The economic effects of a stronger dollar

• A stronger dollar might help exports for some emerging markets, but through other channels it could have a negative impact on growth and financial stability. Our analysis suggests a re‐run of the crisis conditions of 1998-99 is unlikely, but there are areas of significant vulnerability. The dollar's strength reinforces our view that emerging growth will slow in 2015, to the slowest pace since 2009 – with risks to the downside.
• Dollar strength may be negative for emerging markets via several channels – by increasing the burden of dollar‐denominated debt, by lowering key commodity prices, by choking off capital inflows and forcing up interest rates and by triggering private sector deleveraging. These channels will operate to different degrees in different countries, though overall emerging markets look less risky than they did at the end of the 1990s.
• Highly indebted countries with inflation problems and high commodity dependence are the most at risk from dollar strength. Looking across the various indicators of vulnerability we see Malaysia, Chile, Turkey, Russia and Venezuela as most vulnerable. Among the countries better placed to weather a strong dollar are China and India.

     

Individualistic philanthropy: the paradox of embodied participation for health‐related fund‐raising campaigns

• Movember and Julyna have emerged as examples of health‐related fund‐raising and awareness campaigns that require embodied participation in the form of temporary body modification. Reaching a younger demographic not traditionally motivated by appeals to altruism, these campaigns have capitalized on the signifying power of the body to reflect and construct identities and self‐perceptions to motivate participation. Taking a cultural studies approach and employing visual, textual, and discursive analyses of the campaigns' websites, a primary vector for information dissemination and recruitment, this study highlights how philanthropic activity has been successfully coded as making participants more physically, sexually, and socially desirable. In promoting such individualistic motives for philanthropy, however, these campaigns further a mentality that philanthropy is foremost about personal gain. The challenge these initiatives pose is how to convert participants from individualistic to altruistic models of philanthropy.

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Standardization or localization? Executing corporate philanthropy in international firms

• Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a key component of a firm's reputation. The reputational vulnerabilities and pressure for CSR are perhaps greatest among international firms with business activities across many countries and cultures. Although the strategies of firms entering new markets have been well researched, the CSR component of the market entry decision has been largely ignored, despite its significant relationship with the financial performance of the firm. Further, previous research has largely considered CSR from an environmental performance point of view, and thus has focused on a minimum level of investment in CSR as opposed to the optimal form of the investment. Our paper seeks to address this gap by examining market entry decisions as they relate to corporate philanthropy.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs become venture philanthropists

• Non‐traditional charitable sources of revenue may be categorised as follows:
  • Venture philanthropy: Human resources and funding invested as donation in the charity by entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, trusts and corporations in search of a social return on their investment. It involves high engagement over many years with fixed milestones and tangible returns and exit achieved by developing alternative, sustainable income.
  • Commercial ventures: They seek a financial return on investment by creating a social enterprise operated by charities and their trading/holding companies alone or in partnership with the corporate sector, venture capitalists or investors to provide funding. Venture philanthropists may also ‘invest’ without establishing an equity position in the commercial enterprise. Any profits are re‐directed to mission‐related activity, although the business activity may or may not be mission related.
  • Social venture capital: It funds commercial ventures (as above) but may not seek a complete return on investment; instead the investor may off set some or all of the investment against social outcomes.
• Within the context of venture philanthropy, this paper demonstrates how charities, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may work together in strategic alliances. It explores venture philanthropy from the perspective of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, giving examples. Charities are shown how to prepare themselves to take advantage of these entrepreneurial opportunities.
• Although the emphasis in this paper is on venture philanthropy, the processes outlined may be used to help a charity take advantage of opportunities within the broader social entrepreneurial context. Successful venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have demonstrated the ability to turn outline business ideas into big results, frequently in highly competitive business environments.
• A common characteristic that appears to unite these individuals when they divert their interest toward social ventures is a desire to apply their business‐like approach, which includes planning processes, milestones and outcome measurement to their social venture activity.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The great rotation in global credit risks

• ? The pattern of global credit risks looks very different today than in 2007. Risks are now mostly centred in China and emerging markets. “Excess” private debt in China is as high as $3 trillion compared with $1.7 trillion in the US a decade ago. Yet some pockets of significant risk still exist in advanced economies, which not only implies vulnerability to rising interest rates, but also that the scope for rate rises may be limited.
• ? With policy normalisation underway in the US and the scaling back of asset purchases expected to start soon in the Eurozone, we focus on assessing vulnerabilities across global credit markets. This article explores the topic using a top‐down, cross‐country approach. We find that although private debt and debt service ratios look more benign in advanced economies than a decade ago, they have deteriorated markedly in many emerging markets in recent years.
• ? Based on a measure of excess private debt – comparing private credit‐to‐GDP ratios with their trend – China, Hong Kong and Canada are the riskiest. When comparing debt service ratios relative to their long‐term averages, risks are also mainly concentrated in emerging countries. But Canada, Australia and some smaller European countries also have high debt service ratios that have failed to drop since 2007, despite the slump in global interest rates.
• ? Overall, aggregate private debt indicators look less worrying than in 2007. We would also argue that the concentration of excess private debt levels in China reduces the risk of a sudden financial crisis based on massive credit losses, such as the one in 2007–2010. But with corporate debt levels in the US, Canada and some other G7 countries above their long‐term trend, investors need to be attentive to these considerable pockets of risk.

     

Don't rely on public investment to save the day

• ▀ We think public investment in the advanced economies should be increased, but we're also sceptical that, on its own, it can save economies from recession in the event of further negative shocks.
• ▀ Deteriorating infrastructure and low bond yields make a compelling case for sustained increases in public investment. And given the shortage of safe assets and the global savings glut, higher government borrowing seems unlikely to have big negative repercussions for private sector borrowers.
• ▀ But the scope for a sustained and aggressive rise in public investment to counter shocks is limited. Even when funds are plentiful, governments often struggle to meet capital spending targets due to other constraints.
• ▀ Spikes in public investment during downturns typically dry up the capital pipeline, leading to falling investment further ahead. As a result, it's harder to sustain increases in investment, compared to other government spending.

     

Values motivation and concern for appearances: the effect of personality traits on responses to corporate social responsibility

• The present research seeks to examine differences in support for corporate social responsibility based on certain personality traits. Secondary data from a nationally representative sample of 6065 respondents were examined. The results demonstrate that individuals motivated by a concern for appearances, an egoistic enhancement motivation, as well as individuals motivated by their values, make purchases in support of corporate philanthropy. However those concerned for appearances do not view CSR as a normative requirement, unlike those motivated by their values.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ECB tapering: beware of global consequences

• ? The ECB's scaling back of its QE programme in 2018 could be more disruptive to global financial markets than the Federal Reserve's ongoing balance sheet unwinding. ECB bond purchases led Eurozone private investors to inject a massive amount of funds into global debt markets over the last few years. As the ECB reduces its stimulus, Eurozone investors will gradually pare back the build‐up of their foreign debt exposures. The full unwinding of ECB QE will see investors rebalance toward domestic debt securities .
• ? We expect Eurozone investors to continue injecting funds into global debt markets as the ECB proceeds to wind down its QE, but they will do so at a much slower pace. Based on our projections, European purchases of foreign debt securities this year will total €200 billion – down by half from the average €400 billion over the last three years. Such a large reduction raises the risk of disruption in some markets.
• ? How did we get here? Spillovers from the ECB's QE were much more pronounced than during Fed's. European private investors that sold bonds to the ECB during its QE programme faced a commensurate shortage of domestic debt assets. In contrast to the US experience, ECB buying far exceeded new domestic issuance, inducing private investors to sharply increase purchases of overseas debt securities.
• ? Ultimately, we expect European investors to seek to restore the share of domestic debt securities in their portfolios to a level in line with the historical norm, after the proportion of their domestic debt holdings fell by 7pp since the programme began. The rebalancing is likely to start in earnest once the ECB stops buying (and eventually starts selling) securities. As a result, the global debt issuance boom is likely to lose steam, given the extent to which it has relied on the support of European investors.

     

Brexit – Customs borders will impose costs and delays

• ? The UK's decision to leave the EU customs union is likely to see physical customs borders being introduced, including in Ireland. This will impose administrative costs and delays, with our modelling suggesting that introducing customs checks would reduce the level of UK GDP in 2030 by between 0.7–1.3%. But there are opportunities for the two sides to limit the damage through cooperation and the UK could also mitigate the costs by agreeing free‐trade agreements (FTA) with third countries.
• ? The UK can take as ‘light‐touch’ an approach to customs checks on imports from the EU as it desires. But it is likely that the EU will introduce customs checks on goods imported from the UK, even if the two sides agree an FTA, to ensure regulatory compliance and that ‘rules of origin’ have been satisfied – this will be particularly important if the UK agrees FTA with countries the EU does not have deals with.
• ? Introducing customs borders would pose some logistical problems, particularly in the Dover Strait where existing infrastructure is limited and there are space constraints. A potential fivefold increase in customs declarations will also pose challenges on the IT front. If the UK and EU are unable to agree transitional arrangements, then the additional infrastructure would need to be up and running in a very short period of time. This risks a period of substantial disruption.
• ? Traders will have to complete additional paperwork – such as export licences and import declarations – but much of this can be dealt with electronically, which should help to limit costs and delays. In addition, if the two sides were to share information then this could help to limit the extent to which risk‐based inspections caused delays.
• ? The Government is effectively calculating that the benefits from agreeing FTA with other countries will outweigh the costs of customs controls on the UK‐EU border. This judgement looks doubtful and, at best, would take many years to bear fruit.

     

A solicitor's perspective on charitable gifts in wills

• In the climate of public spending cuts, charities are increasingly expected to fill the gap. Yet charities themselves face huge challenges. Not just increasing demand for their services but falling income and low investment returns. Encouraging philanthropy has never been more important, and that includes legacy giving. Following the announcement last year of the Government's major inheritance tax incentive to encourage us to give more to charity on our death, the time is right for a major report on current trends in charitable legacy giving. Late last year, Mishcon de Reya undertook the most detailed analysis ever by a firm of solicitors of its clients' wills. In a study of over 1000 wills, we did not just look at how many people leave a legacy to charity. We considered the value of the legacy, the type of legacy, the likelihood of the charity ever receiving it, whether clients prefer to give to multiple charities, and the most popular charitable sectors. This article will give a quick overview of our research followed by a more detailed look at the three types of legacy to charity: cash—‘for example, I leave £10,000 to charity’,—specific items—‘for example, I leave a painting to charity’—and residuary gifts—‘for example, I give half my estate to charity’. The article will then briefly touch on the charity sectors most favoured by our clients before giving a brief summary of Mishcon de Reya's key findings in conclusion.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lack of early engagement: a pre‐eminent barrier to Australian university bequest giving?

• Decreased government funding has placed increasing financial pressure on Australian universities. Currently Australian universities receive 6.6% of all donations to nonprofit organisations in Australia while universities in the United States attract 14%. These figures suggest there is considerable room for improvement for Australian universities. Efforts directed towards adding to knowledge of philanthropy to universities in Australia are, therefore, very topical at present. Despite acknowledged differences between the types of literature on gift‐giving it predominately centres on the motivation to donate to nonprofit organisations during an individual's lifetime (in vivo giving) with less focus on bequests. This exploratory study sought to gain insight into barriers to Australian University bequests. Lack of alumni engagement in Australian Universities was identified as a primary bequest barrier. Barriers identified previously in the literature (e.g. communications quality, performance, insensitive marketing) were considered secondary barriers to bequests. The results suggest a long term strategy is needed for Australian Universities seeking to improve donations. Universities need to engage students from the start of their academic tenure in order to be considered for a bequest. This paper proposes a model which highlights the consequences of this lack of early engagement and identifies key points in the academic and post‐academic process where successive challenges increasingly diverge the student from the university's bequest prospects.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Finding an academic home for fundraising: a multidisciplinary study of scholars' perspectives

• The high‐demand, high‐paying field of fundraising does not have an academic home in higher education, which hampers fundraising research and education. Recent advances in fundraising education and research can be attributed to four different disciplines: public relations, marketing, nonprofit management, and higher education administration. This disjointed approach has impeded the empirical study of fundraising, the development of theory in the field, and the education of future fundraisers. The purpose of this study is to begin the process to scientifically identify an appropriate academic home for fundraising that benefits fundraising practice, advances scholarship, and strengthens America's nonprofit sector. In‐depth interviews were conducted with 15 scholars from multiple disciplines who had published articles on fundraising in the three major nonprofit management and philanthropy journals. Findings show that there is no consensus among scholars about whether fundraising belongs in public relations, marketing, or nonprofit management. Although this study found no consensus among fundraising scholars about the appropriate academic home for fundraising, it does identify areas of agreement and disagreement on pertinent topics and provides a benchmark to guide further discussions about locating fundraising within an academic discipline.

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Brexit — velvet divorce or messy breakup?

• We use a ‘scenario tree’ approach to look at the possible outcomes of the negotiations around the UK's exit from the EU. Given how little common ground there is between the two sides, we find that a relatively loose relationship is the most likely outcome, with the UK set to leave the EU in early‐ 2019.
• The negotiating positions of the UK and EU are diametrically opposed. The UK wants to end the free movement of labour, cease making contributions to the EU budget and regain ‘sovereignty’ from Brussels, while retaining as much access to the single market as possible. But the EU's starting position is that single market access is dependent upon agreeing to the four freedoms and that this is non‐negotiable.
• So far all signs are that the UK will prioritise the ability to control immigration over single market access. Thus remaining a member of the EEA is very unlikely to be viable over the longer‐term – our scenario tree analysis gives it a probability of just 6% – although it may be adopted as an interim step. Remaining part of the customs union is also unlikely (18%) as it will preclude the UK from making FTA with third countries.
• If the EU takes a mercantilist approach, it will have little incentive to come to an agreement with the UK over single market access for services, given the UK's large trade surplus with the EU for these activities, implying that UK firms may face growing non‐tariff barriers after the UK has left the EU. The UK's large deficit on goods trade with the EU gives a better chance of agreeing a FTA for goods, though with any FTA requiring agreement from all 27 EU members, the UK would have to be prepared for lengthy negotiations and make extensive concessions. Therefore, we think that a reversion to WTO rules (37%) is slightly more likely than agreeing a FTA (36%).

     

How and why small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) engage with their communities: an Australian study

• While many studies address corporate philanthropy and corporate community involvement, limited work has been conducted internationally in small to medium businesses and even less has been elucidated about the Australian small business landscape.
• This article reports findings from qualitative research investigating giving to community causes by 52 small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) across Australia.
• Three key questions addressed in this article are: (1) why SMEs engage with community (2) how they engage with community and (3) obstacles they perceive in giving.
• Our findings suggest that SMEs have a preference to avoid cash gifts, prefer to support local causes and would benefit from the development of best practice giving guidelines and templates.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Not all trade wars are created equal

• ? When interpreting estimates of the economic impact of trade wars, the devil is in the detail. Our review of more than 30 institutions' trade war projections finds huge variation – much of which can be explained by differences in assumptions rather than differences in models' structures or specifications. Relative to estimates based on extreme financial or tariff assumptions, our main trade war scenario results are moderate and comparable with the IMF's latest analysis.
• ? In our baseline forecast, trade policy measures have a relatively limited overall impact on global growth. This is in line with recent experience: to date, direct effects from higher trade costs have been small, and policy action has acted to offset adverse impacts on confidence. But the risk of further escalation in US‐China trade tensions remains, even following the (fragile) Trump‐Xi truce agreed at the recent G20 summit.
• ? Our review finds that estimates of the impact of such an escalation range from negligible impacts to a deterioration in some countries’ economic conditions approaching that seen during the global financial crisis. Results in Oxford Economics’ “rising protectionism” scenario – from our latest Global Scenarios Service – are moderate in comparison.
• ? We also find that all estimates showing substantial economic effects from a trade war in our sample are predicated on extreme asset price or tariff moves. In some cases, tariffs are assumed to rise more than at the time of the Great Depression in the 1930s.
• ? Such differences in assumptions can largely account for the divergence in trade war impact estimates. This is illustrated in our very low probability “full‐blown global trade war” scenario – incorporating severe tariff and financial assumptions more in line with institutions like the Bank of England – which generates a deterioration in economic conditions that broadly matches extreme estimates in our sample.

     

BoE financing of the government deficit is no longer taboo

• ▪ The BoE has hinted that it could directly finance the government's soaring deficit. While there is no urgency to do so at present, BoE purchases could calm potential disruption in the gilt market and be a strong economic support.
• ▪ Direct money financing by the UK central bank would be a radical approach, but not unprecedented. However, it's necessary to go back to 1914 to find the last episode when the BoE took on the role of funding public borrowing.
• ▪ Once normality returns, money financing could result in a rise in prices. But a time-limited expedient shouldn't result in persistent inflation. And policymakers could seek to unwind the BoE's money creation.

     

Politique du logement et lutte de classes au Chili (1970-75)*

To analyse the historical evolution of the building sector in Chile, and the way in which it reflects and affects the social structure as a whole, it is necessary to consider two aspects:

• 1 the building sector, considered as a specific part of the production sphere, a specific system of economic and social interests;
• 2 the building front, where the social practices of the conflicting forces express the needs of the reproduction of the labour force, and the class struggle in the building sector, opposed to speculation and capital accumulation processes.

Before 1970, the capital interests were dominant, strongly organized through the Chilean Building Chamber and its influence on government policy-making, and linked with US imperialism, particularly at the finance level. With the Popular Unity Government, a series of measures expressed the shift to the dominant interests of the working class: nationalization of the main private banks; control of the housing market; organization, control and partial socialization of the building industry; breaking of urban segregation patterns; national agreement on wages policy. The construction front was affected by new forms of class struggle: construction brigades, unemployed brigades, popular planning and, at the same time, new forms of economic and political retaliation by capital. This led first to the employers' strike and then, through the constitution of a capitalist class bloc supported by imperialism, to the coup d'etat, which restored the fullest opportunity for exploitation, speculation, segregation, and the power of the Chilean Building Chamber.     

Fixed versus floating: vulnerability to rising interest rates

• ? Looking at different economies' exposure to fixed‐ and floating‐rate private‐sector debt reveals how vulnerable they could be to rising interest rates. Our analysis finds that Hong Kong, Sweden, China and Australia are potentially most exposed via floating rates to rising debt service costs. A 150bp rise in rates would also push several other countries' debt service ratios above the peaks of 2008. Less vulnerable economies include the US and Germany.
• ? High levels of floating‐rate debt imply a large and rapid pass‐through of rising interest rates to firms and households, with negative consequences. Exposure to floating‐rate debt as a share of GDP varies greatly: the highest levels are in Hong Kong, China, Sweden, Australia and Spain, with the lowest levels in the US, France and Germany.
• ? Growing shares of fixed‐rate housing debt in the US, Eurozone and UK mean the impact of higher interest rates may be less severe than a decade ago. Private deleveraging in countries such as the US, UK and Spain could also soften the impact.
• ? A rise of 100bp in short‐term interest rates would raise the debt service ratio after one year by around 2.5% of GDP in Hong Kong, with increases of 1.5–1.7% of GDP in Sweden, China and Australia. The smallest effects would be in the US and Germany.
• ? A 100–150bp rate rise would push debt service ratios in China, Hong Kong, Canada, France and the Netherlands well above their peaks of a decade ago. A similar rate rise would take debt service ratios in Sweden, South Korea and Australia close to, or above, previous peaks.
• ? The distribution of debt within economies, which our analysis does not cover, is also important. For example, there is some evidence that the US corporate sector has a high concentration of debt among borrowers with weak finances. Countries that are highly vulnerable to interest rate rises may see their central banks normalise policy rates more slowly than they otherwise would.

     

A critical review of forms of corporate community involvement: from philanthropy to partnerships

• The paper offers a critical review of the forms of corporate community involvement (CCI) including: corporate philanthropy, benefaction, patronage, sponsorship and cause related marketing (CRM) and partnership. It discusses the differences/similarities and compares the limitations of the transactional forms of interaction with the latest form of partnership.
• The paper suggests that the form of partnership represents a shift towards a non-linear business model of CCI, that is moving away from an outcome towards a process orientation. Three factors are identified conditioning the successful implementation and sustainability of partnerships which are linked with the previous limitations of transactional approaches of interaction. Finally, the paper puts forward three propositions in order for partnerships to: (1) contribute to the increase of institutional trust among organisations and across sectors; (2) assist in balancing the dynamics across the sectors and (3) appreciate the process of interaction as a source of benefits.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are central banks really breaking the (policy) rules?

• ? Looking at the strength of the global economy, it's no surprise that simple policy rules suggest that interest rates in some advanced economies are much too low and/or that several rate hikes would be needed in 2018 to avoid falling further behind the curve. Nonetheless, we expect central banks to respond cautiously and we see a slower pace of tightening than the consensus view .
• ? Policy rules, such as the Taylor Rule, have long been considered a useful guide to the potential path for policy rates. But while it suggests that current US, Eurozone and Australian central bank rates are broadly appropriate, it signals that UK, Canadian, and Swedish rates should be substantially higher. Based on our economic forecasts, Taylor Rules suggest that the central banks in the US, Eurozone, Canada and Australia will all need to raise intertest rates by around 100bps by end‐2018.
• ? However, there are several reasons not to draw strong conclusions from such point estimates. First, the Taylor Rule requires estimates of two unobservable variables – the output gap and the natural rate of interest – which cannot be estimated precisely.
• ? Second, using models that were designed to predict US policy responses in the 1990s to forecast central banks' behaviour today is likely to be misleading. Meanwhile, inferring central banks' reaction functions from recent policy rate moves to assess the future policy path is fraught with difficulties. Not only have interest rates been broadly unchanged for the bulk of the post‐financial crisis period, but policymakers have provided other forms of policy support.
• ? Third, outside the US at least, Taylor Rules have historically pointed to persistently different policy rates from those observed, yet inflation has been well anchored.
• ? The upshot of all this is that we expect central banks in the advanced economies to err on the side of caution and anticipate interest rates rising less quickly than the consensus amongst economists.