共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 298 毫秒
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学校录取机制问题是一个教育界广泛讨论的话题。本文探讨了目前高考录取平行志愿制度的优点和缺陷,提出降低投档比例、打通不同院校之间的专业志愿和增加志愿个数可以改进学生的效用损失。而博士生录取是另外一种类型的非统一录取学校录取机制问题,本文设计了一种偏好顺序机制,并证明了这种机制是满足公平、无浪费、个人理性、抗策略且帕累托最优的,最后提出在现实中运用该机制的具体措施。 相似文献
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高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
当前的高考录取机制是用考生的分数和对学校的志愿来分配入学机会的机制,分数是一个公平的指标,分数的高低决定了考生录取时的优先顺序。本文研究了当前高考的录取程序,分析了分数录取机制下的公平和效率问题。由于目前的招生录取机制并不是分数公平的机制,使得录取结果可能是没有效率的。如果使用分数公平的录取机制,考生真实申报对学校的偏好就是他的优势策略,录取结果可以同时达到帕累托最优和分数公平。 相似文献
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本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是,真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略,达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制,真实偏好是学生的优势策略,结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制,对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。 相似文献
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高考录取机制的博弈分析 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是,真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略,达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制,真实偏好是学生的优势策略,结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制,对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。 相似文献
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随着我国科学信息技术的发展,网上录取招生逐渐成为主流的趋势,而考试档案管理是学生录取过程中的必经流程。同时网上录取会在一定程度上影响考试档案的管理方式。本文先对网上录取模式进行了介绍,对网上录取方式对考试档案管理工作所产生的影响进行了探讨与分析,旨在为网上录取工作的开展提供一定的帮助。 相似文献
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随着我国科学信息技术的发展,网上录取招生逐渐成为主流的趋势,而考试档案管理是学生录取过程中的必经流程。同时网上录取会在一定程度上影响考试档案的管理方式。本文先对网上录取模式进行了介绍,对网上录取方式对考试档案管理工作所产生的影响进行了探讨与分析,旨在为网上录取工作的开展提供一定的帮助。 相似文献
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高校大学生志愿服务是青年志愿服务中以青年大学生为主体开展的一种比较特殊占主要地位的形式。文章通过透析高校大学生志愿服务体系中存在的主要问题进而提出如何提升大学生志愿服务精神的对策,分别对志愿服务主体建设、志愿服务运行机制建设和志愿服务项目建设进行了系统研究,以期有效提高我国青年志愿服务水平。 相似文献
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This study applies Granger causality tests to examine the relationship between attendance, admission prices and real income at the Melbourne Cup, which is Australia’s premier horseracing event and one of the world’s leading handicap races. The motivation for the paper is that while market demand suggests that causation should run from admission price to attendance, it is equally plausible that sporting authorities could alter admission prices in response to a change in demand reflected in attendance. The main findings are that in the short-run there is unidirectional Granger causality running from income to attendance, attendance to admission price and income to admission price, while in the long run both admission price and income Granger cause attendance. 相似文献
12.
Martin F. Hellwig 《Economic Theory》2010,44(3):361-397
This paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis
for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed
that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With
sufficient inequality aversion, nondegenerate randomization in admissions is shown to be desirable for certain model specifications,
with and without participation constraints. The paper also gives a sufficient condition on the distribution of preferences
under which randomization is undesirable. 相似文献
13.
Murat F. Iyigun 《International Economic Review》1999,40(3):697-710
This paper examines the role of public education in determining intergenerational economic mobility. It considers a model in which education is free and admission to schools is competitive. The results indicate that for mobility to increase during the process of development, the share of resources devoted to public education needs to be large enough to offset the relative advantage of having educated parents in academic attainment. 相似文献
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Mervyn A. King 《Journal of public economics》1980,14(2):137-159
This paper models a household's choice of tenure and demand for housing services as a joint decision imposing the restriction that both discrete and continuous decisions are derived from a single preference ordering. The utility index for households is the translog form of the reciprocal indirect utility function allowing for random preferences. Each household chooses between the two main tenures, the owner-occupied and subsidised rental sectors, but households may be rationed in either or both of these sectors and refused admission, in which case they are assumed to enter the third sector, uncontrolled rental. The model is estimated on UK data for 5895 households. 相似文献
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This paper studies how the schooling system may be impacted by the number and skill type of immigrants. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become segregated. Wealthy locals are more likely to choose private schools and vote for a lower tax rate to finance public education. In contrast, high-skilled immigrants tend to reinforce the public system. The optimal immigration policy is highly skill-biased. The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedites redistribution toward the less-skilled local households through both a stronger fiscal support for public education and a reduction in the skill wage premium. 相似文献
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Dominick Salvatore 《Empirica》2001,28(2):137-157
This paper examines how far the restructuring process toward a market system has proceeded in Transition Economies since the collapse of Communist regimes more than a decade ago, how ready these economies are for admission into the European Union, and how the globalization of the world economy is affecting them. The paper also presents a model of the restructuring process and of international trade during the restructuring process. 相似文献
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This paper studies how schooling admission tests affect economic performance in an economy where individuals are endowed with both academic and non‐academic abilities and both abilities matter for labour productivity. We develop a simple model with schools run by the goverment, where individuals signal their abilities by taking an admission test and sort into low quality and high quality schools. When abilities are poorly correlated in the population, as documented in the literature, a standard test based only on academic abilities can be less efficient than a balanced test, which considers both ability types. We show that a sequential testing strategy, with schools testing academic abilities and firms testing non‐academic abilities on the sub‐sample of graduates of high quality schools, does not necessarily replicate the outcome of a balanced test. 相似文献
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《Journal of public economics》2005,89(11-12):1981-2003
This paper studies utilitarian welfare maximization in a large economy with an excludable public good where individual preferences are private information. If inequality aversion is large, optimal allocations involve the use of admission fees and exclusion to redistribute resources from people who benefit a lot from the public good to people who benefit little. If inequality aversion is close to zero, optimal admission fees are zero. Because of inequality aversion, information rents of people who benefit a lot from the public good receive less weight, so optimal provision levels for the public good are below first-best levels. 相似文献
19.
Gianni De Fraja 《Economic journal (London, England)》2001,111(471):104-119
This paper investigates the effects of two specific forms of intervention in the market for education: an ability test for admission to university and a subsidy to tuition fees financed through general taxation. Both these measures enhance equality of opportunity, but their equity and efficiency effects are ambiguous. This ambiguity is reflected in the political economy equilibrium which would emerge as the result of voting on the level of the ability test and of the subsidy. 相似文献