强制性信息披露的适度问题

当市场失灵经济陷入困境时 ,经济学家会寻求政府的庇护 ;当政府管制过严时 ,经济学家又会反过来寻求市场自由的回归。市场和政府是相互依赖的经济调节手段 ,但政府对经济的干预存在合理理性。强制性信息披露作为政府对会计的一种干预也存在一定的度 ,本文以问卷调查方式考查了我国强制性信息披露的合理程度     

论适度强制性信息披露

尽管目前对上市公司信息披露进行管制已是国际通用的做法,但理论界对是否管制以及如何管制仍存在分歧。非管制论主张,上市公司完全可以自愿披露信息,无需强制性信息披露,代理理论(agency theory)、通信理论(signalling theory)与个人契约是构建非管制论的三大支柱。在非管制论的支持者看来,为有效履行受托责任、争夺市场资源及向市场传递良好的信号,上市公司会自愿披     

金融组织强制性信息披露问题研究

由于规模经济的原因,作为信息劣势方——投资者公共利益代表者的政府必然成为强制性信忠披露的主体。政府按照参与约束原则和激励相容原则进行机制设计甄别金融组织,引导其确定合理的信忠披露边界,形成分离均衡,金融市场上的非对称信息转变为对称信息。但政府强制金融组织进行信息披露时,应尊重其利益追求和考虑金融市场发育程度等。     

上市公司自愿进行信息披露存在的障碍和改进措施

上市公司自愿性信息披露对市场交易行为、金融工具创新等资本市场发展的因素有着重要的影响.然而,当前中国上市公司自愿性信息披露的实践并不令人十分满意.我们应当从完善上市公司的治理结构、提升投资者素质以及调整相关政策法规入手,改善我国上市公司自愿披露的现状.     

浅议会计信息披露管制

目前我国会计信息披露监管不力，上市公司会计信息披露质量令人担忧，强制性披露监管不能保证充分可靠的信息披露。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露研究综述

<正>上市公司的信息披露分为强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露,据有关资料对投资者对强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露的重视度调查所得,投资者认为强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露的重要程度各占50%,由此可以看出,投资者越来越重视     

强制性信息披露的适度性分析

信息不对称是企业管理和资本市场中产生道德风险和逆向选择的根源，强制信息披露正是由此而设立的。迄今为止信息披露的重要意义已确信不移，但信息披露是自愿性披露还是强制性披露以及披露的程度，还没能达成一致看法。基于会计信息的公共品特性、市场失灵以及会计信息的成本限制等因素，认为强制性信息披露是必要的，关键在于如何把握强制性信息披露的度，     

政府管制、中介机构声誉机制与IPO信息披露质量

本文从IPO信息披露角度分析了我国新股发行制度中存在的主要问题,指出过度管制和中介机构市场"劣币驱逐良币"是导致证券市场信息披露质量低下的重要原因。我国新股发行实行注册制改革,在放松管制的同时,需重视培育中介机构声誉机制建立的外部环境。在中国证券市场的现实条件下,通过建立中介机构信用信息的强制性披露制度,将中介机构及个人的信用信息纳入招股说明书的强制性披露内容,形成市场对发行人选择良好信用中介机构的倒逼机制。这既是完善以信息披露为中心的发行制度改革的现实选择,也是解决监管机构在注册制下审核边界问题的可行思路。     

关于我国上市公司信息披露的几个问题

目前,在上市公司信息披露上的问题暴露较多,究其原因,有法规制度上不完善问题,有上市公司本身的原因,也有审计方面的问题。本文拟就上市公司信息披露的几个问题进行分析和探讨。一、上市公司信息披露中存在的问题我国现有一套初步的信息披露制度,但在执行中存在着以...     

Dynamic information disclosure

We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits from sequential disclosure. Assuming partial commitment and a special receiver‐type space, a Markov equilibrium exists and almost instant full disclosure arises in the limit.     

Mandatory information disclosure and innovation: Evidence from the disclosure of operational information

We use a quasi-natural experiment wherein the Shanghai Stock Exchange requires listed companies in certain industries to disclose operational information and a staggered difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of mandatory information disclosure on corporate innovation. We find that companies subject to mandatory operational information disclosure show significantly increased innovation. This effect is pronounced for companies classified as non-state-owned enterprises, facing severe financing constraints and a high degree of shareholder tunneling behavior and in competitive and high-tech industries. Although mandatory operational information disclosure reduces their competitive advantage, companies appear to compensate by increasing innovation. Our study highlights the positive impact of mandatory operational information disclosure, indicating that it contributes to the high-quality development of both capital markets and companies.     

企业内部控制及其信息披露

按照美国COSO委员会提出的报告,企业的内部控制是受董事会、管理当局和其他职员的影响,为取得经营效果和效率、财务报告的可靠性、遵循适当的法规等目标而提供合理保证的一种过程,应由控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息沟通、监督五个方面的内容构成.     

Corporate strategy and information disclosure

We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy‐specific investments.     

Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined

Review of Accounting Studies - Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private...     

Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark

This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects information asymmetry for industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Economic theory suggests that disclosing more information should lower the information asymmetry component of a firm's cost of capital [Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000)]. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry. The results are robust even after controlling for various firm characteristics introduced in related literature. Despite differences in institutional settings the findings in our paper are similar to the ones based on US data.     

Customer information disclosure and corporate financing constraints

We examine the impact of voluntary customer information disclosure by Chinese-listed companies on their financing constraints from the perspective of information transparency. The results show that voluntary disclosure can alleviate financing constraints, and the effect is pronounced when detailed customer information is disclosed. Analyst following and information opacity are used as a proxy for information transparency to test the mediating effect, and it is found that voluntary disclosure reduces financing constraints by increasing information transparency. In addition, the results indicate that when industry competition is fierce and the quality of internal control is low, disclosure of customer information has a more pronounced effect on the alleviation of financing constraints. Policymakers and corporate decision-makers should be aware that voluntary customer information has great significance for the improvement of information environment in China's capital market.     

Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information

In this paper, an informational asymmetry exists between investors and the issuer of an initial public offering about the value of the security. To avoid market failure, a solution is proposed in which the issuer makes a disclosure about firm value that is verified by an investment banker. The investment banker enters into a contingent contract with investors which imposes a penalty if the ex post observable cash flow indicates fraudulent disclosure. A bivariate signalling model is formulated and solved, and testable implications are derived from comparative statics analysis.     

Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk

This study examines companies with two classes of shares that entitle their holders to identical cash flow and voting rights but that are available to mutually exclusive sets of investors: A shares to domestic investors and B shares to foreign investors. Price differences between A and B shares are higher in firms with a greater disparity in the disclosures that they make to domestic and foreign investors. This association is more pronounced when the cost (benefit) of information transfer is higher (lower). The results suggest that disclosure disparity creates meaningful differences in investors' average information precision across A and B shares and thus influences the cross-sectional variation in price differences.     

几个特殊会计信息披露问题的探讨

会计信息披露是指影响股东、债权人或潜在投资者等对公司的目前和将来作出理性判断的,进而影响其决策行为的会计信息都应公布于众。一方面,会计信息披露已成为证券市场有效监管的重要组成部分。公开发行股票公司的信息披露能否做到可靠、全面、及时,直接关系到证券市场的公开、公平、公正原则是否能够得到体现和维护,会计信息披露在遵循成本效益原则和重要性原则下应做到充分披露。另一方面,随着企业经济活动的日益复杂化,现有的企业财务会计报告滞后于环境的变化,显示了它的缺陷和不足,财务报告只注重历史而不注重未来,只注重货币信息而忽视非货币信息,使财务报告的有用性受到了挑战。如果财务报告无法为信息使用者提供有用的信息,那么财务报告存在的合理性就必然受到质疑。下面,笔者对几个特殊情形下会计信息披露问题进行探讨。