forecasts. These results support one of the recent behavioural models in which investors underweight new evidence and conservatively update their beliefs in the right direction, but by too little in magnitude with respect to more objective information.     

Measuring the Impact of Corporate Investment Announcements on Share Prices: The Spanish Experience

We bring together three disparate strands of literature to develop a comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency of security analysts' earnings forecasts in Singapore. We focus specifically on how the increased uncertainty and the negative market sentiment during the period of the Asian crisis affected the quality of earnings forecasts. While we find no evidence of inefficiencies in the pre-crisis period, our results suggest that after the onset of the crisis, analysts (1) issued forecasts that were systematically upward biased; (2) did not fully incorporate the (negative) earnings-related news; and (3) predicted earnings changes which proved too extreme.     

Understanding analysts' use of stock returns and other analysts' revisions when forecasting earnings

We investigate analysts' use of stock returns and other analysts' forecast revisions in revising their own forecasts after an earnings announcement. We find that analysts respond more strongly to these signals when the signals are more informative about future earnings changes. Although analysts underreact to these signals on average, we find that analysts who are most sensitive to signal informativeness achieve superior forecast accuracy relative to their peers and have a greater influence on the market. The results suggest that the ability to extract information from the actions of others serves as one source of analyst expertise.     

Investor and (Value Line) Analyst Underreaction to Information about Future Earnings: The Corrective Role of Non-Earnings-Surprise Information

Prior research suggests that financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts' earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts' forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts' earnings forecast revisions.     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

When does analyst reputation matter? Evidence from analysts’ reliance on management guidance

We investigate the joint effects of analyst reputation, uncertainty and guidance news valence on analysts’ reliance on management guidance. We find that, compared to less reputable analysts, reputable analysts rely less on guidance when they issue earnings forecasts. This analyst reputation effect is stronger when earnings and information uncertainty are higher or when the guidance contains good news. Further analysis suggests that both reputable and less reputable analysts sacrifice their forecast accuracy when they rely less on guidance; however, reputable analysts are compensated to a greater extent by the increased informativeness of their forecasts. Finally, we find that analysts’ future career advancement is enhanced when their reliance is low.     

Do Analysts and Auditors Use Information in Accruals?

Existing research indicates that firms with high accruals are more likely to experience future earnings problems, but that investors' expectations, as reflected in stock prices, do not appear to anticipate these problems. In this paper, we directly examine the published opinions of two types of professional investor intermediaries to see if they provide investors with information concerning the future earnings problems experienced by firms with high accruals. First, we examine the earnings forecasts of sell-side analysts. We show that analysts' earnings forecasts do not incorporate the predictable future earnings declines associated with high accruals. Second, we examine the behavior of independent auditors. We find no evidence that auditors signal the future earnings problems associated with high accruals through either their audit opinions or through auditor changes. Overall, our evidence indicates that analysts and auditors do not alert investors to the future earnings problems associated with high accruals, thus corroborating previous findings that investors do not appear to anticipate these problems.     

Rationalizing forecast inefficiency

We show analysts’ own earnings forecasts predict error in their own forecasts of earnings at other horizons, which we argue provides a measure of the extent to which analysts inefficiently use information. We construct our measure by exploiting two sources of variation in analysts’ incentives: (i) more recent forecasts have greater salience at the time of the earnings release so accuracy incentives are higher (lower) at shorter (longer) forecast horizons and (ii) analysts have greater incentives for optimism (pessimism) at longer (shorter) horizons. Consistent with these incentives affecting the incorporation of information into forecasts, we document (i) current year forecasts underweight (overweight) information in shorter (longer) horizon forecasts and (ii) the mis-weighting is more pronounced when recent news is negative—when analysts have greater (weaker) incentives to incorporate the news into shorter (longer) horizon forecasts. Finally, returns tests suggest that forecasts adjusted for the inefficiency we document better represent market expectations of earnings.

     

Economic Value Added,Future Accounting Earnings,and Financial Analysts' Earnings Per Share Forecasts

Empirical research to date on the relative effectiveness of Economic Value Added (EVA) and earnings per share (EPS) as measures of firm performance for stock valuation has been mixed. In contrast to prior research, which primarily focuses on the correspondence of these measures with shareholder value and changes therein, we examine their relative effectiveness in predicting future earnings and their role in enhancing the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Our results indicate that EVA contains information that is incremental to EPS in predicting future earnings. In addition, we find that despite this potential for EVA to add incremental value to analysts' forecasts of future earnings, analysts do not use the information in reported EVA appropriately, but appear rather to overweigh it.     

The Value Relevance of Management Forecasts and Their Impact on Analysts' Forecasts: Empirical Evidence From Japan

A major financial disclosure feature in Japan is that stock exchanges require firms to provide next year's earnings forecasts. This study investigates the value relevance of Japanese management earnings forecasts and their impact on analysts' earnings forecasts. First, the value relevance of management forecasts is investigated using a valuation framework provided by Ohlson (2001 ), in which firm value is expressed as a function of book value, current earnings and next year's expected earnings. The analysis yields that of the three accounting variables examined, management forecasts have the highest correlation and incremental explanatory power with stock price.
Next, the impact of management forecasts on analysts' forecasts is examined. The results show that more than 90% of changes in analysts' forecasts are explained by management forecasts alone. Further analysis reveals that the heavy dependence of financial analysts on management forecasts in formulating their own forecasts may partially be attributed to the relatively high accuracy of management forecasts. At the same time, financial analysts also somewhat modify management forecasts when certain financial factors indicate that the credibility of management forecasts is in doubt.
Overall, this study presents empirical evidence that Japanese management forecasts provide useful information for the market and have a significant influence on analysts' forecasts.     

Analysts' Rationality and Forecast Bias: Evidence from Sales Forecasts

When optimistic forecasts can improve access to management, rational analysts have incentives to issue optimistically-biased forecasts (Lim, 2001). This paper proposes that the extent of this optimistic forecast bias will depend on the forecast's importance to management. If management attaches less importance to a forecasted measure, analysts should decrease their forecast bias because the expected benefits of issuing optimistic forecasts are less. We examine analysts' earnings and sales forecasts, and predict that analysts' optimistic bias will be greater for earnings than for sales. Results are consistent with our predictions and contribute to the evidence that analysts' forecast bias is rational and intentional.     

High-Technology Intangibles and Analysts' Forecasts

This study examines the association between firms' intangible assets and properties of the information contained in analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that analysts will supplement firms' financial information by placing greater relative emphasis on their own private (or idiosyncratic) information when deriving their earnings forecasts for firms with significant intangible assets. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the consensus in analysts' forecasts, measured as the correlation in analysts' forecast errors, is negatively associated with a firm's level of intangible assets. This result is robust to controlling for analyst uncertainty about a firm's future earnings, which we also find to be higher for firms with high levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles. Given that analyst uncertainty increases and analyst consensus decreases with the level of a firm's intangible assets, we also expect and find that the degree to which the mean forecast aggregates private information and is more accurate than an individual analyst's forecast increases with a firm's intangible assets. Finally, additional analysis reveals that lower levels of analyst consensus are associated with high-technology manufacturing companies, and that this association is explained by the relatively high R&D expenditures made by these firms. Overall, our results are consistent with financial analysts augmenting the financial reporting systems of firms with higher levels of intangible assets (in terms of contributing to more accurate earnings expectations), particularly R&D-driven high-tech manufacturers.     

Analysts Earnings Forecasts and the Roles of Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation

This study examines the effect of the degree of association between current earnings and expected future earnings on the relative importance of earnings and book value for explaining equity price. Consensus analysts forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings are used to proxy for expected future earnings and are compared to reported current earnings to measure the degree of the association. We find that the value-relevance of current earnings negatively correlates with the extent to which consensus analysts forecasts deviate from current earnings. We also find that the incremental explanatory power of book value for equity price positively correlates with this measure. These results remain robust after controlling for factors known to be affecting the value-relevance of earnings such as negative earnings and the earnings-to-book ratio. Our results also show that this analysts' forecast-based measure of `earnings persistence' dominates historical earnings variance in explaining cross-sectional variations in the value-relevance of earnings and book value.     

Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors?

In this article we present evidence that a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news, as measured by outstanding stock recommendation, affects its incentives to manage earnings and, in turn, affects analysts' ex post forecast errors. In particular, we find a tendency for firms rated a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income–decreasing earnings management, indicating that they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives to create accounting reserves especially in the form of earnings baths than other firms. In contrast, firms rated a Buy (Sell) are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than analysts' forecasts. Our empirical results provide direct evidence of purported, but heretofore, weakly documented equity market incentives for firms to manage earnings. They are also consistent with a growing body of literature that finds analysts either cannot anticipate or are not motivated to anticipate completely in their forecasts firms' efforts to manage earnings.     

How efficient is the market for Australian firms’ earnings information?

We construct a measure of the speed with which forecasts issued by sell-side analysts accurately forecast future annual earnings. Following Marshall, we label this measure earnings information flow timeliness (EIFT). This measure avoids the aggregation problem inherent in price-based measures of information efficiency. We document large variation in EIFT across firm-years, and show that EIFT is positively associated with the extent of analyst following, consistent with increased analyst coverage improving the speed with which earnings-related information is recognised. We also find that EIFT is higher for firm-years classified as ‘bad news’ (i.e., where analysts’ forecasts at the start of the financial period exceed the reported outcome). However, when we separately consider instances where analysts appear to forecast non-GAAP (or ‘street’) earnings rather than GAAP earnings, we find that the greater timeliness of bad news is concentrated among observations where analysts forecast non-GAAP earnings, where unusual items are typically excluded. We conclude that the market for accounting information is more efficient for negative operating outcomes than for negative outcomes reflecting unusual items.     

财务分析师盈利预测的投资价值:来自深沪A股市场的证据

本文研究了中国股票市场上财务分析师的盈利预测信息对投资者是否有价值。我们发现,可以利用公开的盈利预测制定可获利的套头交易策略。套头交易的回报率不仅在统计意义上显著大于零,而且在经济意义上也是显著的。这些结果不受不同的检验方法影响,也无法为我们所考虑到的风险因素所解释。本文的发现说明了中国的股票市场尚未达到Fama(1970)意义上的半强式有效,投资者在投资决策时可以利用分析师的盈利预测以提高其投资的回报。此外,本文的结果也有助于回答中国的财务分析师是否具有专业胜任能力这一颇有争议的问题。