Profit pools: a fresh look at strategy

In charting strategy, many managers focus on revenue growth, assuming that profits will follow. But that approach is dangerous: today's deep revenue pool may become tomorrow's dry hole. To create strategies that result in profitable growth, managers need to look beyond revenues to see the shape of their industry's profit pool. The authors define an industry's profit pool as the total profits earned at all points along the industry's value chain. Although the concept is simple, the structure of a profit pool is usually quite complex. The pool will be deeper in some segments of the value chain than in others, and depths will vary within an individual segment as well. Segment profitability may, for example, vary widely by customer group, product category, geographic market, and distribution channel. Moreover, the pattern of profit concentration in an industry will often be very different from the pattern of revenue concentration. The authors describe how successful companies have gained competitive advantage by developing sophisticated profit-pool strategies. They explain how U-Haul identified new sources of profit in the consumer-truck-rental industry; how Merck reached beyond its traditional value-chain role to protect its profits in the pharmaceuticals industry; how Dell rebounded from a misguided channel decision by refocusing on its traditional source of profit; and how Anheuser-Busch made a series of astute product, pricing, and operating decisions to dominate the beer industry's profit pool. The companies with the best understanding of their industry's profit pool, the authors argue, will be in the best position to thrive over the long term.     

Energizing corporate culture and creating competitive advantage: a new look at workforce programs

Beliefs about the best ways to attract and retain employees--and keep them continuously motivated and productive--have shifted considerably in recent years. Structural changes wrought by the "3 Rs"--restructuring, rightsizing and reengineering--have given way to organizational changes caused by the "3 Cs"--culture, communication and competencies.     

Another look at corporate social responsibility and reporting: An empirical study in a developing country

This paper presents a view of corporate social responsibility accounting and reporting from the standpoint of a developing country. The study is based on a personal interview questionnaire survey conducted by the authors with mainly chief executive officers in one hundred companies operating in Malaysia. Various aspects of corporate social performance, including social reporting, are examined. The findings indicate that social reporting lags behind corporate social involvement and that major corporate attention is focused on activities relating to employees and products/services. In addition, the results show that corporate size and national origin of corporate ownership are relevant in reflecting the extent of social commitments made by companies.     

The role of managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: the 1990s evidence

This paper examines the relationship between the likelihood a firm is acquired and the governance and financial characteristics of the firm. Given many of the developments in the corporate control market in the late 1980s, I suspect that the process governing takeover likelihood may have changed in the 1990s. I examine a sample of 342 NYSE/AMEX firms that were acquired during the 1990–1997 period and compare them to a matched sample of nonacquired firms. I find that firms that were acquired over this period can be characterized as having lower managerial ownership and higher ownership by outsiders, particularly higher ownership by nonmanagement blockholders with board representation. The fact that managerial ownership is negatively related to takeover likelihood is consistent with studies using data from 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that managerial ownership helps managers maintain control, or alternatively that ownership proxies for how much managers care about control.     

The new landscape for nonprofits.

For most of this century, society's caring functions have been the work of government and charities. But social services in the United States are in a period of transition. Today the U.S. government no longer considers nonprofits to be entitled--or even best qualified--to provide social services. Profit-seeking companies like Lockheed Martin are now winning contracts for such services. William Ryan describes how government outsourcing and a new business mind-set have changed the landscape of social services. The change raises fundamental questions about the mission and future of nonprofits. Ryan attributes the growth of for-profits in the social service industry to four factors: size, capital, mobility, and responsiveness. While those attributes give for-profits an advantage in acquiring new contracts, nonprofits have not yet lost their foothold. Ryan cites examples of organizations like the YWCA and Abraxas to demonstrate various ways that nonprofits are responding--from subcontracting to partnership to outright conversion to for-profit status. By playing in the new marketplace, nonprofits will be forced to reconfigure their operations and organizations in ways that could compromise their missions. Because nonprofits now find themselves sharing territory with for-profits, sometimes as collaborators and sometimes as competitors, the distinctions between these organizations will continue to blur. The point, Ryan argues, is not whether nonprofits can survive opposition from for-profits. Many have already adjusted to the new competitive environment. The real issue is whether nonprofits can adapt without compromising the qualities that distinguish them from for-profit organizations.     

Balancing corporate power: a new Federalist paper

In an effort to govern their increasingly complex organizations, chief executives in some of today's largest corporations are turning to one of the world's oldest political philosophies-federalism. Given that organizations are seen more and more as minisocieties, the prospect of applying political principles to management makes a great deal of sense. Federalism is particularly appropriate because it offers a well-recognized system for dealing with paradoxes of power and control: the need to make things big by keeping them small; to encourage autonomy but within bounds; and to combine variety and shared purpose, individuality and partnership, local and global. As London Business School professor Charles Handy explains it, federalism responds to these paradoxes by balancing power among those in the center of the organization, those in the centers of expertise, and those in the center of the action--the operating businesses. The centers of federal organizations meet regularly, but they do not need to live together. Doing so would concentrate too much power in one place, whereas federalism gets its strength and energy from spreading responsibility across many decision points. Guided by five principles, federalism avoids the risks of autocracy and the overcontrol of a central bureaucracy. It ensures a measure of democracy and creates a "dispersed center" that is more a network than a place. That's why Asea Brown Boveri CEO Percy Barnevik calls his sprawling "multi-domestic" enterprise of 1,100 separate companies and 210,000 employees a federation. It succeeds because the independent bits, be they individuals, clusters, or business units, know they are part of the greater whole.     

The tax incentives and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment of an accelerated depreciation tax policy for fixed assets

Based on a quasi-natural experiment of an accelerated depreciation tax policy (ADP) for fixed assets in China, we examine the impact of the ADP on corporate cash holdings. Using a multiperiod difference-in-differences model with a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2020, we document that firms subject to the ADP exhibit lower cash holdings compared to firms not affected by the policy. The effect is more pronounced for young firms, profitable firms, and firms with less R&D investment. According to our mechanism analysis, the ADP mitigates a firm's financing constraints and financialization and therefore, a firm does not need as much as cash holdings as they did before the implementation of the ADP. The mechanism test results suggest that the ADP lowers the precautionary and speculative demand for cash. The analysis of economic consequences shows that the reduction of cash holdings significantly enhances firm value. Our research results suggest that the ADP is a good policy for firms.     

Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999–2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm‐specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure.     

The association between audit committees,compensation incentives,and corporate audit fees

This study uses audit fee data from the 2001–2003 reporting periods to examine the relationship between measures of audit committee effectiveness and compensation incentives with corporate audit fees. Our results suggest that audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring management. In contrast, CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating management. Notwithstanding results on the full sample of firm-years, we uncover significant differences in the determinants of audit fees between the years examined. An important implication of these results is that explaining the intra-firm variation in audit fees over time is clearly necessary in order to understand the antecedents and consequences of audit fees.

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

Environmental tax incentives and corporate environmental behaviour: An unintended consequence from a natural experiment in China

Using the implementation of the Environmental Protection Tax (EPT) Law in China as a natural experiment, we explore the impact of environmental tax incentives on corporate environmental engagement. Evidence shows that, after the implementation of the EPT Law, there exists a significant improvement in the environmental performance of firms located in regions with increased EPT rates. However, our results reveal an unintended consequence that this effect is more salient for nonheavy-polluting companies rather than for heavy polluters that are more targeted by the EPT Law.     

Regulation: The market for corporate control and corporate governance

This study examines the effects of regulation and a contested market for corporate control on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance. The study focus is on two sectors, manufacturing and banking, due to their differences in the governance environment. In the United Kingdom for the sample period used in this study, manufacturing was characterized by a contested market for corporate control with little or no regulatory interference. In banking on the other hand, takeovers, hostile or otherwise, were absent and ownership changes and board appointments were supervised by the regulator—the Bank of England. The findings of the panel data estimates show that, unlike in the manufacturing sector, disciplinary top management turnover in banks was not related to share price performance. Outside directors were significantly less effective in disciplining top management in banks than in manufacturing firms.     

Dollar-weighted returns to stock investors: A new look at the evidence

Dichev [2007. American Economic Review 97, 386–401], in an influential paper, examines the gap between the performance of major stock markets and the dollar-weighted performance of investors in these markets. He finds a significant gap of 1.3 percent per year for NYSE/AMEX and 1.5 percent internationally. We question these results. The NYSE/AMEX performance gap is actually negative in the last two thirds of Dichev's 1926–2002 period, while his international results are influenced by a dramatic increase in Datastream's coverage. When, instead of Datastream, we use a comprehensive share price database, the UK performance gap changes from 1.1 to −1.3 percent. In short, Dichev's findings are not robust.     

Making visions visible for long-term landscape management

Results generated by planning and futures studies are often too abstract to provide a clear vision of the future to non-specialists. In this study the role of 3D visualization and the challenges in developing and communicating visible visions for our future landscapes is explored. While traditional visualization techniques have been well-known for several hundreds of years digital 3D visualizations are still not yet taken advantage of in long-term planning or in futures studies in general to their full potential. As part of an iterative consultation and participation process a long-term vision for the landscape and land management of the Alport Valley in the Peak District National Park, UK is developed in order to improve the valley's special landscape character, to enhance the valley's visual and recreational attractiveness, to regenerate the woodlands in ways that maximize the long-term benefit of ecology, wildlife and landscape and to get a good balance between wooded areas and open moorland.An early integration of 3D visualization in the planning process offers a wide range of opportunities for exploring alternative futures but it also poses challenges to the expert planners such as being able to react timely, with a high degree of realism and interactively to incorporate new inputs from participating stakeholders. Furthermore, the planner is forced to translate a vision into concrete geographically referenced data. Only then the vision can be visualized. The full potential of 3D visualizations in the planning disciplines and in futures studies is still to be explored. The visualizations could be the basis to communicate the vision - the views of the future - and to share the vision with others in order to influence future change.     

Macroeconomic effects of corporate default crisis: A long-term perspective

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the US has experienced many severe corporate default crises in which 20–50% of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate bonds has at times rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current theories that emphasize the unique role that banks and the credit and collateral channels play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks.     

The incentives for tax planning

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements.