Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

A South African Success Story: Excellence in the Corporate Use of Capital and Its Social Benefits

South African companies have made great progress in improving corporate profitability since the nation became a full democracy in 1994. Using the “Cash Flow Return on Investment” (CFROI) method, the authors demonstrate that South African listed companies have been generating world‐beating levels of inflation‐adjusted return on capital over the past decade. But not all parts of the South African economy have benefited from this corporate success. Despite the impressive corporate returns, economic growth remains lackluster, constrained by confused labor and government policies. The authors recommend that South African policy makers aim to minimize uncertainty for the private sector by refraining from interventions with agendas that have little to do with expanding output or employment growth. Using terminology borrowed from Thomas Piketty's recent book, the two authors argue that what South Africa needs is not some way to limit investors' return on capital (r) but rather sound economic approaches to liberate growth (g). The authors would like to see the country's companies continue to generate high “r” while reinvesting their profits to produce more wealth‐creating “g.”     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

Estimating the Cost of Capital Using Stock Prices and Near‐term Earnings Forecasts

Earnings‐based valuation models, although long used by finance practitioners, have become increasingly popular among finance academics as well. Among the most important reasons for academics' increased acceptance of earnings‐based valuation is the well‐documented claim that earnings over a short (three‐ to four‐year) forecast horizon tend to capture a large fraction—as much as 80%—of today's value, much more than is captured by near‐term forecasts of free cash flow, the measure long advocated by finance theorists as the basis for DCF valuation. But most important for the purposes of this article, the recognition that such a large percentage of the current values of many public companies is captured within a short forecast horizon has led to a large academic literature that uses earnings‐based valuation models together with current stock prices to “back out” estimates of the companies' implied expected rates of return and costs of equity capital. The effectiveness and precision of such reverse engineering depend on the reliability of the forecasts both within a finite forecast horizon and beyond. And although the models tested in academic work, which are based on large samples of forecasts and hard‐to‐verify assumptions about earnings beyond the forecast horizon, often do not appear to provide useful estimates, the author argues that such reverse engineering of the valuation models should become straightforward and workable once reliable forecasts of earnings are obtained—say, from the corporate (or investment) analysts who are familiar with the operations of the companies they work for (or cover).     

Capital Deployment Roundtable: A Discussion of Corporate Investment and Payout Policy

U.S. companies are now reportedly earning record‐high operating returns on capital while at the same time continuing to set new records both for corporate cash holdings and distributions to investors in the form of dividends and stock repurchases. But are most of these companies really maximizing value? And what role, if any, do these large distributions play in creating value? These are the two main questions that are addressed by a small group that includes two senior corporate executives and two representatives of well‐known activist investors. A number of panelists suggest that many companies, in misguided efforts to maximize returns on capital, have been using hurdle rates that are too high and so sacrificing value‐adding investment opportunities. As evidence for this claim, they cite evidence that, in recent years, the companies that have achieved the highest stock market returns appear to have made conscious decisions to reduce their returns on capital to pursue higher growth. Another increasingly common charge against U.S. companies is their tendency to pay out excessive capital to investors, especially in the form of stock repurchases at prices that turn out to be too high. But this last practice, however widespread, may not be as troubling as it has been made out to be. Although it involves a wealth transfer from existing to selling shareholders, overall investor value is lost only if such buybacks lead to corporate underinvestment. But, as a number of panelists (including the activist investors) point out, such payouts of capital have generally functioned as a demonstration of corporate managers' commitment to investing and operating with the optimal, or value‐maximizing, level of capital—neither too much nor too little.     

Is Economic Growth Good for Investors?1

When measured over long periods of time, the correlation of countries' inflation‐adjusted per capita GDP growth and stock returns is negative. This result holds for both developed countries (for which the correlation coefficient is –0.39 using data from 1900–2011) and emerging markets (the correlation is –0.41 over the period 1988–2011). And this means that investors would have been better off investing in countries with lower per capita GDP growth than in countries experiencing the highest growth rates. This seems surprising since economic growth is generally assumed to be good for corporate profits. In attempting to explain this finding, the author begins by noting that economic growth can be achieved through increased inputs of capital and labor, which don't necessarily benefit the stockholders of existing companies. Growth also comes from technological advances, which do not necessarily lead to higher profits since competition among firms often results in the benefits accruing to consumers and workers. What's more, it's important to recognize that growth has both an expected and an unexpected component. And one explanation for the negative correlation between growth and stock returns is the tendency for investors to overpay for expected growth. But there is another—and in the author's view, a more important—part of the explanation. Along with the negative correlation between long‐run average stock returns and per capita growth rates, the author also reports a strong positive association between (per share) dividend growth rates and overall stock returns. Such an association is not surprising since unusual growth in dividends is a fairly reliable predictor of increases in future earnings. But another effect at work here is the role of dividends—and, in the U.S., stock repurchases too—in limiting what might be called the corporate “overinvestment problem,” the natural tendency of corporate managers to pursue growth, if necessary at the expense of profitability. One of the main messages of this article is that corporate growth adds value only when companies reinvest their earnings in projects that are expected to earn at least their cost of capital—while at the same time committing to return excess cash and capital to their shareholders through dividends and stock buybacks.     

Improving the Health of Healthcare Companies

The healthcare sector has been extremely effective in improving human health while at the same time delivering outstanding returns to shareholders, at least on average. But averages can hide a lot of poor performance, and careful examination of the sector shows a sizable disparity between the long‐run productivity and value added of the top companies and the rest. To better understand the reasons for this disparity, the authors undertook a comprehensive study of how differences in capital deployment strategies, financial policies, and measures of corporate operating performance such as sales growth and return on capital are associated with returns to shareholders. Perhaps the most striking finding is the strong positive correlation in the healthcare industry between higher rates of reinvestment, especially in the form of spending on R&D and acquisitions, and stock price performance. And given the importance of such reinvestment, it is not surprising that maintaining financial flexibility by paying down net debt and otherwise limiting corporate leverage—and even issuing significant equity—are all associated with higher stock returns. When it comes to operating performance, moreover, it's not enough just to be good; it takes growth and improvement in cash flow and earnings to drive share prices higher. Measures of changes in performance such as increases in EBIT and ROIC, and high rates of growth in sales, all show consistently strong and positive relationships with stock returns while measures of levels of performance, especially EBIT margins and EBITDA margins, demonstrate relationships that are weak and in some cases even negative. Last, and consistent with the findings reported above, despite often vocal investor demands to pay dividends and buy back shares, in the case of healthcare as a whole such distributions have a clearly inverse relationship with share price performance. That is to say, the larger the payouts to shareholders, the lower the shareholder returns.     

The valuation of projects under the dividend imputation tax system

This paper proves that a modified weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) valuation methodology is a rigorous and practicable method of valuing projects and companies under the Australian dividend imputation tax system. This methodology uses an effective tax rate in calculating both the discount rate and the ungeared after tax cash flow. A cash flow after effective corporate tax is shown to be equivalent to a cash plus value of imputation credit stream. Importantly, this valuation methodology is applicable to returns that are non-uniform and of finite duration. Also examined is the discounting of equity returns at the company's cost of equity capital. A worked example is presented to clarify and quantify the effects discussed.     

EVA, ACCOUNTING PROFITS, AND CEO TURNOVER: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, 1985–1994

A growing number of companies use EVA or related measures of economic profits as metrics for corporate planning and executive compensation. Unlike traditional accounting measures of performance, EVA attempts to measure the value that firms create or destroy by subtracting a capital charge from the cash returns they generate on invested capital. For this reason, EVA is seen by its proponents as providing the most reliable year-to-year indicator of a market based performance measure known as market value added, or MVA. Although EVA and MVA have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been little empirical study of these performance measures—and what studies have been produced have provided mixed results. This study joins the debate over EVA vs. conventional accounting measures by asking a different question: Which performance measures do the best job of explaining not only stock returns, but the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance? Using a sample of 452 firms during the period 1985–1994, the authors report that EVA has a somewhat stronger correlation with stock price performance than conventional accounting measures such as ROE and ROA. But, of greater import, EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover than conventional accounting measures.     

Save the Buyback,Save Jobs

In response to a recent New York Times op‐ed by Senators Schumer and Sanders deploring the effects of stock buybacks on workers and the economy, the authors explain the role of buybacks in increasing corporate productivity and in recycling “excess capital” from mature companies with limited growth and employment opportunities to the next generation of Apples and Amazons. Some companies, as Schumer and Sanders charge, are guilty of repurchasing shares in the name of “shareholder value maximization” instead of pursuing job‐creating investments. But as the authors argue, well‐run companies increase shareholder value not by boosting EPS through buybacks, but mainly by earning competitive returns on capital and investing in their long‐run “earnings power.” And by paying out capital they have no productive uses for, such companies give their own shareholders the opportunity to reinvest in other companies with promising prospects for growth and jobs. But the authors go on to note the tendency of companies to buy back shares not when their stock prices are low, but instead when the companies are flush with cash and nearer the top than the bottom of the business cycle. The result of this tendency, as research by Fortuna Advisors (the authors' firm) shows, is that fully three quarters of companies doing large buybacks during the period 2013‐2017 failed to produce an adequate “Buyback ROI,” a metric developed by Fortuna that indicates management's effectiveness in “timing” its stock repurchases. Given the usefulness of buybacks in recycling capital, the authors conclude that the most reliable solution to the corporate short termism and underinvestment problem is for companies to adopt better financial performance measures—including Buyback ROI—to guide their capital allocation. And when management determines that it has significantly more capital than value‐adding investments, but wants to avoid committing to unsustainable dividend increases, it should consider buybacks—but only if management is convinced that its stock price has not outpaced performance.     

Do corporations learn from mispricing? Evidence from takeovers and corporate performance

In this article we form the simple prediction that mispricing encourages traders to collect costly information that guides managerial decisions at corporate level. Our findings support this prediction based on evidence derived from both the US market for corporate control and the overall variation in aggregate corporate profits. The trading activity in response to the temporary mispricing of the merging companies provides useful information that leads to the design of high-synergy deals. Such synergies are reflected in an increase in the announcement period acquirer abnormal returns and are not reversed in the long-run. At the market-wide level, our results suggest that the growth in the overall stock trading volume in response to market mispricing is associated with high future corporate profit growth. Overall, after controlling for several economic and financial conditions, the temporary mispricing in a developed and generally efficient stock market stimulates informative trading, ultimately leading to value- and performance-enhancing corporate decisions.     

Using residual income to refine the relationship between earnings growth and stock returns

We use residual income (RI) to decompose earnings growth into growth in RI, growth in invested capital and other components and use this decomposition to explain stock returns. Our approach provides a significant increase in explanatory power vis-à-vis a regression of returns on levels and changes in earnings. While the market values growth in RI more than growth in invested capital, it still undervalues growth in RI and overvalues growth in invested capital. Earnings growth from growth in RI is more persistent, while earnings growth from growth in invested capital is more likely to reverse. Future returns are positively associated with growth in RI and negatively associated with growth in invested capital. A trading rule based on these findings generates significant hedge returns that persist after controlling for known risk factors. Hence, RI, a measure long recommended by accountants, allows investors to differentiate and evaluate different sources of earnings growth.     

The Impact of Capital Structure Change on Firm Value: Some Estimates

This study develops a model based on current corporate finance theories which explains stock returns associated with the announcement of issuer exchange offers. The major independent variables are changes in leverage multiplied by senior security claims outstanding and changes in debt tax shields. Parameter estimates are statistically significant and consistent in sign and relative magnitude with model predictions. Overall, 55 percent of the variance in stock announcement period returns is explained. The evidence is consistent with tax-based theories of optimal capital structure, a positive debt level information effect, and leverage-induced wealth transfers across security classes.     

Geographic dissemination of information

Urban companies are located near millions more potential investors and sophisticated money managers than non-urban companies. More investors are familiar with urban companies and have access to informal information about them. The stock of urban companies is also more liquid than the stock of non-urban companies. We hypothesize that these factors lead information to be spread from urban companies to other companies. Urban stock returns lead rural/small city stock returns even controlling for size, industry, and analyst coverage. Closer examination of the lead–lag relation reveals that urgent trades, which are likely to reflect short-lived information, are much more common for urban firms. Information appears to be uncovered through informal means more easily available to people physically near a company. We discuss the corporate finance implications of our findings.     

How Do Institutional Investors Affect Corporate Performance? Evidence from Private Placements in China

Using data on private placements in China from 2007 to 2014, we show that abnormal returns of issuing companies’ stocks are significantly positive on the announcement day, but they become significantly negative during the event window [?20, +20]. Participation by institutional investors has a significant and negative impact on the short-term stock returns. This negative effect is also present in issuing companies’ long-term stock returns and profitability. Furthermore, we find that participation by institutional investors reduces dividend payments after private placements. Overall, our findings do not support the monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors’ role in corporate finance but are consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis and shareholder pessimism hypothesis.     

Capital Allocation: Evidence,Analytical Methods,and Assessment Guidance

Capital allocation is one of top management's primary responsibilities. Although always important, it is critical today because corporate operating returns on invested capital are at an all‐time high, while recent growth and investment have been modest, and corporate balance sheets in the U.S. have substantial cash. Yet few senior executives are sufficiently well‐versed in finance theory and methods to allocate capital as effectively as possible. Further, incentive programs that focus on meeting earnings per share often encourage behavior that is not in the best interests of long‐term shareholders. In this report, the authors begin with the premise that the goal of corporate capital allocation is to build long‐term value per share; and with that view in mind, they examine the main sources and uses of capital by the largest 1,500 U.S. companies during the last 30 years. More specifically, the authors identify the amounts of capital allocated to each of seven important alternatives, including major uses of capital such as M&Amp;A, capital expenditures, R&D, and distributions of capital to investors such as dividends and stock repurchases. And after reviewing the past allocations of capital to each of these alternatives, the authors summarize the academic research on the effects on corporate values of each of these uses of capital. The authors report that U.S. corporations fund most of their investments internally, and that M&Amp;A and capital expenditures have long been, and continue to be, the largest operating uses of capital, though both capital expenditures and growth in assets have fallen in recent years. At the same time, both corporate cash holdings and distributions to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks are at record levels. But even with such high payouts, R&D spending as a percentage of revenue by U.S. companies has remained high, and actually increased during the past decade. Finally, the authors provide a framework that can be used either internally or by outsiders to evaluate the capital allocation practices and effectiveness of a management team. This framework asks management to assess its past performance, provide realistic projections of future returns on invested capital, and evaluate their own incentive programs—all while renewing their commitment to the five principles of thoughtful capital allocation: (1) zero‐based capital allocation; (2) funding of strategies, not projects; (3) no capital rationing; (4) zero tolerance for bad growth; and (5) continuous monitoring of the value of all assets and business, and willingness to take action if and when such values are larger outside than inside the firm.     

The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns: New Evidence from an Emerging Market

Over 300 factors have been found to explain the cross-section of expected stock returns. Empirical studies also show that findings from multifactor asset-pricing models have not been consistent in an emerging market. Using DuPont analysis and a residual income valuation model for 284 nonfinancial companies on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange during the period 2008–2014, findings suggest that the return on equity and its change are informative for stock returns in Vietnam. In addition, the level of capital turnover, financial cost ratio (FCR), and changes in capital and in the FCR contain incremental explanatory power for stock returns.     

MORGAN STANLEY ROUNDTABLE ON Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of distinguished finance academics and practitioners discuss a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerges is that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial flexibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value both by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate free cash flow problem. In such cases, both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks signal management's commitment to its shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce low‐return growth that comes at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve more flexibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial flexibility: too little can mean lost investment opportunities, but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.