浅析我国公共部门人力资源管理问题及对策

当前,现代人力资源管理思想正在对公共部门尤其是政府人事管理方式提出挑战,公共部门人力资源管理的理念、制度和模式的转变成为改革的一个重大部分。而目前,公共部门人力资源管理存在着一些不足之处,因此,以现代人力资源管理思想为指导,建立与之相适应的管理制度和方法成为我国公共部门人力资源管理发展的必然趋势。     

我国公共部门人力资源管理问题及对策

随着知识经济时代的到来,现代人力资源管理恩想正在对公共部门尤其是政府人事管理方式提出挑战,公共部门人力资源管理的理念、制度和模式的转变成为改革的一个重大部分,而目前,公共部门人力资源管理存在着一些不足之处,因此,以现代人力资源管理思想为指导,建立与之相适应的管理制度和方法成为中国公共部门人事管理发展的必然趋势。     

公共部门人力资源管理发展趋势研究

现代公共部门人力资源管理侧重于更具全局性、前瞻性、战略性的管理内容,人力资源管理在实现公共部门战略目标的过程中扮演着越来越重要的角色,他不仅为公共部门管理与决策提供了重要的人力资源,成为公共部门成长的坚强后盾,而且作为一个有效增值的环节,他还为公共部门创造价值（包括经济价值与社会效益）,支持和促进了各部门的发展。公共部门人力资源管理战略化最直接的体现就是人力资源管理的相关部门角色的转换——从事务性部门走向战略性部门。伴随着公共部门改革的深入以及有关人事制度的变革,公共部门人力资源管理表现出新的发展趋势。在管理过程中,改革以往以事为中心、人去适应事、人往往处于一种被动的地位。要以人为中心,让人处于一种主动的地位,充分发挥人的潜力。这对传统的人力资源管理提出了挑战,对它的发展趋势产生了深远的启示。     

我国公共部门人力资源管理激励机制探究

相对于企业组织中人力资源管理激励机制而言，我国公共部门人力资源管理激励机制的改革相对滞后，现有的激励机制不能有效的调动公务人员的积极性。在当前的社会变革环境中，分析我国公共部门人力资源管理激励机制存在的问题，并根据这些问题提出一些切实可行的解决的措施，这对于提高我国公共部门行政效率，打造为民务实的服务型政府具有重要作用。     

公共部门与私人部门在人力资源管理的方面的差异

现代人力资源管理在企业管理领域成就日益突出，公共部门人力资源管理也是在私人部门人力资源管理理论的影响下生长与发展起来的。但政府和企业毕竟是两种不同类型的机构组织。二者之间存在严格界限。存在着管理目标上的差异，管理环节着重点的差异，对人员的素质和要求的差异。存在着适用法律方面的差异。分析这些差异对于指导公共部门和私人部门的人力资源管理和开发具有重要的意义。     

完善我国公共部门人力资源管理方案

现代人力资源管理思想正在对公共部门尤其是政府人事管理方式提出挑战。目前,公共部门人力资源存在着一些不足,完善的趋势是以现代人力资源管理思想为指导,建立与之相适应的管理制度和方法。     

公共部门人力资源管理教学的困境与改革出路

公共部门人力资源管理作为人力资源管理的一个分支,具有自身的特点和个性,对于这门课程的现行教学在诸多方面面临困境。高效必须大力开展教学内容、教学方法、教学考核等方面的改革,并加强与公共部门的联系和寻求合作,才能培养出更多优秀的管理人才。     

浅谈事业单位人力资源管理与绩效考核

一、事业单位人力资源管理概念 人力资源管理,是在经济学与人本思想指导下,通过招聘、选拔、培训、激励等管理形式对组织内外相关人力资源进行有效运用,满足组织当前及未来发展的需要,保证组织目标实现与成员发展的最大化,以便实现最优组织绩效的全过程。事业单位人力资源是整个社会人力资源管理系统的主要组成部分。事业单位人力资源主要包括行政事务管理人员、专业技术人员和后勤服务人员。同时,事业单位的主要使命是服务于社会,维护社会公平,促进国家发展,这又要求事业单位的人力资源在政治品德、职业道德、科学文化素质等方面高于社会平均水平。     

公共部门人力资源管理的特殊性及其有效开发

公共部门人力资源是公共社会生产力发展的重要基础。公共部门人力资源的开发对于公共部门应对新的社会管理需求具有重要的意义。公共人力资源的开发是公共部门人力资源管理的核心内容。我们要在准确把握公共部门人力资源管理特殊性的基础上,认清当前公共人力资源开发面临的新挑战,分析存在的问题,通过管理理念、技术与方式等方面的创新,实现公共部门人力资源的有效开发。     

关于公共部门人力资源管理问题的探析

公共部门人力资源管理是行政管理的重要组成部分，目前，世界各国都将人才视为未来国际竞争的中心，进行人力资源管理在这—趋势下显得更加重要，而公共部门人力资源管理则是重中之重。本文简要分析了公共部门人力资源的含义、重要性及其存在的问题，并提出了相应的对策。     

The regionalization of indian politics and its implications for economic reform

Is political decentralization an impetus for economic liberalism, or are state and local governments impediments to a rigorous reform process? This article describes India's federal system, the growth of regional parties and governments, the changing balance of power between India's state and central governments, and the deterioration of state administrations, then assesses the economic reform and human resource policies of the states. The factors which slow the pace of reforms (politically unstable governments, fiscal populism, organized local interests, patronage and rents for party and government officials) and those that push for reforms (fiscal deficits, the need for investments in infrastructures, and inter-state competition for private investment) are analyzed.     

外资参股城市商业银行:制度与风险

外资参股作为近年来外资银行进入中国的捷径,也是城市商业银行摆脱发展困境的一个有效途径。但是,城市商业银行的产权制度、人事制度与激励制度、信息披露制度以及所面临的存款保险制度、分业经营制度改革的滞后,为外资参股带来了不可回避的风险。     

Local governments’ fiscal balance and privatization in transition countries1

Several transition economies have undertaken fiscal decentralization reforms over the past two decades along with liberalization, privatization and stabilization reforms. Theory predicts that decentralization may aggravate fiscal imbalances, unless the right incentives are in place to promote fiscal discipline. This study uses a panel of 20 transition countries over 19 years to address a central question of fact: Did privatization help to promote local governments’ fiscal discipline? The answer is clearly ‘no’ for privatization considered in isolation. However, privatization and subnational fiscal autonomy along with reforms to the banking system – restraining access to soft financing – may prove effective at improving fiscal balances among local governments.     

The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry

This paper employs the economics of shortage framework to examine post-Mao reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. Performance has been disappointing because reforms through 1985 failed to fundamentally alter economic agent behavior. The “soft” budget constraints at the enterprise and local government levels continue to generate “quantity” and “expansion” drives. The resultant inflationary pressures have necessitated administrative interventions and thwarted reform progress. The Maoist legacy of active participation by local governments in economic management is high-lighted as a major obstacle to the elimination of paternalism in state-enterprise relations.     

Between plan and market: The role of the local sector in post-mao China

The Chinese economy has long been characterized by multilevel planning, with local governments controlling nearly half of total industrial output and allocating substantial resources. Because of the important role played by local governments, market reforms have not brought a straight-forward transfer of decision-making authority from the central government to economic agents. Instead, there has been a good deal of “leakage” in the reform process, with local governments retaining and even expanding control over enterprises through a variety of informal mechanisms, as well as through their control over geographically immobile factor resources. This paper looks at the local sector and how market reforms have affected it.     

Disentangling liberalization and privatization policies: Is there a political trade-off?

We empirically investigate the political determinants of liberalization and privatization policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries (1975–2007). We unbundle liberalization and privatization reforms and study their simultaneous determination in a two-equation model. Unlike previous studies, we account for cross-effects between the two pro-market measures. Our findings unveil that both right-wing and left-wing governments implement liberalizations and privatizations, showing a common trend under the so-called neo-liberalism wave. However, although the privatization rate is higher than liberalization in right-wing environments, the opposite occurs under left-wing governments. We argue that ideological cleavages still affect pro-market reforms, particularly the combination of privatization and liberalization policies. We conclude that different deregulation patterns should be expected under governments characterized by different political ideologies. Our results shed new light on the literature investigating the political-economic rationale underpinning pro-market choices.     

Compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms*

We propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible. In our model, a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions. Governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing. This comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses, resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms.     

Review essay

Regulatory reforms which are implemented in many developing countries after market reforms constitute a conflict-ridden process generating complex tensions between governments, independent regulatory agencies, international institutions and private interest groups. By criticising the mainstream a-historical approaches, which reduce those tensions to the reluctance of interest-maximising politicians to delegate power, this article locates current reforms within the historical context of the trajectory of neoliberalism. In the case of Turkey, rather than undertaking comprehensive regulatory reform, the governments of the 1980s implemented ad-hoc strategies within the existing system, which corroded and de-legitimised the old institutional structures and facilitated market reforms. Yet, the same strategies created an institutional structure producing its own vested political and economic interests which gave its specific colour to the form and pace of current regulatory reform. The article derives insights from the Turkish case in order to re-think the crucial relation between politics and regulation, and between choices available to and constraints faced by policy makers and to re-conceptualise the role of unintended consequences by refuting any ideal typical understanding of neoliberalism.     

How to reform China’s fiscal system?

ABSTRACT

As the population aging, China’s government expenditures, including general fiscal expenditure, healthcare and social security expenditure, will grow more rapidly than government revenues, tending to elevate government debt. Local governments undertake overwhelming 85% of total general fiscal revenue and are responsible for healthcare and social security, and their debt has been growing. Fiscal reforms are imperative, including tax reforms, the structure of government spending reforms, social security reforms, healthcare reforms, local public finance reforms, and central and local government’s fiscal relationship reforms. This paper will explore the fiscal challenges China faces and discuss how to reform the fiscal system to cope with these challenges.     

中国地方政府生产率相对有效性的实证研究

本文将目前在管理学界广泛运用的“数据包络分析”（DEA）方法,引入到中国地方政府全要素生产率,即地方政府相对效率的实证性测量与评估之中,利用包含内容比较宽泛的8个指标,操作性地定义了政府的投入与产出以及政府全要素生产率,利用DEA方法测算了1985年至2003年19年间中国地方政府全要素生产率每年的相对效率,并进行了规模收益性分解,分析了不同时期不同省份的相对效率变化状况．并对这种状况进行了理论分析,比较了不同区域政府生产率相对有效性的差异,并对这种差异进行了理论分析;说明了行政管理体制改革和经济体制改革对政府相对效率的影响;以及政府相对效率与政府管理制度之间的相关关系。