What does the experience of German monetary union tell us about the theory of monetary union?

This paper summarizes the modern theory of monetary unions to identify in what circumstances such unions are supposed to impose low costs on, and give substantial benefits to, their members and then considers the case of the effect on Eastern Germany of German monetary and economic union. This union satisfied most of the conditions for low cost and high benefit, yet the initial impact of union was a severe fall in economic activity in Eastern Germany. The paper concludes that the conventional theory is deficient in ignoring the effects on the poorer member countries of a union of the expectations engendered by the creation of the union, and argues that an explicit regional policy is required in a union of members of widely different income levels.     

The prospects of a monetary union in East Asia

This paper assesses the empirical desirability of the East Asian economies to form a monetary union. The Structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) method is employed to assess the nature of macroeconomic disturbances among the East Asian countries, as a preliminary guide in identifying potential candidates for forming an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). In comparison with European countries, East Asia has less symmetric underlying structural shocks but the speed of adjustment to shocks is much faster. The empirical results suggest that there exists a scope among some small sub-regions, comprising mainly of ASEAN countries, for potential monetary integration. The finding of an increased symmetry of shocks among countries after the Asian Financial crisis indicates that the regional policy-coordinating effort after the crisis has put the region on the right track if monetary union is a desired goal.     

Monetary union in Latin America: an assessment in the context of optimum currency area

The article applies the optimum currency area (OCA) theory to Latin America to assess the potential of a monetary union in Latin America and in its major existing regional trade agreements (RTAs). According to OCA criteria we find that Latin America is far from being an optimum currency area, as its countries’ exposure to asymmetric shocks is high and their capacities to adjust in response to macroeconomic disturbances are limited. Using a panel of 20 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2014, we apply the dynamic OLS estimation techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. We find that the costs are high, because Latin America’s economies are vulnerable to severe macroeconomic disturbances and its RTAs differ significantly in their response to negative demand shocks. Most of the monetary efficiency gains are shown to be the result of a common restrictive monetary policy which would result in higher FDI inflows and, to a more limited extent, increased GDP, both overall and per capita. Although Central American countries are shown to be most suitable for further monetary integration, we conclude that Latin American countries should head first towards greater economic and political integration.     

Some empirical tests on the integration of economic activity between the euro area and the accession countries

This note looks at the correlation of short‐term business cycles in the euro area and the EU accession countries. The issue is assessed with the help of vector autoregressive models. There are clear differences in the degree of correlation between accession countries. For Hungary and Slovenia, euro area shocks can explain a large share of variation in industrial production, while for some countries this influence is much smaller. For the latter countries, the results imply that joining the monetary union could entail reasonably large costs, unless their business cycles converge closer to the euro area cycle. Generally, for smaller countries the relative influence of the euro area business cycle is larger. Also, it is found that the most advanced accession countries are at least as integrated with the euro area business cycle as some small present member countries of the monetary union. JEL classification: E32, F15, F42.     

The endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area criteria in East Asia

The Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 has increased interest in policies to achieve greater regional exchange rate stability in East Asia. It has renewed calls for greater monetary and exchange rate cooperation. A country's suitability to join a monetary union depends, inter alia, on the trade intensity and the business cycle synchronization with other potential members of the monetary union. However, these two Optimum Currency Area criteria are endogenous. Theoretically, the effect of increased trade integration (after the elimination of exchange fluctuations among the countries in the region) on the business cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Reduction in trade barriers can potentially increase industrial specialization by country and therefore resulting in more asymmetry business cycles from industry-specific shocks. On the other hand, increased trade integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. If the second hypothesis is empirically verified, policy makers have little to worry about the region being unsynchronized in their business cycles as the business cycles will become more synchronized after the monetary union is formed. This paper assesses the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, specialization and business cycle synchronization for East Asian economies using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The dynamic panel approach improves on previous efforts to examine the business cycle correlations — trade link using panel procedures, which control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Based on the findings on how trade, finance and sectoral specialization have effects on the size of common shocks among countries, potential policies that can help East Asian countries move closer toward a regional currency arrangement can be suggested. The empirical results of this study suggest that there exists scope for East Asia to form a monetary union.     

A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN¹ countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they coordinate their monetary and/or fiscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary authorities. We also find that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation depends on the type of shocks and the extent of fiscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

One Size Must Fit All: National Divergences in a Monetary Union

Should a common central bank in a heterogeneous monetary union base its decisions on EU‐wide averages of economic variables or on national welfare losses? A central bank that minimizes the sum of national welfare losses reacts less to common shocks. Under certain parameter constellations this leads to higher average union‐wide expected welfare and it might thus be preferable that decision‐making is dominated by national representatives. Countries with a transmission mechanism far from the average benefit from an orientation on national welfare losses. For countries with a transmission mechanism close to the average, welfare can be lower in this case.     

The monetary transmission mechanism: evidence and implications for European Monetary Union

We provide some evidence consistent with a heterogeneous credit channel of monetary policy transmission in the European Union. Using the techniques of cointegration and Error Correction Models, we have shown that the external finance premium is one important leading indicator of real economic activity in Germany and Italy. No evidence is found for France and the UK. Therefore, a common monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank might be transmitted in different ways across the member countries of the monetary union, thus exacerbating existing regional disparities among the member countries.     

Business cycle synchronization and African monetary union: A wavelet analysis

In this paper, we analyze the feasibility of an African monetary union based on the necessary condition of business cycle synchronization. In this regard, we examine the synchronization of growth cycles between five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that will have to merge to form an African monetary union: the East African Community; the Economic Community of Central African States; the Economic Community of West African States; the Southern African Development Community; and the Arab Maghreb Union. To do this, we use a new continuous wavelet approach. Results show evidence of heterogeneous synchronization across time and horizons between the RECs. Controlling for the influence of some countries' membership in several RECs at the same time, the synchronization landscape does not improve. Overall, our results suggest that business cycle synchronization across the RECs has not yet reached a sufficient level to allow African countries to benefit from a common monetary policy.     

The Impact of 2007/08 Financial Crisis on the Stability and Enlargement of the EMU

Before 2007/08, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was expected to be enlarged on schedule, but the European sovereign debt problem, triggered by the exogenous US sub‐prime crisis, not only has revealed the EMU's fiscal coordination failure, but also has weakened regional financial integration. The stagnation of financial integration will therefore increase the cost of sustaining a monetary union, which in turn slows EMU enlargement and ruins the reputation of the euro. This paper aims to measure the damage to financial integration and to provide a more precise answer on real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. Our estimation indicates that RIP between the EMU and some accession candidates is still valid after the interruptions of the financial crises. However, convergence of real interest rates cannot be achieved until 2030. This implies the EMU authority must strengthen regional financial integration to solidify the EMU and then be able to re‐start enlargement.     

Commitment and the adoption of a common currency*

In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto‐dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.     

The optimality of a gulf currency union: Commonalities and idiosyncrasies

A high degree of shared national elements that drive the bulk of observed output volatility between countries is generally seen as a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a successful monetary union. This is because countries in a monetary union accept a one-size-fits all, resigning regions to policies that are based on some aggregate macroeconomic target rather than a country-specific one. For this reason, the cost of monetary union membership depends on the incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than symmetric, or common shocks. This criteria is examined for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, who reaffirmed plans for the implementation of a single currency. This paper quantifies, using structural factor models with common factor restrictions, changes in output synchronisation, the importance of common factor or idiosyncratic shocks between the regions, and the synchronisation of these shocks across the GCC as well as the implications for GCC-wide macroeconomic policy at short-to-medium term horizons. Despite current difficulties in fulfilling the convergence criteria goals to monetary union, the results show the synchronisation of output growth fluctuations between economies of the GCC to have increased over the past 25 years. This paper also finds that a fairly sizeable proportion of output fluctuations in business cycle frequencies are driven by a common component that, to some degree, reflects U.S. monetary policy and U.S. demand shocks as well as changes in crude oil prices.     

The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone

When entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into defaulting. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. I analyse the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I argue that the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort is crucial in reducing the fragility of the Eurozone. In addition, steps towards a budgetary union are key in structurally strengthening the union.     

SYNCHRONIZATION OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS BETWEEN GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES,EUROPE, JAPAN,AND OIL MARKET: CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME†

Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with block exogeneity, this study examines the impacts of external shocks originating from the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the oil market as well as those of the regional shocks, on the oil‐rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), viewed as a prospective monetary union. It takes into account the implications of the shock impacts for selecting an appropriate common exchange rate arrangement. The SVAR variance decomposition and impulse response analyses strongly underscore the relative impacts of the global shocks over the regional ones. The findings imply that the world's two major currencies, the U.S. dollar and the euro, should figure highly in a GCC's common basket of currencies. Accordingly, a transitional movement to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement such as a basket peg may be desirable for these trade‐dependent economies in the long run, as is argued in the optimal currency literature for developing countries. (JEL E52, O52, C22)     

Monetary Union Enlargement,Fiscal Policy,and Strategic Wage Setting*

This contribution develops a framework for studying the effects of the enlargement of a monetary union on macroeconomic performances in the presence of strategic interactions between non‐atomistic labor unions, monetary, and fiscal authorities. We show that the integration of new identical member countries may have beneficial effects, depending on the fiscal policymaking structure. Qualifications to this result are provided under cross‐country asymmetries in the size of the economies, the structure of the labor markets, and the fiscal authorities' preferences.     

Is East Asia an optimum currency area?

This paper assesses the empirical desirability of the East Asian economies to an alternative exchange rate arrangement (a monetary union) that can potentially enhance the exchange rate stability and credibility in the region. Specifically, the symmetry in macroeconomic disturbances of the East Asian economies is examined as satisfying one of the preconditions for forming an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). We extend the existing literature by improving the methodology of assessing the symmetry shocks in evaluating the suitability of a common currency area in the East Asian economies employing the Bayesian State-Space Based approach. We consider a model of an economy in which the output is influenced by global, regional and country-specific shocks. The importance of a common regional shock would provide a case for a regional common currency. This model allows us to examine regional and country-specific cycles simultaneously with the world business cycle. The importance of the shocks decomposition is that studying a subset of countries can lead one to believe that observed co-movement is particular to that subset of countries when it in fact is common to a much larger group of countries. In addition, the understanding of the sources of international economic fluctuations is important for making policy decisions. The falling share of country specific factor and the rising role of region factor indicate that East Asia has become increasingly favorable for a monetary union. However, the share of country-specific factor that is still significant implies that it could be costly to renounce individual currencies to advance into a monetary union in East Asia.     

West African Currency Unions: Rationale and Sustainability

Drawing on the recent literature and experience of monetaryintegration in Europe, the paper examines the rationale forestablishing regional currency unions in western Africa. Despitedramatic economic, political and historical differences betweenthe two regions, the analysis indicates that monetary unificationmight well be beneficial for a number of the member states ofthe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Themain reason is that the costs stemming from the loss of monetaryautonomy are often more than offset by the gains originatingin the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers. However,large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditureobjectives would not be attractive partners because they wouldbe expected to pressure the common central bank, creating excessiveinflation in the entire union. Hence, the desirability and sustainabilityof a currency union critically depends on fiscal disciplineamong its members. We also explore the vulnerability of regionalmonetary institutions to country-specific disturbances. Overall,the desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strongfiscal surveillance procedure both in the transition phase andafter the establishment of the union. (JEL E58, E61, F42)     

On the Role of Labour Market Reform for the Enlargement of a Monetary Union

This paper studies the incentives to join a monetary union,and the incentives to reform within a monetary union and withinthe candidate countries, respectively. We present some "ordersof magnitude" evidence on the size and balance of the incentiveeffects for joining and being joined, and on the desirabilityof reform in and out of the existing EMU in Europe. It is foundthat countries will only want to join a monetary union wherethere has been sufficient labour market reform, and where labourmarkets are more flexible than their own. But existing memberswill want the same properties of their new partners as well.(JEL F02, F15, F33, F 42)     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.